Opinion
D072799
04-25-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VINCENT MANUEL MEDELLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Miles Clark III for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Annie Featherman Fraser, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1500108) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. Miles Clark III for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Annie Featherman Fraser, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Vincent Manuel Medellin of attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664/459; count 1); attempted criminal threats (§§ 664/422; count 2); and resisting, delaying, and obstructing a public officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury also found true that Medellin used a firearm in the commission of counts 1 and 2 under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The court sentenced Medellin to prison for 12 years.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Medellin appeals, contending the trial court erred by granting his motion to represent himself and then subsequently by not revoking that order when it became "obvious" that "his mental incompetence was jeopardizing his defense." We affirm because the record shows that Medellin's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary, and there was no showing in the record that he was unable to perform the basic tasks needed to represent himself without the help of counsel.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The victim, Medellin's mother, lived in an upstairs apartment in Corona by herself, next door to R.L. Medellin stayed with her intermittently. In late December 2014, Medellin left his mother multiple voicemails threatening to kill her. The victim put a safety latch on her door because she feared for her safety.
On the afternoon of December 31, 2014, the victim was home alone with her dog. As she blew her hair dry, she heard a loud banging on the door, causing the door to shake. R.L. also heard the commotion. Medellin was outside his mother's door, yelling and cursing. He said, "Open the fucking door, Mom," threatened to break down the door, and said, "I'm going to kill you." He was kicking and beating on the door and trying to open the kitchen window. He was holding a .22 caliber rifle in one hand. The victim grabbed her puppy and went into the bathroom. The victim was scared and did not open the door. She was crying and yelled, "Go away. Leave me alone."
After going to her bathroom, the victim ran to her bedroom and opened the window. She grabbed her phone and tried to call 911. The victim's phone was not working so she yelled out the window for Medellin to leave and for someone to call 911. The victim eventually called 911. She told the dispatch operator that Medellin was trying to kill her and break down her door. R.L. also called 911.
Medellin stopped banging on the door, picked up his rifle, and went to the parking lot. As the victim looked out the window, she saw Medellin running through the gates with a rifle toward her unit. Medellin then got into a car with Nevada license plates and drove away. The police soon arrived. A sheriff's deputy saw a car matching the description of the car Medellin left in and followed it as he waited for backup. Medellin drove into a shopping center parking lot, got out of his car, and walked to the back door of the car. The deputy pointed his weapon at Medellin and told him to step away from the car and show his hands. When Medellin complied, the deputy holstered his gun. The deputy told Medellin to come to him and Medellin responded, "make me." The deputy then pepper sprayed Medellin twice. Medellin ran into a sandwich shop. The deputy followed him, and ordered him to stop, but Medellin refused and cursed at the deputy. The deputy took Medellin to the ground and applied a carotid restraint. Another deputy arrived, and Medellin was arrested.
The rifle was recovered. It was loaded and had a silencer taped to it.
DISCUSSION
Medellin's opening brief is not the model of clarity. As the People note, Medellin mixes arguments under various headings and presents disparate portions of the record together without context while arguing that this court should create new law. It appears that Medellin takes issue with both the court's initial decision to allow Medellin to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) and the court's subsequent failure to revoke its order to allow him to proceed in propria persona. We find no error on the record before us.
I
MEDELLIN'S FARETTA MOTION
A. Background
Medellin was arraigned and pled not guilty to the charges on January 5, 2015. About six weeks later, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Medellin's competency to proceed under section 1368, and the court suspended criminal proceedings and referred Medellin for a competency evaluation. Two doctors evaluated Medellin and prepared written reports.
These reports are not in the record.
On April 23, 2015, the parties submitted the issue of Medellin's competency to stand trial based on the reports from the doctors, and the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Medellin understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings and could rationally assist counsel; therefore, it found him competent to stand trial. On May 7, 2015, a preliminary hearing occurred and Medellin was held to answer.
