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People v. Manzano

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Sep 12, 2008
No. B203610 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KA078665 Bruce F. Marrs, Judge. Affirmed with modifications.

Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kristofer Jorstad and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


TURNER, P. J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant, Moises Aranda Manzano, appeals from his convictions for marijuana transportation (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)) and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and the trial court’s finding that he was previously convicted of a serious felony. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) Defendant argues the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony and denied his request to dismiss a prior conviction. Defendant further argues that his prior conviction must be stricken and his abstract of judgment must be corrected to more accurately reflect the sentence imposed. The Attorney General argues that additional fees and penalties and a court security fee must be imposed. We affirm with modifications.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909.) At approximately 2:20 a.m. on April 1, 2007, Covina Police Officer Oswaldo Preciado was working in uniform in a marked patrol car. While at the area of Arrow Highway and Azusa Avenue, Officer Preciado saw a brown 1991 Honda Accord parked in a commercial complex parking lot. Officer Preciado noticed the Honda’s lights were on and the engine was running. There were people inside the Honda. Officer Preciado drove behind the Honda. As he did so, the car was driven away at approximately 30 to 45 miles an hour through the parking lot. Officer Preciado followed the car out of the parking lot onto Azusa Avenue. The car made a sudden lane change without signaling. Officer Preciado activated the overhead lights on the patrol car to stop the Honda. The Honda stopped at a red light, made a U-turn, and halted.

As Officer Preciado walked toward the Honda, he could see two individuals inside the car. Defendant, the driver, opened his door and attempted to get out of the Honda. Officer Preciado ordered defendant back inside. Defendant stated there was no reason to stop him and he was going to continue driving. Defendant got back inside the Honda. However, defendant again got out of the Honda. Defendant again said there had been no reason to stop him. Officer Preciado again ordered defendant to get back inside the Honda. Defendant got back into the car. Defendant made a couple of furtive movements inside the Honda. Defendant turned his shoulder toward the center of the Honda. Officer Preciado saw the white reverse tail lights light up briefly. Officer Preciado feared that defendant would drive away. Defendant said he was going to continue driving because there had been no reason for the officer to stop him. Officer Preciado testified what happened next, “I basically told him that if he continued, that I would follow him.” Defendant complied with Officer Preciado’s order, placing the Honda in park. Officer Preciado requested assistance. Thereafter, Officer Felipe Munoz and Sergeant David Foster arrived.

Officer Preciado discovered that defendant was driving without a license. Defendant was arrested and searched. A digital scale was found in defendant’s right pocket and two cellular telephones in his left pocket. Officer Preciado pointed out defendant’s car to Officer Munoz. Officer Munoz found a plastic bag containing a “sizable quantity” of marijuana on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat of defendant’s car. Defendant was told his car would be impounded. Defendant spontaneously said he had a small amount of marijuana in his car for personal use. When defendant’s property was inventoried during the booking process, $1,132 was found in his wallet.

Sam Le, Supervising Chemist for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Scientific Service Bureau, supervised Senior Criminalist Tom McCleary. At the time of trial, Mr. McCleary was on vacation. Mr. Le testified regarding the analysis of the marijuana seized from defendant’s car. Mr. McCleary had performed the analysis. Mr. Le reviewed Mr. McCleary’s notes as well as a report prepared on April 9, 2007. The report indicated that Mr. McCleary had examined the evidence, performed various chemical tests, and concluded the evidence contained 258 grams of plant material containing marijuana.

Detective Terrence Hanou had extensive training in the field of narcotics. A hypothetical based upon facts similar to those in this case was posed to Detective Hanou. Based upon his training and experience, Detective Hanou believed the marijuana was possessed for sale. Detective Hanou cited the quantity of marijuana discovered and the scale and cash found on defendant’s person. Further, the marijuana found in defendant’s car was very compacted and had not yet been broken into smaller portions to be sold. Detective Hanou believed that the marijuana was probably worth $300 to $400. Detective Hanou believed the amount of marijuana was sufficient for over a thousand uses.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of Forensic Evidence

1. Waiver

Citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 54, 59, defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted the hearsay testimony of Supervising Chemist Le. Defendant asserts the ruling violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Prior to Mr. Le’s testimony, the prosecutor advised the court: “[Mr. Le]’s not the one who analyzed the marijuana in this case. The person who analyzed the marijuana is Tom McCleary[]. He’s on vacation, and that’s why Mr. Sam Le is here. And I’ve got a case from the Supreme Court of California that says it’s okay to do that, that a supervisor can come to court and testify regarding the report done by his staff. [¶] . . . [¶] The case is People versus [Geier]. The cite is 41 Cal.4th 555.” The court then added: “My recollection is that just reiterates a long series of cases going way back about testimony from business records.” Defense counsel responded, “I would submit it.” Preliminarily, we agree with the Attorney General that defendant has waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 166 [defendant’s failure to raise confrontation clause claim at trial forfeits issue on appeal]; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1028 [same].)

