Opinion
No. 2010–485 W CR.
2014-05-29
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard LONG, Appellant.
Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Town of Eastchester, Westchester County (Domenick Porco, J.), rendered February 3, 2010. The judgments convicted defendant, upon jury verdicts, of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree and disorderly conduct, respectively.
Present: IANNACCI, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
On December 5, 2006, defendant was arraigned in the City Court of New Rochelle on a simplified traffic information charging him with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[1][a] ) and an information charging him with disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20[3] ). The People announced their readiness for trial, and the case was adjourned for one day for the assignment of counsel. Subsequently, the action was transferred to the Justice Court of the Town of Eastchester, after the judges of the City Court of New Rochelle recused themselves. Following a jury trial in January and February 2010, defendant was convicted of the charged offenses.
On appeal, defendant contends that the judgment convicting him of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree should be reversed on the ground that the simplified traffic information is “jurisdictionally defective” because the complainant police officer was not the person who had completed the supporting deposition, and because the information fails to allege that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that his license had been suspended. Defendant further contends that both judgments of conviction should be reversed because the Justice Court made an improper Sandoval ( People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 [1974] ) determination and because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
A review of the simplified traffic information indicates that it is sufficient, since it designates the offense charged, substantially conforms to the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles ( see CPL 100.25 [1], 100.40[2]; Regulations of Commissioner of Motor Vehicles [15 NYCRR] § 91; People v. Tytutin, 39 Misc.3d 131[A], 2013 N.Y. Slip Op 50470[U] ), and provides the court with adequate information to establish that it has jurisdiction to hear the case ( see People v. Fernandez, 20 N.Y.3d 44 [2012]; People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d 111, 116 [1976]; People v. Ferro, 22 Misc.3d 7, 871 N.Y.S.2d 814 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008] ). Moreover, any alleged defects in the supporting deposition have been waived ( see e.g. People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103 [1986] ), inasmuch as defense counsel first, orally, moved for dismissal of the information in January 2010—after the trial had commenced ( see CPL 170.30[2]; 255.20[1] ). The absence of adequate factual allegations in a deposition in support of a jurisdictionally valid simplified traffic information is not a jurisdictional defect and can be waived if not timely raised ( see People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d at 116–117, 408 N.Y.S.2d 16, 379 N.E.2d 1147).
The Justice Court ruled that the People could cross-examine defendant regarding his 1982 attempted criminal impersonation conviction. The nature and extent of cross-examination is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 374, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413). Defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the prejudicial effect of the evidence of his attempted criminal impersonation conviction so outweighed the probative value of this evidence on the issue of credibility that its exclusion was warranted ( see id. at 378, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413; People v. Dahlbender, 23 A.D.3d 493 [2005] ).
In order to determine whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20, the following factors must be considered: “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay” ( People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445 [1975] ). An inexcusable delay will not “in and of itself, be sufficient to warrant the drastic measure of dismissal” ( id. at 446, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303). Upon applying the Taranovitch factors to the case at bar, we find that defendant has not shown any constitutional violation for the 16 to 17 months of delay from his December 5, 2006 arraignment—on which date the People announced their readiness for trial—until his June 2008 motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.20. Defendant was not incarcerated at any time during the delay, and he has not shown how his defense was significantly impaired by the delay. The record reveals that a substantial amount of the delay was due to defendant's motion practice, defendant's requests for new counsel, the recusal of the judges of the City Court of New Rochelle and the subsequent transfer of the case to the Justice Court of Eastchester. We note that defendant's due process right to prompt prosecution and constitutional speedy trial right are evaluated using the same Taranovitch factors ( see People v. Decker, 13 N.Y.3d 12, 15 [2009] ).
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. IANNACCI, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ., concur.