On June 25, 2015, a different defense attorney declared a doubt as to Medellin's competency, and noted that Medellin also was requesting a Marsden hearing. The court again suspended criminal proceedings, and transferred the case to the mental health department. The next day the court explained that it had recently found Medellin competent and did not know if the judge who had referred Medellin for an additional competency determination was aware of that fact. Therefore, the court sent the matter back to the judge who had ordered an additional competency hearing so the judge could consider this additional background. When the parties returned to the referring judge, defense counsel explained that there had been a change in circumstances justifying another competency evaluation; thus, that judge again referred the case back to the mental health department.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Under a Marsden motion, a defendant seeks new counsel by showing that appointed counsel is not providing competent representation or that there is an irreconcilable conflict such that ineffective representation is likely to result. (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 917.)
Two more doctors were appointed and evaluated Medellin. Renee Wilkinson, Ph.D., evaluated him and found he was competent to stand trial as he understood the nature of the criminal proceedings and could assist counsel in a rational manner in the presentation of his defense. Wilkinson concluded that Medellin did not have "significant symptoms of a substantial mental illness." Wilkinson believed Medellin's thought process "was linear and relevant," and that "he was able to demonstrate an adequate rational as well as factual understanding of legal knowledge."
Gene Berg, Ph.D., also found Medellin was competent to stand trial in that he had the ability to understand the legal proceedings and to cooperate with and rationally assist in his defense. Medellin told Berg he could represent himself, and that he had a conflict with his attorney about wanting to represent himself. In discussing his desire to represent himself, Medellin could articulate, in a "minimal fashion," "the form of defense that he would consider" and exhibited "some ability to talk about his case and how he could defend himself[.]" Berg believed Medellin was "linear, organized, and coherent in his thinking . . . [and] had a basic common sense logic to his thinking." Berg did not believe Medellin met "the standards for a major mental disorder."
On July 30, 2015, the parties submitted on the competency reports and the court found Medellin was competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings.
Less than a week later, Medellin appeared at a hearing represented by counsel. At that hearing, Medellin indicated that he wanted to represent himself at trial. After confirming that he wanted to represent himself, Medellin asked the court for a pretrial release. The court informed him that he would not be released if he chose to represent himself. The court then proceeded to apprise Medellin of the realities of him proceeding in propria persona:
"Let's be straight about it. I'm supposed to try to talk you out of this, because it's usually not in your best interest. Usually, a person who represents himself has a fool for a client. He doesn't know what he's doing. He doesn't necessarily have the resources. You are in jail. I assume you're going to stay there, and you're a lot better off having
somebody who knows what they're doing who's on the outside working for you."
Medellin was not persuaded. He affirmed that it "would be better for" him to represent himself. The court then asked Medellin if he could read and write, whether he had represented himself before, and what he believed would happen if he represented himself. The court, undeterred by Medellin's desire to represent himself, attempted a couple more times to convince him to keep his counsel. Medellin declined.
The court then asked counsel for input. The prosecutor indicated that he spoke with Medellin about representing himself and believed Medellin had "a little bit of a problem comprehending." The prosecutor also indicated that Medellin's attorney "had questions about [Medellin's] competency." The prosecutor further explained that four doctors had evaluated Medellin and concluded he was competent for trial, but stated she was not sure if the doctors would have the same opinion if he wanted to represent himself.
The prosecutor talked to Medellin with Medellin's attorney's permission.
Upon hearing about Medellin's possible mental issues, the court again questioned Medellin regarding his desire to proceed in propria persona. The court asked Medellin, "Don't you think you should have a lawyer?" Medellin responded:
"No, sir. I can represent myself. I can read and write. I went to college. I comprehend a lot of things. It's just that little -- I just want to go to trial as fast as a I can, so I can get this over with."
The court then reassured Medellin that an attorney could help him get "to trial as fast as you can." The court also noted that it might take him longer to get to trial if he represented himself because he would take longer to prepare. The court once more suggested that Medellin allow an attorney to represent him, but Medellin was adamant: "I would rather do it myself on my own basis. I'm very highly intellectual. I comprehend a lot of things. I read."
In addition, Medellin signed a petition to proceed in propria persona. In doing so, he initialed several boxes that detailed that he understood he had the right to be represented by counsel, the difficulties of proceeding without counsel, and the fact he was waiving any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by representing himself.
