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People v. Medina

Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division One.
Nov 5, 2003
No. B160770 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2003)

Opinion

B160770.

11-5-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANCISCO JAVIER MEDINA, Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond L. Girard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William T. Harter, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Kenneth N. Sokoler, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Francisco Medina appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of premeditated murder and attempted premeditated murder in which he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. He was also convicted of shooting at an inhabited dwelling and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, with one of the assault counts including a finding that defendant inflicted great bodily injury upon his victim. This appeal follows a retrial, occasioned by reversal of the prior judgment on the ground that a deliberating juror was improperly dismissed. (People v. Medina (Jan. 16, 2002, B132682) [nonpub. opn.].

The prior judgment included six counts of attempted premeditated murder. Defendant was acquitted on four of these counts at retrial.

Defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of murder and attempted murder, (2) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (3) testimony of two witnesses from defendants prior trial was improperly admitted, (4) the jury should have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter and attempted involuntary manslaughter, (5) he was denied due process by the reasonable doubt instruction, and his sentence (6) violated Penal Code section 654 and (7) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Attorney General notes that (8) defendants sentence includes an enhancement that was not supported by a jury finding and asks that the sentence be modified to correct this error. We shall modify the judgment as suggested by the Attorney General and affirm.

FACTS

In August 1998, Sergio and Irma Chavez and their four young children lived in a bungalow complex in Compton. Their unit was 12 feet wide and 19 feet deep. The front door faced a yard where there were several units of identical size. Oscar Flores and his wife, Veronica Diaz, lived in the bungalow next door.

According to the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Chavez, after Mr. Chavez came home from work on Friday, August 28, he had a few beers with neighbors in the yard in front of the bungalows, coming back into his own unit around 10 p.m. He took a bath and he, Mrs. Chavez, and their four children went to bed. The night was warm, so the front door to the bungalow was left open. A metal screen door remained closed. The group of neighbors remained outside drinking and playing cards. Around midnight, Mrs. Chavez went outside and asked the men to be quiet. By this time, defendant, with whom the Chavezes were not acquainted, had joined the group.

There was still a lot of noise around 3 a.m. and no one in the Chavez family could sleep. Mr. Chavez went outside and asked the men to go home. The men did not comply. Mr. Chavez then said, "`Whos the man around here whos going to bring more beers so you can keep on drinking?" Defendant stood up, stating, "`People cannot tell me what to do and what not to do." Defendant withdrew a gun from his waistband and put it to Mr. Chavezs chest. Oscar Flores intervened, asking defendant what he was going to do. Defendant repeatedly said, "`Let me kill this person." He also said, "`I dont care. Im not interested. Let me kill or get killed." Flores grabbed defendant and took him behind the Chavez bungalow, where Floress truck was parked. Mr. Chavez heard Flores tell defendant that defendant could take the truck.

Mr. Chavez saw the truck being driven away. But shortly thereafter, defendant and Flores returned to the bungalow complex. There, defendant asked Flores for help in finding the "clip that [defendant] lost." Mr. Chavez, apparently standing inside his screen door, saw defendant and Flores looking on the ground and heard defendant say, "`Let me kill this guy" and "`I dont care if I get killed." Defendant also said, "`I dont like it when people tell me what I need to do or not need to do." Mr. Chavez became concerned about the safety of his neighbors who were standing around and yelled for them to go back inside.

As defendant continued looking on the ground, he stood near the front door of the Chavez bungalow and fired a shot into the ground. Defendant then fired eight or nine shots through the screen door of the Chavez bungalow. Flores grabbed defendant and Mr. Chavez came outside. Defendant pointed his gun at Flores and Mr. Chavez and pulled the trigger, but the weapon did not fire. Defendant thereafter drove away in Floress truck. Flores told Mr. Chavez defendants name and gave him the license plate number of the truck. The police were informed of the incident.

Mr. Chavez was hit by fragments of the metal screen door. One of his children sustained two bullet wounds, including one that entered and exited her neck. A second child was fatally wounded by a bullet to her chest.

