Opinion
1238 KA 18–00500
12-20-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Erick MEIR, Defendant–Appellant.
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SHERRY A. CHASE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DANIEL J. PUNCH OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SHERRY A. CHASE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DANIEL J. PUNCH OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CURRAN, WINSLOW, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, of predatory sexual assault against a child ( Penal Law § 130.96 ) and predatory sexual assault (§ 130.95[3] ), arising from defendant's sexual assault of a three-year-old child. Defendant contends that the conviction is not based on legally sufficient evidence and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because neither his statements to police nor the victim's unsworn testimony was corroborated. We conclude that defendant's contentions lack merit.
Defendant's statements and the unsworn testimony of the victim cross-corroborated each other (see People v. Lane, 160 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 76 N.Y.S.3d 299 [4th Dept. 2018] ; People v. Bitting, 224 A.D.2d 1012, 1013, 637 N.Y.S.2d 820 [4th Dept. 1996], lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 845, 644 N.Y.S.2d 691, 667 N.E.2d 341 [1996] ). Moreover, the testimony from both the victim's pediatrician and aunt provided further corroboration. Thus, we conclude that the conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ; Lane, 160 A.D.3d at 1365, 76 N.Y.S.3d 299 ).
We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to preclude the People's expert witness from testifying regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Such expert testimony has long been admissible to explain behavior of a victim that might be puzzling to a jury (see People v. Nicholson, 26 N.Y.3d 813, 828, 28 N.Y.S.3d 663, 48 N.E.3d 944 [2016] ; People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 465, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620 [2011], cert denied 565 U.S. 942, 132 S.Ct. 400, 181 L.Ed.2d 257 [2011] ). Here, the expert testimony was properly admitted to assist the jury in understanding the victim's response to the sexual abuse and in assessing the victim's credibility. Contrary to defendant's contention, the expert did not exceed the bounds of what is permissible inasmuch as the expert's testimony was " ‘general in nature and [did] not constitute an opinion that [the] particular alleged victim [was] credible or that the charged crimes in fact occurred’ " ( People v. Graham, 171 A.D.3d 1566, 1570, 99 N.Y.S.3d 562 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1104, 106 N.Y.S.3d 689, 130 N.E.3d 1299 [2019] ). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting that testimony (see id. ; cf. People v. Ruiz, 159 A.D.3d 1375, 1376, 73 N.Y.S.3d 308 [4th Dept. 2018] ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, his sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they do not require reversal or modification of the judgment.