The court ultimately signed an order allowing Medellin to represent himself at trial and appointed an investigator to provide investigative services to him.
B. A Defendant's Right to Represent Himself
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives defendants the right of self-representation. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819.) To invoke the right of self-representation, the defendant should unequivocally assert the right within a reasonable time before trial. (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128.) "The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant's conduct and other words. Because the court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant's conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-representation may support the court's decision to deny the defendant's motion. A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23; see People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1002 ["Equivocation of the right of self-representation may occur where the defendant tries to manipulate the proceedings by switching between requests for counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions are the product of whim or frustration."].)
In addition, "[a] knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is required before a criminal defendant is allowed to represent himself. [Citation.] The defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so the record shows he is making an informed choice with his eyes wide open. [Citation.] The purpose of this requirement is to determine whether the defendant in fact understands the significance and consequences of his decision and whether that decision is voluntary. [Citation.] On appeal the test is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given. Instead, we examine the record as a whole to determine whether the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of his case." (People v. Miranda (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 978, 984 (Miranda).) The likelihood or actuality of a poor performance by a defendant acting in propria persona does not "defeat the federal self-representation right." (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 866 (Taylor).)
C. Analysis
Although Medellin devotes most of his opening brief to argue the court erred in failing to revoke its order to allow him to represent himself, he also implies that it was reversible error for the court to grant Medellin's Faretta motion in the first instance. We disagree.
"It has long been settled that the burden is on an appellant to affirmatively show in the record that error was committed by the trial court: '[I]t is settled that: "A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error." ' " (People v. Alvarez (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 679, 694; italics omitted.)
Here, Medellin has not cited to any portion of the record at the time of his Faretta motion showing that the court improperly granted it. At most, Medellin relies on portions of the record after the hearing on his Faretta motion to support his argument that the court should not have granted his motion. These record citations are not of the moment. "We review the correctness of the trial court's ruling at the time it was made, however, and not by reference to evidence produced at a later date." (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739.)
Further, there is nothing in the record at the time Medellin moved to represent himself that gives us pause. Medellin's request to represent himself was unequivocal and timely. After being apprised of the risks, he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Indeed, the trial court vigorously attempted to convince Medellin to retain counsel. And Medellin signed a petition to proceed in propria persona. There was no error under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806. (See People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 23; People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128.)
Additionally, our analysis is not altered by Medellin's reliance on Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards) and People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519 (Johnson). Medellin cites these two cases to argue that the superior court should have applied a different standard than the one under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806 to determine if Medellin could represent himself. Put differently, Medellin argues he was a "gray-area defendant" who might have been competent to stand trial, but was not competent to represent himself. However, we do not read Edwards or Johnson as modifying Faretta to support Medellin's claim that his constitutional rights were violated at the time the court granted his motion to represent himself. (See Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 878 [concluding the holding of Edwards "does not support a claim of federal constitutional error in a case . . . in which defendant's request to represent himself was granted"].)
The United States Supreme Court called defendants deemed competent to stand trial but not to represent themselves "gray-area defendants." (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 174.)
In Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, the trial court twice found the defendant was not competent to stand trial. (Id. at pp. 168-169.) When his competence was restored the third time and criminal proceedings were reinstated, the defendant sought to represent himself. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the request. (Id. at p. 168.) The jury convicted the defendant on two of the charged counts, but was unable to reach a verdict on two others. (Id. at pp. 168-169.) The prosecution decided to retry the defendant on the two remaining charges. (Id. at p. 169.) Once again, the court denied the defendant's request to defend himself. This time the court noted the many psychiatric reports filed in the defendant's case and held the defendant was competent to stand trial, but not competent to defend himself. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "[W]hether the Constitution permits a State to limit that defendant's self-representation right by insisting upon representation by counsel at trial--on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented." (Id. at p. 174.) Alternatively stated, the issue was whether a trial court could deny self-representation to an individual with a severe mental illness. (Id. at pp. 174, 178.) The court did not consider whether the Constitution required denial of the right of self-representation. The court ultimately concluded a state could deny the request of self-representation made by a defendant who had been found competent despite "severe mental illness." (Id. at pp. 177-178.)