Oscar Flores testified that he and defendant were cousins. Everyone was drinking beer that evening. Flores and defendant had also taken cocaine. At some point when Mr. Chavez was not present, defendant passed his gun around for everyone to see after first removing the clip. When Mr. Chavez came out of his bungalow, he started shouting for the biggest man there to get up. Defendant could have seen this as a challenge. Flores explained that defendant did not like to be challenged, regardless of whether he was drunk or sober. When defendant pulled out his gun and threatened Mr. Chavez, Flores got between them. Defendant then asked Flores to take him home. They went to Floress truck, but defendant told Flores to wait because he had forgotten his clip. Flores helped look for the clip. Flores saw defendant fire directly into the door of the Chavez bungalow.

Floress prior testimony was read into the record.

Diaz testified she heard Mr. Chavez say, "`"Let the most manly man stand up,"" and that defendant got up and wanted to fight. Flores and the other men prevented defendant and Mr. Chavez from fighting. She was with Flores and defendant as defendant was being driven home. After a short while, defendant told Flores to stop because he had forgotten the magazine for his gun. The truck returned and Flores and defendant went to look for the magazine. Diaz then heard shots, after which defendant again asked Flores to take him home.

Diazs prior testimony was also read into the record.

"Magazine" and "clip" were used interchangeably by the witnesses.

The prosecution also presented evidence that defendant was apprehended by the police while he was driving away from the scene in Floress truck. He was cooperative with authorities and was able to walk forward and backward with no difficulty. A semiautomatic pistol was found under the drivers seat of the truck. Investigators determined that seven bullets had been shot through the metal screen door of the Chavez bungalow. The bullet holes were grouped in an area starting 40 inches above the top step and extending for 18 inches. The grouping was 15 inches across. A firearms expert was of the opinion that the shots had been fired from 10 to 14 feet away from the door and that "the shooter would have had to have been in control of that firearm in order to fire this many shots in the relatively small group."

In defense, defendant testified that he had previously been to the Flores bungalow and knew it had only one room. On the night in question, in addition to drinking beer he ingested cocaine more than ten times. He lost his sense of time. Defendant remembered a man coming out and asking the group to be quiet, making a comment like, "`Whos man enough." Defendant got up in response, but did not remember reaching for his gun. When Flores started to take him home, defendant realized that a magazine for the gun was missing from his pocket. (Defendant explained that he always carried his gun loaded to protect valuable inventory at work and that he carried a second magazine for the gun.) Defendant was angry because he thought someone had stolen the magazine. While looking for it, he felt someone hit him and knock him down. He thought the gun went off at that time, in response to his being attacked. Defendant also testified that he thought the gun went off accidentally from the impact of being pushed. He thought he fired toward the ground and did not remember shooting at the bungalow. He was not upset at anyone in the bungalow, fired into it by accident, and did not intend to harm anyone.

DISCUSSION

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant was convicted of the premeditated murder of the Chavezes daughter on a theory of intent transferred from his intent to kill Mr. Chavez, and of the attempted premeditated murder of Mr. Chavez. Both premeditated murder and attempted murder require that the perpetrator intend to kill. (See People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 603; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114.)

Defendant contends that his convictions were unsupported because "there is no evidence that he fired with the intent to kill [Mr.] Chavez, his daughter . . ., or anyone else inside the bungalow." Defendant "could not see inside [the Chavezes bungalow], and at three oclock in the morning he had no reason to believe the occupants were anything but asleep in their beds, and no reason to believe Chavez was standing inside the door." Evidence of premeditation is lacking because his threat to "`kill this one" was "drunken bluff." "Chavezs testimony indicated that [defendant] was ranting as he searched for the clip, growing angrier because he could not find it; he never testified that [defendant] said these words to him, or that immediately before firing he said them." Rather, according to defendant, "[h]ad [he] intended to kill Chavez, he could have called him out, and with Chavez in sight have shot him at pointblank range."

Defendants contention is based on a selective reading and a self-serving interpretation of the record. It is an approach fit for argument to the jury, not for sufficiency-of-the-evidence review.

"One who intentionally attempts to kill another does not often declare his state of mind either before, at, or after the moment he shoots. Absent such direct evidence, the intent obviously must be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the putative killers actions and words. Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill is, of course, a question for the trier of fact. While reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of that issue, our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946.)

"In regard to first degree murder, [the Supreme Court] has distinguished three basic categories of evidence of deliberation and premeditation: (1) planning activity, (2) evidence of motive, and (3) facts related to the manner of killing which tend to establish a preconceived design to kill. (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [].) `Analysis of the cases will show that [the Supreme Court] sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). (Id., at p. 27.)" (People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 518-519; see also People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 724-725.) "In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. [Citation.] . . . The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive." (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125.)

