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People v. Martinez

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Apr 13, 2009
No. E044555 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF122689, Patrick F. Magers and Elisabeth Sichel, Judges.

Barbara R. Rich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey J. Koch and William M. Wood, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

MILLER J.

A jury found defendant Paul Theodore Martinez guilty of (1) willfully and unlawfully attempting by means of threats and violence to deter and prevent an executive officer from performing his duties (Pen. Code, § 69); (2) carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 12020, subd. (a)(4)); (3) possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); and (4) actively participating in a criminal street gang with knowledge that the gang members engage in a pattern of criminal activity, and willfully promoting, furthering, or assisting in felonious criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered (1) a prior felony conviction that resulted in a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); (2) a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and (3) a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 10 years.

All further references to code sections are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

Defendant makes three contentions. First, defendant contends the evidence supporting his conviction for participating in a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) does not meet the substantial evidence standard. Second, defendant argues he was denied due process and a fair trial because improper criminal disposition evidence was admitted at trial, or, alternatively, that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the criminal disposition evidence. Third, defendant asserts the court abused its discretion by denying his Pitchess motion. We affirm the judgment.

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2005, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department’s gang unit, in the jurisdiction of the Jurupa Station, consisted of Corporals Martinez, Padilla and Robertson, and Deputy Negrete. On March 25, all four members of the gang unit went to Glen Avon to gather information about gunshots that had been fired at a residence during the previous night. The residence was known to Corporals Martinez and Robertson, and Deputy Negrete, as a “han[g]out for a gang known as Mira Loma Dodd Street,” and deputies had previously made “numerous arrests” at the residence.

When the corporals and deputy arrived at the residence, they noticed defendant and another man outside the house. Defendant was working in the yard, using a weed eater to cut weeds. The corporals and the deputy exited their cars and approached the residence. One of the deputies said, “Hey, is it okay if we talk to [you]?” Corporal Robertson then asked defendant “to put the weed [eater] down.” Defendant complied. Deputy Negrete, referring to defendant, said, “that’s Indio” or “Hey, Indio.” “Indio” was defendant’s nickname. Deputy Negrete recognized defendant as a Dodd Street gang member who, at the time, had two active felony warrants for his arrest. Defendant denied that he was known as “Indio.” Corporal Martinez told defendant to put his hands behind his back. Defendant walked away towards the residence. Corporal Martinez attempted to grab defendant’s arms and place them behind his back, but defendant began running towards the house. Corporal Martinez then grabbed defendant and pushed him to the ground.

Once defendant was on the ground, Corporals Martinez and Robertson, and Deputy Negrete, tried to place defendant’s arms behind his back but defendant was flailing his arms and trying to pull his arms forward, underneath his body. The officers told defendant to stop resisting and place his hands behind his back. After approximately 30 seconds the officers gained control of defendant’s arms. During the struggle, the other man who had been in the yard ran away.

Corporal Robertson walked defendant towards the sheriff’s car. Defendant complained of pain in his wrist and asked the corporal to let go of him. The corporal refused because defendant had tried to escape. After Corporal Robertson unlocked the door to the car, defendant began to pull away from the corporal’s grasp, as if to run. Corporal Robertson forced defendant to the ground and defendant rolled onto his back. Defendant tried to kick Corporal Robertson. Deputy Corey came to assist Corporal Robertson, and defendant tried to kick him as well. After one or two minutes, Corporal Robertson and Deputy Corey were able to place defendant in the sheriff’s car. Defendant was not searched prior to being placed in the car.

The officers requested that a medical unit examine defendant. While waiting for the medical team to arrive, defendant was taken out of the sheriff’s vehicle. Corporal Robertson searched defendant before the medical personnel arrived, and found a substance that was similar to salt in one of defendant’s shirt pockets. Corporal Robertson also searched underneath the back seat of the vehicle. Under the back seat, the corporal found a knife, a clear plastic baggie that contained “a white crystalline substance that appeared to be methamphetamine,” and two pipes that could be used for smoking methamphetamine. Corporal Robertson had removed the back seat of the vehicle and checked the car when he began his shift that day. Deputy Negrete, who was Corporal Robertson’s partner, did not see anything in the area of the back seat when the car was checked at the beginning of the shift. Defendant was the first person Corporal Robertson arrested during his shift.

