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People v. Mendoza

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Apr 24, 2009
No. B207971 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. VA103782 Beverly Reid O’Connell, Judge. Reversed.

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Margaret E. Maxwell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


ROTHSCHILD, J.

A jury convicted Arturo Mendoza of burglary. He appeals, contending the trial court erroneously admitted incriminating statements he made in custody before he was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (Miranda). We agree that the admission of the statements was erroneous, and we find the error sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.

Appellant Arturo Mendoza was tried together with a codefendant named Robert Mendoza. To avoid confusion, we will refer to them by their first names.

BACKGROUND

The amended information charged Arturo with one count of second-degree commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. The charge was tried to a jury, which returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced Arturo to the low term of 16 months in state prison and imposed various statutory fines and fees. Arturo timely appealed.

The evidence introduced at trial showed the following facts: On December 25, 2007, David Guy, a security guard for the City of Vernon (City), was watching two City-owned buildings located on adjacent properties at 5119 District and 5201 District. The buildings had been gutted in preparation for demolition, and part of the building at 5119 District had already been demolished. Theft of such items as copper wiring, copper tubing, and telephone lines had been a “common problem” at the two buildings. A six-foot chain link fence surrounded the two properties.

At approximately 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Guy noticed two people inside the perimeter fence at 5119 District rummaging through the debris where the building had been partially demolished. Guy never saw either individual go into either building. He called the police, reported a trespass, and asked for assistance.

City police officer Edward Hernandez and two other officers responded to Guy’s call. When Hernandez arrived at the scene, from his car (a marked black-and-white police car) Hernandez saw codefendant Robert trying to crawl under the fence to exit the property. Hernandez “shouted at him to stop,” but Robert crawled back under the fence and ran inside the building at 5119 District, where Hernandez lost sight of him.

Hernandez, still in his car, then saw Arturo walking toward him. Arturo walked past Hernandez and turned left at the next street corner. Hernandez turned his car around and followed but lost sight of Arturo. A bystander, however, directed Hernandez to a nearby pool hall where Hernandez found Arturo coming out of one of the toilet stalls in the bathroom; Arturo was sweating and breathing hard and appeared to have just been running.

Hernandez handcuffed Arturo and told him that he was not under arrest. Hernandez then took him outside and asked him what he was doing at the building where Hernandez had first spotted him. Arturo “said that he went into the building to explore.” Another officer arrived and drove Arturo back to 5119 District. Hernandez returned to that location as well.

Back at the two properties, another officer found Robert hiding in a pile of wood, handcuffed him, and brought him to the front of 5119 District. Troy George, a third individual who was detained as he was walking away from the properties, was in possession of four strands of copper wire. Investigating officers also found a pickup truck parked inside the warehouse at 5119 District. Hernandez found “[n]umerous copper pipes and wires” in the bed of the truck. When questioned by Hernandez, Robert initially claimed that it was a friend’s truck, but he later admitted owning the truck himself. He also admitted having taken some copper pipes from the warehouse at 5119 District and put them in the truck.

After questioning Robert, Hernandez again questioned Arturo, who was still in handcuffs. Arturo said that he was Robert’s uncle and that he (Arturo) had gone into the building “to get a little wire.”

Hernandez conducted a “field show-up” in which he presented George, Robert, and Arturo to Guy and asked Guy to identify any individuals he had seen on the two properties. Guy identified George and Arturo.

DISCUSSION

Arturo argues that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to Hernandez, because Hernandez’s questioning constituted custodial interrogation but Hernandez had not advised Arturo of his Miranda rights. We agree.

Before trial, Arturo and Robert moved to exclude their statements to Hernandez. At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing outside the presence of the jury, Hernandez testified concerning his questioning of both defendants. He said that he was not accompanied by any other officers when he detained Arturo at the pool hall, placed him in handcuffs, and took him outside. Hernandez testified that he had Arturo taken from the pool hall to 5119 District for safety reasons—he did not want to put his or Arturo’s “life at risk” by remaining at the pool hall where there were “[l]ots of pool sticks,” and he did not “know if that place serves alcohol.” Hernandez also testified that outside the pool hall, before Arturo was transported to 5119 District, Hernandez asked Arturo “what was he doing at the building where he had seen me driving,” and Arturo answered the question. (At the hearing Hernandez did not say what Arturo’s answer was, but at trial Hernandez testified that Arturo “said that he went into the building to explore.”) Another officer brought the handcuffed Arturo to 5119 District, and Hernandez too returned there to search for other suspects. Robert was apprehended about an hour after Hernandez first detained Arturo at the pool hall.

Hernandez further testified that after Robert was apprehended, Hernandez questioned him and recorded the conversation, during which Robert remained handcuffed. Hernandez then conducted a tape-recorded interview of Arturo, who also remained handcuffed and was not free to leave. The interview took place outside in front of 5119 District. Hernandez asked Arturo “questions about going into the location and why he was going into the location,” and “questions about what [Hernandez] suspected was their [i.e., Robert and Arturo’s] involvement at this location in criminal activity.” He also went back and forth between Robert and Arturo to try to verify the information that each provided. Hernandez’s tone was sometimes accusatory. He did not advise either Robert or Arturo of their Miranda rights, and he did not tell them that they were free to leave.

