Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, Super.Ct.No. SWF023022, Peter L. Spinetta, Judge. (Retired judge of the Contra Costa Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
H. Reed Webb, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter Quon, Jr. and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
A jury convicted defendant John Joseph Marr of inflicting injury on a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition, (count 1—Pen. Code § 273.5) assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, (count 2—§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and false imprisonment by violence. (count 4—§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)). On appeal, defendant contends that the mens rea of the crime of false imprisonment is, or should be, the specific intent to confine, restrain, or detain the victim. Thus, defendant maintains that insufficient evidence was adduced below that defendant had such an intent. We find that false imprisonment is a general intent crime and that substantial evidence supported defendant’s conviction on count 4. We, therefore, affirm the judgment in full.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 22, 2006, the victim and defendant had been living together in a fifth-wheel trailer in Lake Elsinore for three months. The two had been involved in a romantic relationship for over three years. The owner of the recreational vehicle (RV) park the two were staying in stopped by the trailer to wish them a “Merry Christmas” and drop off some tamales. Defendant was lying down in the bedroom while the victim spoke to the owner.
After the owner left, defendant came out of the bedroom and the victim told defendant that the owner had stopped by and dropped off the tamales. Defendant replied that the owner thought defendant was lazy. Defendant then stood in front of the door and started repeatedly kicking the victim. The victim backed up towards the couch and crouched down to try to get away from defendant “because there [was] nowhere else to go. . . .” The victim repeatedly told defendant to stop. Despite trying, she could not leave because defendant was blocking the door and attacking her. Defendant then repeatedly hit her with his fist on her face and torso. Defendant eventually picked up the victim’s wooden cane and hit her with it repeatedly on her face, head, back, and body. The beating lasted between 10 and 20 minutes.
At the end of the beating, defendant took out a closed, folding knife and, without opening it, told her if she screamed, he would kill her. One-half hour later defendant left the trailer to go to the store. The victim made no attempt to leave because she was scared and had no place to go.
One or two days later the victim told defendant she was going to the swap meet with the manager of the RV park. In actuality, the victim intended to leave defendant in order to obtain help. The victim met a California Highway Patrolman whom she asked for help. She requested medical attention because she still had pain, soreness, and felt dizzy. The officer called an ambulance, which took her to the hospital. The victim sustained facial bruising; bruising on her back, shoulders, thigh, and arms; broken skin; and a black eye.
As to count 4, the court instructed the jury with a slightly modified version of CALCRIM No. 1240 without comment or objection from defense counsel. During its deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the court: “Do you have to falsely imprison someone beyond the time of the actual attack for it to be considered false imprisonment? [¶] Can the attack itself constitute false imprisonment?” While conferring with counsel regarding the request, defense counsel suggested that “there has to be an intent beyond the attack itself. There has to be an intent to restrain someone or confine them in some way, restrain their liberty. I don’t know. I would just suggest we refer them to the instruction.” After objecting to the court’s proposed response, defense counsel again suggested the court “just refer [the jury] back to the original instruction.” After modifying its proposed response, defense counsel acquiesced to the court’s eventual reply to the jury: “Please refer again to the instruction entitled ‘1240 Felony False Imprisonment.’ Whether any given ‘attack’ constitutes false imprisonment depends on whether all the elements of that crime set forth in that instruction are met.”
DISCUSSION
A. Felony False Imprisonment is a General Intent Crime.
Defendant contends that an intent to confine, restrain, or detain should be an implied element of felony false imprisonment and, therefore, we should read such a specific intent into the statute. Hence, he maintains, the matter must be reversed for the supposed failure of the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the requisite intent. We disagree.
“‘A general criminal intent crime exists when the statutory definition of the crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to [an] intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence. A specific intent crime exists when the statutory definition refers to the defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Fernandez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 716 (Fernandez).) False imprisonment is “the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” (§ 236.) If effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, it is a felony. (§ 237; Fernandez, at p. 717.) “The statute neither expressly nor by necessary implication defines felony false imprisonment as an act of violence, menace, fraud or deceit performed with the intent to unlawfully violate the personal liberty of another.” (People v. Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1398 (Olivencia).) Thus, felony false imprisonment is a general intent crime. (Fernandez, at pp. 716-718; Olivencia, at pp. 1397-1399; People v. Swanson (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 109-110 (Swanson).)