The evidence here established that defendant responded to Mr. Chavezs statement by stating that people could not tell him what to do, that defendant specifically threatened to kill Mr. Chavez, and that defendant fired multiple controlled shots into the screen door of the 12-by-19-foot-wide Chavez bungalow within a short period after he had had a confrontation with Mr. Chavez and just moments after Chavez had yelled for his neighbors to go back inside. Such evidence was more than adequate to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that, by firing into the bungalow, defendant intended to kill Mr. Chavez and acted in a deliberate, premeditated manner. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.)

2. Speedy Trial

Defendant contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated when, over his objection, trial was continued beyond the 60-day period specified in Penal Code section 1382. We find no merit in the contention, because defendant waived his right to trial within the statutory time and further because good cause existed for a continuance of trial even in the absence of a waiver.

a. Background

Following reversal of defendants earlier conviction, remittitur issued on March 26, 2002. Defendant first appeared for further proceedings on May 16, 2002, at which time the court stated that absent a waiver of time, the last day for trial would be May 28, 2002. Defense counsel, who had represented defendant at the first trial, stated he doubted that he could be prepared for retrial in such a short period of time. He did not know precisely when the remittitur had issued and did not have a copy of the transcript from the previous trial. Counsel also stated that defendant wished to present a motion pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

The prosecutor was excused, and defendant explained to the court that he did not think that counsel had properly represented him at the first trial. He also stated that he did not wish to waive time for retrial. The court told defendant it did not think any lawyer could be ready to try such a serious case by May 28. Defense counsel added that he had another trial set for May 21-23. Counsel further stated that he would make his best efforts to get defendants prior transcript and prepare for trial, adding that there would be issues regarding the prosecutions diligence in securing the attendance of witnesses who had testified at the previous trial. But, counsel added, if he could not be ready, he would file a motion for a continuance. Defendants Marsden motion was denied. Thereafter, defendant specifically declined to waive time for trial, which was set for May 28, 2002, as day 60 of 60.

On May 23, 2002, counsel filed a motion to continue trial to July 9, 2002. In the motion, counsel declared that he needed "more time to prepare in light of the gravity of the charges and the consequences to the defendant. . . . In reviewing this file from 3 1/2 years ago it is evident to counsel that additional time is necessary to locate and interview potential witnesses and to review this extensive file and the trial transcripts." Counsel further indicated that the jury was deliberating on his trial that had started on May 23 and that if there was a conviction, further trial proceedings would be conducted on that defendants prior convictions. Counsels declaration was considered at a hearing on May 24, 2002, and the trial court found good cause and continued the trial to July 9.

Nevertheless, the matter was called for trial on May 28. At that time defendant was asked: "Are you willing to give up your right to go to trial today and agree to July 9 as your trial date." Defendant responded: "Okay. Thats fine." Defense counsel joined in the waiver.

On July 9, 2002, the matter came on for trial. The court stated that the file contained motions filed by defendant in propria persona for dismissal based on lack of speedy trial and for substitution of counsel under Marsden. (The motions were dated May 28 and had been filed on June 4, 2002.) Defense counsel indicated that he had been unaware of the motions. The trial court did not entertain the motion to dismiss because defendant had a lawyer. The court conducted a hearing on the Marsden motion, which thereafter was denied.

Defense counsel further stated: "[T]heres one thing that kind of sticks out in my memory is that [defendant] on May 28th waived time, if I remember properly. First there was good cause, then we brought him back out on that date for the next date because something had not been ruled on specifically."

b. Analysis

Regardless of the reason why the matter was called for trial on May 28 and irrespective of the existence of defendants propria persona written motion to dismiss bearing that date, at the hearing on May 28, 2002, defendant clearly told the trial court that he would waive time for trial until July 9. As such, his issue has been waived.

And even if we assume that defendants personal waiver had not been entered, this is not a situation where counsel sought to continue trial solely to accommodate his own calendar. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 566-567.) The existence of counsels other trial was only a minor factor in seeking the continuance. Of greater importance was that three years after originally trying the case, with no specific notice of the date of the remittitur and with the first trial setting hearing being conducted only 12 days before day 60 of 60 for trial, counsel was not in possession of the transcripts of the previous trial and had not had an opportunity to interview witnesses or to investigate possible issues pertaining to the prosecutions diligence in seeking witnesses who apparently could not be secured for retrial.