Before the hearing, the trial judge listened to the tape recording of the interviews. The judge stated at the hearing that on the tape “Hernandez says on multiple occasions that they’re not under arrest, and the reason why they’re handcuffed is because they represented a flight risk.” The court denied the motion to suppress except as to certain statements made by Robert after he was placed in the patrol car following the field show-up.

As an initial matter, respondent contends that Arturo’s motion to suppress was limited to his tape-recorded statements during the interview at 5119 District and did not include the statement he made when first detained at the pool hall. The record does not support the contention. At the hearing on the suppression motion, Hernandez testified that he questioned Arturo outside the pool hall and that Arturo responded. Arturo’s counsel argued in support of the suppression motion that “any questioning, any line of questioning that was conducted by [Hernandez] or one of his fellow officers of my client” constituted custodial interrogation, so all of Arturo’s responses should be suppressed. We therefore conclude that the motion was not limited to the tape-recorded statements made at 5119 District.

Miranda warnings are required “as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 440 (Berkemer).) The issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 402.) We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard to the trial court’s factual findings, but we independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial. (Ibid.)

We determine whether the interrogation was custodial by applying an objective standard: Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest? (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 442; People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1161.) The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole. (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 272, disapproved on another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) No one factor is controlling, and the circumstances to be considered include the following: “(1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.” (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.) Additional factors are whether the suspect agreed to the interview and was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the suspect’s freedom of movement during the interview, and whether police officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were “aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory,” whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the interview. (People v. Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.)

Handcuffing does not automatically render an interrogation custodial for purposes of the Miranda rule. Rather, as already mentioned, no one factor is controlling, and courts must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter. (See also United States v. Bautista (9th Cir. 1982) 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 [rejecting the argument that the defendants were “automatically” arrested when handcuffed].) For example, brief handcuffing of a detainee would look less like a formal arrest if the interviewing officer informed the detainee that the handcuffs were temporary and solely for safety purposes, that the officers considered the detainee only a witness in the investigation, and that the detainee could decline to answer their questions. (See United States v. Salvo (6th Cir. 1998) 133 F.3d 943, 951 [informing the suspect that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and would not be arrested after the interview was “an important factor in finding that the suspect was not in custody”].) But mitigating factors such as those are absent in the instant case.

Miranda warnings are not required during the course of a brief detention as long as the suspect is not placed under restraints normally associated with a formal arrest. If the suspect is so restrained, however, Miranda warnings are required because the suspect understands the detention is not likely to be “temporary and brief” and therefore is “completely at the mercy of the police.” (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. pp. 437-438.) Handcuffing conveys that message because it is a distinguishing feature of a formal arrest. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 215 & fn. 17 [handcuffs considered among the “trappings of a technical formal arrest”]; United States v. Newton (2d Cir. 2004) 369 F.3d 659, 676 (Newton) [handcuffing “recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest”]; United States v. Maguire (1st Cir. 2004) 359 F.3d 71, 79 [handcuffs considered “‘one of the most recognizable indicia of traditional arrest’”]; United States v. Glenna (7th Cir. 1989) 878 F.2d 967, 972 [“handcuffs are restraints on freedom of movement normally associated with arrest”].)

Here, a reasonable person in Arturo’s position would have concluded that he had been placed under restraints tantamount to formal arrest when Hernandez handcuffed him immediately upon finding him in the bathroom of the pool hall. The prosecution did not present evidence negating that assumption. On the contrary, Hernandez repeatedly informed Arturo that he was handcuffed because he “represented a flight risk,” thereby emphasizing that Arturo was not free to leave and would not be permitted to leave until Hernandez decided to let him go. Hernandez did tell Arturo that he was not under arrest, but even that evidence does not negate a finding that Arturo was subjected to custodial restraints. “[T]elling a suspect that he is not under arrest does not carry the same weight in determining custody when he is in handcuffs as it does when he is unrestrained.” (Newton, supra, 369 F.3d at p. 676; see United States v. Henley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1040, 1042-1043 [a handcuffed suspect was entitled to Miranda warnings even though agents informed the suspect that he was not under arrest].) Under the totality of the circumstances Arturo confronted, a reasonable person would have assumed that the detention was going to continue unless he answered Hernandez’s questions. Nor was there evidence that Arturo volunteered to speak with the police. We therefore conclude that Arturo faced a custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court fashioned Miranda warnings to compensate for the coercive pressures inherent in a custodial interview, and Arturo should have received those warnings before Hernandez questioned him. (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.)

The admission of a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda warrants reversal unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510 [the prejudicial effect of a confession admitted in violation of the federal constitution is evaluated under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California, supra]; Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 437-441 [the Miranda rule is imposed by the federal constitution].) The admission of Arturo’s statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Absent Arturo’s statements, the evidence of his guilt of burglary, even as an aider and abettor, was very thin. No direct evidence showed that he entered the buildings, and no evidence other than his trespassing on the grounds at the time of the crime showed that he either intended to or did in fact aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate Robert’s entry into the buildings. (See CALCRIM Nos. 401, 1700.) The admission of the statements in violation of Miranda was therefore not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Arturo’s conviction must be reversed.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is reversed.

We concur: MALLANO, P. J. WEISBERG, J.

Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

People v. Mendoza

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Apr 24, 2009
No. B207971 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Mendoza

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTURO MENDOZA, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division

Date published: Apr 24, 2009

Citations

No. B207971 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009)