At one point, Corporal Padilla tried to place leg shackles on defendant, but had a difficult time due to the large rubber boots defendant was wearing. Defendant said to cut off the boots. Corporal Robertson told defendant he did not have any scissors. Defendant said, “I used to have a knife.”

The crystalline substance tested positive for 0.14 grams of methamphetamine. Corporal Robertson opined that the salt-like substance from defendant’s shirt pocket would be added to methamphetamine to increase the quantity for sale.

Evidence related to the gang conviction will be presented in the following section, in order to avoid repetition.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence

Defendant contends the evidence supporting his conviction for actively participating in a street gang does not meet the substantial evidence standard. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).) We disagree.

“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a limited one.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains “‘“substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value”’” from which a jury comprised of reasonable persons could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758.) We presume “in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the [jury] could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the trial court, we do not resolve issues of credibility or evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient....” (Ibid.)

To establish the commission of the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal street gang, the prosecution must prove that (1) the defendant is more than a nominal or passive member of the gang, (2) the defendant has “‘knowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,’” and (3) the defendant “‘willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.’ (§ 186.22[, subd.] (a).)” (People v. Lamas (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 523.)

First, we examine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the finding that defendant is more than a nominal or passive member of a gang. Corporal Robertson testified that defendant has “an ‘M’ and an ‘L’” tattooed on the back of his head. Corporal Robertson said the “‘M’” and “‘L’” represent the Mira Loma Dodd Street criminal street gang. Deputy Negrete testified that the “M” and “L” indicate membership in the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang. Deputy Negrete also said that a non-gang member would “[a]bsolutely not” get such a tattoo on the back of his head. Further, Deputy Negrete stated that the house where defendant was arrested was a known “hangout” for members of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang, and he would not expect a person who disassociated himself with the gang to be at the residence. Additionally, when defendant was in the booking area of the sheriff’s station, defendant said, “‘I guess you caught one of the last of the old time Dodd Streeters.’” Deputy Negrete also identified four field interview cards from the year 2000, a fifth field interview card from the year 2001, and a sixth field interview card from the year 2002, in which defendant identified himself as a member of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang. Further, defendant had a knife and methamphetamines in his possession, and the primary activities of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang involved violent crimes and drug activity.

Deputy Negrete testified that, in his opinion, defendant was an active member of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang in March 2005 because (1) defendant was at a house known to be a “hangout” for Mira Loma Dodd Street gang members; (2) defendant was armed with a knife; and (3) defendant had his head shaved so that the “ML” could be prominently displayed.

We conclude that the foregoing evidence provides substantial support for the jury’s finding that defendant was more than a nominal or passive member of the gang because defendant admitted his gang affiliation, defendant shaved his head so that a tattoo related to the gang could be displayed, defendant was working at a residence known to be a “hangout” for the gang, and defendant possessed a knife and methamphetamines, which indicated he was involved in drug activity—one of the gang’s primary activities.

Second, we address whether the evidence supports a finding that defendant had knowledge that members of the gang engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. Deputy Negrete testified that the primary activities of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang included homicide, attempted murder, carjacking, robbery, vehicle theft, burglary, and drug activity. Specifically, Deputy Negrete recalled (1) an individual named Paul Rios, who he believed was a member of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang, and who was convicted of committing attempted murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang; the crime occurred on September 12, 2001, and (2) a person named David Schumm, and another individual named Manuel Mercado, who he believed were members of the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang, and who were convicted of carjacking and robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang; the offenses occurred on June 12, 2004. Deputy Negrete testified that defendant associated with Manuel Mercado, and that defendant identified himself as a Mira Loma Dodd Street gang member in 2000, which was prior to the specific crimes detailed by Deputy Negrete. Additionally, Deputy Negrete opined that a person who was an active participant in the gang, and who was at the residence where defendant was arrested, would be aware of the gang’s criminal activities. Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant had knowledge that the gang’s members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