Our high court has concluded that Edwards did not hold that due process requires a higher standard of mental competence for self-representation at trial than competency to stand for trial; it only allows states to impose a higher standard without violating Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806. (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 877-878.) And the California Supreme Court further considered the impact of Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164 on California courts in Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th 519.
In Johnson, the court upheld a trial court's decision to deny self-representation to a defendant who was competent to assist counsel, but who the trial court found lacked the mental competency to handle a trial. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 525.) The court held the trial courts can, in the exercise of their discretion, deny self-representation where "the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel." (Id. at p. 530.) However, the court cautioned that "[t]rial courts must apply this standard cautiously . . . . Criminal defendants still generally have a Sixth Amendment right to represent themselves. Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it may deny self-representation only in those situations where Edwards[, supra, 554 U.S. 164] permits it." (Johnson, supra, at p. 531.)
Our high court has interpreted Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164 as providing a permissive rule, not a mandatory one. (See Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 527; Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 878.) Moreover, the court noted: "As with other determinations regarding self-representation, we must defer largely to the trial court's discretion. [Citations.] The trial court's determination regarding a defendant's competence must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence." (Johnson, supra, at p. 531.)
Here, Medellin does not argue that, at the time the court granted his Faretta motion, substantial evidence did not support the trial court's decision that he could represent himself. Indeed, he could not reasonably make such an argument. Medellin was evaluated twice by four doctors under section 1368 and found competent to stand trial. There is no indication that any of the four doctors examining him found that he suffered from a severe mental illness. When the court discovered that Medellin had "some mental health issues," it suggested that he should have a lawyer, but Medellin declined. Simply put, there is nothing in the record, at the time Medellin moved to represent himself, indicating that he could not "carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel." (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.)
To the extent that Medellin argues that the trial court violated Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164 or Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th 519 by failing to revoke the order allowing him to represent himself, we will address that argument in the next section.
II
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO REVOKE ITS ORDER
TO ALLOW MEDELLIN TO REPRESENT HIMSELF
A. Medellin's Contention
Medellin spends the lion's share of his opening brief arguing that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to revoke its order allowing Medellin to represent himself, and that it was reversible error when it failed to do so. We reject this argument.
B. Background
On September 17, 2015, Medellin again appeared in superior court, but in front of a different judge. The court explained that Medellin sent some ex parte letters and "kites" to the court asking for $850,000 in yen for being falsely incarcerated, a "confidential informant list," immediate release, and "immediate disposition of any hard evidence." The court stated, "It makes me wonder about him representing himself, quite frankly." The court explained that Medellin was facing serious charges, and would not be able to allege ineffective assistance of counsel. The court inquired of Medellin what "yen" referred to, and Medellin responded that it was Japanese currency. Medellin explained, "I just wanted Japanese money in yen. I know you could take any euro, yen, when you beat your case, or ask when you're beating the case, you guys pay—you guys pay directly the money. You can ask for yen, Japanese money, or euros. I know this for a fact. I have witnessed this." Medellin clarified that he had not seen it, but had overheard it. Medellin said that he had heard that yen was worth more than United States currency, and he could transfer his yen to American money.
The court noted that as it talked to Medellin, Medellin "blinked his eyes and hesitated for long periods of time and kind of turned his head, didn't seem to have any real connection with the Court." Additionally, the court indicated it wanted a competency evaluation based on the documents Medellin filed and because he had not gone over the discovery with the investigators and it was the day of trial. The prosecutor, however, informed the court that Medellin had recently been evaluated two separate times under section 1368 and found competent to stand trial. The court stated that if there was not a change in circumstances, there was no need for another competency determination. The court then asked Medellin if he wanted more time to review the discovery, and Medellin said he wanted to proceed.
