Opinion
January 7, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Lamont, J.).
Defendant's sole contention on this appeal is that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion for a trial order of dismissal pursuant to CPL 290.10 on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish defendant's accessorial liability for the crimes charged.
The essential facts are not in dispute. At approximately 2:00 A.M. on July 18, 1995, defendant was in the company of his two codefendants, Marquis Bell and Kareem Murphy. Observing the victim, Timothy Thomas; approach on a bike, defendant conversed with him about purchasing the bike. When defendant asked to take the bike for a spin, Thomas refused absent a partial payment in hand. Defendant then approached Thomas and sat on the bike with him. Bell then asked Thomas if he had the money that was owed to him, which Thomas offered to deduct from the price of the bike. Bell stated "We ain't buying that bike. We're going to take [it]," and proceeded to sit on the front tire of the bike with both hands on the handlebars. According to Thomas' trial testimony, when he refused to give up the bike Bell directed Murphy to shoot Thomas. Murphy walked to the corner, loaded his gun and returned, directing defendant and Bell to get off the bike. Murphy then shot Thomas and left the scene with Bell and defendant.
Bell and Murphy pleaded guilty before trial and testified against defendant at trial.
Defendant argues that there is no proof that he intentionally aided Bell and Murphy in their criminal conduct against Thomas or possessed the requisite mental culpability therefor. He emphasizes that the extent of his involvement in the events was sitting on the bike, and that he neither spoke nor acted in furtherance of any crime.
The line between mere presence at the scene of a crime, even with knowledge of its commission, and participation sufficient to give rise to accessorial liability is sometimes difficult to discern. Reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence underpinning a jury verdict, however, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and determine only whether "`any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt'" ( People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 [emphasis in original]).
Applying this standard, we cannot say that the jury's verdict was irrational. Evidence providing a rational basis for the jury verdict included the fact that defendant remained on the bicycle during the exchange between the victim, Bell and Murphy (wherein the latter expressed their intention to take the bike and shoot Thomas) permitting an inference of defendant's participation in the crime ( see, People v. Corbett, 162 A.D.2d 415, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 837; People v. Davis, 186 A.D.2d 437, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 787; Matter of Eric R., 213 A.D.2d 310; Matter of Emerson D., 189 A.D.2d 712) and a community of purpose with his codefendants ( see, People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 832; People v. Whatley, 69 N.Y.2d 784). That defendant left the scene of the crime in the company of Bell and Murphy is further evidence of his complicity in the crime ( see, People v. Coulter, 240 A.D.2d 756, 757, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 871; People v. Corbett, supra, at 415). Mental culpability may be inferred from defendant's conduct and from the surrounding circumstances ( see, People v. Dorsey, 112 A.D.2d 536, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 769). Finally, both of defendant's accomplices, whose credibility was for the jury to determine, inculpated him to a substantially greater degree than did the victim.
We therefore conclude that the crimes of which defendant was convicted represented the "culmination of a continuum of events" in which he continued to participate after the intentions of his codefendants became manifest, so as to justify the jury's conclusion that he shared their criminal intent and aided in commission of the crimes ( see, People v. Little, 186 A.D.2d 1072, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1075; People v. Bosque, 78 A.D.2d 986, lv denied 52 N.Y.2d 901, cert denied 451 U.S. 992).
Crew III, Yesawich Jr., Carpinello and Graffeo, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.