From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Mendoza

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Sep 25, 2008
No. B206610 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN MENDOZA, Defendant and Appellant. B206610 California Court of Appeal, Second District, First Division September 25, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA 330660. Norman J. Shapiro, Judge.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

ROTHSCHILD, J.

Defendant Jonathan Mendoza appeals from his conviction after pleading no contest to possessing cocaine base for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5, while armed with a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c), and for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). He contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion, pursuant to section 1538.5, to suppress all evidence that police officers found on his person or in his car after detaining him, because no substantial evidence supported his detention. We disagree and affirm.

All undesignated code section references are to the Penal Code.

BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2007, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Los Angeles police were conducting undercover narcotics surveillance in an area within the territory of the Avenues gang. An officer radioed that he had observed a hand-to-hand drug transaction involving a silver BMW sedan and asked other police to follow the car. Detectives Ramirez and Koenig each followed the BMW in separate unmarked cars. The BMW entered the parking lot of an apartment complex in an area with major drug and gang activity. Both police cars followed the BMW in, first Koenig, then Ramirez. Mendoza’s Honda was parked in the middle of the parking lot, not in a parking stall, blocking other cars from pulling into or out of marked parking stalls. The silver BMW parked close (within five feet) behind the Honda.

As Ramirez drove in, he saw a group of seven Hispanic males to the left, about 10 or 15 feet from Mendoza’s Honda. He recognized one of the group members as a member of the Avenues gang whose presence, he believed, constituted a violation of a gang injunction. Ramirez did not see the occupant or occupants of the BMW exit the car, but the car already was unoccupied when he drove into the parking lot. Ramirez saw Mendoza exit the Honda. Detectives Koenig and Ramirez exited their cars, and, with their police badges displayed around their necks, identified themselves as police. The situation then became chaotic as members of the group attempted to scatter. One jumped over a fence and ran away, another dropped to his knees and attempted to crawl between parked vehicles toward the rear of the parking lot, and the recognized gang member threw a canister in his hand to the ground. Mendoza started walking toward the open door of a nearby apartment in the complex. He did not make any sudden movements, reach into his pockets, or give any indication that he was armed. Detective Ramirez, who had his gun drawn but pointed toward the ground, ordered Mendoza to stop. Mendoza, who had gotten within five feet of the open apartment door, lay down on the ground.

Ramirez went over to handcuff Mendoza. As he did so, he noticed a white container like an aspirin bottle protruding from his pocket. Ramirez then left Mendoza lying on the ground and returned to help Detective Koenig keep watch over the detained group members while awaiting the arrival of backup police officers.

When backup arrived, one of the officers asked Mendoza to stand up and patted him down for weapons. The officer also saw the aspirin-bottle-like container protruding from Mendoza’s pocket and asked what was in it. Mendoza said, “I don’t know.” The officer asked whether he could check the contents of the bottle, and Mendoza said yes. The officer found just under an ounce of marijuana in the bottle and handcuffed and arrested Mendoza.

Because Mendoza’s green Honda was illegally parked and was blocking cars from getting into or out of parking stalls, the police impounded the vehicle. An inventory search found a duffel bag containing a .32-caliber revolver with .32-caliber ammunition, a container containing several pieces of cocaine base, and Mendoza’s Los Angeles County Jail inmate identification card.

On November 19, 2007, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an information charging Mendoza with one count of possession of cocaine base for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 (count 1) and one count of carrying a loaded, unregistered firearm in violation of section 12031, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). Regarding count 1, the information further alleged that Mendoza was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (c). As to both counts, the information alleged, pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A), that Mendoza committed the offenses for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang to further the gang’s criminal purposes.

On December 10, 2007, Mendoza filed a motion pursuant to section 1538.5 to suppress the evidence obtained from the police searches of his person and his vehicle. On January 8, 2008, the court heard and denied the motion to suppress. On March 13, 2008, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mendoza waived his trial rights, pleaded guilty to count 1, and admitted both of the corresponding special allegations. The court dismissed count 2, denied probation, sentenced Mendoza to the lower term of three years for count 1, sentenced him to the middle term for each enhancement but stayed both enhancements, credited Mendoza with 222 days in custody, and imposed various statutorily mandated fines and fees. Mendoza timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Mendoza contends that no substantial evidence supported his detention, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, and the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches of his person and his vehicle that resulted from his detention. We disagree.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s explicit and implicit factual findings for substantial evidence, then exercise our independent judgment to determine, as a matter of law, whether the search or detention was constitutionally reasonable based upon the evidence supporting the factual findings. (See People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123; People v. Hester (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 385.) In reviewing the factual findings for substantial evidence, we presume in support of the findings the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence, and if the circumstances reasonably justify the findings, we must affirm even if the circumstances and evidence would also support a contrary finding. (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)

