Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. SAMBATH MAO, 150968, 154076
Jones, P.J.
Sambath Mao appeals from two separate judgments: (1) a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a) ), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and (2) a judgment entered after the trial court revoked his probation. His counsel on appeal has filed an opening brief that asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record as is required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel also informed appellant that he had the right to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. Appellant declined to file such a brief.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further section references will be to the Penal Code.
On October 12, 2005, in case number 150968, appellant pleaded no contest to receiving a stolen vehicle. (§ 496d, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation.
On November 5, 2006, Laquita Dunn parked her car, a Toyota, in front of her home in Oakland. When Dunn awoke the next morning, the car was gone. She notified the police.
Dunn’s son called her later that same day and told her the car had been spotted near the corner of 30th and Myrtle Streets. Dunn went to the location indicated. When she arrived she saw her car, her son, and the police. Dunn looked inside her car. The faceplate to the stereo was missing.
Dunn spoke with one of the officers on the scene, Officer Keith Dodds. As she was doing so, Deborah Dixon, who lived nearby and who knew both Dunn and Dodds came up to them. When Dixon learned the car had been stolen, she stated spontaneously, “I know who stole it.” “I saw Sam get out of the car.” Dixon said that Sam lived in the house in front of where the car was parked.
Officer Dodds went to the house Dixon identified and knocked on the door. A man answered and Dodds asked him if someone named Sam lived there. The man said yes, pointed to an adjacent room, and knocked on the door. Appellant opened the door. Dodds asked appellant whether he was Sam. When appellant said, “yeah,” Dodds detained him.
Officer Dodds placed appellant in handcuffs and led him outside. When they emerged, Dixon who was still outside, stated spontaneously, “Yes, that’s him, that’s Sam.” Dodds then placed appellant under arrest. Dodds performed a warrant check on appellant. He learned appellant was on probation and that his person and residence were subject to search. Dodds relayed that information to Officer Robert Race who also was on the scene. Race searched appellant’s room pursuant to the search condition and found a stereo faceplate. Dunn identified the faceplate as having been taken from her car.
Appellant was transported to a local jail. As appellant was being booked, a key fell out of his wallet. It was an uncut key for a Toyota vehicle. Officer Race tried the uncut key in Dunn’s Toyota. It started the car, although it did not open the car’s door locks.
Based on these facts, a petition was filed in case number 150968 to revoke appellant’s probation. In addition, an information was filed in case number 154076 charging appellant with three counts, (1) vehicle theft, (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (2) receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)), and (3) receiving stolen property (the stereo faceplate) (§ 496, subd. (a).) As to the first two counts, the information alleged as an enhancement, that appellant had previously been convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle. (§ 666.5.)
Appellant filed a motion to suppress. He argued the police had entered his home illegally, that he had been detained, and that his detention was unduly prolonged. In addition, appellant filed a motion to suppress his identification by Dixon, arguing his “show up” was unduly suggestive. The trial court conducted hearings on both motions and denied them.
The case then proceeded to a combined court trial on the petition to revoke and jury trial on the new charges that had been filed. After hearing the evidence presented, the jurors acquitted appellant of vehicle theft but found him guilty of receiving a stolen vehicle and receiving stolen property.
The parties resolved the section 666.5 allegation by negotiation. Appellant admitted the prior conviction that was alleged in support of the 666.5 allegation. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed not to seek the upper term that could be imposed based on such a finding.
The court also conducted a court hearing on the issue of whether appellant had violated his probation in case number 150968. The court found appellant had violated his probation.
Subsequently, in case number 154076, the court sentenced appellant to the middle term of three years on the receiving a stolen vehicle conviction enhanced by the section 666.5 finding. The court also imposed but stayed an eight-month sentence on appellant’s receiving stolen property conviction. In case number 150968, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of eight months, (one-third the mid-term). Thus, in total, the court sentenced appellant to a total of three years, eight months in prison. In addition, the court imposed an $800 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and imposed but suspended an equivalent $800 parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45.
We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude there are no meritorious issues to be argued.
The court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress. (Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 186; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) The court did not err when it ruled that Dixon’s identification of appellant could be admitted at trial. (Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384.) Appellant’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court did not commit any prejudicial evidentiary rulings. Prior to accepting appellant’s admission on the enhancement, the court made sure that appellant understood the Constitutional rights he was waiving. The court also confirmed that appellant understood the consequences of his admission. The court’s finding that appellant violated his probation is supported by substantial evidence. We see no error in the sentence. Appellant was effectively (and vigorously) represented by counsel.
We conclude there are no arguable issues within the meaning of People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 . (See also, People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.)
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: Simons, J. Needham, J.