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People v. McDaniel

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Jan 10, 2012
2d Crim. No. B226763 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012)

Opinion

2d Crim. No. B226763

01-10-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY MCDANIEL, JR., Defendant and Appellant.

Richard C. Gilman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 2007027559)

(Ventura County)

Anthony McDaniel, Jr. appeals a judgment following his conviction of: 1) first degree murder of Daniel Q. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), with findings that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang while he was an active participant in a gang (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); 2) attempted murder of Cesar N. and Pablo M. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), with findings that these offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and he personally used and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury to Pablo M. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)); 3) assault with a semiautomatic firearm on Arturo S. and Vicente M. (§ 245, subd. (b)), with findings that these offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); and 4) second degree robbery (§ 211), with findings that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd (b)(1)) and that he discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced him to an "indeterminate term" of life without the possibility of parole and a "fixed determinate term" of 97 years 4 months.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

We conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court did not err by granting the prosecution's motion to consolidate the murder count with a second case involving attempted murder and robbery counts, 2) it properly admitted evidence about uncharged robbery offenses, 3) a gang expert's opinion that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a gang was properly admitted, 4) substantial evidence supports the finding that the robbery of a bakery was a gang-related crime, 5) the court properly instructed the jury on deliberation and premeditation, 6) there was no error in admitting a recorded jail conversation between McDaniel and another gang member, and 7) McDaniel's sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

FACTS

In the early evening of August 21, 2006, Daniel Q. was sitting on the porch of his house in Oxnard, California. He was affiliated with the Colonia Chiques gang and his gang moniker was "Little Beaker."

Daniel walked towards "D" Street. He was following an African-American man who was wearing a bandana around his neck. Luis Q., Daniel's brother, saw the man with the bandana "turn around," face Daniel, pull out a gun, and shoot Daniel. Luis heard three shots and saw Daniel fall to the street. Daniel was not armed, he had nothing in his hands, and was four to five feet away from the man with the gun when he was shot. He died from a "gunshot wound to the chest."

McDaniel and Robert S. were members of the West Side Gangster Crips gang. Two or three hours after the shooting, McDaniel met Robert S. and told him "he had just shot someone."

The Vanessa Bakery Robbery

On September 3, 2006, Robert S. drove McDaniel to the Vanessa Bakery. McDaniel told him he wanted to commit a robbery at that establishment. Robert S. testified that when McDaniel got out of the car he had a .22 caliber handgun. McDaniel was wearing gloves, a hooded sweatshirt, and he had a "Crip rag" gang bandana around his neck.

Vicente M., the owner of the Vanessa Bakery, testified that an African-American man came into the bakery wearing a sweatshirt, gloves and a "beanie" covering his face. He had a gun and demanded money. Vicente opened the register. The man took the money and "started shooting." He shot Vicente in the leg. He shot Arturo L. in the ankle.

Pablo M. was moving away. The robber saw him and shot him twice in the back and once in the buttocks. Cesar N. and other employees started running to the back of the bakery. Cesar testified that the man with the gun had a bandana covering his face. Cesar hid next to a pillar. The robber came through a door and saw him. Cesar raised his hands. The robber shot him in the arm. Cesar tried to grab the gun. The robber ran away.

Robert S. was waiting in the car outside the bakery. He testified he heard multiple gunshots. McDaniel got into the car and Robert S. drove away rapidly because a man was chasing them. McDaniel gave him some of the money taken from the register at the bakery. The gun McDaniel was holding "no longer had a magazine in it."

After the robbery, police found a ".22 caliber magazine" on the sidewalk in front of the Vanessa Bakery.

The Recorded Jail Conversations

The prosecution introduced a tape and transcripts of jail conversations between McDaniel and fellow gang member Robert S. In one conversation, McDaniel discussed the shooting of Daniel Q. He said he went to that area because he wanted revenge. In an earlier incident, he was injured in a confrontation with a rival gang. He said, "Three ese's come off . . . the porch right there where I was walkin' by on 'D' Street. By the time I got to the corner of 'D' Street, they met me there and he was right behind me." McDaniel said that before he fired the shots, the victim asked him, "You bang?" McDaniel responded, "Do I bang? . . . [T]his Gangsta Crip Gang, bitch, gang-bang on that, nigga and I pulled out . . . I fed him two, he . . . cringed, cuz and grabbed his chest . . . . [T]hat wasn't my first time puttin' in work for fuckin' Westside Gansta Crip, homie."

