Opinion
No. 1-20-0455
05-13-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHERMOND LUCKEY, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 16 CR 2054 Honorable James M. Obbish, Judge, presiding. JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant's sentence is affirmed over his contentions that it is excessive in light of numerous mitigating factors and that the trial court improperly considered in aggravation that he failed to demonstrate remorse during his trial testimony. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Shermond Luckey was convicted of attempted armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 18-2(a)(2) (West 2016)) and, based on his criminal history, sentenced to a Class X term of 16 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive in light of numerous factors in mitigation which he argues outweigh the nature of the offense and his criminal history. He further asserts that the trial court improperly considered in aggravation the fact that he demonstrated no remorse during his trial testimony. For the reasons which follow, we affirm. ¶ 3 Defendant's conviction arose from an incident at a Chicago cellular phone store on January 13, 2016. Following arrest, defendant and his codefendant, Demari Williams, were charged by indictment with two counts of attempted first degree murder (counts I and II) and two counts of attempted armed robbery with a firearm (counts III and IV). Williams pled guilty to attempted armed robbery and is not a party to this appeal. Defendant proceeded to a bench trial. ¶ 4 At trial, Michael Jafilan testified that on the date in question, he was working as a sales representative at a T-Mobile store on East 95th Street in Chicago. Jafilan was working the morning shift with his coworker, Michael Posey. They were the only two individuals in the store when, around 11:03 a.m., two men entered the store and began looking at cell phones. One of the men, whom Jafilan identified in court as defendant, was wearing a black sweater and jeans. The other individual, later determined to be Williams, was wearing a red sweater and red jeans. Defendant was speaking with Jafilan about purchasing a cell phone while Posey stood in the back of the store, near a door which led to the inventory room, and Williams was standing near the register. ¶ 5 Defendant provided Jafilan a photo identification (ID). Jafilan thought the photo on the ID did not appear to be defendant, but nevertheless took it to the computer to start processing it. As Posey started to enter the inventory room at the back of the store, there was a "bum rush" in that direction. When asked to elaborate, Jafilan explained that both defendant and Williams ran toward the door to the inventory room, and that defendant was holding a firearm, which was pointed straight at Posey. ¶ 6 Jafilan retrieved his own firearm. Posey entered the inventory room and shut the door behind him. Defendant and Williams turned and looked toward Jafilan, and defendant pointed his firearm at Jafilan, who was scared and thought defendant was trying to shoot at him. Jafilan believed he had to defend himself and fired at defendant. He was not sure how many times he fired but agreed he "ma[d]e contact" with defendant and stated that he observed defendant lie down on the floor. Jafilan ran out of the store through the glass front door, which was shattered. Defendant followed, pointing his firearm at Jafilan. Jafilan thought he was going to die. He ran across a parking lot and hid behind some parked vehicles. Eventually, he connected with Posey. ¶ 7 When the police arrived at the scene, Jafilan told them what happened. He then accompanied the police to South Shore Hospital to see if he could make an identification of the offenders. While Jafilan was at the hospital, he noticed defendant passing him on a stretcher and was able to view his face. Jafilan identified defendant to the police as the man who had the handgun in the store. ¶ 8 In court, Jafilan identified People's Exhibit 1 as the clothing Williams had been wearing and People's Exhibit 2 as the clothing defendant had been wearing. Surveillance video from the store was admitted into evidence and published to the court. Jafilan identified himself, Posey, defendant, and Williams on the surveillance video. ¶ 9 The video footage, which is included in the record on appeal, shows three different angles of the incident. The first video, which depicts most of the sales floor, shows defendant handing Jafilan an item and Jafilan taking it to a computer. Then, as Posey moves toward the store's interior back door, defendant points a handgun at Posey and he and Williams run toward him. Posey passes through the door and closes it behind him. Jafilan then briefly appears in the frame pointing a firearm at defendant and Williams and discharging his weapon. Defendant falls to the ground and Williams runs toward the front of the store. After defendant manipulates his own firearm, he gets up and runs toward the front of the store, out of the camera's view. In the second video, which depicts the back of the store, defendant is seen pointing a handgun toward Posey, defendant and Williams running toward Posey, and Posey entering the inventory room and closing the door behind him. It also depicts defendant falling to