Defendants in Fernandez, Swanson, and Olivencia made arguments similar to those made by defendant here, i.e. that false imprisonment is or should be deemed a specific intent crime which requires the intent to confine. However, we agree with and follow those courts in rejecting such arguments. As stated in Fernandez, “[t]he essential element of false imprisonment, be it misdemeanor or felony, is restraint of the person.” (Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.)
While the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1240, which provides that, in order to prove defendant guilty of the offense of false imprisonment by violence, it must find that “[t]he defendant intentionally and unlawfully . . . (restrained,/ or confined,/ or detained) by violence or menace;” (italics added) defendant admits that the word “‘intentionally’” has been interpreted to mean “‘knowingly.’” (Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 718; Swanson, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 110.) Thus, all that is required is that defendant knowingly have committed an act which resulted in the deprivation of the victim’s liberty. No showing that defendant intended confinement to result from his acts is required.
Defendant cites People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659-660, People v. Haney (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313, and People v. Ross (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1553, for the proposition that some intent to confine the victim must be demonstrated in order to convict of false imprisonment. However, both Fernandez and Olivencia noted that in neither Agnew nor Haney was the requisite intent at issue; thus, neither case stands for the proposition asserted by defendant. (Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 717-718; Olivencia, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1399.) “‘[I]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1125, 1153, quoting People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176.) Likewise, Olivencia found that, at most, Agnew supported a requirement of intent to confine only in the narrow factual context in which a defendant indirectly causes the restraint, a circumstance not present in the current case. (Olivencia, at p. 1399.) Similarly, Ross fails to support defendant’s argument because it also relied on Haney for its assertion that false imprisonment required an intent to confine. (Ross, at pp. 1553-1554.) Moreover, the issue in Ross was whether attempted false imprisonment required a showing that the defendant had the present ability to commit the crime, not the requisite intent. (Id. at pp. 1553-1555.) On the other hand, Fernandez, Olivencia, and Swanson all specifically and at length dealt with the issue of the requisite intent to prove false imprisonment. Thus, those cases stand directly for the proposition that false imprisonment is a general intent crime.
Finally, defendant notes that since felony false imprisonment may be accomplished by fraud or deceit, requiring that the perpetrator have a future consequence in mind as a result of his acts, the offense necessarily requires proof of specific intent. Since the crime of felony false imprisonment cannot be parceled out into its distinct methods of implementation (People v. Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 95, overruled on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 [i.e. violence, menace, fraud, or deceit]), defendant contends the entire offense must be deemed a specific intent crime. That same argument was raised and rejected in Olivencia. (Olivencia, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1398.) First, the difference between the statutory requirements for misdemeanor and felony false imprisonment is directed primarily at the methods of its accomplishment, not the intended result. (Ibid.) Second, as in Olivencia, the evidence here would only support a finding of violence or menace; therefore, the argument that deceit or fraud requires a specific intent is irrelevant under the present facts. (Id. at p. 1398, fn. 3.) Thus, felony false imprisonment is a general intent crime and the jury here was properly instructed. “While appellant’s argument holds some appeal, it is not for us to add [or alter] elements to a statutorily defined crime. That task is best left to the Legislature.” (People v. Reed (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 274, 284 (Reed).)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported Defendant’s Conviction for False Imprisonment.
Defendant contends that insufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for felony false imprisonment, specifically because no evidence was adduced that defendant intended to confine the victim. As discussed above, felony false imprisonment is a general intent crime for which no showing of intent on the part of defendant to confine the victim is required. Nevertheless, we address defendant’s contention that insufficient evidence supported the conviction because, otherwise, it would “turn every battery, at least those consisting of more than one blow, into a false imprisonment simply because the victim would be prevented from moving in the direction that the blows are coming from for as long as the battery lasts.”
In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, “an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128.) In making this determination, we must presume every fact in support of the judgment which the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 23.)
