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People v. Luke

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Mar 24, 2020
No. 348530 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2020)

Opinion

No. 348530 No. 348533

03-24-2020

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATTHEW JAMES LUKE, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMIE LYNN STARR, Defendant-Appellee.


If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 18-008949-01-FC Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 18-008949-02-FC Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ. PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 348530 and Docket No. 348533, the prosecution appeals as of right the circuit court's orders dismissing the single count, each, of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321, against defendants. We affirm.

The circuit court's orders dismissing the criminal charges state that defendants were charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. However, from our review of the record it is clear that, while defendants were both originally charged with second-degree murder, they were bound over after preliminary examination for involuntary manslaughter. The entries on the trial court's orders referencing second-degree murder amount to scrivener's error. Our analysis proceeds accordingly.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record in this case is quite extensive. Further facts pertinent to our resolution of the issue on appeal will appear in the context of our analysis

This appeal arises out of the death of 22-month old Devin Bisesi on March 12, 2018. At the time of his death, Devin lived in an apartment with defendants and defendants' two children, along with several other of Luke's children, despite neither defendant being Devin's biological parent. Devin's grandmother, Kimberly Bisesi (Bisesi), lived in the same building, in the apartment downstairs from the one Devin and defendants resided in.

At about 3:00 a.m. on the morning of March 12, 2018, defendant Luke put Devin to bed. Devin slept in a "pack-and-play" playpen, that was located in a bedroom he shared with defendants' two other children. To keep Devin from getting out of the playpen when he was supposed to be sleeping, Luke placed a baby gate or board on top of the playpen, covered it with a sheet, and, according to the observation of Bisesi on the day before Devin died, weighted it down with one or two boxes filled with toys. On March 12, 2018, Luke and defendant Starr fell asleep on the couch in the apartment's living room. Defendants woke up sometime about noon that same day. Luke left the apartment briefly to run some errands, and he recalled Starr giving Devin a bottle at that time. Defendants heard Devin in his playpen at some point during the afternoon, but believed, after Devin had become quiet, that he had fallen asleep. After Luke returned home, the family watched television. Sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Luke went into the bedroom to check on Devin. Luke found Devin sitting in the playpen with his arms extended, and unresponsive. In later interviews concerning the event, Luke stated that he believed the baby gate was still on top of the playpen, but that the boxes containing toys were not.

Luke took Devin out of the playpen and brought him into the apartment's living room. Luke rushed downstairs to the Bisesi's apartment and told her that there was an emergency and that Devin was not breathing. The two rushed back upstairs to defendants' apartment, where Starr was on the telephone with 911 and administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to Devin. Bisesi attempted to assist with CPR, and in doing so noticed that Devin's lips were purple and that his jaw had locked. As a result of Starr's 911 call, police and emergency medical services arrived at the apartment shortly before 5:00 p.m. A firefighter rushed Devin to the waiting ambulance, but Devin was already deceased.

Defendants were charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and the district court held a consolidated preliminary examination. At the preliminary examination, the district court heard testimony that the day before Devin's death, Bisesi had discovered Devin alone in the playpen with its top opening covered with a piece of wood held down by toys. Bisesi testified that she had warned defendants against leaving Devin in his playpen when it was covered by these items. Bisesi's brother, Brian Littlejohn, testified that at some point in the two weeks prior to Devin's death, he had observed Devin in the playpen in a bedroom, alone, with at least part of the top opening covered. The district court also heard testimony from Dr. David Moons, the assistant medical examiner who had performed the autopsy on Devin.

Dr. Moons testified that he had been unable to determine either the cause or the manner of Devin's death. Dr. Moons testified that the findings of the autopsy and the circumstances of Devin's death were consistent with death caused by asphyxiation, but that he could neither conclude or exclude that cause of death with any medical certainty. Indeed, because of the minimal evidence provided by the autopsy, such as a lack of notable bruising or indications of hemorrhaging, Dr. Moons stated there were many possible causes of death that could not be excluded. Upon further questioning by the prosecution—and over defendants' objections—Dr. Moons testified that Devin's death was consistent with Devin having attempted to climb out of the playpen, becoming stuck between the playpen and the baby gate, and suffocating. But, this too was a possibility without medical certainty.

This sequence of events, testified to by Dr. Moons, summarizes the prosecution's theory of this case.