the ground, Williams running toward the front of the store, defendant manipulating his handgun, and defendant getting up and running toward the front door. The third video, which depicts the front of the store, shows Williams running toward the glass front door, which shatters just before he reaches it. Williams falls to the ground. Jafilan enters the frame, pointing his firearm in several directions, and runs through the door. A few seconds later, defendant runs through the front door, and Williams gets up and follows. Then Williams and defendant, with his arms extended in front of him, run in the direction that Jafilan fled. ¶ 10 On cross-examination, Jafilan clarified that the store's front door was locked so that people had to be "buzzed" in and out. He did not recall who buzzed the door for defendant and Williams to enter the store. He had never seen either individual prior to the day in question. Jafilan explained that he had his own firearm on his hip when defendant and Williams entered the store. When defendant opened his wallet to retrieve his ID, Jafilan thought he noticed another form of ID in the wallet. He, however, did not see a photo on the second ID. He did not return the first ID to defendant as he "didn't have a chance." ¶ 11 Jafilan agreed that neither individual demanded or grabbed any merchandise, demanded money, or tried to take anything from the register. In addition, neither man verbally threatened him. Jafilan was less than 10 feet from defendant when defendant drew his weapon. Jafilan agreed that there was an exit in the back of the store, behind the inventory room door. He reiterated that he did not remember how many times he fired his own weapon, but agreed that he fired at both defendant and Williams and believed he kept shooting until there were no bullets left in his firearm. He was not sure if anyone else fired any shots in the store. ¶ 12 Chicago police detective Edward Gorman testified that he was assigned to investigate the shooting. At the store, he spoke with Jafilan, Posey, and the responding officers. After learning from other officers that the suspects were victims of gunshot wounds, he went to South Shore Hospital and then Stroger Hospital, where he observed defendant with bandages around his groin area. Gorman identified defendant in court. ¶ 13 The parties stipulated that an evidence technician collected two swabs of suspect blood from the floor in front of the rear counter of the store; a forensic scientist determined that blood was indicated on the floor swabs; an investigator collected a buccal swab from defendant; and another forensic scientist determined that the DNA profile identified from the blood on the floor swabs matched the DNA profile of defendant obtained from the buccal swab. ¶ 14 Defendant moved for a directed finding as to all charges. The trial court granted the motion as to the charges of attempted first degree murder, but denied the motion as to the charges of attempted armed robbery with a firearm. ¶ 15 Defendant testified that on the morning in question, he woke at his fiancée's home and went to the store to get something to drink. He armed himself for protection because there was "a real lot" of gang activity in the area. Defendant was drinking outside the store when he noticed a vehicle in the parking lot, occupied by two men he did not know. The automobile pulled up alongside defendant and the passenger, later determined to be Williams, asked if defendant wanted to "make some quick cash." Defendant, who was unemployed at the time, agreed to assist Williams in a plan to use another man's ID to purchase cell phones. He got into the vehicle and they drove to the T-Mobile store on East 95th Street, parking about a block away. After defendant memorized a social security number, he and Williams got out of the automobile and walked to the entrance of the store. ¶ 16 Defendant pulled on the store's front door, but it would not open. After he and Williams were "buzzed" in, defendant told Jafilan he was interested in purchasing cell phones. Defendant provided the ID that Williams had given to him so that Jafilan could run a credit check. Jafilan asked defendant his name and observed that defendant did not look like the depicted person in the photo ID. In response, defendant asked for the ID back three times. When Jafilan refused, defendant told Jafilan to "buzz" him out so he could leave the store. Jafilan answered, "[T]he only way you're going to leave the store is through the police or a body bag." ¶ 17 At the mention of the police, defendant panicked because he was on parole at the time. When he saw Posey edging toward the back of the store, he thought Posey was intending to leave the store through the back door. Defendant pulled out his handgun and said to Posey, "[L]et me out of the store, homey." Posey went through the back door and closed it. ¶ 18 Defendant heard gunshots. He turned and noticed Jafilan was firing at him. He was hit three times and fell to the ground. Jafilan moved around the counter, shot toward Williams, hit and shattered the glass on the front door, and continued firing until his weapon was empty. Then, as Jafilan was leaving through the shattered front door, defendant tried to take the safety off his own handgun. ¶ 19 At some point, defendant and