Third, we determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted in any felonious conduct by members of the gang. Deputy Negrete testified that violent behavior keeps “other people” away from the gang members’ neighborhood and away from the criminal activity that gang members conduct in the neighborhood. Deputy Negrete stated that defendant’s behavior during his arrest showed the community “how violent he is.” Accordingly, the jury could infer that defendant’s violent behavior furthered or assisted in the felonious conduct of members of the gang, because violent conduct helped to prevent people from interfering with the gang’s criminal activities. In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted felonious conduct by members of the gang.

In conclusion, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant actively participated in a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)

B. Due Process

1. Facts

Corporal Robertson identified a photograph of defendant from the sheriff’s station, in which defendant was wearing a gray, black and white jersey with the number 13 on it. Corporal Robertson testified that when he first contacted defendant at the residence, defendant was “wearing several layers of clothing” and the top layer was an orange vest. Corporal Robertson testified that sheriff’s deputies or medical personnel may have removed one of defendant’s shirts after defendant was arrested. Corporal Robertson could not recall if the jersey was in defendant’s possession at the time he was arrested.

The prosecutor asked Deputy Negrete to explain the significance of the number 13 in gang culture. Deputy Negrete testified that the number 13 showed a person’s affiliation with the Mexican Mafia, which was a major prison gang. On cross-examination, Deputy Negrete testified that defendant’s orange vest likely would have covered the number 13 on the jersey.

Defendant’s trial counsel also asked Deputy Negrete if he had any field interview cards for defendant from the years 2003, 2004, or 2005. Deputy Negrete said that he had no cards for defendant from those years. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Deputy Negrete what the reason was for not having field interview cards for defendant from 2003, 2004, and 2005, and the following exchange took place:

“[Deputy Negrete: Defendant] wasn’t available to us at that time. He was

“The Court: That’s fine.

“[Prosecutor]: Thank you. Nothing further.”

2. Waiver

Defendant contends his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the prosecution presented evidence that (1) defendant was wearing a jersey with the number 13, (2) the number 13 was affiliated with the Mexican Mafia, which is a prison gang, and (3) defendant was “not available” during 2003, 2004 and 2005, because the evidence alluded to defendant being in prison and participating in a prison gang. Defendant contends that when the foregoing evidence was combined with evidence that defendant had two outstanding warrants, it amounted to unfair criminal disposition evidence. We agree with the People that defendant forfeited this argument by not objecting to the evidence at the trial court.

Our Supreme Court has concluded that to the extent a defendant “may be understood to argue that due process required exclusion of... evidence for a reason different from his trial objection, that claim is forfeited.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436.) At the trial court, defendant did not object to the evidence that he now complains violated his due process rights. Accordingly, we conclude defendant forfeited this argument.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant alternatively argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney not objecting when the prosecution presented evidence that (1) defendant was wearing a jersey with the number 13, (2) the number 13 was affiliated with the Mexican Mafia, and (3) defendant was “not available” during 2003, 2004 and 2005, because the evidence alluded to defendant being in prison and participating in a prison gang, which likely led to the jury convicting defendant of participating in a street gang despite the alleged lack of substantial evidence on that charge. We disagree.

“‘In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶]... under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” [Citation.] If the record “sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” [Citations.] If a defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel’s performance was deficient, he or she also must show that counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.)

“[T]he decision whether to object, move to strike, or seek [an] admonition... is highly tactical, and depends upon counsel’s evaluation of the gravity of the problem and whether objection or other responses would serve only to highlight the undesirable testimony.” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 165.) In her closing argument, defendant’s trial attorney argued that defendant was distancing himself from the gang, and was not guilty of actively participating in the gang because he had a vest covering the number 13 on his jersey and a hat covering the tattoo on his head. Accordingly, defense counsel used the evidence to defendant’s advantage to show that he had disassociated himself from the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang, and was no longer an active member. Nevertheless, the record provides no indication of why counsel did not object to the evidence of which defendant now complains, and we cannot conclude, especially in light of defense counsel’s closing argument, that counsel’s inaction could not have had any legitimate tactical basis. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective for not objecting.