The district court next heard testimony concerning several admissions made by defendants in the course of the police investigation into Devin's death. Patricia Tackitt, a pediatric mortality investigator assigned to the case, who performed reenactments of the circumstances concerning Devin's death with defendants, testified that Luke stated during the reenactment that he had placed the baby gate, sheet, and boxes of toys on top of Devin's playpen when putting Devin to bed on the morning of Devin's death. Detective Sergeant Sean Street of the Michigan State Police—the officer in charge of the investigation—testified that Starr stated in a police interview that she knew Luke put the baby gate and boxes of toys on top of Devin's playpen and that it was common for Luke to do so. However, Starr did not approve of the practice. The district court also viewed a DVD recording of an interview between Detective Street and Luke, in which Luke states that Devin's death was his fault because he placed the baby gate on top of the playpen. In addition to the testimonial evidence, the district court received several photographs of Devin following his death, the playpen, the reenactments, and the bedroom in which Devin died, into evidence.

On the basis of this evidence, the district court found defendants had created an unsafe sleeping environment for Devin on the day Devin died. However, the district court did not find that defendants had the requisite intent to sustain a charge of second-degree murder. As a result, the district court bound over defendants on charges of involuntary manslaughter.

After defendants were bound over, Starr requested that the circuit court quash the information and dismiss the criminal charge against her. The circuit court held a hearing on Starr's motion and determined that the district court had abused its discretion in binding over Starr, because the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that a homicide had occurred. The circuit court granted Starr's motion and entered an order dismissing the charge. Luke thereafter requested that the information be quashed and the charges dismissed in his case and the trial court granted the request.

The prosecution now appeals the circuit court's orders dismissing the charges of involuntary manslaughter against Luke and Starr.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review a district court's bindover decision for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v Fairey, 325 Mich App 645, 649; 928 NW2d 705 (2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This Court essentially sits in the same position as the circuit court when determining whether the district court abused its discretion and no deference is given to the trial court with respect to its decision to grant or deny a motion to quash the bindover. People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 276; 615 NW2d 784 (2000).

III. ANALYSIS

The prosecution asserts that the circuit court erred in granting defendants' motions to quash the information and dismissing the criminal charges against defendants. We disagree.

Under Michigan law, a criminal defendant has the statutory right to a preliminary hearing when the "criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of an information rather than by indictment . . . ." People v Taylor, 316 Mich App 52, 54; 890 NW2d 891 (2016).

At a preliminary examination, the prosecution must present evidence establishing that the defendant committed the charged offense, and the district court must find that probable cause exists to bind over a defendant for trial. To satisfy this burden, the prosecution must present evidence of each and every element of the charged offense, or enough evidence from which an element may be inferred. [Fairey, 325 Mich App at 648-649 (citations omitted).]
A bindover is warranted if the prosecution produces evidence "that a crime was committed and that probable cause exists to believe that the charged defendant committed it." Id. at 649. Probable cause exists when "the evidence would persuade a careful and reasonable person to believe in the defendant's guilt." Id. at 649, citing People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659 NW2d 604 (2003). The evidence supporting a probable cause determination "may be circumstantial, but must nevertheless demonstrate reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant's personal guilt." Fairey, 325 Mich App at 649 (citation omitted). Further, "[t]he evidence considered must be legally admissible." Id. In determining whether the prosecution has met its burden, this Court "review[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution . . . ." Id. at 650.

Under Michigan's criminal law, "[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is a catch-all crime that encompasses all homicides that do not constitute murder, voluntary manslaughter, or a justified or excused homicide." People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 532; 917 NW2d 752 (2018)(citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has defined involuntary manslaughter as "the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty." People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 604; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). The prosecution does not allege that defendants committed an unlawful act causing Devin's death. Thus, to prove involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution must show that the actions of defendants that caused Devin's death constituted gross negligence. Id.

To prove gross negligence, a prosecutor must show:

(1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another.

(2) Ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand.

(3) The omission [i.e., failure] to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another. [Head, 313 Mich App at 532 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
While the prosecution provides extensive arguments concerning why Luke's conduct in this case meets the requirements for gross negligence, having reviewed the record we find it more helpful to start, as the circuit court did, with the issue of causation. In doing so, we are able to resolve the assignment of error raised in both appeals.

