Opinion
E053557
01-24-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN SIRIUS MACLAUGHLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Gideon Margolis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. RIF149028)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Christian F. Thierbach, Judge. Affirmed.
Gideon Margolis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant John Sirius MacLaughlin pled guilty to unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and was placed on probation with the condition that he serve 240 days in county jail. Among the terms of probation were that he pay victim restitution. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by setting the restitution to include amounts that, according to defendant, could have been "at least partially avoided" by the victim. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying the victim's restitution request were undisputed and not formally presented. Accordingly, we draw the bulk of the factual background from the representations of counsel in open court and in their restitution briefs.
On March 12, 2007, defendant's vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was recovered by the sheriff's department and picked up by defendant on June 20, 2007. However, defendant had filed a claim with his insurer, the victim, and authorized the transfer of ownership of the vehicle to the victim. On June 27, 2007, the victim paid $21,369.83 to the lien holder. Defendant drove the vehicle until May 2008. After the vehicle was recovered, the victim placed it up for auction; a report estimated the market value of the vehicle at $11,440.67; it's "blue book" value would have been $16,235. In a first round of auctioning, four bids between $5,900 and $6,200 were received and were countered with proposals between $11,500 and $12,700. In the second round, bidding started at $7,000, went as high as $7,300, and was countered with proposals of $12,000, then $11,000, then $10,975, then unprompted reductions to $10,000 and $8,000, before a bid was finally approved at $6,000. This netted the victim $5,447.50.
The victim requested restitution in the sum of $15,922.33 based upon its payoff of the lien, $21,369.83, less its receipt of $5,447.50 from the auction. The parties agreed that at the time defendant took the vehicle, it was worth the amount of the lien payoff. A restitution hearing was set; the parties reported to the trial court their factual agreements, but asserted a legal disagreement over the setoff amount for the victim's recovery and sale of the vehicle. While pondering its own query as to why the victim had the vehicle put "on the auction block," the trial court stated: "I know the answer to the question: It's easier to just put it on the auction block and get what you can for it."
The parties agreed to submit briefs and accept the trial court's ruling under submission. Both parties filed restitution briefs; the trial court announced its decision at a subsequent hearing. The trial court was "of the opinion that the defendant is liable in terms of restitution to the insurance company for the difference between the $21,369.83 that the insurance company paid him and the $5,447.50 that the insurance company received from the sale of the car. Accordingly, the Court will order that the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $15,922.33." The trial court suggested appellate review, noting a lack of "black letter law," and stated that "to the Court, this Court anyway, that the equities demand that the insurance company be reimbursed for the amount—the difference between what they paid to [defendant] and what they received from the sale of the car."
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by setting the restitution to include amounts that, according to defendant, could have been "at least partially avoided" by the victim. In effect, defendant is claiming that the victim is receiving a windfall because, according to defendant, the victim did not attempt to sell the vehicle at its fair market value. The People contend there was no abuse of discretion because the trial court used a rational method to determine restitution that "best returned the victim to the economic status quo by fully compensating it for the total amount lost from [defendant's] theft of the [vehicle]." The People further contend that the victim was not required to further mitigate its loss by retaining the vehicle to attempt a higher price sale, as mitigation is a requirement of some civil matters but restitution need not reflect the recovery available in a civil action. We agree with the People.
"A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered. „ "[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.) As a condition of probation, anyone may be awarded restitution for any injury done to them resulting from the breach of the law if the court determines it would be "fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done." (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) "There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action." (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121 (Carbajal).)
"Trial courts continue to retain authority to impose restitution as a condition of probation in circumstances not otherwise dictated by section 1202.4. In both sections 1203.1 and 1202.4, restitution serves the purposes of both criminal rehabilitation and victim compensation. But the statutory schemes treat those goals differently. When section 1202.4 imposes its mandatory requirements in favor of a victim's right to restitution, the statute is explicit and narrow. When section 1203.1 provides the court with discretion to achieve a defendant's reformation, its ambit is necessarily broader, allowing a sentencing court the flexibility to encourage a defendant's reformation as the circumstances of his or her case require." (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 29.) Thus, a trial court may impose probation restitution conditions under Penal Code section 1203.1 that are not provided for under Penal Code section 1202.4. (See Anderson, at pp. 26-34 [comparing Pen. Code, §§ 1203.1, 1202.4].)
Preliminarily, we note that the victim did attempt to obtain a better price for the vehicle; its initial counteroffers in both auction rounds were higher than the value estimated in the report it commissioned. Thus, the victim recovered a vehicle that, on paper, it should have been able to sell for a higher amount, but was unable to do so and ultimately settled for less. Even without the more flexible framework for probation restitution, there was nothing arbitrary or capricious about the trial court's decision to offset the victim's loss with only the amount received through the auction, rather than the theoretically higher amounts available through continued or different sales efforts. Given the more flexible framework for probation restitution, even if defendant was not fully responsible for the inability of the victim to recover a greater sum for the vehicle, requiring restitution for the victim's full financial loss is both a rehabilitative measure tailored to correct his behavior, as well as a deterrent to future criminality. (See Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124.)
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
McKINSTER
J.