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People v. Lovato

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Sep 17, 2008
2d Crim. B204181 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo No. F-406312, John A. Trice, Judge.

Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven F. Mercer, David Zarmi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


YEGAN, J.

Lawrence Lovato appeals from the judgment entered following a court trial at which he was determined to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) According to a psychiatrist, appellant suffered from two severe mental disorders: a "delusional disorder, persecutory type," and "pedophilia, sexually attracted to females." Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that (1) he in fact suffered from pedophilia, (2) he was in treatment for pedophilia for at least 90 days within the year preceding his parole release date, (3) the delusional disorder existed at the time of the MDO offenses; and (4) the delusional disorder was an aggravating factor in the commission of those offenses. We affirm.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

M DO Offenses

On June 29, 1989, appellant was sentenced to prison for 24 years on "seven counts of lewd and lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14." (§ 288, subd. (a).) The victim was appellant's seven-year-old niece. The lewd acts "consisted of oral copulation, anal penetration, attempted vaginal penetration, and some contact between [appellant's] fingers and the private part of the child." The acts were committed between July 3 and October 1, 1986.

Psychiatrist's Testimony

Joan Odom became appellant's treating psychiatrist on August 3, 2007. She testified as follows:

"Delusional disorder is a mental illness that consists of firmly-fixed false beliefs of a non-bizarre nature." Appellant believed "that the system is against him and is attempting somehow to abuse him" and that "individuals are trying to bring some harm to him." For example, he believed that "correctional officers were adulterating his food and stealing his mail," that "his wife had set him up and sent him to prison under false pretenses," and that "the doctors were trying to poison him with the medications that they had prescribed." In addition, appellant told Dr. Odom: "You are crazy. All you doctors are crazy. You are just trying to make up stuff about me so you can line your own pockets."

Appellant's paranoid delusional disorder was "connected" with the commission of the MDO offenses. Dr. Odom explained: "I do believe that because of [appellant's] tendency to misinterpret environmental stimuli and to believe that people are in some way provoking him, . . . that very likely those thoughts and beliefs were active at the time of the [MDO] offense[s] in such a way that, combined with his [sexual] attraction [to female children], it was more likely that he would act on the aberrant thoughts, feeling provoked in some way." On the other hand, appellant's pedophilia "was the more active of the two [disorders] at the time of the commission of the [MDO] offense[s]."

The mental health records reviewed by Dr. Odom did not indicate that appellant had been treated for pedophilia, and Dr. Odom did not know whether such treatment had been administered. The records stated that appellant had been "treated continuously since at least 1999" for the delusional disorder. Dr. Odom did not know whether he had received treatment for this disorder before 1999. It was "[v]ery unlikely" that the delusional disorder had started in 1999 because "[t]he nature of the illness is that it tends to have an earlier onset and to be refractory to treatment and to exist lifelong."

Dr. Odom concluded that, because of his severe mental disorders, appellant posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others. She noted that he had "a long history of violence within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. . . . Those [violent] acts included threats to harm and kill staff eight times; . . . battery on a peace officer two times; mutual combat five times, of which in one instance he stabbed a [cellmate] with a pen, and on another instance he stabbed a [cellmate] with a toothbrush."

Standard of Review

The substantial evidence rule applies to appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in MDO proceedings. (People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 919-920.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value" - such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant met the MDO criteria. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) We may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. (People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.)

Sufficiency of the Evidence: Pedophilia

"The MDO law is a civil commitment scheme targeting state prisoners with severe mental disorders who are about to be released on parole." (People v. Martin (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 970, 973.) Several criteria must be met before a prisoner may be required to accept treatment under the MDO law. One criterion is that the prisoner must have "been in treatment for the severe mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the prisoner's parole or release." (§ 2962, subd. (c).)

Appellant correctly contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish this criterion as to his pedophilia. The mental health records reviewed by Dr. Odom did not indicate that he had been treated for pedophilia, and Dr. Odom did not know whether such treatment had been administered. Appellant's MDO commitment, therefore, cannot be based on the disorder of pedophilia. Accordingly, we need not consider appellant's other contention that the evidence is also insufficient to show that he in fact suffered from pedophilia.

Sufficiency of the Evidence: Delusional Disorder

Another criterion for MDO commitment is that "[t]he severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the commission of" the MDO offense. (§ 2962, subd. (b).) Appellant does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to show that, beginning in 1999, he suffered from a paranoid delusional disorder. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to show (1) that he suffered from the delusional disorder in 1986 when he committed the MDO offenses, and (2) that this disorder was "an aggravating factor" in their commission.

We disagree. Dr. Odom opined that it was "[v]ery unlikely" that the delusional disorder had started in 1999: "The nature of the illness is that it tends to have an earlier onset and to be refractory to treatment and to exist lifelong." In view of appellant's "tendency to misinterpret environmental stimuli and to believe that people are in some way provoking him," Dr. Odom also opined that his delusional disorder was "connected" with the MDO offenses. She explained that his paranoid beliefs made it "more likely that he would act on the aberrant thoughts [sexual attraction to female children] feeling provoked in some way." Dr. Odom's testimony constitutes substantial evidence that appellant's delusional disorder existed in 1986 and was an aggravating factor in the commission of the MDO offenses. (See People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 879 ["A single psychiatric opinion that an individual is dangerous because of a mental disorder constitutes substantial evidence to support an extension of the defendant's commitment under section 1026.5"]; accord, People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165.)

Section 1026.5 provides for the extended commitment to a state hospital of a defendant who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to section 1026. The commitment may be extended only if the defendant's "mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).)

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: GILBERT, P.J., PERREN, J.


Summaries of

People v. Lovato

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Sep 17, 2008
2d Crim. B204181 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Lovato

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAWRENCE LOVATO, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Sep 17, 2008

Citations

2d Crim. B204181 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2008)