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People v. McDowell

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Jun 27, 2024
No. A167670 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2024)

Opinion

A167670

06-27-2024

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT MCDOWELL, JR., Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR7542561

BROWN, P. J.

A jury convicted defendant Robert McDowell of one count of unlawful driving (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). On appeal, defendant challenges only his conviction for receipt of stolen property, arguing that (1) insufficient evidence supports the conviction, and (2) his counsel provided prejudicial ineffective assistance by failing to request that the jury be instructed on mistake of fact. We conclude that substantial evidence supports defendant's conviction, and he has not established that his counsel committed prejudicial ineffective assistance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

BACKGROUND

The Sonoma County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with the driving or taking of a vehicle without the owner's consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)).

The Prosecution's Case

On June 28, 2022, Michael Brown parked his 1994 red Toyota SR5 truck, which he had acquired for $3,500, two blocks from his house around 9:00 a.m. He locked the doors and took the key to the truck with him. At trial, he could not recall whether the truck's rear sliding window was broken at the time he parked the truck, but the truck had no other damage and was in good working order. Around 9:00 p.m. the same evening, Brown returned to where he had parked his truck, but it was missing. Brown had not given anyone permission to take the truck, and he reported the truck stolen.

On June 29, 2022, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Officer Scalercio located defendant driving Brown's truck and initiated a traffic stop. Defendant was the sole occupant of the truck, and he was cooperative. During his investigation, Officer Scalercio observed that the truck's ignition was "punched," and the center column of the steering wheel had been ripped out. The ignition was detached from, and hanging below, the steering column. The truck's rear window was broken, the truck appeared to be "kind of thrashed on the inside," and a wrench and screwdriver were inside the truck. The truck's glove box contained a bill of sale bearing Michael Brown's name and a registration for a prior owner.

Defendant had a "silver like generic car key you buy at a hardware store" in his possession when Officer Scalercio stopped him. Officer Scalercio attempted to start the truck with that key, but it would not start the truck or lock or unlock the truck's door. There was a screwdriver on the front passenger floorboard of the truck, which Officer Scalercio testified could have been used to start the truck. Defendant told Officer Scalercio that he received the truck from someone else the night before around 11:00 p.m.

Brown came to the scene where police had stopped and arrested defendant. Brown testified that when he recovered his truck, there was new damage. The entire steering column was broken, the ignition was damaged, the lock for the gas cap door that required a key was broken, and the truck was a little trashed. Brown also testified that, after retrieving his truck, "[T]hey had like a - whoever had a screwdriver or something there." He used that screwdriver to start his truck.

The Defense Case

Defendant testified that he received a key when he got the truck and he used the key to operate the truck. When Officer Scalercio pulled defendant over, defendant said he turned the car off with the key and waited for the officer to tell him what to do. Defendant testified that he received the truck from a former friend, Jeff Buckingham, and Buckingham had given him the truck for free because Buckingham owed defendant "a couple vehicles." Buckingham had "blow[n] up" one of defendant's cars, and he was responsible for the police taking and impounding another car.

Defendant testified that, when he received the truck from Buckingham, it was in the condition described by other witnesses (Brown and Officer Scalercio) during their trial testimony. Defendant acknowledged that the steering column had been "messed with," but said he had had "many cars like that." He implied that he did not believe the vehicle was stolen when Buckingham gave it to him because Buckingham did "lien sales." Defendant knew there was paperwork in the truck, but he never checked the paperwork to confirm whether the truck was registered to or owned by Buckingham. He had planned on going to the DMV the day after the traffic stop to register the vehicle in his name.

Rebuttal

Officer Scalercio confirmed that, at the time of defendant's arrest, he possessed only the generic silver key that Officer Scalercio determined could not be used to start the truck. Officer Scalercio also confirmed that there was no paperwork in the truck in the name of Jeff Buckingham.