McDaniel also discussed the Vanessa Bakery robbery. He said, "I walked in the front door . . . I was . . . hooded up, I had the rag on my face . . . ." He instructed the man inside to "get on the floor" and "sit down." McDaniel said, "[T]he fuckin' old Mexican dude tried to walk away from the fuckin' register like, tried to go to the back. That's when I shot him in the knee. . . . I told him to get all the money from underneath the register . . . . I'm grabbin' all the money . . . ." McDaniel said he saw people running out the door. He said, "I hit one of the dudes four fuckin' times in the back. . . . That motherfucker had so many bullets in him. . . . And then I came out and there was dudes standin' on the other side of the pillar." McDaniel "grabbed" one by the shirt and "shot him in the shoulder."

Gang Expert Testimony

Robert Coughlin, the prosecution's gang expert, testified that the gangs involved in the homicide case were the Colonia Chiques gang and the West Side Gangster Crips. McDaniel was a member of the West Side Gangster Crips. Daniel Q. was "associated with" the Colonia Chiques gang.

The prosecutor asked Coughlin to assume facts based on hypotheticals from prosecution evidence for the murder count and the Vanessa Bakery robbery crimes. Coughlin stated his opinion that both of those offenses were committed for the benefit of the West Side Gangster Crips. He opined that the shooting of Daniel Q. was revenge for a prior gang altercation to show the other gang that "you cannot just mess with a West Side Gangster Crip." He said the Vanessa Bakery robbery involved "two gang members acting in concert to commit the violent crime."

Evidence about Uncharged Robberies

Duane M. testified that on the morning of September 15, 2006, he was parked near an Econolube store in Oxnard, California. A car approached him. An African-American man, who was a passenger in that car, got out, "shoved a gun" in his chest, and took his wallet and car keys. The robber was wearing a hood and a bandana.

On the morning of September 24, 2006, Matthew S., the owner of the Hook, Line and Sinker restaurant in Oxnard, was sharpening a knife to cut fish. This was in the same shopping center as the Econolube robbery. A man approached him with a gun. He "was hooded" wearing a bandana. Matthew yelled, "[A]re you fucking kidding me." The man "ran out the back door."

Later that morning, Monty T. was working at the Heavenly Cakes bakery in Oxnard. A man with a black bandana covering his face entered the store and pointed a gun at him. Monty opened the register for him and the robber took the money.

Robert S. testified that he drove McDaniel near the Econolube on September 15th so that McDaniel could rob Duane M. He and McDaniel went to the Heavenly Cakes bakery on September 24th. Robert S. committed that robbery; McDaniel was the getaway driver. Robert S. drove McDaniel to the Hook, Line and Sinker restaurant to commit that robbery. McDaniel went in the restaurant, but then came back and told Robert S. "the dude threw a fuckin' knife at me." Robert S. testified that he also drove McDaniel to the Vanessa Bakery on September 3, 2006.

The Defense Case

McDaniel testified that he was a member of the West Side Gangster Crips and his gang moniker is Sneaks 211. His business in the gang involves "[d]rugs, sex, money and alcohol." He often carried a blue bandana. This "Crip rag" was a flag of his gang which he proudly wears.

McDaniel did not commit the Vanessa Bakery robbery. He was at his girlfriend's house on September 3rd.

On August 21st, he walked past Daniel Q.'s house. Daniel Q. appeared to be a Colonia Chiques gang member; he was following McDaniel down the street. There were two other individuals across the street who were also heading in his direction. Daniel Q. said, "[W]hat's up, do you bang?" He then made "an aggressive motion" taking a step towards McDaniel. He could not see Daniel Q.'s right hand.

McDaniel testified, "I wasn't gonna take a chance of getting stabbed again." He was stabbed on a previous occasion. He said, "[T]herefore my initial reaction was to protect myself."

DISCUSSION


Consolidating the Cases

McDaniel contends the trial court erred by granting the prosecution's motion to consolidate the murder case with the Vanessa Bakery crimes which involved attempted murder and robbery.