Williams left the store and went back to the vehicle. The driver dropped defendant and Williams off at South Shore Hospital, where defendant received treatment for his gunshot wounds. Defendant left his firearm in the vehicle as he was on parole and did not want to have the handgun in the hospital. ¶ 20 On cross-examination, defendant agreed that he carried a weapon because the neighborhood was dangerous, but nevertheless got into a vehicle occupied by individuals he had never met before "just to get some phones." He explained, "[I]t happen[s] all the time." On redirect examination, defendant clarified that his understanding of his arrangement with Williams was that for every three phones defendant was able to purchase, he would receive one. ¶ 21 The trial court found defendant guilty of both counts of attempted armed robbery with a firearm. Defendant filed and argued a posttrial motion, which the trial court denied. ¶ 22 At sentencing, the trial court merged count III into count IV and indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation (PSI) report. The PSI report, which the parties corrected at the hearing, reflected that defendant's criminal history included the following: a 2011 conviction for aggravated domestic battery predicated on strangulation (Class 2) and aggravated battery weapon/air rifle, for which defendant received consecutive sentences of four and two years in prison; a 2011 conviction for direct criminal contempt, for which he received a sentence of 90 days in jail; a 2008 conviction for retail theft, for which he received a sentence of one year in prison; another 2008 conviction for retail theft, for which he received a sentence of one year in prison; and a 2002 conviction for residential burglary (Class 1), for which he initially received a sentence of three years of probation but was subsequently sentenced to four years in prison on a probation violation. The State noted that the PSI report also reflected defendant had older misdemeanor convictions for domestic battery and battery. ¶ 23 The PSI report related that defendant was born on May 8, 1980, and that his father died when defendant was five years old. Defendant's mother was in and out of psychiatric hospitals, so he stayed with his grandmother or aunt for months at a time. Defendant reported that he had a "somewhat stable home" and all of his basic needs were met. Although his mother was physically abusive to him, he was never involved with the Department of Children and Family Services. Both of defendant's parents struggled with substance abuse, and one of his brothers had been involved with the criminal justice system. Defendant has a good relationship with his mother, whom he sees regularly and with whom he maintains phone contact every other day. ¶ 24 Defendant reported that he attended a special education program but left school after tenth grade due to high gang activity in the high school and the neighborhood. He later attended a GED program, but did not pass the GED test. He hoped to obtain an GED and a commercial driver's license in the future. Defendant was last employed by a construction company in 2009 and earned $100 per day in cash. He received enough government benefits to be able to get by, but sometimes worried about his finances. ¶ 25 The PSI report reflected that defendant is single and has never been married. He has five children with whom he maintains regular phone contact and "decent" relationships. He acknowledged that he had been arrested for domestic violence on a few occasions. He stated that his siblings were upset and angered by his arrest, his family is fairly supportive of him, and he was "somewhat" satisfied with the level of support he receives. ¶ 26 Defendant had three close friends that he visited regularly until his incarceration. The group went to the gym and played football together. Defendant reported that he was affiliated with the Black Disciples street gang from age 12 to age 25. He attended church on a daily basis. ¶ 27 Defendant reported that he saw a psychiatrist once at age 19 as he was feeling down, but did not remember if he was diagnosed with any condition. He had only one appointment and was not prescribed any medication. He saw a doctor as necessary for Supplemental Security Income approval. He has never been court-ordered to undergo a behavioral clinical examination. ¶ 28 The PSI report further reflected that defendant first used alcohol at age 12 and increased his alcohol use through his teen years until his incarceration. He last used alcohol in January 2016. Defendant first used marijuana at age 12 and continued consuming it until age 20. He first used Ecstasy at age 19 and stopped using it at age 27. He used promethazine from age 27 until his incarceration. Defendant reported that he attended and completed a substance abuse treatment program while incarcerated from 2012 to 2014. His mother had expressed concern about his drug use, and defendant stated that his drug use contributed to poor decision-making. ¶ 29 In aggravation, the State relied on defendant's criminal history and highlighted that he was on parole at the time of the instant offense. ¶ 30 In mitigation, defense counsel noted that defendant was 39 years old, that two of his daughters had been coming to court consistently to support