2. The evidence was not testimonial

Notwithstanding that waiver, defendant’s claim lacks merit. In Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at page 59, the United States Supreme Court held, “Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” (See Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, ___ [127 S.Ct. 1173, 1179].) The Crawford court concluded, “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 68-69; see Danforth v. Minnesota (2008) 552 U.S. ___, ___ [128 S.Ct. 1029, 1033].) In People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at page 597, the California Supreme Court noted: “Under Crawford, the crucial determination about whether the admission of an out-of-court statement violates the confrontation clause is whether the out-of-court statement is testimonial or nontestimonial. . . . On the other hand, Crawford made it clear that ‘not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns,’ [citation].” (See Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51.) In Geier, our Supreme Court held that forensic evidence in the form of laboratory notes and reports were not testimonial in nature. (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 606-607; see People v. Rawlins (N.Y. 2008) 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1032.) The laboratory records in Geier involved deoxyribonucleic acid analysis records. The documents were prepared “‘during a routine, non-adversarial process “meant to ensure accurate analysis.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Geier, supra. 41 Cal.4th at p. 607, quoting People v. Brown (N.Y. S.Ct. 2005) 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712.) As a result, our Supreme Court explained the technician’s notes that recorded what she did to comply with established protocols and documented each step in her analysis did not “bear witness” against the accused. Our Supreme Court concluded: “Records of laboratory protocols followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not accusatory. ‘Instead, they are neutral, having the power to exonerate as well as convict.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4that p. 607quoting State v. Forte ( N.C. 2006) 629 S.E.2d 137, 143; see also People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984, fn.14.) The same is true in this case. Mr. McCleary’s notes and report simply documented his observations of the substance, chemical tests conducted, and his scientific conclusion. As a result, it did not constitute testimony for confrontation clause purposes.

3. Any error in admitting the evidence was harmless

In any event, even if the evidence was inadmissible, any error in allowing Mr. Le to testify regarding the scientific findings was harmless under any standard. (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 608; People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 991-994.) Even absent the error, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found defendant guilty. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18.) Defendant admitted that he had marijuana in his car. Moreover, when defendant testified on his own behalf, he admitted that he purchased approximately a half pound of marijuana with his income tax return. As Detective Hanau testified, the amount of marijuana found was capable of providing approximately 1,000 uses. Defendant had approximately $1,132 in his possession as well as a digital scale. A rational juror could reasonably conclude that the marijuana was of a significant amount and was not merely for defendant’s personal use.

4. Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel

Moreover, defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of the laboratory report by Mr. Le is without merit. Defense counsel was not obligated to pursue futile or meritless objections or argument. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 261; People v. Ochoa (1998)19 Cal.4th 353, 432; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 289.) Further, defendant has failed to sustain his prejudice burden. (Rompilla v. Beard (2005) 545 U.S. 374, 375; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.)

B. Sentencing

1. Section 1385, subdivision (a) sentencing discretion

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its section 1385, subdivision (a) discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior serious felony conviction and in imposing the upper term. While the trial judge’s order is subject to review for abuse of discretion, the California Supreme Court has made clear: “‘. . . A court’s discretion to strike [or vacate] prior felony conviction allegations [or findings] in furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must proceed in strict compliance with [Penal Code] section 1385[, subdivision] (a), and is subject to review for abuse. . . . [¶] ‘“The trial court’s power to dismiss an action under [Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a)], while broad, is by no means absolute. Rather, it is limited by the amorphous concept which requires that the dismissal be ‘in furtherance of justice.’”’” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158-159, 162, quoting People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-531; see also People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 499-500.)

