Opinion
2d Crim. No. B231882 Super. Ct. No. BA366240
02-15-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDGAR MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County)
Edgar Martinez appeals from the judgment after conviction by jury of one count of voluntary manslaughter. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).) The jury found true an allegation that he used a deadly weapon (a knife). (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) It acquitted appellant of first and second degree murder. The trial court sentenced appellant to 12 years in state prison.
Appellant contends that his conviction for manslaughter must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that the homicide was not justified. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant stabbed Elmer Rodriguez in the heart at a Christmas Eve party. Appellant's wife,Wendy, had been fighting with Rodriguez's sister-in-law, Libeni, while appellant and Rodriguez were nearby. The women struggled on the ground and pulled each other's hair. According to Libeni, Wendy was on top of her, and swung a broken bottle toward her neck. A witness corroborated this, while other witnesses testified that Libeni was on top of Wendy, or that neither woman was on top.
We use the first names of Wendy Lopez and Magda "Libeni" Santiago for clarity. Libeni was not actually married to Rodriguez's brother, but she was his longtime romantic partner and witnesses referred to them as husband and wife. Wendy married appellant after he killed Rodriguez, but was already appellant's romantic partner and the mother of his child on the night appellant killed Rodriguez.
The women's fight was breaking up when appellant walked over to Rodriguez and stabbed him. According to Libeni, Rodriguez was leaning against a wall. Another witness, Jasmine Garcia, testified that Rodriguez was unarmed and raised his palms up and outward as appellant approached him. Appellant pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed Rodriguez under his ribs. Jasmine Garcia did not see Rodriguez threaten appellant. Yet another witness, Catalina Garcia, saw appellant pull a long, thin silver object from his pants and stab Rodriguez in the heart and above his waist. Rodriguez did not appear to Catalina Garcia to be threatening anyone. Rodriguez's back was to Libeni and Catalina Garcia. No one saw a weapon in Rodriguez's hands or Libeni's hands. The music was too loud for anyone to hear whether appellant and Rodriguez argued.
After he stabbed Rodriguez, appellant ran to his apartment with Wendy and their son. Rodriguez collapsed after saying, "That guy fucked me up," and he died soon after. Rodriguez had a defensive cut on his palm, a fatal stab wound to his heart, and a non-fatal stab wound to his abdomen. The knife was not found.
In an interview with a police detective, appellant did not admit that he stabbed Rodriguez. He said his wife was in a fight. When he tried to help her he was hit in the head with a bottle and he ran away with his child. He did not mention anyone threatening him with anything, and he did not mention four men confronting him.
At trial, appellant testified that he was hit in the head by a flying bottle and attacked by men with a bat or piece of wood, a broken bottle, and a stone when he tried to help his wife. He said a man lifted her dress and touched her intimate parts, and that someone kicked her. He tried to leave with his son, but four men blocked his path. The man who had kicked appellant's wife approached him with a broken bottle, and said he would "fuck [appellant] up," so appellant picked up something sharp and stabbed the man. His son was clinging to him, but he testified he did not think the men would hit a child.
Appellant's wife, Wendy, testified that Libeni attacked her and that someone pulled up her skirt during the struggle. Her son was nearby screaming. Her neck, knees, and elbow were injured. Photographs showed only injuries to her knees. She testified that she did not know whether Rodriguez was one of the people who attacked her. The child testified that he saw his mother thrown to the ground and saw his father fighting. He was scared.
The trial judge instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, self-defense, and defense of others. The prosecutor argued that the killing was second degree murder because appellant demonstrated intent to kill, or conscious disregard for human life, when he stabbed Rodriguez more than once in the torso. It was not justified because eyewitnesses said Rodriguez was not threatening anyone, and appellant's testimony was not credible. Defense counsel argued that the killing was justified by self-defense and defense of others, because appellant reasonably feared for his safety and the safety of his wife and son. He argued that the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other and were not credible.
DISCUSSION
We reject appellant's contention that there was insufficient evidence that the killing was not justified. There is substantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not stab Rodriguez in self-defense or in defense of his wife or son.
Our role is limited. We review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find appellant guilty of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Substantial evidence is evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.)
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).) An unlawful killing is a killing that is not justified. It is the prosecution's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing was not justified. (People v. Banks (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 384.)
A killing is justified, in self-defense or defense of another, if (1) the defendant reasonably believed that he (or someone else) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury, (2) the defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger, and (3) the defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. (Pen. Code, § 197, People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.) Here, the testimony of Libeni supports a finding that appellant could not have reasonably believed he or his family were in imminent danger. She, and others, testified that Rodriguez was unarmed and that the fight between the women had ended when appellant stabbed Rodriguez. A juror could reasonably conclude that Wendy had never been in danger if the juror believed Libeni's testimony that Wendy initiated the fight, was on top of Libeni, and threatened Libeni with a broken bottle. Although appellant testified that he was attacked by a group of men, including the victim, his testimony was contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses, and he did not say he was attacked in his initial account to police.
Resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive province of the jury. (People v. Ochoa ( 1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) Appellant's argument that the eyewitnesses were not in a position to see whether Rodriguez had a weapon because his back was to them goes to the weight of their testimony. We will not disturb the jury's assessment of credibility or weight. The verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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YEGAN, Acting P.J.
PERREN, J.
Lance A. Ito, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles
Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kichael Katz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.