The Attorney General, relying on People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 392, suggests that McDaniel forfeited this issue by not moving to sever the consolidated actions. There our Supreme Court held that trial courts have "no sua sponte duty" to sever actions. (Ibid.) The defendant must "'make a showing of "good cause" in order to obtain severance, and defendant's failure to request a severance waives the matter on appeal." (Ibid.) Here McDaniel never filed a motion to sever, and we do not have a transcript of the hearing on the prosecution's motion to consolidate. Consequently, the record does not demonstrate that McDaniel ever raised a severance issue or made a showing of good cause in the trial court. But even on the merits, the result is the same.

As a general rule, the prosecution may join several charged offenses against a defendant and try them in one case. (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 773.) Two or more offenses "of the same class of crimes" may "be consolidated for trial in order to promote judicial efficiency [citation] and a trial court's rulings on joinder are reviewed for abuse of discretion." (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1074.)

Here the murder count was in the same class of crimes as the Vanessa Bakery offenses—attempted murder and robbery. "Robbery and murder are the same class of crime; both involve a common element of assault on the victim." (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1243.) "[M]urder and attempted murder are both assaultive crimes against the person and, as such, are 'offenses of the same class.'" (People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 987.)

McDaniel claims the combination of the two cases was prejudicial. Separate trials are appropriate where: 1) one case is "unusually likely to inflame the jury," or 2) combining a weak case with a strong one makes it easier to obtain a conviction than if the cases were tried separately. (People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) But here the evidence against McDaniel was strong for the offenses in each of the consolidated cases. Moreover, the murder case and the Vanessa Bakery offenses involved a similar level of gun violence making it unlikely that the jury would be inflamed. (Id. at p. 1245.)

McDaniel claims it was easier to convict him of murder because the trial court admitted uncharged robbery evidence to tie him to the Vanessa Bakery offenses. But the prosecution's evidence on the murder count was independently strong. The jury did not find McDaniel's claim of self-defense to be credible. The court instructed the jury that it could only consider the uncharged offenses in connection with the Vanessa Bakery crimes. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed these instructions. (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 517.) Moreover, given the strong prosecution evidence and the unique facts of the murder case, there was a diminished likelihood that jurors would have relied on any "spillover" evidence from the uncharged crimes to support the murder count. (People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) McDaniel has not shown an abuse of discretion.

Admitting Evidence about Uncharged Robbery Offenses

McDaniel notes that the prosecution presented evidence about uncharged robberies to prove the identity of McDaniel as the Vanessa Bakery robber. He claims the trial court erred by admitting this evidence because the uncharged offenses were dissimilar and were not necessary to the prosecution's case. We disagree.

Here the identity of the Vanessa Bakery robber was an important issue. McDaniel testified that he did not commit that robbery. The prosecution may introduce evidence of uncharged offenses to prove the defendant's "identity as the perpetrator of the charged offense." (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 23.) The admissibility of this evidence "turns on proof that the charged and uncharged offenses share sufficient distinctive common features to raise an inference of identity." (Ibid.)

The three uncharged offenses involved two robberies and an attempted robbery. The modus operandi of these crimes was similar to the Vanessa Bakery robbery. A man wearing a hood and a bandana approached his victims with a gun and then got into a car with a waiting getaway driver. These were all early morning robberies.

"[A]n uncharged prior offense need not be identical to the charged offense in every detail." (People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 249, fn. 18.) "[T]he question in each case is whether there is support for the inference that the perpetrator of the [uncharged] offense . . . is the person who committed the charged offense." (Ibid.) A link to the defendant may be established by proof that the defendant's associate participated in committing both the uncharged and charged offenses. (Id. at p. 249.) Here Robert S. testified that he was either the driver or the robber in the uncharged offenses that he committed with McDaniel. He also said he drove McDaniel to the Vanessa Bakery.

The trial court reasonably could find that the probative value of this evidence substantially outweighed the possibility of prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The evidence was relevant to connect McDaniel to the Vanessa Bakery crimes. The testimony about the three uncharged offenses was relatively short. The possibility of inflaming the jury was diminished because these incidents did not involve shootings and were consequently less violent than the charged crimes. Moreover, McDaniel admitted that he was present with Robert S. during two of the uncharged incidents. McDaniel has not shown an abuse of discretion. Nor has he shown prejudice. He made compelling admissions about committing the charged offenses in his jail conversations with Robert S.

Gang Expert Testimony

McDaniel contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution's gang expert to opine that the charged offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. We disagree.