On September 23, 2015, after picking a jury, Medellin asked the court whether it was too late to have counsel appointed, apparently because he was having second thoughts about his ability to represent himself, based on talking to other inmates. The court explained it would have to dismiss the jury and declare a mistrial if it was to appoint counsel for Medellin at that point. The prosecutor told the court that the day they were sent out for trial, Medellin's former counsel approached Medellin and offered to represent him, but that it would be after the trial that counsel was about to start. Former counsel also had followed up and contacted the prosecutor to ask whether Medellin had changed his mind.
The court took a recess to contemplate Medellin's request and discussed the matter with some colleagues. The court returned and explained that it was not going to appoint counsel because Medellin had numerous opportunities to have and/or request counsel. It explained that even prior to selecting a jury, the court asked if Medellin wanted counsel, and he said he wanted to represent himself. The court explained that if Medellin had requested an attorney the prior day, before a jury was selected, it would certainly have granted that request.
At trial, Medellin declined to make an opening statement and did not cross-examine three of the four witnesses. He also did not call any witnesses. However, he did cross-examine the victim and make a closing argument. In his closing argument, he told the jury he was not at the scene of the crime and did not own a gun. He asserted that R.L. was not credible because he could not identify Medellin and claimed the banging on the door lasted 20 minutes. He said he would count 20 minutes to show the jury how long it lasted, and at the end of his argument asked the court if they could wait until 20 minutes elapsed to make his point. He argued the police would have arrived well before 20 minutes elapsed because it was a city, and the police response time would have been five or 10 minutes. He also argued that his mother was not credible because she would not be able to hear banging over the noise of her blow dryer. He pointed out that his mother had not had problems with him except when he was a teenager, and the problems were minor. He also argued his mother was not credible because she did not know what color car Medellin allegedly drove away in, and he implied that he would not drive a car with Nevada plates. He told the jury that if he was yelling, the jurors would have heard it on the 911 call, there was no proof of who the car was registered to, and there were no fingerprints on the car keys. Not surprisingly, Medellin was not familiar with some of the more technical aspects of a jury trial (objections, jury instructions, and admitting evidence).
C. Analysis
As we discuss above, our high court held in Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th 519, a trial court has discretion to deny self-representation, and by extension, revoke self-representation, if the court determines "the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel." (Id. at p. 530.) Here, Medellin insists the trial court committed reversible error by not revoking the order allowing Medellin to represent himself. Alternatively stated, Medellin contends that the record clearly presents a situation where the court had no choice, but to disregard Medellin's desire to proceed in propria persona and appoint counsel. We disagree. Although we can contemplate a scenario under which a court would abuse its discretion by failing to revoke an order allowing a defendant to represent himself, this is not that case.
Here, Medellin glosses over the fact that there is nothing in the record that indicates that he suffers from a severe mental illness. Four doctors evaluated Medellin and none found that he has a mental illness.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that Medellin was impacted by a mental illness, the record does not support his argument that he could not carry out the basic tasks needed to present a defense. He cross-examined the victim. He gave a closing argument in which he challenged the prosecution's evidence, including maintaining that two of the witnesses were not credible. Nevertheless, Medellin largely ignores these portions of the record and presents us with disjointed selections of the record that he claims shows he was not capable of defending himself. We are not persuaded. Most of the examples Medellin provides are without context and do not support his position that he was incapable of carrying out the basic tasks of defending himself. Instead, most of the record citations underscore that Medellin is not a practicing attorney; thus, he is unfamiliar with trial procedures, the rules of evidence, and jury instructions. This shortcoming is precisely why the court strongly encouraged Medellin to retain counsel. Having proved unsuccessful at trial, Medellin's challenge here essentially reduces to no more than the argument that he was not as capable as a practicing attorney. The fact that Medellin performed poorly at trial does not undermine his right to represent himself. (See Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 866.)
Moreover, we find nothing in the record that leads us to conclude the court abused its discretion by not revoking Medellin's right to self-representation. Although we agree that Medellin's request to be paid in yen was strange, this comment is not enough to find reversible error. Indeed, we find this case is like Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 978.