What is prohibited by Johnson is granting a continuance based on "the consent of appointed counsel to a postponement of trial beyond the statutory period, if given solely to resolve a calendar conflict and not to promote the best interests of his client. (26 Cal.3d at p. 567.) Factors that constitute good cause for delay of a trial, including delay for the benefit of the defendant, are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Id. at p. 570.) The six-week continuance from May 28 to July 9, 2002, sought by counsel here was to promote defendants best interests in trying a complex case in which defendant was being exposed to an extremely lengthy sentence. (See Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 783-784.) Nor has defendant provided any relevant authority to support his alternative contention (assuming that we find waiver) that being forced to choose between delay and going to trial with inadequately prepared counsel violated his right to due process. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any form of relief based on the asserted failure to bring this matter to trial in a timely manner.

3. Prior Testimony

The People were unable to locate the Chavez familys next-door neighbors, Oscar Flores and Veronica Diaz, in order to serve subpoenas on them to appear as witnesses at the current trial. Accordingly, the prosecutor sought to establish that Flores and Diaz were unavailable so that their testimony from the prior trial could be admitted as evidence in the instant proceeding.

Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a), permits evidence of former testimony when a witness is "unavailable." The witness may be deemed unavailable when "the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the courts process." (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5).)

At a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, which took place when defendants case was called for trial on July 9, 2002, district attorney Investigator Gilbert Roldan testified that he had been looking for Flores and Diaz for about two months. Roldan stated, "I went to the last known address of those individuals to attempt to contact them. I also went to prior employers for Mr. Flores, also contacted the state Employment Development Department, as well as local hospitals; made various checks through our system to check any up-dates on D.M.V.; clinical records or any booking information that I could find." Roldan also checked Floress and Diazs name for any past or current criminal activity. At the bungalow complex, which was the last known address, there was no on-site manager. Roldan spoke with a neighbor who was a witness to the shooting. The witness stated that Flores and Diaz had moved out approximately one and one-half years before. Other witnesses to the events also did not know Floress and Diazs whereabouts. Nor did any of Roldans other efforts, which he described for the court, yield any results. In a contact that occurred immediately before trial, Floress former employer told Roldan that some of his employees stated that Flores had moved to Mexico. Many of the people contacted by Roldan spoke primarily in Spanish, and although Roldans Spanish admittedly was "very limited," he knew a sufficient amount to understand what was being said.

Defendant argued that the prosecutions efforts had been inadequate. The trial court noted that the search for Flores and Diaz had been ongoing for two months and that in the past few days Roldan had "obtained additional information, indicating theres no way to contact these individuals." The court found that reasonable diligence had been exercised in the attempt to contact Flores and Diaz in that all reasonable avenues to do so had been pursued. Accordingly, permission was granted to introduce evidence of their prior testimony at the instant trial.

Defendant contends that this ruling was erroneous because Roldan did not speak adequate Spanish (or employ the services of an interpreter), did not check with certain local hospitals, did not check with the State Franchise Tax Board, did not make further inquiry at the bungalow complex where Flores and Diaz lived, and did not conduct his investigation in a timely manner.

Whether reasonable diligence has been shown is a factual question, which is reviewed de novo on appeal. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893; see People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1296.) A trial courts determination of the issue should not be reversed "simply because the defendant can conceive of some further step or avenue left unexplored by the prosecution." (People v. McElroy (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1415, 1428, overruled on another point in People v. Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901, fn. 3.) "The law requires only reasonable efforts, not prescient perfection." (People v. McElroy, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1428.)

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that reasonable efforts had been expended to locate Flores and Diaz, who were therefore "unavailable." Accordingly, defendants contention must be rejected.