The trial court has wide discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony. (People v. Garcia (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1512.) In cases where a gang enhancement is alleged, a gang expert's testimony is properly admitted to assist the jury in an area well beyond their "common experience." (Ibid.) In response to prosecution hypothetical questions from facts in the prosecution's case, Coughlin stated his opinion that the Daniel Q. shooting and the Vanessa Bakery robbery were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.

McDaniel argues that the jury must decide intent for the commission of the charged offenses, and consequently the gang expert's opinions should have been excluded. A hypothetical question may be based on evidentiary facts. (People v. Yang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045-1046; see also People v. Garcia, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1513.) That is what occurred here. The gang expert's opinions may often go to an ultimate issue in the case, such as whether the crime was committed for the benefit of a gang. (Id. at pp. 1513-1514.) But allowing such opinion testimony is not an abuse of discretion when it is in response to hypothetical questions. (Ibid.) The gang expert was not usurping the role of the jury. He was merely drawing a conclusion on the basis of assumed facts. The jury remains the trier of fact as to all the facts presented in the hypothetical questions. It may reject the expert's opinions or conclude that the expert is not credible.

Moreover, from McDaniel's own words, the jury could reasonably infer the murder was a gang-related crime. McDaniel went to an area looking for a confrontation with members of a rival gang. He wanted revenge for a prior confrontation where he was injured. He told Robert S. how he felt. He said, "I'm about to catch me somebody, I'm mad, nigga." Before he fired the shots, McDaniel said the victim asked him, "'You bang?'" McDaniel responded, "Do I bang? . . . [T]his Gansta Crip Gang, bitch, gang- bang on that, nigga and I pulled out . . . fed him two, he . . . cringed, cuz and grabbed his chest . . . ." McDaniel added, "[T]hat wasn't my first time puttin' in work for fuckin' Westside Gangsta Crip, homie." (Italics added.) Even without consideration of the gang expert's opinions, these admissions supported the jury's finding that the murder was committed for the benefit of the gang.

The Vanessa Bakery Robbery--A Gang-Related Crime?

McDaniel claims there is no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the Vanessa Bakery robbery was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) We disagree.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences from the record in support of the judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We do not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of the witnesses. It is the appellant's burden to show that the evidence is not sufficient to support a jury finding of fact.

McDaniel was a member of the West Side Gangster Crips. The gang's primary activities included committing burglaries and robberies. The gang expert testified that the Vanessa Bakery crimes were committed for the benefit of McDaniel's gang.

McDaniel suggests a gang expert's testimony cannot be sufficient to support the jury's gang allegation findings. But "[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was 'committed for the benefit of . . . a [] criminal street gang' within the meaning of section 186.22(b)(1)." (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 63.) Here Coughlin said the gratuitous shooting of people while committing the Vanessa Bakery robbery was to "instill more fear for the West Side Gangster Crips gang." He said the gang uses the proceeds of the robberies to "buy drugs, guns and other items that would help benefit the gang." This is sufficient evidence to support the finding. (Ibid.) Moreover, there was additional independent witness testimony.

Robert S. testified that members of the gang carry a blue bandana with them known as a "Crip rag." They wear it to "let people know" that "[they are] a Crip." They wear it when committing crimes so the victims will see it. In discussing the Vanessa Bakery robbery with Robert S., McDaniel said that when he walked into the bakery, "I had the rag on my face." At trial he testified that he proudly wore it as the flag of his gang. The fact that McDaniel and Robert S. were West Side Gangster Crips members who committed the Vanessa Bakery robbery supports an inference that the crime was gang related. (In re Daniel C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.) The evidence is sufficient.

Instructions on Deliberation and Premeditation

McDaniel notes that the trial court gave a proper standard instruction on deliberation and premeditation. (CALCRIM No. 521.) It provides, in relevant part, "The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before committing the act that caused death." (Ibid., italics omitted.)

The trial court also gave an additional special instruction, which provides, "To prove the killing was 'deliberate and premeditated,' it is not necessary to prove that the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected on the gravity of his act."

McDaniel claims this special instruction is improper and confusing because it "removes an element of the crime from the jury and pinpoints a result" favoring a first degree murder conviction.