Medellin provides other examples from the record that he states show that he was not sufficiently competent to represent himself. These comments range from asking for a flash drive with the evidence on it to displaying a lack of understanding of evidentiary rules or the proper manner to request a new trial. Again, we view these comments as underscoring his lack of acumen as a trial attorney, not as proof that he suffered from a mental illness prohibiting him from carrying out the basic tasks necessary to his defense.
In Miranda, the appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in not reversing its Faretta order. (Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 987.) In that case, the defendant went to his mother's house with a gun and threatened to kill her, and then swore at the police and resisted arrest. (Id. at p. 981.) He represented himself. During trial, the court learned about the defendant's mental instability, and on appeal he argued that once the trial court learned about his mental health issues, the court was obligated to inquire into his competence and revoke his self-representation. (Id. at p. 988.) The appellate court rejected the defendant's claim. It explained that because defendants have a constitutional right of representation, "trial courts must exercise their discretion cautiously." (Ibid., citing Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) "A valid invocation of the right of self-representation 'remains the norm and may not be denied lightly.' " (Miranda, supra, at p. 988, citing Johnson, supra, at p. 531.)
Evidence was presented that the defendant suffered from a bipolar disorder and schizophrenia that had to be controlled by medication. In addition, the defendant had attempted suicide and was " 'kind of slow.' " (Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.)
The court further noted that although in certain circumstances Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164 and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th 519 expressly grant trial courts the discretion to deny self-representation, they do not address "when, or even whether, trial courts may revoke that right after it has been granted." (Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.) The court concluded that even if it were assumed a defendant had such a right, the record showed the defendant "was capable of performing the basic tasks of self-representation without the assistance of counsel." (Ibid.)
In the instant matter, Medellin, like the defendant in Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 978 performed the basic tasks of self-representation. He told the court he "kind of" knew what an opening statement was, and the court explained the court process. He discussed what witnesses he intended to call. Medellin said he understood the voir dire process. He orally moved to exclude evidence, and requested the prosecutor provide him criminal histories of witnesses. Medellin cross-examined his mother about whether she had previous problems with him, what type of behavior he had previously engaged in, what she had been doing the day of the crime, why she believed he would run through the parking lot and laugh, whether she had taken prescriptions, how long the banging occurred, how loud the banging was, and whether she could hear it over her blow dryer. He also gave closing argument. And although Medellin was less adept in representing himself than a trial attorney, there is no indication in the record that he could not perform the necessary basic tasks.
Although Medellin does not address Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 978 in his opening brief, he urges us to follow People v. Burnett (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1314 (Burnett) and People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 (Lightsey) and find reversible error. We decline to do so.
The People relied extensively on Miranda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 978 in their respondent's brief. Medellin did not file a reply brief.
Medellin relies on Burnett, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1314 for the proposition that there exists a lower standard for the competence to stand trial than to waive counsel. (Id. at p. 1321.) However, Burnett was decided before the United States Supreme Court determined the two standards are the same. (See Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-401; People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 740 [acknowledging that the law was different at the time Burnett was decided].) Moreover, Burnett predates Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164 and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th 519; therefore, it is of little help to Medellin's position here.
Similarly, Medellin's reliance on Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th 668 also is misplaced. In that case, the California Supreme Court determined it was error to allow a defendant to proceed in propria persona in a competency hearing under section 1368. (Lightsey, supra, at pp. 691-698.) The court observed that the plain language of section 1368, subdivision (a) requires that counsel be appointed for a competency hearing. (Lightsey, supra, at p. 692.) The court further noted that appointing counsel " 'for the limited period needed to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is not viewed as a denial of the defendant's right to self-representation.' " (Id. at p. 698.) Here, Medellin was represented by counsel during his competency hearings. Thus, Lightsey is not instructive here.
In short, Medellin has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to revoke its order that he be permitted to represent himself. The record does not disclose that Medellin suffered "from a severe mental illness to the point where he . . . [could not] carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel." (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.) There was no error.
Medellin correctly observes that the trial court excluded any reference to Medellin's mental issues that he might have. The court did so after asking Medellin if he was going to "put on any mental illness issues" at trial, and Medellin answered in the negative. Medellin does not explain how this ruling shows the court should have revoked his right to represent himself. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. GUERRERO, J.