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People v. Martin

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Apr 16, 2018
F075209 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2018)

Opinion

F075209

04-16-2018

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NICHOLAS EUGENE MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant.

Sara E. Coppin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Jennifer Oleksa, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. MF012262A)

OPINION

THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R. Brehmer, Judge. Sara E. Coppin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Jennifer Oleksa, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.

-ooOoo-

After denial of his motion to suppress evidence of methamphetamine found during a search of his vehicle (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Nicholas Eugene Martin pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and admitted a prior felony conviction allegation (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a prior prison term allegation (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and a prior drug conviction allegation (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)). The trial court imposed and suspended a nine-year term and granted three years' probation. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the stop of the vehicle was based only on the officer's belief that the passenger was on probation, not on his knowledge of a search condition. The People argue defendant's arguments regarding the subsequent searches are forfeited because the parties stipulated the hearing would be limited to the stop of the vehicle, but they concede that stop was improper. Also, by way of supplemental briefing, the parties agree recent legislation requires that the prior drug conviction allegation be stricken. We reverse and remand.

All statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise noted. --------

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

A. Evidence

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated that the "scope of this hearing was going to be limited to the stop of the vehicle." Kern County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Garza testified as follows at the hearing on the suppression motion. On September 18, 2016, at about 2:11 p.m., Garza was following a light blue vehicle whose passenger was Shawn Clifton, a "known probationer." Garza was able to see Clifton in the passenger side mirror. Garza had arrested Clifton before, and when he had conducted records checks of him in the past, Clifton had always been on active probation, predominantly for drug-related charges. When Garza realized Clifton was a probationer, Garza initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle and contacted the driver, who was defendant. Garza asked defendant if he was on probation and he answered that he was.

On cross-examination, Garza explained that he stopped the vehicle because he knew Clifton was on probation; Garza wanted "to see if there was any crime occurring, if [Clifton] was going to be in possession of any narcotics." Garza stopped the vehicle because of Clifton. He had never met defendant, nor did he know defendant's probationary status.

The trial court ruled as follows:

"[I]f using your example you are living with a probationer and, for instance, law enforcement wants to search that probationer's room and they come to your house, they have the right to ask you who you are to identify yourself and that additional question if you are on probation and my understanding was the motion was to the initial stop, but even beyond that, it's clear, once he's stopped, the officer could ask the driver his name and that subsequent question. So I am going to deny the motion to suppress at this time ...."

B. Analysis

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, considering the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's disposition, and we exercise our independent judgment to determine the lawfulness of the search or seizure. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.) Evidence may not be suppressed unless its seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.)

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145.) "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ' "by means of physical force or show of authority," ' terminates or restrains his freedom of movement ...." (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254.) A seizure through a show of authority occurs when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to leave or to decline an officer's request. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341.) The temporary detention of individuals during the stop of a motor vehicle by police constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810; In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307 ["Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions"].)

"There are two different bases for detaining an individual short of having probable cause to arrest: (1) reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity [citation] and (2) advance knowledge that the individual is on searchable probation or parole [citations]." (People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 860, italics added.) "Searchable probation" refers to the status of a probationer who is subject to an express search condition. (See id. at p. 863 ["[a] search condition is not mandated by statute for every probationer"].) An officer may search a probationer subject to a search condition without reasonable suspicion that the probationer has violated the law or possesses evidence of a crime or contraband—but the officer must be aware of the search condition (which must be broad enough to justify the particular search) before conducting the search. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 332-333 [search may not be justified by parole status unless officer was aware of it when the search was conducted]; People v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184 [officer who relies on a probation condition to justify an otherwise illegal search or seizure must know of that condition when he acts, and may not rely on subsequently acquired information about the person's probationary status].)

Here, Garza testified that he stopped the vehicle because he knew Clifton was on probation, based on his past contacts with him. Garza had no suspicion that either Clifton or defendant was involved in criminal activity; he wanted to conduct a probation search of Clifton to determine if he possessed drugs. Although Garza testified that he knew Clifton was on probation when he stopped the vehicle, he did not testify that he also knew Clifton's probation included a search condition. Accordingly, the evidence did not support a finding that Garza's stop of the vehicle and detention of its occupants to conduct a probation search of Clifton was a lawful detention.

We agree that the parties did not litigate, and the trial court did not consider, the legality of the subsequent searches. The parties stipulated to limit the hearing to whether the stop was lawful. We have concluded the trial court erred in deciding the stop was lawful, and we will remand for possible further proceedings on the search issues. II. Prior Drug Conviction Allegation

Section 11370.2 was recently amended: Senate Bill No. 180 became effective on January 1, 2018. The bill narrows the scope of section 11370.2 to apply only to prior convictions for narcotics sales involving a minor in violation of section 11380. Defendant's prior drug conviction was for possession for sale (§ 11378).

Absent some indication to the contrary in the bill, courts presume the Legislature intended amendments to the Penal Code that reduce the punishment for a crime to apply retroactively, at least in cases which are not yet final. (See People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323-324; see also In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.) We conclude the same applies here. Nothing in Senate Bill No. 180 indicates the Legislature intended prospective application only. (Stats. 2017, ch. 677, § 1.)

As a result, the prior drug conviction allegation must be stricken.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to permit defendant to withdraw his no contest plea. If the People intend to retry the case, the court shall hold a suppression hearing (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) to determine whether the evidence gained during the searches subsequent to the unlawful stop of the vehicle should be excluded as fruit of the illegal detention. The trial court is further directed to strike the prior drug conviction allegation (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)).


Summaries of

People v. Martin

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Apr 16, 2018
F075209 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2018)
Case details for

People v. Martin

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NICHOLAS EUGENE MARTIN, Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Apr 16, 2018

Citations

F075209 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2018)