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People v. Macias

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Feb 9, 2011
No. F058894 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Nos. BF120065A, BF127282A, Michael B. Lewis, Judge.

Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Robert Gezi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

THE COURT

Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Gomes, J.

On July 26, 2007, a detective who entered the home of Anna Maria Macias in search of a parolee found a smoking pipe and a bindle of methamphetamine in her pockets and a PG&E meter on top of her bed. On March 25, 2009, a police officer saw her swing a five-gallon gas can in front of her fireplace as the wall became engulfed in flames. In a negotiated disposition, she pled no contest to receiving stolen property and to recklessly causing a fire. On appeal, she challenges the denial of her motion to suppress and seeks retroactive presentence conduct credits. We affirm.

The facts are from the preliminary hearing transcripts, which by stipulation were a factual basis of the pleas.

BACKGROUND

On August 17, 2007, an information charged Macias with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), theft of utility services (count 2; Pen. Code, § 498, subd. (b)), receiving stolen property (count 3; Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and possession of drug paraphernalia (count 4; Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)) on July 26, 2007. (Case No. BF120065A.) On August 20, 2007, she pled not guilty to all four counts.

On January 7, 2008, Macias filed a motion to suppress. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) On January 10, 2008, the prosecutor filed an opposition to the motion. On January 17, 2008, Macias filed a reply to the opposition. On April 9, 2008, the court held a hearing on the motion. On April 10, 2008, the court denied the motion.

Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

On August 20, 2009, an information charged Macias with arson (count 1; § 451, subd. (b)) and resisting an executive officer (count 2; § 69) on March 25, 2009. (Case No. BF127282A.) On August 25, 2009, she pled not guilty to both counts.

On September 15, 2009, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to amend the information in Case No. BF127282A to charge recklessly causing a fire (count 3; § 452, subd. (b)) on March 25, 2009. In a negotiated disposition, she withdrew her not guilty pleas in both cases and pled no contest to recklessly causing a fire in Case No. BF127282A and to receiving stolen property in Case No. BF120065A in return for the dismissal of all other counts.

On October 14, 2009, the court granted Macias formal probation for three years with time served in Case No. BF120065A and formal probation for three years with time served concurrently in Case No. BF127282A.

DISCUSSION

1. Motion to Suppress

Macias argues that the denial of her motion to suppress due to the illegal entry of detectives into her house was error. The Attorney General acknowledges the illegal entry but argues the court’s ruling was not error.

The documents that frame the issue before us are Macias’s motion, the prosecutor’s opposition, Macias’s reply and supplemental points and authorities, a stipulation to the admission of a parole agent’s report, the reporter’s transcripts of the two-day hearing on the motion, and the court’s summary minute order denial of the motion. After the evidentiary phase of the hearing, Macias argued, and the prosecutor conceded, that the address of the parolee whom detectives sought at the time of the search was different than hers. The prosecutor argued that detectives entering Macias’s home relied on a government parolee database showing his address was the same as hers. Macias argued suppression was the appropriate remedy even though “the government cannot identify the specific source of the error.” The parties agreed that “good faith does not prevent suppression of evidence when officers rely on mistaken information from state parole officers or other California Department of Corrections personnel.”

In ruling on a motion to suppress, the court finds the historical facts, selects the rule of law, and applies the rule of law to the facts to determine if the law as applied has been violated. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134.) Our duty is to review the findings of the historical facts by the deferential substantial-evidence standard and to review the application of the rule of law to the facts as a mixed question of law and fact by the independent-review standard. (Id. at p. 1134.)

At the hearing on the motion, the court heard two detectives, a parole agent, and Macias testify. The evidence showed that detectives secured from LEADS, a database that allows police officers to “check parolees by name, ” the address and photograph of a wanted parolee on July 23, 2007. The address was Macias’s.

On July 24, 2007, a detective saw someone who looked like the person in the photograph driving in Macias’s neighborhood. He made a U-turn to follow him, and the vehicle fled at a high rate of speed, but he could not pursue him since he lacked red-light capability. A couple of hours later, he saw the same car with the same person inside parked within a block of Macias’s address. He walked toward him with his black police jersey with badge and gun visible. The vehicle started up, and he said, “Stop, police, ” but the vehicle again fled, and he again could not pursue since he lacked red-light capability.

