Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD199476, Melinda J. Lasater, Judge.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Christopher Luevano was convicted by a jury of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203), with true findings that he used a deadly weapon (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), with true findings that he inflicted great bodily injury under sections 12022.7, subdivision (a) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), and that he used a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23); and petty theft with a prior theft conviction (§§ 484 & 666). Luevano admitted two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and two serious/violent prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). Luevano also admitted a prior theft conviction within the meaning of section 666.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Luevano was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), consecutive to a 10-year term for the serious felony prior convictions.
Luevano appeals contending the trial court's denial of his request to reopen the case prior to closing arguments was an abuse of discretion that denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness. We find no error and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Luevano does not challenge either the admissibility or the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Accordingly, we will summarize the evidence to provide context for the discussion of his contentions on appeal.
The Prosecution Case
On June 5, 2006, Luevano was observed by Wal-Mart store security personnel. Loss prevention officer Adrian Salas observed Luevano place a 19-inch computer monitor in a shopping cart. Salas observed Luevano replace the bar code label on the monitor. Salas observed Luevano take the monitor to the "self-checkout" counter and process the purchase. Salas was able to learn that the bar code placed on the computer monitor was for a $3.00 computer mouse pad. Other items were similarly charged as merchandise other than that which was taken by Luevano.
Salas approached Luevano as Luevano attempted to leave the store. Salas attempted to detain Luevano who began to run away. Salas struggled with Luevano inside the store, but Luevano broke free and the pursuit continued outside the store. Once in the parking lot, Salas was able to tackle Luevano who struggled to get away.
Salas attempted to restrain Luevano and to place him in handcuffs. Luevano produced a razor-type knife, referred to as an X-acto knife, and repeatedly slashed Salas in the head, neck, face and stomach. Salas did not immediately realize he had been cut until after Luevano had been subdued. Salas sustained serious lacerations to his face, lip, head, neck and stomach, which required staples, stitches, repair by a plastic surgeon and resulted in permanent scars.
The Defense Case
Luevano testified in his own behalf. He explained his actions in the store, removing the labels and switching them to lower-priced labels. He said he used his knife to remove the labels. He testified he fled when contacted by Salas in order to avoid the consequences of being caught.
Luevano described his struggles with Salas and explained he was trying to avoid apprehension. He testified that Salas hit him, knocked him down and attempted to restrain him. Luevano said he thought Salas was going to beat him, not merely restrain him. Luevano testified he took the knife out of his pocket and slashed Salas to make him stop his efforts to apprehend him and to use force against Luevano.
DISCUSSION
After the close of the evidence and shortly before final arguments, defense counsel requested the court to allow him to reopen the evidence. Counsel advised he had previously subpoenaed Wal-Mart to produce their policy material regarding store security and apprehension of thieves. Counsel advised he had just received the material and that it would show that Salas took actions to apprehend Luevano, which were not authorized by Wal-Mart's internal policies. Counsel contended the discovery of those materials required him to further cross-examine Salas to demonstrate that Salas was not authorized by Wal-Mart policies to pursue Luevano outside the store and that he was not authorized to use force to attempt to restrain Luevano.
After an extensive review of the Wal-Mart material, the trial court concluded the store policies had no relevance regarding whether Salas acted within California law in his use of force to restrain Luevano or on the question of whether Luevano was entitled to use deadly force in self-defense. The court further concluded any possible relevance was outweighed by the prejudicial effect, particularly in the potential for confusion of the jurors as to whether Wal-Mart policies or state law controlled the decisions in this case.
Luevano contends the trial court abused its discretion in that the Wal-Mart policies were relevant to whether Salas acted in excess of his authority and whether Luevano acted in self-defense. Luevano further argues such abuse of discretion deprived him of the right to confront the witness against him in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. We agree with the trial court that any marginal relevance of the new material was clearly outweighed by the potential prejudice arising from the likelihood of jury confusion. We further find the court's proper exercise of discretion to regulate the admissibility of evidence did not violate Luevano's right to confrontation either under the California or United States Constitutions.
Trial courts have broad discretion to control the admission of evidence. Such discretion includes the power to reopen a criminal case to permit the introduction of additional evidence. Such decisions are reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836; § 1094.) Trial courts exercising discretion to permit the reopening of a criminal case should consider the significance of the evidence, the diligence of the party offering new evidence, whether the process will cause undue focus on the new material and the importance of the evidence newly offered. (People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 294-295.) The trial court is not required to allow a case to be reopened when the evidence to be presented is irrelevant, or of only marginal relevance.
To the extent Luevano has couched his contention in constitutional terms, it is also clear that the Sixth Amendment does not require trial courts to admit any evidence offered by a defendant, nor must it permit every avenue of cross-examination such defendant might wish to pursue. Trial courts have discretion to exclude evidence, even in the face of a Sixth Amendment argument, where such evidence is repetitive, cumulative, or only marginally relevant. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372; People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 350.)
Applying the appropriate standard of review, it is clear the trial court acted well within its discretion to deny the request to reopen. As the trial court noted, the material at issue dealt entirely with Wal-Mart's internal policies regarding store security. The policies recognized the company policies might be more restrictive than state law. They are plainly designed to regulate the activities of company employees to prevent injury or potential civil liability. They do not purport to address the criminal law of any state or federal jurisdiction. Rather, such policies rationally seek to limit losses that companies might incur due to civil suit or injury to employees. A retailer might conclude the loss of a few hundred dollars in merchandise is not worth the risk of serious injury to an employee or customer. Such a rational business decision does not affect the question under California law of whether Salas was the aggressor, for purposes of Luevano's claim of self-defense or whether Salas used excessive force, which might have justified Luevano using deadly force to protect himself.
Salas was thoroughly cross-examined and Luevano was able to fully set forth his defense. Further examination of Salas about internal Wal-Mart policies, which he apparently had never seen, would not add any relevant evidence for the jury's consideration. The trial court's decision to deny the request to reopen the case was proper and did not deny Luevano his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J., AARON, J.