Opinion
February 5, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (R. Goldberg, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that the People failed to meet their burden of proving that the police acted properly when they arrested the defendant (see, People v. Mack, 224 A.D.2d 448 [decided herewith]). The testimony adduced at the suppression hearing demonstrates that the police officers who responded to the scene of the crime had received a radio report that gunshots had been fired there. At the scene of the crime, the complainants confirmed that they had been robbed at gunpoint of jewelry, money, and an automobile. They gave the police a detailed description of the stolen automobile, including that it had Pennsylvania license plates and a partial license plate number. Other police officers observed the stolen automobile, followed it until it stopped and broadcast over the radio a description of the defendant, who fled. Within minutes, the complainants were brought to the location of the stopped automobile and the defendant was apprehended and identified by the complainants. In view of the foregoing, the defendant's arrest was proper (see, People v. Thompson, 215 A.D.2d 604; People v. Butler, 175 A.D.2d 252; People v. Cumberbatch, 171 A.D.2d 671, 672; People v. Lacen, 154 A.D.2d 398; People v. Jenkins, 133 A.D.2d 348). Furthermore, one of the arresting officers observed the defendant discard a gun during his flight, which provided additional probable cause to arrest him (see, People v. Cox, 210 A.D.2d 497).
The defendant contends that the People failed to sustain their burden of proving that there had been probable cause to arrest him simply because they failed to produce as witnesses at the suppression hearing the police officers who had detained him. This issue is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05). In any event, the testimony of the arresting police officer demonstrates that the identification and physical evidence were not procured through tainted police procedures, and there is no evidence that the police officers who detained the defendant possessed material evidence about whether the challenged evidence had been lawfully obtained (see, People v. Witherspoon, 66 N.Y.2d 973, 974; People v. Chappell, 201 A.D.2d 492; People v. Hucks, 175 A.D.2d 213).
The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to reopen the suppression hearing based upon the testimony adduced at the trial (see, CPL 710.40). While there were some differences between the hearing testimony of the arresting officer and the trial testimony of a complainant with respect to the manner in which the identification occurred, these minor discrepancies did not deprive the defendant of any substantial rights (see, People v Corso, 135 A.D.2d 551, 553).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05) or without merit. Thompson, J.P., Friedmann, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.