Opinion
F080709
12-07-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTURO MATEO, Defendant and Appellant.
Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County Super. Ct. No. F19902121. David Andrew Gottlieb, Judge.
Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Defendant Arturo Mateo stands convicted of causing injury while driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The trial court found that he had suffered a prior "strike" juvenile adjudication within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)- (i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a prior DUI conviction in the past 10 years and sentenced him to six years in prison. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he had suffered a prior strike adjudication. The People disagree. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On December 10, 2019, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a second amended information charging defendant with causing injury while driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 1), causing injury while driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 3). As to counts 1 and 2, the second amended information further alleged that defendant's blood-alcohol content was 0.15 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23578) and defendant had suffered a prior felony DUI conviction within the previous 10 years (Veh. Code, § 23550.5, subd. (a)). As to all counts, the information alleged defendant had suffered a prior strike adjudication (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
On December 17, 2019, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found the allegation on count 1 that he had a blood-alcohol content of 0.15 percent or higher true.
The jury did not return a finding on defendant's blood-alcohol percentage as to count 2.
In a bifurcated proceeding on December 19, 2019, the trial court found true that defendant had committed a prior DUI offense within the last 10 years. In a continuation of that bifurcated proceeding on January 16, 2020, the trial court found true that defendant had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication that qualified as a strike conviction.
On February 3, 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of six years in prison as follows: on count 1, six years (the upper term doubled due to the prior strike conviction); on count 2, six years stayed pursuant to section 654; and on count 3, 180 days with credit for time served.
On February 3, 2020, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
Because defendant raises only legal issues the facts underlying the offenses are not relevant and are omitted from this opinion.
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he suffered a prior strike conviction. Specifically, he argues that his 2003 no contest plea to a violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), was insufficient to prove he had a prior strike conviction because it could have been a plea to assault with a deadly weapon-which qualifies as a strike-or assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury-which does not qualify as a strike. We disagree. Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant had a prior strike conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
1. Additional Background
The People submitted a certified copy of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition filed on November 20, 2003 (the petition), alleging defendant, at 17 years of age, committed two counts of "ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, in violation of … SECTION 245, subd. (a)(1)" (counts 1 & 2). Both counts alleged that defendant used a knife. Neither count alleged that defendant used force likely to produce great bodily injury. The petition bore handwritten notations that indicate defendant pled no contest on count 1 and that count 2 was dismissed with a right to comment and seek restitution. The People also submitted the record of adjudication from January 5, 2004, reflecting defendant's no contest plea to count 1 and the trial court's finding of a factual basis for the admission followed by the handwritten notation: "Peo. vs. West." The record of adjudication did not reflect that defendant pled to a lesser offense.
Specifically, the "N/C" was written next to count 1 and "Dismiss w. RTC & R" was written next to count 2.
The parties agree that "Peo. vs. West" refers to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 (West).
On February 3, 2020, the trial court held a hearing at which it found the prior strike valid. It commented that it reviewed People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059 (Delgado), which it found to be "very convincing [and] on all fours with [this] case."
2. Legal Standard
"The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082.) Certified documents create a presumption of conviction that can only be overcome by evidence calling into question" 'the authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of the prior conviction records.'" (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) "[I]f the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense." (Ibid.)" '[The] trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from certified records offered to prove a defendant suffered a prior conviction ….'" (Ibid.) However, a court cannot look beyond the defendant's record of conviction to find that a prior conviction qualifies as a strike. (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 134-137.) When determining whether a prior conviction is a strike, the trial court is limited to "those facts that were established by virtue of the conviction itself-that is, facts [the finder of fact] was necessarily required to find to render a guilty verdict, or that the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea." (Id. at p. 136.)
"On review, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other words, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt." (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1067.)
3. Analysis
It is undisputed that a juvenile adjudication can qualify as a strike" 'only if the prior offense is listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 [subdivision] (b)' and is classified as a 'serious' felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c), or as a 'violent' felony under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)." (In re Brown (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 699, 713.)
Former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), as it existed at the time of defendant's conviction in 2004, proscribed assault upon the person of another either with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm, or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(31), assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a serious felony under the Three Strikes law, but assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury does not. (People v. Banuelos (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 601, 605 ["a conviction of assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury is not a serious felony unless it also involves the use of a deadly weapon or actually results in the personal infliction of great bodily injury"].)
As defendant correctly notes, the current version of section 245 splits the two versions of aggravated assault between two subdivisions. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) & (4).)
Defendant contends that the trial court "neglected to consider that [he] pled no contest to count [1] as a felony violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1) under People v. West …. Under West, a court … may accept a plea to any reasonably related lesser offense. … [Defendant argues that] [t]he West plea … indicates an intent to plead no contest to the 'reasonably related lesser offense' of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury …. [Defendant's] West plea would be meaningless otherwise."
Defendant is only partially correct. A plea pursuant to West is "a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea." (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932; People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424.) "Such a plea, also referred to as an Alford plea, based on North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 37- 38, allows a defendant to plead guilty [or no contest] in order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence." (Rauen, at p. 424.) Nonadmission of a factual basis pursuant to West is, therefore, not meaningless if it does not reflect a plea to a lesser offense than the charged offense. While a defendant may plead no contest to a lesser offense pursuant to West (West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 611-613 [a defendant may plead guilty to uncharged crimes which he has not committed, so long as the crimes are reasonably related to those with which he is actually charged]), and not admit a factual basis pursuant to West, nonadmission of a factual basis pursuant to West does not necessarily signify that a defendant has pled no contest to a lesser offense. We do not presume on an empty record that a no contest plea with a factual basis representation pursuant to West is a plea to a lesser offense.
The Rauen court noted that "West did not actually involve a claim of innocence but addressed the validity of a plea to an uncharged lesser offense entered pursuant to a plea bargain." (People v. Rauen, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 424, fn. 1.)
Here, the trial court drew reasonable inferences from defendant's record of conviction and determined his prior assault conviction qualified as a strike beyond a reasonable doubt. The record of conviction reflected that defendant pled no contest to count 1 of the petition which was charged as assault with a deadly weapon. It was not charged in the alternative-i.e., it did not allege that defendant committed an assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. The fact that the change of plea form read, "There is a factual basis for the admission" followed by the handwritten notation "Peo. vs. West" does not undermine the trial court's finding that the strike was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It merely confirms that defendant did not admit a factual basis for the no contest plea to the offense charged in count 1 of the petition-assault with a deadly weapon. We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
[*] Before Hill, P.J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.