him, that one of those daughters was present that day, and that he maintained a relationship with his mother. Counsel argued that defendant had a difficult childhood, with his mother having been diagnosed with schizophrenia and having abused him. Counsel highlighted that defendant suffered from a learning disability and substance abuse issues, which had an effect on his decision-making, had received some substance abuse treatment, and hoped to obtain a GED and a commercial driver's license in the future. Counsel pointed out that defendant had been in custody for four years already and had been productive during that time, working in the sanitation department. Finally, counsel reminded the court that defendant suffered severe injuries during the incident. ¶ 31 In allocution, defendant apologized to his daughter, the court, Jafilan, and Posey. He apologized for his "shortcomings in not being a productive citizen to society." He stated that he made a poor decision and learned a valuable lesson that "there is no right way to do wrong." He stated that he was tired of reaping the consequences of doing wrong and was now going to try to reap the benefits of doing the right thing. ¶ 32 In announcing sentence, the trial court noted that the mitigation evidence presented by the defense was well-documented and that defendant had a long history of substance abuse starting at age 12. The court stated that defendant's history with substance abuse contributed to his poor decision-making and was motivation for why an individual would engage in an attempted armed robbery. The court noted defendant's minimal work history, his relationship with his mother, and his parents' own substance abuse issues. ¶ 33 The court also considered defendant's "significant" criminal history, including his 2011 conviction for aggravated domestic battery predicated on strangulation, for which he was on parole at the time of the current offense. The court stated that all domestic batteries are dangerous and have the likelihood of escalating to causing serious bodily harm, but that cases involving strangulation are extremely significant, dangerous, and potentially fatal to the victim. In addition, the court noted that defendant had at least four felony convictions, two of which subjected him to mandatory sentencing as a Class-X offender in this case. The court stated that there was a great threat of harm in the instant case as defendant was armed with a firearm and the injuries defendant received "just as easily could have been inflicted upon either" Jafilan or Posey. ¶ 34 With regard to defendant's statement in allocution, the trial court remarked as follows:
"I'm a little impressed by what you say today, [defendant], as being putting [sic] you in contact with reality about your situation, apologizing. Maybe today maybe in front of your daughter you sort of realized a little bit more about terrible mistakes that you've made with your life here, especially in this particular case. That wasn't really the case when you testified. That didn't really demonstrate any acceptance of responsibility at that time. But I do take into consideration that you seem to have changed your ways a little bit now."¶ 35 Observing that defendant "is X by background," the trial court sentenced him to 16 years in prison. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the court denied. ¶ 36 On appeal, defendant contends that his 16-year sentence is excessive. ¶ 37 A trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference on review. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). Sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference on appeal as the trial court is in a superior position to fashion an appropriate sentence based on firsthand consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, including the defendant's credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). Although the trial court's consideration of mitigating factors is required, it has no obligation to recite each factor and the weight it is given. People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11. Absent some indication to the contrary, other than the sentence itself, we presume the trial court properly considered all relevant mitigating factors presented. People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19. ¶ 38 In reviewing a defendant's sentence, this court will not reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we would have weighed these factors differently. People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 20. A sentencing determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000). Sentences that fall within the permissible statutory range may be deemed to be the result of an abuse of discretion only where they are "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Id. at 210. ¶ 39 Here, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 16 years' imprisonment. Due to his criminal background, defendant was subject to Class X sentencing, with an applicable sentencing range of 6 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a), 5-4.5-95(b) (West 2020). Because the 16-year sentence imposed in this case was within the statutory sentencing range, it is presumed proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. ¶ 40 Defendant does not