Opinion
No. 350046
09-17-2020
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LARRY GERALD MEAD, Defendant-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 14-004482-FH Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and BORRELLO and TUKEL, JJ. PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence and setting aside his conviction. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E)(1). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
This case has a long procedural history. It has already been before this Court and our Supreme Court on two separate occasions. Our Supreme Court summarized the factual and procedural history of this case in People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 209-212; 931 NW2d 557 (2019) (footnote omitted):
In May 2014, Jackson Police Officer Richard Burkart pulled over Rachel Taylor for driving with an expired plate. As he approached the car to ask for Taylor's license and registration, Burkart observed the defendant, Larry Gerald Mead, in the passenger seat, clutching a black backpack on his lap.
Burkart asked for identification from both and determined through a database search that neither had an outstanding warrant. Although Taylor had admitted that she did not have a valid driver's license, Burkart decided that he would not arrest her but would try to get her permission to search the car. Burkart asked Taylor to step out of the car, out of the defendant's earshot. (Burkart later testified that he "typically" pulls the driver aside to obtain consent because "that way you can get an answer from them that's not influenced by the other people that
may be in [the] car.") After a brief conversation, Burkart learned that Taylor had just met the defendant—they were traveling the same direction, and she had agreed to drop the defendant off on her way. Burkart obtained Taylor's consent to search her person and the vehicle.
Once Burkart had obtained Taylor's consent to search, he returned to the car and asked the defendant to get out. The defendant left his backpack on the passenger floorboard before stepping outside. He permitted Burkart to frisk him for narcotics and weapons. Burkart also asked the defendant how he knew Taylor. The defendant confirmed that they had met that night at a mutual friend's home and that Taylor had let him hitch a ride.
Burkart requested that the defendant step away from the vehicle, and Burkart then began to search the passenger side. He opened the defendant's backpack and inside found a digital scale, 5 prescription pills, 9.8 grams of marijuana, and 4.03 grams of methamphetamine. The defendant acknowledged the backpack was his and was arrested. He was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, with possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i).
Officer Burkart testified at the defendant's preliminary examination that Taylor did not give explicit consent to search the backpack (only the vehicle) and that he did not separately seek the defendant's consent to search the backpack. Burkart also testified that he believed (but did not confirm) that the backpack belonged to defendant because he was hugging it in his lap.
The defendant was bound over for trial. In the circuit court, he moved to suppress the evidence of methamphetamine in his backpack as the fruit of an illegal search. The trial court denied his motion, citing this Court's peremptory order in People v LaBelle, 478 Mich 891. The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to serve 2 to 10 years in prison.
The defendant appealed. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence because our LaBelle order held that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the backpack after the driver consented to the search of the car. People v Mead, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 13, 2016 (Docket No. 327881). The defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to that Court with directions to consider: "(1) whether this Court's peremptory order in People v LaBelle, 478 Mich 891 (2007), is distinguishable; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the police officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the driver's consent to justify the search, see Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 181, 183-189, 110 S Ct 2793, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990); and (3) whether there are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified." People v Mead, 500 Mich 967, 967 (2017).
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that the defendant's case could not be distinguished from LaBelle, that Rodriguez's common-authority framework does not apply to third-party consent searches of containers in automobiles in Michigan, and that no other grounds justified the search. People v Mead (On Remand), 320 Mich App 613, 617, 621, 627, 908 NW2d 555 (2017). Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the application and directed supplemental briefing on these issues:
(1) whether Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 181, 183-189, 110 S Ct 2793, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990), should control the resolution of the question whether the police officer had lawful consent to search the backpack found in the vehicle; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the driver's consent to justify the search; and (3) whether there are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified or the evidence may be deemed admissible. [People v Mead, 501 Mich 1029, 1030 (2018).]
Our Supreme Court then found that the search of defendant's backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 220. Consequently, our Supreme Court reversed this Court's opinion in Mead (On Remand), 320 Mich App at 613, vacated the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Mead, 503 Mich at 220. Relevant to the issue on appeal in this case, our Supreme Court specifically found that Taylor could not give consent to search defendant's backpack because she did not have "actual or apparent authority over it" and then held that it "agree[d] with the Court of Appeals that none of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement has been satisfied." Id. at 219-220.