The Romero court noted that a trial court abuses its discretion if it strikes a sentencing allegation merely on the basis of the effect on defendant: “ . . . Nor would a court act properly if ‘guided solely by a personal antipathy for the effect that the three strikes law would have on [a] defendant,’ while ignoring ‘defendant’s background,’ ‘the nature of his present offenses,’ and other ‘individualized considerations.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531; see People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 993 .) The Supreme Court further clarified the standard for reviewing a ruling on whether to strike a prior serious felony conviction: “[T]he court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. . . .” (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161; see People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377; People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 498-499.) “[Section 667] not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378; see People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 904-905.)

Defendant’s criminal history dates back to age 16 when on March 13, 2000, a delinquency petition was sustained against him for assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause great bodily injury. Defendant was placed home on probation. Defendant’s probation was revoked on April 9, 2000. On May 26, 2000, a petition for obstructing a public officer was sustained against defendant. Defendant was placed in camp. On January 5, 2004, defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license. Defendant was placed on three years of formal probation and fined $300. On November 16, 2004, defendant was again convicted of driving with a suspended license. Defendant was placed on 3 years summary probation and fined $300. On March 28, 2005, defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license. Defendant was placed on 3 years summary probation and ordered to spend 25 days in jail and pay a $300 fine. Also on March 28, 2005, in a separate matter, defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license, placed on 3 years of summary probation, and required to serve 21 days in jail. On April 1, 2005, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendant was sentenced to serve 180 days in jail. On December 17, 2006, defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The disposition of that matter was pending at the time of trial. Defendant was arrested in this case on April 1, 2007.

In denying his motion to strike the prior serious felony conviction the trial court noted: “As we all know, the ultimate test in our case as to whether or not we should strike a strike under Romero, which clearly provides the court the discretion to do so is guided by People versus Williams at 17 Cal.4th at 148. And I have to consider his background, his character, his prospects, the present case, whether or not, taking all of those items into consideration, the defendant may be deemed to be outside the spirit of the three-strikes law. [¶] In looking at everything, I don’t see anything particularly positive in [defendant’s] background. Granted, most of his convictions are not particularly large, but just seems to be on and on and on, more and more the same thing. [¶] And he, quite candidly, admitted that he apparently planned to smoke, according to him, this nine-ounce package of marijuana within a very short period of time, clearly indicating that he was unable or unwilling to conform his behavior to that required by the law. And certainly his string of 14601’s seem to suggest exactly the same thing. [¶] I cannot find that, on the basis of the record I have before me, that [defendant] falls within Williams and should be the beneficiary of striking the strike pursuant to Romero.” There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reasoned factually based decision not to strike defendant’s prior serious felony conviction finding pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a). (People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 874; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 346.)

2. Imposition of upper term

Defendant’s further argument that the trial court improperly imposed the high term is also meritless. To begin with, there is no merit to defendant’s contentions an abuse of discretion occurred. The California Supreme Court has held: “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377, quoting People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978; People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831.) Here, in imposing sentence, the trial court noted: “Reviewing the facts in our case, eight or nine ounces is a pretty good amount, scales, two phones, prior record of open container, [driving under the influence], he was on probation apparently at the time of the commission of this offense, five grants of probation for which he learned absolutely nothing. As I mentioned a moment ago, it appears he has no respect for the law. He intends to do whatever he wants. [¶] The court, for those reasons, selects the upper term of four years on count 1 as a base term, plus four years pursuant to section 1170.12(a) through (d) and 667(b) through (i), for a total of eight years.”

Defendant argues that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors raised by defense counsel. This issue has been waived because it was never raised in the trial court trial. (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1117; People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 581-582.) But even if the issue was not forfeited, it has no merit. Defense counsel argued defendant had: suffered a head injury in a traffic accident; had a job; and intended to get a medical release for marijuana use. Rule 4.409 provides, “Relevant criteria enumerated in these rules must be considered by the sentencing judge, and will be deemed to have been considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise.” (See also People v. Holquin (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1317-1318; People v. Castellano (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 608, 615; People v. Jackson (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 635, 639.) In addition to defense counsel’s argument, the trial court reviewed the probation officer’s report and heard defendant’s trial testimony. As noted, we presume the trial court considered the mitigating factors. Moreover, California courts have long held that a single factor in aggravation is sufficient to justify a sentencing choice, including the selection of an upper term for an enhancement. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 670; People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 615; People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433.) Therefore, even if the only factor in aggravation was that defendant was on probation at the time of this offense or the amount of marijuana he possessed, either factor would have been sufficient, standing alone, to support the trial court’s selection of the upper term. Moreover, where it is not reasonably probable that a remand for resentencing would result in a more favorable result, we need not do so. (People v. Sandoval (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1303; People v. Sanchez (1994)23 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1684; see also People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 961, 963 [any circumstance in aggravation may be used to impose an upper term].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upper term.