To establish probable cause sufficient to support a bindover, the prosecution must show that defendants' conduct caused the victim's death. Head, 313 Mich App at 532. "Causation in the criminal context requires proof of factual causation and proximate causation. Factual causation exists if a finder of fact determines that 'but for' defendant's conduct the result would not have occurred." Id. at 532-533 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Proximate cause, by contrast, "is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant's conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural." People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 195; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In its explanation dismissing the charges against defendants, the circuit court stated the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that a homicide occurred—that defendants' conduct had caused Devin's death. Expanding on the circuit court's explanation, if defendants did not cause Devin's death, then there can be no finding of probable cause that the crime of involuntary manslaughter was committed. This conclusion is supported by our review of the preliminary examination.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at the preliminary examination shows: (a) defendants had been warned against leaving Devin unattended in the playpen and placing a baby gate on top of the playpen weighted down by boxes of toys; (b) Luke, after putting Devin to bed, placed the baby gate, a sheet, and, possibly, one or two boxes of toys on top of the playpen; (c) Devin was found several hours later, unresponsive, and with his arms straight out; and (d) that the cause of Devin's death was unknown and the manner of his death indeterminate. The prosecution explained Devin's death as resulting from Devin attempting to climb out of the playpen, becoming caught between the playpen and the gate, suffocating, and dying. The prosecution further asserts that Devin's body fell into the position that Luke found Devin in at some point after Devin's death. In support of its theory, the prosecution points to Dr. Moons's testimony that this proposed cause of death would be consistent with the findings of the autopsy. However, despite intentionally searching for evidence of asphyxiation during the autopsy, Dr Moons found none sufficient to conclude Devin died from asphyxiation. Indeed, part of the reason Devin's death is consistent with asphyxiation is because none of the autopsy's findings allowed Dr. Moons to conclusively exclude asphyxiation as a cause of death. And, as Dr. Moons testified, asphyxiation was one of several potential causes of death that could not be excluded. Thus, the prosecution is asking this Court to rely on speculation given the myriad of possibilities that might explain Devin's death.

Moreover, the prosecution cannot point to any medical evidence that bolsters their theory concerning how Devin died, or more crucially, how Devin's death was caused by defendants' conduct. The ultimate piece of medical evidence, and the only one offered by Dr. Moons with reasonable medical certainty, is that the cause of Devin's death is unknown and the manner of his death is indeterminate. As Dr. Moons stated, we do not know what killed Devin. And because we do not know what killed Devin, we cannot know if defendants' conduct was the "but for" cause of Devin's death.

The prosecution asserts that the indeterminate manner of Devin's death does not completely undermine its theory. In support of this assertion, it relies on this Court's decision in People v Nelson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 27, 2016 (Docket Nos. 332115; 332116). But even if seen as persuasive authority (see e.g. People v Green, 260 Mich App 710, 720 n 5; 680 NW2d 477 (2004)), Nelson is not helpful here. In Nelson, the medical examiner made an initial conclusion, supported by specific medical evidence of pulmonary and cerebral edemas, that the victim's death was consistent with asphyxiation and only later changed it to "indeterminate" when presented with other factual claims. Nelson, unpub op at 4-5. In this case, the cause of Devin's death has never been settled; the prosecution is the only one who makes an unsupported assertion that Devin died in a particular manner. Again, in Nelson, specific medical evidence supported the findings concerning cause of death; here, the absence of evidence is claimed to prove a specific cause of death that supports the prosecution's theory. But, as discussed earlier, that absence of evidence can support any number of theories concerning Devin's death. The theory and the evidence upon which it is based is simply too tenuous to support a determination that defendants' conduct caused Devin's death.

We note that unpublished decisions of this Court lack precedential authority. MCR 7.215(C)(1); People v Green, 260 Mich App 710, 720 n 5; 680 NW2d 427 (2004).

Because there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause concerning the causation element of involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution failed to meet its burden at the preliminary examination. The evidence does not show that any crime was committed or, specifically, that the crime of involuntary manslaughter was committed by defendants. As a result, the district court based its decision to bind defendants over on an error of law, which is necessarily an abuse of discretion. People v Everett, 318 Mich App 511, 516; 899 NW2d 94 (2017). The circuit court did not err in dimissing the criminal charges against Luke and Starr.

Affirmed.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto


Summaries of

People v. Luke

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Mar 24, 2020
No. 348530 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2020)
Case details for

People v. Luke

Case Details

Full title:PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATTHEW JAMES…

Court:STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Date published: Mar 24, 2020

Citations

No. 348530 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2020)