This case was then remanded to the trial court. Defendant submitted a proposed order granting his motion to suppress and vacating his conviction. The prosecution objected, arguing that the trial court first needed to determine whether any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied in this case. Defendant argued in response that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court already addressed that issue on appeal. The trial court agreed with defendant and granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence, which effectively vacated defendant's conviction. The prosecution now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
The law-of-the-case doctrine "provides that an appellate court's decision regarding a particular issue is binding on courts of equal or subordinate jurisdiction during subsequent proceedings in the same case." People v Herrera, 204 Mich App 333, 340; 514 NW2d 543 (1994). "Normally, the law of the case doctrine applies without regard to the correctness of the prior determination." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine only applies if the facts in the case "remain materially the same." People v Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 433; 556 NW2d 512 (1996). The doctrine does not apply when there has been an intervening change in the pertinent law upon which the appellate court relied. See People v Spinks, 206 Mich App 488, 491; 522 NW2d 875 (1994). Additionally, the doctrine only applies to "issues actually decided, either implicitly or explicitly, in the prior appeal." Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000). We review de novo whether the law-of-the-case doctrine applies. New Props, Inc v George D Newpower, Jr, Inc, 282 Mich App 120, 132; 762 NW2d 178 (2009).
The prosecution argues on appeal that this Court and our Supreme Court failed to address whether the good-faith and the inevitable discovery exceptions apply in this case. Additionally, the prosecution argues that both apply in this case and that the trial court should not have suppressed the evidence found in defendant's backpack. We disagree.
In Mead (On Remand), 320 Mich App at 621, this Court held that the search of defendant's backpack was justified only on the basis of Taylor's consent to the search of her vehicle. See id. ("We conclude that, under the facts of the case presented to this panel, no other grounds justified the search."). This Court did not specifically address the good faith exception to the warrant requirement, but it did address the inventory search and inevitable discovery exceptions and concluded that neither exception applied. Id. at 626-627. After addressing these specific exceptions to the warrant requirement this Court "conclude[d] that no other grounds justified the search." Id. at 627 (emphasis added). Then, in Mead, 503 Mich at 220, our Supreme Court held that it "agree[d] with the Court of Appeals that none of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement has been satisfied." Id. (emphasis added). In doing so, our Supreme Court expressly affirmed this Court's conclusion that the inventory search and inevitable discovery exceptions did not apply in this case. See id. Furthermore, our Supreme Court also implicitly ruled that the good faith exception did not apply in this case. See id. The good faith exception is a well-known exception to the warrant requirement, and by stating that "none of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement has been satisfied" our Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the good faith exception did not apply in this case. See id.
There are at least twenty-two exceptions to the warrant requirement. See California v. Acevedo, 500 US 565, 582-583; 111 S Ct 1982; 114 L Ed 2d 619 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring in the judgement).
We also note that, after our Supreme Court's opinion in Mead, 503 Mich at 205, the prosecution filed a motion for our Supreme Court to clarify its opinion. In this motion, the prosecution asked our Supreme Court to specifically address the issue it raises in this case, i.e. the good faith and inevitable discovery exceptions. Our Supreme Court denied the prosecution's motion. People v Mead, 503 Mich 1041, 927 NW2d 255 (2019). --------
While the prosecution clearly wishes otherwise, the law of the case doctrine requires us to affirm the trial court's order in this case. The inventory search and inevitable discovery exceptions were expressly decided by this Court, Mead (On Remand), 320 Mich App at 626-627, and expressly affirmed by our Supreme Court, Mead, 503 Mich at 220. Similarly, both this Court and our Supreme Court held that no other exceptions to the warrant requirement applied in this case. Id.; Mead (On Remand), 320 Mich App at 621, 627. The prosecution asks us to believe that this Court and our Supreme Court were unaware of the good faith exception when they made those statements. We cannot agree with that conclusion. Thus, based on the previous decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court, we cannot revisit the issue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence and setting aside his conviction is affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Jonathan Tukel