3. Use of juvenile adjudication as a qualifying prior serious felony

Defendant argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and jury trial by using his prior juvenile adjudication as a qualifying prior serious felony conviction to double his sentence pursuant to section 667, subdivision (d)(3) and 1170.12, subdivision (b)(3). Citing to Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 and United States v. Tighe (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1187, 1194-1195, defendant argues that his juvenile adjudication may not be considered a prior serious felony because he was not afforded the right to a jury trial at the time his delinquency case was adjudicated. We and other California Courts of Appeal have consistently rejected that argument. (See People v. Buchanan (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 139, 149; People v. Andrades (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 817, 834; People v. Lee (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1312-1316; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077-1078; People v. Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 391-394; People v. Fowler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 581, 586.) The statute effective at the time defendant committed the instant offense provided for the imposition of a longer term of imprisonment based upon a prior juvenile adjudication. (See People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 13 “[W]e interpret section 667, subdivision (d)(3) according to its terms . . . Under paragraph (B), a prior juvenile adjudication qualifies as a prior felony conviction for Three Strikes purposes only if the prior offense is listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) or is classified as ‘serious’ or ‘violent’”; see In re Jensen (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 262, 266.) Here, defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication met the statutory criteria. Although this issue is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in People v. Nguyen (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1205, review granted, October 10, 2007, S154847 , we decline to depart from the statutory mandate and consistent analysis of our Courts of Appeal.

Section 667 provides in part: “(d) [A] prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement if: [¶] (A) The juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense. [¶] (B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony. [¶] (C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. [¶] (D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.Section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(3) provides essentially the same.

4. Stay of sentence as to count 2

Defendant argues and the Attorney General concedes that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to more accurately reflect that the trial court stayed the sentence imposed as to count 2. We agree. The California Supreme Court has held: “[T]he abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction, and cannot prevail over the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the extent the two conflict. [Citations.]” (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070; see also §§ 1213, 1213.5, People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; People v. Walz (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1367.) California Rules of Court, rule 8.155(c)(1) provides in pertinent part, “[O]n its own motion, the reviewing court may order correction . . . of any part of the record.” (See also People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 185-188; People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 256.)

5. Penalty assessments, surcharges and fees imposed as to the laboratory fee

Following our request for further briefing, the parties agree that the penalty assessments and fees imposed as to the $50 Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, subdivision (a) laboratory fee should have been set forth in detail at the time of sentencing and on the abstract of judgment. The trial court stated, “There’s a laboratory analysis fee of $50 penalty assessment as to count 1.” The abstract of judgment indicated “plus penalty assessment in the sum of $120.00.” The $50 laboratory fee was subject to the following: a section 1464, subdivision (a) $50 penalty assessment; a Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a)(1) $35 penalty assessment; a $10 section 1465.7, subdivision (a) state surcharge; and a $15 Government code section 70372, subdivision (a)(1) state court construction penalty. Thus, the total amounted owed in addition to the $50 laboratory fee is $110. (See People v. McCoy (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254-1257; People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 454, 456-457.)

6. Court security fees

The Attorney General argues the trial court should have imposed a $20 section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) court security fee as to each of the two counts for which defendant was convicted. We agree. (See People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368, 371; People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 865-866.) The trial court imposed one court security fee. One additional section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) fee shall be imposed. The trial court is to actively and personally insure the clerk accurately prepares a correct amended abstract of judgment. (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 109, fn. 2; People v. Chan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426.)

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to include the fines as set forth in the body of this opinion. Upon remittitur issuance, the clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting: the laboratory fee originally imposed by the trial court as well as the changes set forth above; an additional $20 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1); and the stay of sentence as to count 2 and forward a copy to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., KRIEGLER, J.


Summaries of

People v. Manzano

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Sep 12, 2008
No. B203610 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Manzano

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MOISES ARANDA MANZANO, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division

Date published: Sep 12, 2008

Citations

No. B203610 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2008)