Opinion
2012-10759
11-18-2015
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Adrienne Wallace of counsel), for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Adrienne Wallace of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Kahn, J.), rendered November 16, 2012, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
During the defendant's trial, the County Court allowed the People to elicit testimony from the complainant as to statements made by the defendant about a prior period of incarceration. The complainant testified that, after sexually assaulting her, the defendant told her that he had to kill her because he feared that she would report the incident, and that he said to her “I'm not going back to prison.” The defendant's claim that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay is without merit. To the extent that the subject statement “has a content that can be characterized as true or false” (People v. Kass, 59 A.D.3d 77, 86, 874 N.Y.S.2d 475), it constituted an implicit acknowledgment by the defendant that he had engaged in conduct that would result in him “going back to prison.” Thus, the statement contained an “implied admission of guilt” (People v. Koestler, 176 A.D.2d 1207, 1208, 576 N.Y.S.2d 705), and was therefore admissible under the party admissions exception to the hearsay rule (see People v. Nealy, 32 A.D.3d 400, 402, 819 N.Y.S.2d 106; People v. Thomas, 300 A.D.2d 1034, 752 N.Y.S.2d 482; People v. Swart, 273 A.D.2d 503, 505, 709 N.Y.S.2d 653).
The defendant also claims that this statement, as well as two other statements that he made evidencing prior criminal conduct, were unduly prejudicial and were admitted to demonstrate a propensity to commit the crimes charged. The second statement was elicited through testimony of a police officer that demonstrated a familiarity between the defendant and that officer, because they addressed each other by name at the time of the defendant's arrest. The third statement, in which the defendant acknowledged he had recently been released from jail, was part of the defendant's written statement, and was read into the record by another police officer. Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant preserved these contentions for appellate review (see CPL 470.052; People v. Judd, 96 A.D.3d 784, 945 N.Y.S.2d 569).
Evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is not admissible to show a defendant's predisposition to criminal conduct (see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291–293, 61 N.E. 286; People v. Norman, 40 A.D.3d 1128, 1129, 837 N.Y.S.2d 694). Such evidence, however, is admissible when it is relevant to a material issue in the case, and the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential prejudice to the defendant (see People v. Ingram, 71 N.Y.2d 474, 479–480, 527 N.Y.S.2d 363, 522 N.E.2d 439; People v. Norman, 40 A.D.3d 1128 at 1129, 837 N.Y.S.2d 694; cf. People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 54–55, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197, 535 N.E.2d 250). We agree with the defendant that the County Court erred in allowing these statements to be admitted into evidence, as the prosecutor failed to establish that any of the comments were relevant to a material issue in the case (see People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553, 559, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808; People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59; People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. at 297–305, 61 N.E. 286; People v. Judd, 96 A.D.3d 784, 945 N.Y.S.2d 569). Nonetheless, the error in admitting the statements revealing the defendant's prior criminal history was harmless, because the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that the error contributed to his convictions (see People v. Arafet, 13 N.Y.3d 460, 467, 892 N.Y.S.2d 812, 920 N.E.2d 919; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241–242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787; People v. Judd, 96 A.D.3d at 784, 945 N.Y.S.2d 569).
The defendant also contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 420, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in permitting the prosecution to present rebuttal testimony (see CPL 260.307; People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, 489–490, 749 N.Y.S.2d 766, 779 N.E.2d 705; People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 442 N.E.2d 1205; People v. Henrius, 6 A.D.3d 548, 549, 774 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. James, 285 A.D.2d 561, 727 N.Y.S.2d 900).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 85–86, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).