As to constitutional reasonability, the California Supreme Court, in reviewing the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, has explained, “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Reasonable suspicion sufficient to support an investigative detention involves a less rigorous standard than probable cause for arrest. (Id. at pp. 230-231.) “[T]he lawfulness of a temporary detention depends not on any one circumstance viewed in isolation, but upon the totality of the circumstances known to the detaining officer[.]” (Id. at p. 227.) “The reasonableness of official suspicion is measured by what the officers knew before they acted.” (People v. Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.) This particularized suspicion is based on the inferences and deductions a trained police officer, not a lay person, would make regarding the totality of the circumstances based upon probabilities, not hard certainties. (Ibid., quoting United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 418.)

With this standard in mind, we conclude that the record provides substantial evidence of specific articulable facts that, considering the totality of the circumstances, gave rise to a particularized suspicion that Mendoza may have been involved in criminal activity when he was detained. A group of men, one of whom the police recognized as a local gang member, were congregated in a parking lot in an area known for narcotics and gang activity. A car just recently involved in a drug transaction pulled into the parking lot and parked, illegally, directly behind and within five feet of Mendoza’s illegally parked car. Mendoza, whose car was parked a short distance from the men, got out of his car, and when police identified themselves, left his car blocking parking lot traffic and walked away toward the open door of an adjacent apartment. At the same time, the other men scattered. These specific, articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that Mendoza was somehow connected to the drug transaction involving the BMW.

Mendoza points out that just because the detectives knew that the occupant or occupants of the BMW had engaged in a drug transaction, they did not have reason to detain everybody in the parking area; the presence of a known gang member in violation of a gang injunction only provided, in itself, a basis for detaining that gang member, not anyone else; merely exiting a vehicle and attempting to walk into an apartment does not, in itself, justify reasonable suspicion; and mere presence in a gang area, or even being a gang member, do not, in themselves, create reasonable suspicion. As we see from our Supreme Court’s analysis in People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th 224, however, we are not concerned with the various pieces of evidence each considered in isolation, but with the totality of the circumstances that confronted the detectives when they drove into the parking area and with the juxtaposition and cumulative effect of the various pieces of evidence. Although merely exiting a car and walking to an apartment may not be suspicious, sitting in a parked car as if waiting for a car just involved in a drug transaction to arrive is suspicious. The presence of a group containing a gang member nearby, in an area known for gang and drug activity, adds further suspicion. Those facts, combined with leaving a car blocking traffic just after police identify themselves, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and justified detention.

Moreover, although Mendoza contends that exiting a car and entering an apartment is, in itself, normally an innocent activity, “‘The possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.’” (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233, quoting In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894.) “Rather, when circumstances are ‘ “consistent with criminal activity,” they permit—even demand—an investigation[.]’” (Ibid.) Here, Mendoza’s actions and juxtaposition, even had they been entirely innocent in actuality, were consistent with criminal activity under the totality of the circumstances known to the detectives.

The authorities Mendoza cites do not compel a different conclusion. In each of them, unlike this case, the defendants were not in close proximity to illegality that was occurring when police detained them. (See, e.g., People v. Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 387-388 [rejecting a detention based upon one known African American gang member riding with other African Americans in a car that was driving in formation with two other cars after a shooting by a rival gang]; People v. Rodriguez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 238 [detaining officer testified that detained group “appeared to be doing nothing more than talking and socializing”]; People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 558 [detained defendant was “merely walking down the street” in a high-crime area]; People v. Loewen, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 123-124 [detention based only on officer’s “‘feeling’” that truck occupants had been involved in criminal activity].)

Mendoza acknowledges that he only directly challenges the validity of the detention in this case; regarding the subsequent searches of his person and vehicle, he notes that “[i]f the detention was constitutional, [he] concedes that what followed was also constitutional.” Because we have determined that the initial detention was constitutional, we will not address the later searches that produced the evidence Mendoza challenged in his motion to suppress.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: MALLANO, P. J. HASTINGS, J.

Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

People v. Mendoza

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Sep 25, 2008
No. B206610 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Mendoza

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN MENDOZA, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division

Date published: Sep 25, 2008

Citations

No. B206610 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2008)