4. Instruction on Voluntary Manslaughter

Defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter based on the following: "There is evidence that [defendant] was intoxicated and in that state could readily be inflamed by a challenge; Chavez issued the challenge apparently to [defendant], with bluster and bravado, standing next to and directly behind him; Chavez upset him, and [defendant] was clearly directing his anger at him while he searched for the magazine clip; his anger mounted and finally erupted when he was knocked down near the front of Chavezs house and the gun went off. [Defendant] believed he had been attacked, but allowed the first shot could have gone off because his finger was on the trigger. His anger in reaction to the provocation rendered by Chavez, exacerbated by being knocked down, supports a conclusion that [defendant] was acting under the stress of heat of passion when he fired the gun, and thus it is possible that had the jury been instructed on attempted voluntary manslaughter, it would have accepted that heat of passion motivated his act of firing."

Defendants argument ignores the fundamental inquiry with respect to the existence of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion of "`"whether or not the defendants reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion . . . to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from his passion rather than from judgment." [¶] To satisfy the objective or `reasonable person element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the accuseds heat of passion must be due to `sufficient provocation. [Citation.]" (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 326, disapproved on another ground in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201; accord, People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163.)

Even if Mr. Chavezs request for the biggest man in the group to get up was directed at defendant, this is not the type of act that would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly. And defendants state of intoxication provides no basis for a voluntary manslaughter instruction because it is "incompatible with the reasonable-person standard." (People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 740.) Nor can defendant rely on his belief of being attacked as a basis for the instruction because there was no evidence that the attack came from or at the direction of Mr. Chavez. (People v. Lujan (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1411-1412.) Finally, defendant testified that he was not upset at anyone in the Chavezes bungalow. Accordingly, voluntary and attempted voluntary manslaughter instructions were not required in this case.

5. Reasonable Doubt Instruction

Defendant contends that the current version of the reasonable doubt instruction (CALJIC No. 2.90) denies due process because it omits reference to "moral evidence" and "moral certainty." In November 1994, our Supreme Court held that the concepts of "moral evidence" and "moral certainty" add nothing to the jurys understanding of reasonable doubt and that they may be "safely delete[d]" from the instruction. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 504.) Under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, we are bound by the ruling of our Supreme Court, which has approved the revised instruction. (See, e.g., People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1091; People v. Godwin (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1571-1572.)

6. Penal Code section 654

Defendants sentence was enhanced by consecutive terms of 25 years to life under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), for his convictions of murder, attempted murder, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Defendant contends that because the three enhancements were based on a single act of firing his gun at the door of the Chavez residence, imposition of the enhancements violated Penal Code section 654s proscription against multiple punishment for crimes committed with the same intent and objective. We disagree.

As explained infra, one of these enhancements must be stricken because it was not found by the jury.

In People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313, the court concluded that because Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)-(d) specify that their provisions are to be applied "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," section 654 may not be applied to enhancements under this statute. "[T]he law is not punishing [the defendant] twice for the same act; rather, the law is punishing him once for the components of that act which make it so dangerous and antisocial." (People v. Hutchins, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.)

Defendant urges that Hutchins was wrongly decided and should not be followed by this court. We find no reason to forge a different course than the one taken by the Hutchins court. Accordingly, defendants argument is rejected.

7. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Defendants aggregate sentence was 101 years 8 months to life in state prison, including 75 years to life under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). He contends that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Similar claims have been rejected in People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494-495; People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 16; and People v. Zepeda (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1212-1216. We conclude that defendants conduct in carefully firing his gun several times into a small inhabited bungalow, causing injury and death of its inhabitants, defeats the instant claim.

8. Erroneous Sentence Enhancement

With respect to the attempted murder of Mr. Chavez (count 3), defendant was alleged to have personally discharged a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c), which carries a term of 20 years in state prison. The jury found this enhancement allegation to be true. However, as aptly noted by the Attorney General, defendants sentence on count 3 was enhanced by 25 years to life in state prison under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), which had not been alleged in the information or found by the jury. Accordingly, the judgment must be modified with respect to count 3 to reflect an enhancement of 20 years in state prison under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c), rather than 25 years to life in state prison under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d).

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified with respect to count 3 (attempted murder of Sergio Chavez) to reflect an enhancement of 20 years in state prison under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c), rather than 25 years to life in state prison under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The trial court is ordered to forward a copy of the modified abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

We concur: ORTEGA, Acting P. J., and VOGEL (MIRIAM A.), J.


Summaries of

People v. Medina

Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division One.
Nov 5, 2003
No. B160770 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Medina

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANCISCO JAVIER MEDINA…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division One.

Date published: Nov 5, 2003

Citations

No. B160770 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2003)