dispute that his sentence fell within the permissible sentencing range and is presumed proper. Rather, he argues that his sentence is excessive in light of numerous factors in mitigation that he argues substantially outweighed the nature of the offense and his criminal history. As mitigating factors, defendant highlights that he had a learning disability, survived an abusive childhood, battled substance abuse, enjoyed a supportive relationship with his family, and had ended his gang affiliation. He further asserts he was "aging out" of criminal behavior, as he was 39 years old at sentencing, and maintains that as an aging prisoner, he would create financial cost for the correctional system. He emphasizes that he did not cause harm to Jafilan or Posey, but rather, was injured himself and fled the scene to seek medical assistance instead of returning gunfire or otherwise injuring anyone. He also argues that "with the exception of one prior conviction," his criminal history is not unusually violent or heinous such that it would require a 16-year sentence. Finally, defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered as aggravating that he demonstrated no remorse during his trial testimony. ¶ 41 The record demonstrates that the trial court was well aware of the mitigating factors identified by defendant on appeal. All of these mitigating factors—defendant's learning disability, abusive childhood, history of substance abuse, supportive family ties, discontinuation of gang membership, and age—were included in the PSI report, which the trial court stated it had reviewed prior to imposing sentence. In addition, defense counsel highlighted many of these same factors, including defendant's age, support from his mother and daughters, difficult upbringing, learning disability, and substance abuse, and noted that defendant had been injured during the incident. Finally, while we may presume that the trial court properly considered all relevant mitigating factors presented (Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19), here, the trial court expressly noted that it considered the mitigation evidence, which it stated was "well-documented." ¶ 42 In addition to considering the evidence in mitigation, the trial court also made clear at sentencing that it was disturbed by the factual circumstances of the case. The court found that there was a "great threat of harm" caused by defendant's actions because he armed himself with a firearm, and observed that the injuries defendant suffered "just as easily could have been inflicted upon either" Jafilan or Posey. The most important sentencing factor is the seriousness of the offense, and a trial court need not give greater weight to a defendant's rehabilitative potential or other mitigating factors than to the severity of the offense. People v. Sandifer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142740, ¶ 82. Moreover, the trial court voiced concern regarding defendant's criminal history, especially his most recent conviction for aggravated domestic battery premised on strangulation, for which he was on parole at the time of the incident here. A defendant's criminal history is a proper aggravating sentencing factor. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2020); see also People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399 (2009) ("criminal history alone" may "warrant sentences substantially above the minimum"). ¶ 43 Criminal penalties must be determined according to the seriousness of the offense and the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A defendant's history and character are primary considerations when evaluating a defendant's rehabilitative potential. People v. Cetwinski, 2018 IL App (3d) 160174, ¶ 69. A lengthy criminal history weighs heavily against a defendant's claim that he has strong rehabilitative potential. People v. Larsen, 47 Ill. App. 3d 9, 31-32 (1977). A trial court may also consider the relative risk of recidivism, the nature and circumstances of the offense (Cetwinski, 2018 IL App (3d) 160174, ¶ 69), whether the defendant persists in claiming innocence, and whether he expresses remorse (People v. Charleston, 2018 IL App (1st) 161323, ¶ 29). Moreover, where the trial court has examined the PSI report, it is presumed that it considered the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. People v. Colbert, 2013 IL App (1st) 112935, ¶ 25. The trial court is not required to make an express finding that a defendant lacks rehabilitative potential. People v. Redmond, 265 Ill. App. 3d 292, 307 (1994). ¶ 44 Here, the trial court did not specifically speak to defendant's rehabilitative potential when announcing sentence. However, as the trial court had reviewed the PSI report, we may presume it considered that aspect of sentencing. Colbert, 2013 IL App (1st) 112935, ¶ 25. Beyond that presumption, the court noted several factors that were relevant to the issue. In defendant's favor, the trial court recognized, as discussed further below, defendant's expression of remorse when he spoke in allocution. However, most of the relevant factors weighed against defendant, including his long history of substance abuse, his minimal work history, his significant criminal history, and the nature and circumstances of the instant offense, which