C. Pitchess Motion

1. Summary of Motion and Ruling Below

Defendant filed a pretrial Pitchess motion seeking discovery of documents in the personnel files of Corporals Robertson, Martinez and Padilla, and Deputies Negrete and Corey (the corporals and deputies). With respect to each of the corporals and deputies, defendant sought (1) records concerning excessive force, moral turpitude, dishonesty, racial discrimination, or violence—the type of records sought by defendant included complaint records, contact information of all the people that filed complaints, contact information of people that were interviewed in regard to the complaints, all statements by people who filed the complaints, and all recordings or notes of people who investigated the complaints; (2) the Department’s written procedures for investigating citizen complaints against personnel; (3) all records concerning statements, reputations, and opinions pertaining to the corporals and deputies; (4) all records of discipline imposed on the corporals and deputies; and (5) all documents recording disciplinary action against the corporals and deputies or investigation of the corporals and deputies as a result of the corporals’ and deputies’ treatment of an arrestee.

Defendant’s trial counsel attached her declaration of good cause for the above-described discovery. Counsel declared on information and belief “that a likely issue at trial will be the [corporals’ and] deputies’ lack of veracity, possible false arrest, illegal search and seizure, the fabrication of charges and/or evidence, dishonesty, use of excessive force, and improper tactics... such as... neglect of duty, and false arrest.”

Defense counsel attached the reporter’s transcript of the preliminary hearing. At the hearing, Corporal Robertson testified that, on the day of the incident, a deputy told defendant he had two outstanding felony warrants and that he was under arrest. Corporal Martinez tried to arrest defendant and move defendant’s hands behind his back, but defendant started to move away from the corporal. Defendant was moved to the ground, where he struggled and tried to reach under his torso. Once handcuffed, defendant tried to run away, but he was moved to the ground, and then defendant tried to kick Corporal Robertson.

Deputy Negrete also testified at the preliminary hearing. Deputy Negrete stated that defendant flailed his arms while he and Corporal Robertson tried to move defendant’s arms behind his back. Deputy Negrete also testified about the Mira Loma Dodd Street gang and defendant’s statements about the gang’s activities.

Defense counsel also attached an initial incident report by Corporal Robertson, and a supplemental incident report by Deputy Negrete.

At the hearing on the Pitchess motion, the court expressed concern that the motion was overbroad. Defendant’s trial counsel tried persuading the court that the motion contained sufficient specificity; however, the court ultimately denied the motion, without prejudice, because it concluded the motion was overbroad.

2. Discussion

Defendant contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his Pitchess motion because the court applied the incorrect legal standard for ruling on a Pitchess motion. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for an abuse of discretion. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039.) The concept of abuse of discretion includes review of whether the trial court’s decision was “guided and controlled by fixed legal principles.” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)

A defendant is entitled to discovery of a police officer’s confidential personnel records that contain information relevant to the defendant’s defense, upon a showing of good cause. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016 (Warrick).) “To determine whether the defendant has established good cause for in-chambers review of an officer’s personnel records, the trial court looks to whether the defendant has established the materiality of the requested information to the pending litigation. The court does that through the following inquiry: Has the defense shown a logical connection between the charges and the proposed defense? Is the defense request for Pitchess discovery factually specific and tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct? Will the requested Pitchess discovery support the proposed defense, or is it likely to lead to information that would support the proposed defense? Under what theory would the requested information be admissible at trial? If defense counsel’s affidavit in support of the Pitchess motion adequately responds to these questions, and states ‘upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records,’ [citation], then the defendant has shown good cause for discovery and in-chambers review of potentially relevant personnel records of the police officer accused of misconduct against the defendant.” (Warrick,at pp. 1026-1027.)

In this case, the trial court concluded that defendant did not establish good cause “because the request is overbroad.” This finding related to the second question in the Pitchess motion inquiry: “Is the defense request for Pitchess discovery factually specific and tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct?” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1026-1027.) Accordingly, we conclude the court applied the correct legal principles when ruling on the motion.