But in People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 981-982, our Supreme Court rejected these claims involving this same special instruction. It noted that the instruction "was taken verbatim from section 189, which defines first degree murder." (Id. at p. 979.) "'"[T]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction . . . ."'" (Id. at pp. 980-981.) It held that the instruction is not confusing. The court said, "The words in the phrase 'maturely and meaningfully reflected' are commonly understood terms . . . ." (Id. at p. 981.) The instruction was given with a standard premeditation instruction requiring that: 1) the defendant's reflection must occur before the commission of the crime, and 2) the crime "resulted from careful thought and a weighing for and against the chosen course of action." (Ibid.) Given this combination, the court concluded, "There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could find deliberation and premeditation solely from evidence that defendant intended to kill, or solely from evidence that he committed the act . . . ." (Ibid.) "[T]he instruction did not mislead the jury regarding the requisite mental states for first degree murder . . . ." (Id. at p. 982.)

Here, as in People v. Smithey, the special instruction was given with a standard instruction providing, "The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill." (Italics added.) It also provided that premeditation required the defendant to decide "to kill before committing the act that caused death." This combination of instructions does not mislead jurors or lessen the prosecution's burden of proof. (People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 981-982.)

"Premeditation can be established in the context of a gang shooting even though the time between the sighting of the victim and the actual shooting is very brief." (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 849.) "''"Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly."''" (Ibid.) McDaniel testified that he believed Daniel Q. was a Colonia Chiques gang member and he knew Daniel was following him before he shot him. He told Robert S. his motive was revenge for a prior incident and he said his mental state was "I'm about to catch me somebody . . . ." There was no error.

Admitting Recorded Jail Conversations

At trial, the prosecution introduced a tape and transcript of recorded conversations between McDaniel and Robert S. while they were in jail. During these conversations, McDaniel made incriminating admissions about the Daniel Q. shooting and the Vanessa Bakery robbery.

McDaniel concedes that those portions of the tape were properly admitted. He claims, however, that the tape includes additional irrelevant conversations where McDaniel and Robert S. used profane language which should have been excluded.

The Attorney General responds that McDaniel has not cited to the portions of the transcript he claims were prejudicial. Absent citations to the record, McDaniel's general argument that much of the transcript should have been excluded is insufficient to show error. (People v. Mendoza (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 390, 398.) But even on the merits, the result is the same.

The Attorney General notes that much of the transcript was admitted to show McDaniel's attachment to the gang, the gang lifestyle, and his attachment to Robert S. That was relevant to prove facts involving the gang allegations, charged and uncharged offenses, and to impeach McDaniel's trial testimony. During his conversations, McDaniel used crude and profane language. But he has not shown how this would inflame reasonable jurors. "Jurors today are not likely to be shocked by offensive language . . . ." (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1009.) Nor has he shown that the allegedly prejudicial impact of his profanity on the tape outweighed the highly probative value of the admissions he made in these conversations. (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1044-1045.) Given his testimony about his criminal activities, reasonable jurors would be less likely to be offended by the fact that he used crude and foul language on the tape. At trial, McDaniel testified his gang business included drugs and sex. McDaniel has not shown an abuse of discretion.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

McDaniel contends that life without the possibility of parole combined with a consecutive "97 year determinate sentence" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree.

A sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a special circumstance murder does not shock the conscience nor is it constitutionally disproportionate. (People v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 253, 299.) McDaniel concedes that his sentence for first degree murder is not, by itself, inappropriate. He claims the additional 97 years renders it constitutionally infirm. The consecutive 97 years added to a life without the possibility of parole sentence exceeds his life span, but this does not mean that the sentence is unconstitutional. (People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383.) As the Attorney correctly notes, adding 97 years "has no practical effect" as McDaniel will not be eligible for parole. McDaniel is a recidivist. Given the gravity and violence of his offenses and the number of victims, the sentence is not unconstitutional. (People v. Johnson, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.)

We have reviewed McDaniel's remaining contentions and we conclude he has not shown error or grounds for reversal.

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P.J.

We concur:

COFFEE, J.

PERREN, J.

Patricia M. Murphy, Judge


Superior Court County of Ventura

Richard C. Gilman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Summaries of

People v. McDaniel

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Jan 10, 2012
2d Crim. No. B226763 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012)
Case details for

People v. McDaniel

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY MCDANIEL, JR., Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX

Date published: Jan 10, 2012

Citations

2d Crim. No. B226763 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012)

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People v. McDaniel

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