The jury found defendant guilty on both counts. The court suspended imposition of sentence and ordered defendant to serve two years of probation with various terms, including 270 days in jail.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review." '[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value - from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] "Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citations.] The conviction shall stand 'unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]." '" (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507-508.)

A conviction for receiving stolen property requires proof that "(1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew it was stolen; and (3) the defendant had possession of it." (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.) "Although knowledge that property has been stolen can seldom be proved by direct evidence [citation], 'possession of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation or unsatisfactory explanation, . . . will justify an inference that the goods were received with knowledge that they were stolen. Corroboration need only be slight and may be furnished by conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt.'" (People v. Shope (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 816, 821; see also People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754-755.)

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that he knew the truck was stolen, but he ignores the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Defendant was pulled over driving Brown's truck the day after it was stolen. When Officer Scalercio pulled defendant over, the truck's ignition was "punched," or detached from, and hanging below, the steering column, and the center column of the truck's steering wheel had been ripped out. Defendant testified that he received the truck and the key that operated the truck from a friend, but Officer Scalercio testified that the only key that defendant possessed when stopped would not start the truck or lock or unlock its door. However, a screwdriver that could be used to start the truck was on the truck's front floorboard when police stopped defendant. The jury thus had sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant drove the recently stolen truck under suspicious circumstances and that his explanation for his possession of the truck was false and unsatisfactory. The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant knew he was driving a stolen truck. (See People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 755 [where recently stolen property is found in conscious possession of defendant who gives a false explanation regarding his possession, an inference of guilt is permissible].)

II. Ineffective Assistance

Defendant asserts that his counsel should have requested CALCRIM No. 3406 (CALCRIM 3406), an instruction that would have conveyed the principle that an unreasonable mistake of fact negates the knowledge element for receipt of stolen property. As a result of his counsel's omission, defendant contends that he received prejudicial ineffective assistance.

CALCRIM 3406 states: "The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) did not have the intent or mental state required to commit the crime because (he/she) [reasonably] did not know a fact or [reasonably and] mistakenly believed a fact. "If the defendant's conduct would have been lawful under the facts as (he/she) [reasonably] believed them to be, (he/she) did not commit <insert crime[s]>. "If you find that the defendant believed that <insert alleged mistaken facts> [and if you find that belief was reasonable], (he/she) did not have the specific intent or mental state required for <insert crime[s]>. "If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the specific intent or mental state required for <insert crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty of (that crime/those crimes)." The Bench Notes to this instruction and case law make clear that the bracketed language requiring that the lack of knowledge or mistaken belief be reasonable is not applicable to crimes requiring specific criminal intent, such as those charged against defendant here. (People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 789 (Speck).)

The standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is well established. The defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) "[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." (Id. at p. 697.) Prejudice requires a showing of "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (Id. at p. 669.) This does not require a showing that counsel's actions" 'more likely than not altered the outcome,'" but the difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters" 'only in the rarest case.'" (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 112.) "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." (Ibid.)

We dispose of defendant's claim on the ground of lack of prejudice. While defendant's knowledge was admittedly the only element in dispute, there was strong circumstantial evidence that he had actual knowledge of the stolen nature of the truck. Defendant admitted that, when he received the truck for free from a friend at around 11:00 p.m., the truck's ignition was "punched," the center column of the steering wheel had been ripped out, the truck's inside was a little trashed, and the gas cap lock was broken. When police stopped defendant, there was a screwdriver on the truck's front floorboard that Officer Scalercio confirmed could have been used to operate the truck, and Brown's testimony established that the screwdriver did not belong to Brown. Officer Scalercio also testified that he tried to start the truck with the key defendant had in his possession when stopped, but that generic key would not start the truck or lock or unlock the truck's door. Further, the truck's glove compartment contained a bill of sale in Brown's name, but no paperwork in defendant's name or in the name of defendant's friend, Buckingham.