On July 26, 2007, a police officer in the company of both detectives knocked on the door of Macias’s house, identified himself, and waited for 15 or 20 seconds without getting a response, at which point all three went inside, saw Macias in possession of the evidence at issue, and arrested her. The wanted parolee was not there. He used to live there. Macias told detectives where to find him.

On July 27, 2007, a new LEADS database printout showed a new address for the wanted parolee. Someone had changed his address in LEADS after the earlier printout. The new address was the one Macias gave detectives the day before. The police found him there. He was not the person driving near Macias’s house days before.

Parole agents maintain the LEADS database for police officers to secure current addresses for parolees. LEADS is an older database and Cal Parole is a newer database, but law enforcement officers still rely on LEADS even though there was a cut-off date “probably” within the past year.

On appeal, the Attorney General acknowledges, with commendable candor, that the entry by officers into Macias’s home to conduct a parole search was not lawful since there was no evidence a parolee lived there on the date of the search, no search warrant, and no valid exception to the warrant requirement. So the question before us is whether the “constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.” (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1651.)

On that question, the parties argue opposing theories. In reliance on People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22 (Willis), Macias urges us to reverse the order denying her motion. In reliance on Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135 (Herring), the Attorney General urges us to affirm the court’s order. Our analysis persuades us that Herring is the controlling authority and that the court’s denial of Macias’s motion was not error.

As our Supreme Court noted nine years ago in Willis, “Federal constitutional standards generally govern our review of claims that evidence is inadmissible because it was obtained during an unlawful search.” (Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 29.) Two years ago, Herring articulated those federal constitutional standards. “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred – i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable – does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 700, citing Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 223.) “Indeed, exclusion ‘has always been our last resort, not our first impulse, ’ and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule.” (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 700, citing Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591.) “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 702, italics added.)

Here, there is no showing that the presence of the wanted parolee’s former address in the LEADS database two days before the illegal entry into Macias’s home – which the LEADS database replaced with his current address no later than the day after the illegal entry – was symptomatic of a “routine or widespread” database error. (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 704.) Likewise, there is no showing here of “systemic errors” that could lead to an inference that reliance by officers on the LEADS database was not “objectively reasonable” or that officers who did so rely “might be reckless” (Ibid.) Finally, there is no showing here that the LEADS database contained any other inaccuracy at all. On the record before us, the court’s denial of Macias’s motion was not error.

2. Conduct Credits

Macias argues that she should receive retroactive presentence conduct credits. The Attorney General argues the contrary.

The court awarded Macias presentence conduct credits in the amount of 294 days and 282 days, respectively, in Case No. BF120065A and Case No. BF127282A, for a total of 576 days. On the premise that amendments to section 4019 that took effect after her sentencing apply to her, she asks that we order additional presentence conduct credits in the amount of 130 days and 126 days, respectively, in Case No. BF120065A and Case No. BF127282A, for a total of 832 days. Intrinsic to her argument is a request to reconsider our rejection of a like claim in People v. Rodriguez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1, review granted June 9, 2010, S181808. We decline to do so.

The lead case on whether the amendments to section 4019 apply retroactively is People v. Brown (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1354, review granted June 9, 2010, S181963.

If there is no express declaration of retroactivity and no clear and compelling implication of legislative intent to that effect, the general presumption is that a statute does not operate retroactively. (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753 (Alford), citing § 3 [“No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” (Italics added.)].) Here, in the absence of both an express declaration and a clear and compelling implication to that effect, the amendments apply prospectively only. (Cf. Alford, supra, at p. 754.)

Macias argues that prospective-only application of the amendments violates her equal protection rights. Since the amendments evince a legislative intent to increase her incentive for good conduct during presentence custody – an incentive that cannot affect her past behavior – and neither involve suspect classifications nor touch on fundamental interests, prospective-only application of the amendments has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate public purpose and does not violate her equal protection rights. (Cf. People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Macias

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Feb 9, 2011
No. F058894 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011)
Case details for

People v. Macias

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNA MARIA MACIAS, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Feb 9, 2011

Citations

No. F058894 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011)