the trial court observed involved a great threat of harm. Finally, the trial court noted that defendant was on parole at the time he committed the attempted armed robbery here. A defendant's criminal conduct while on parole demonstrates that he has little rehabilitative potential. People v. Jackson, 303 Ill. App. 3d 583, 588 (1999). ¶ 45 Given that all of the mitigating factors defendant raises on appeal were discussed in defendant's PSI report and defense counsel's arguments in mitigation, defendant essentially asks us to reweigh the sentencing factors and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. As noted above, this we cannot do. See Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 20 (a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently). ¶ 46 In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of defendant's assertion that he is "aging out" of criminal behavior, as he was 39 years old at the time of sentencing, and that his incarceration will be costly due to his age. In support of this argument, defendant relies on United States v. Presley, 790 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2015). However, while Presley observed that violent crime "is far less common among persons over 40," it defined "aging prisoners" as those 50 years old or older and attributed the increase in cost of incarcerating such prisoners primarily to medical costs. Id. at 702. The Presley court also emphasized it was not suggesting that sentencing judges "should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine how long a prison sentence to give" and recognized that cases exist where the "heinousness of the defendant's crime or other factors argue compellingly" for a longer sentence even where the defendant is "aging." Id. at 702-03. As such, Presley does not dictate a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. ¶ 47 Finally, we address defendant's argument that the trial court erred by considering his failure to show remorse during his trial testimony. Defendant recognizes that a trial court may consider a defendant's lack of remorse as aggravating. However, he asserts that here, the trial court improperly penalized him for asserting his right to trial. See People v. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526 (1986) ("when it is evident from the judge's remarks that the punishment was, at least in part, imposed because the defendant had refused to plead guilty but had instead availed himself of his constitutional right to trial, the sentence will be set aside"). In making this argument, defendant focuses on the trial court's observation that while defendant apologized at sentencing, "That wasn't really the case when you testified. That didn't really demonstrate any acceptance of responsibility at that time." ¶ 48 We disagree with defendant's characterization of the trial court's comment as evidencing that it was punishing defendant for not pleading guilty. The trial court's remark must be viewed in context. Id. at 526-27 (when determining whether a sentence was improperly imposed, a reviewing court should not focus on a few words or statements of the trial court, but rather, must consider the entire record as a whole). As noted above, the trial court's remarks, in context, were as follows:
"I'm a little impressed by what you say today, [defendant], as being putting [sic] you in contact with reality about your situation, apologizing. Maybe today maybe in front of your daughter you sort of realized a little bit more about terrible mistakes that you've made with your life here, especially in this particular case. That wasn't really the case when
you testified. That didn't really demonstrate any acceptance of responsibility at that time. But I do take into consideration that you seem to have changed your ways a little bit now."¶ 49 Viewing the trial court's comments in context, we find no impropriety. Defendant argues that the trial court "held the fact that he failed to admit guilt during his trial testimony as aggravating." We cannot agree. In our view, the trial court simply reviewed the timing of defendant's expression of remorse and, in fact, acknowledged his acceptance of responsibility at sentencing, and properly accorded weight to this factor as mitigating. The trial court stated it was impressed with defendant for expressing remorse at sentencing and stated it was taking into consideration that he had "changed [his] ways." When viewed in context, it is clear that the trial court did take into account as a mitigating factor that defendant demonstrated remorse. See People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 281 (1989) (remorse is a proper subject for consideration at sentencing). Thus, defendant's argument fails. ¶ 50 In light of the facts of this case, the interests of society, and the trial court's stated consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors, we cannot find that defendant's sentence is "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. ¶ 51 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 52 Affirmed.
The parties both state that Jafilan possessed a concealed carry permit, and defendant indicates that Jafilan also possessed a Firearm Owner's Identification card. However, this information does not appear in Jafilan's testimony. --------