Further, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion was overbroad. Defendant’s motion sought information about Corporals Robertson, Martinez and Padilla, and Deputies Negrete and Corey, pertaining to excessive force, moral turpitude, dishonesty, racial discrimination, and violence. The proposed factual scenario included in defendant’s motion, in which the officers allegedly committed misconduct, did not identify what roles, if any, the officers played. Defendant suggested that “three deputies” hit defendant and “[o]ne or two” deputies used their fists on defendant. In her declaration, defendant’s trial counsel declared that an issue at trial would be “the deputies’ lack of veracity, possible false arrest, illegal search and seizure, the fabrication of charges and/or evidence, dishonesty, use of excessive force, and improper tactics... such as... false arrest.”

The trial court could properly conclude that defendant’s Pitchess motion was overbroad because it sought information pertaining to a broad variety of misconduct, and sought such information in relation to corporals and deputies, without providing the court with a specific factual basis for determining which type of misconduct a particular corporal or deputy might have engaged in. (See Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1022.) For example, defendant did not indicate against which deputy information about an illegal search and seizure would be relevant. This lack of specificity created a substantial risk that confidential information could be disclosed from an individual deputy’s file concerning past misconduct that was irrelevant to the proposed defense.

One of the purposes of the good cause declaration is to provide the court with sufficient specificity so that, if the court does conduct an in camera review, it can easily identify what information is responsive to the request and relevant to the defense, while at the same time protecting the officer against overly broad disclosure of irrelevant information. (Warrick, supra,35 Cal.4th at pp. 1021-1022.) By denying the motion without prejudice, and suggesting the defense amend the motion, the court did not foreclose the possibility of obtaining the requested discovery. At the same time, by requiring counsel to provide more specifics, the court insured that if it did conduct an in camera review, the only information disclosed would be relevant and narrowly responsive to the defense request.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying, without prejudice, defendant’s Pitchess motion on the ground that it was overbroad because the categories of information sought were not tethered to a specific factual scenario linking each officer to a particular act of misconduct. (See Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1022.)

Defendant argues the trial court misunderstood the legal principles involved in Pitchess motions, because (1) the court indicated that the motion was deficient for not limiting the request for records to a particular time period, and (2) the court stated that it was more familiar with civil discovery rules.

The facts related to these issues are as follows: the trial court expressed concern that the Pitchess motion was overbroad because it did not include a time period for the requested documents, such as the police personnel records from 2002 to the present. The court asked defendant’s trial counsel, if a deputy had “sexually harassed someone in the office 10 or 15 years ago” would that be a complaint that the defense was requesting. The court then explained that it was asking this question about the relevant time period because the court was more familiar with civil discovery, “where there’s got to be [a] rational tendency to prove something in issue before it’s discoverable.”

The court’s comments about the time frame issue are reasonable, because, typically, conduct complaints that occur more than five years before the event that is the subject of the case cannot be disclosed. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b)(1).) However, in defendant’s Pitchess motion, he requested disclosure of information about the deputies’ behavior “regardless of when [the behavior] occurred.” Defendant’s failure to include a relevant time period could reasonably be viewed as creating an overbroad motion, in light of the usual five-year limitation. In any event, the court later explained that the time frame problem was just one example of how the motion was overbroad. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the court based its ruling solely on the failure to include a time period for the requested documents, and as concluded ante, the court could properly find that the motion was overbroad.

Next, the court’s statement that it had a greater understanding of civil discovery rules does not indicate that it applied civil discovery standards in the hearing on defendant’s Pitchess motion. After the court made the comment about civil law, it listened to further argument from trial counsel, and the court referenced the Pitchess motion rule that the defense must “tender a specific allegation” of misconduct. The court did not indicate that it was applying civil discovery standards simply because it was more familiar with those rules. Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: GAUT, Acting P. J., KING J.


Summaries of

People v. Martinez

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Apr 13, 2009
No. E044555 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Martinez

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL THEODORE MARTINEZ, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

Date published: Apr 13, 2009

Citations

No. E044555 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009)