False imprisonment is “the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” (§ 236.) If effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, it is a felony. (§ 237; Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) “‘“Violence” . . . means . . . “‘the exercise of physical force used to restrain over and above the force reasonably necessary to effect such restraint.’”’ [Citation.]” (Reed, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)
Here, substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for false imprisonment. Prior to initiating the beating, defendant stood in front of the door, preventing the victim’s egress from the trailer. After defendant initiated the beating, the victim backed up towards the couch and crouched in order to get away from him. She became trapped on the couch because she had nowhere else to go due to defendant’s incessant attack. The trailer was small. The victim repeatedly told defendant to stop. The victim testified that she “certainly couldn’t get out of there because [defendant] was blocking the door.” She attempted to get out of the trailer while defendant was beating her, but she was unable to because of defendant’s assault. The beating lasted between 10 and 20 minutes; it involved kicking, punching, and caning. It was so severe that the victim needed to be taken to the hospital two days after its occurrence and she still had readily demonstrable signs of injury. Thus, defendant violated the personal liberty of the victim simply by standing in front of the door, which prevented her from leaving the trailer. In turn, defendant used physical force in excess of that needed to effect the restraint by his 10 to 20 minute beating of the victim.
Even to the extent that only defendant’s beating of the victim could be viewed as the act which resulted in a deprivation of the victim’s liberty, substantial evidence still supports defendant’s conviction. Defendant cites Fernandez for the proposition that a beating, in and of itself, cannot constitute the basis for a restraint sufficient to convict for false imprisonment. In that case, the victim was held to the ground where he was kicked, punched, and hit with a bike lock. (Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.) In holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of both battery with serious bodily injury and false imprisonment, the court noted that, “[h]ere [the defendant] restrained [the victim] long enough for [the victim] to suffer over 20 kicks. The restraint was not, as [the defendant] argues, part of the battery. [The defendant] and the others could have hit [the victim] without holding him down.” (Id. at p. 718.) Thus, defendant contends that something above and beyond a beating, e.g. holding the victim down, must be the predicate for a conviction of false imprisonment. We disagree.
First, Fernandez did not hold that something more than just a beating must be adduced in order to convict a defendant of both battery and false imprisonment. Indeed, it had no occasion to do so as that was not the issue before that court. Rather, the issue was whether false imprisonment was a specific or general intent crime. Second, the court’s above-quoted statements amount to mere dicta as they were unnecessary to the court’s holding. Third, we find Fernandez factually distinguishable from the present case. In Fernandez, the victim was held down and beaten outside. (Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 712-713, 718.) Thus, the assailants may have found it necessary to hold the victim down so that they could accomplish the beating as fast as possible, without getting caught, and without the victim escaping. Here, defendant blocked the door, barring the victim’s only method of escape. Thus, she was trapped within the relatively small confines of the trailer and defendant had no need to hold her down in order to restrain her. Finally, though no mention was made in Fernandez regarding the duration of the beating, we know that the victim was kicked over 20 times in public, apparently by all three assailants, to the point that he lost consciousness. (Ibid.) Here, the victim was kicked, punched, and caned for 10 to 20 minutes in the privacy of defendant’s own residence. Thus, the present circumstances are more suggestive of a beating involving a longer interval of restraint than that present in Fernandez.
Neither party cites to any case which specifically delineates the point at which a defendant may or may not be convicted of separate offenses for a battery in which he is also alleged to have falsely imprisoned the victim; or, whether such a line exists at all. Likewise, our own research has not revealed any. Nonetheless, we find the principles announced in Reed, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 274, and People v. Von Villas (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, instructive by analogy. In both cases, the courts conducted lengthy discussions and analyses regarding whether a defendant may be convicted of both robbery and false imprisonment where both offenses were committed simultaneously. (Reed, at pp. 279-284; Von Villas, at pp. 255-256.) Both courts concluded that the defendants were properly convicted of both crimes. In Von Villas, the court noted that “[a] robbery can be committed without subjecting a person to false imprisonment”; nonetheless, the facts of the case before it supported conviction for false imprisonment because the victims’ personal liberty was violated when they were held at gunpoint. (Von Villas, at pp. 214-215, 256.) Likewise, in Reed the restriction of the victim’s movement when held at gunpoint was not considered “incidental” to the robbery. (Reed, at p. 281.) Here, defendant’s restraint of the victim during the beating was not incidental to the beating. Rather, defendant barred the victim’s only manner of escape before initiating the beating. Moreover, the defendant engaged in the beating for a sustained period of time in a confined area which effectively deprived the victim of her personal liberty. Thus, no legal impediment bars defendant’s conviction on both counts.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, Acting P. J., KING, J.