In contrast, defendant's weak testimony was uncorroborated and contradicted. Defendant said that he got the free truck from Buckingham, who did lien sales; Buckingham owed defendant a car after blowing up one of defendant's cars and getting another impounded by police. Defendant said he did not think the truck was stolen, and he did not think Buckingham stole the truck. He also told the jury that he received a generic key with the truck, and he repeatedly testified that the key worked and he used it to operate the truck. On crossexamination, defendant relied on the fact that Buckingham gave him the key to explain why, when Buckingham handed him paperwork for the truck, defendant did not bother to review the paperwork. However, this part of defendant's story was notably at odds with Officer Scalercio's testimony that he could not get the truck to start with defendant's key and that key did not lock or unlock the truck's door. Defendant's testimony that Buckingham handed him the paperwork found in the truck, which was in the name of Brown and a prior owner, not Buckingham, is also implausible.

After the court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the elements required for conviction, the jury deliberated for only about an hour and 15 minutes. Given the strong evidence supporting defendant's conviction and the comparatively weak evidence supporting defendant's mistake of fact, the likelihood of a different result is not substantial.

Defense counsel emphasized in closing argument that a conviction required actual knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, not that defendant probably knew or that he should have known the truck was stolen. The prosecutor did argue that defendant's testimony was not reasonable in support of her broader point that this unreasonableness showed that defendant actually knew the truck was stolen. Even assuming the prosecutor's argument conveyed some ambiguity, given the evidence, we have no serious doubt as to whether defense counsel's failure to request CALCRIM 3406 affected the result.

Defendant relies on Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th 784, but we find the case to be distinguishable, namely because the prejudicial-error finding there turned on the evidence specific to that case. Speck involved a car stolen from a towing yard with its keys. (Id. at p. 787.) Defendant Speck requested CALCRIM 3406, the trial court refused to give the instruction, and the jury convicted Speck under section 496d and Vehicle Code section 10851. (Speck, at p. 787.) Police had stopped Speck and the mother of his child in the stolen car, which was spray painted matte black, had no front license plate, and had a back license plate that did not match the car's registration. (Ibid.) The car's assigned license plate was in the back seat, and police found tools capable of securing the false plate in the trunk. (Ibid.) Speck was driving, and he told police that he borrowed the car from his friend Jason, who owned an autobody shop, to take the mother of his child to a medical appointment; Speck said he had spray painted over the car's teal color to make it less noticeable because the woman he was with had a restraining order against him. (Id. at pp. 787-788.) The car's ignition was not damaged, and Speck testified that he did not believe the car was stolen because the key Jason gave him operated the car and there were no signs of theft or damage to the car. (Id. at p. 788.)

In finding the trial court's refusal to give CALCRIM 3406 prejudicial, Speck rejected the People's claim that the error was harmless solely because the court had instructed the jury on the intent elements for the crimes: "[CALCRIM 3406] 'would have clarified the knowledge element by ensuring that the jury understood that a good faith belief, even an unreasonable good faith belief, would negate one of the elements of the offense. The instruction[ ] also would have drawn the jury's attention to facts that could raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt.'" (Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 794.) After engaging in a prejudice analysis under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, the court concluded that the evidence supporting Speck's claim that he did not believe the car was stolen - namely, that he had the specific key for the car; the car did not have a ripped ignition or show signs of hotwiring; Speck expressed surprise when police told him the car was stolen; he testified he had been stopped before when borrowing the car without consequences; and the car's condition was not inconsistent with being a loaner car from an autobody shop - was not so weak compared to the prosecution's evidence that there was no reasonable probability of a different result had the jury been correctly instructed. (Speck, at pp. 793-795.) In light of the facts set forth ante, we reach a different conclusion based on the evidence in this case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: STREETER, J., GOLDMAN, J.


Summaries of

People v. McDowell

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Jun 27, 2024
No. A167670 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2024)
Case details for

People v. McDowell

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT MCDOWELL, JR., Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division

Date published: Jun 27, 2024

Citations

No. A167670 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2024)