Opinion
H042951
09-10-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TRACY DONNELL LEE, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1512240)
Following his conviction of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), petty theft (§ 484), and battery on an intimate partner (§§ 242, 243, subd. (e)(1)), defendant Tracy Donnell Lee was sentenced to 50 years to life pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Lee argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his Romero motion to strike one of his prior strikes, that his 50 year-to-life sentence is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, that he was denied due process because his strike priors are juvenile adjudications, and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his attorney stipulated over his objection that he had committed crimes. We affirm the judgment.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
On June 1, 2015, Levalle Beloney and Rico Robles were with Angel Tompkins in Tompkins's apartment. After drinking heavily, Beloney fell asleep in Tompkins's bed, Tompkins passed out in the bathroom, and Robles passed out on the living room couch. At around 3:00 a.m., Beloney woke up to find Lee, who was Tompkins's ex-boyfriend at the time, climbing through the bedroom window. Lee kicked Beloney in the face. Lee told Beloney to leave the apartment and began jabbing at him with a knife. Beloney defended himself by putting his hands up and kicking at Lee. Beloney was eventually able to get out of bed, and proceeded to jump out of the bedroom window.
Tompkins married Lee after June 1, 2015, and changed her last name to Lee.
From outside of the apartment, Beloney looked into the kitchen window and saw Lee and Tompkins arguing. Lee slapped Tompkins hard across the face, and Tompkins swung at Lee but missed. Lee walked over to the couch where Robles was still passed out and stabbed him in the buttocks. Lee told Robles to leave and threw his backpack out of the front door.
Lee then left the apartment carrying Beloney's shoes, shirt and cell phone. Beloney later noticed that he had been stabbed on the back of his right knee, and that his big toe had been injured. Neither Beloney nor Robles sought medical attention for their injuries.
An information was filed on July 9, 2015, charging Lee with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 and 3), petty theft (§ 484; count 2), and battery on an intimate partner (§§ 242, 243, subd. (e)(1); count 4). The information also alleged that as a juvenile, Lee committed two strike offenses. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
On October 14, 2015, Lee was found guilty of all of the criminal charges. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found the prior strike allegations true.
On October 27, 2015, Lee filed a Romero motion to strike one of the prior strikes in the interests of justice pursuant to section 1385.
Lee also filed a motion to dismiss one of the prior strikes pursuant to People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, arguing that both of the strike priors arose out of a single incident against a single victim. Lee does not assert this argument on appeal.
The court denied Lee's Romero motion on October 30, 2015, and imposed a sentence of 25 years to life for counts 1 and 3, to run consecutively, resulting in a sentence of 50 years to life. On counts 2 and 4, the court imposed two 30-day terms to run concurrent with the life terms. Lee filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Romero Motion
Lee argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero motion to strike one of his prior strike adjudications.
Section 1385 authorizes a trial court to strike prior strike convictions "in furtherance of justice." (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 504, 529, 530.) That discretion, however, is "limited." (Id. at p. 530.) "[T]he Three Strikes initiative, as well as the legislative act embodying its terms, was intended to restrict courts' discretion in sentencing repeat offenders." (Id. at p. 528.) "To achieve this end, 'the Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court "conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made because, for articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he [or she] actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).)
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must " ' "consider[ ] both . . . the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People . . . ." ' " (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530, italics omitted.) The trial court must accord "preponderant weight . . . to factors intrinsic to the [Three Strikes] scheme, such as the nature and circumstances of the defendant's present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his [or her] background, character, and prospects." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) "[N]o weight whatsoever may be given to factors extrinsic to the scheme, such as the mere desire to ease court congestion or, a fortiori, bare antipathy to the consequences for any given defendant. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Ultimately, the trial court must determine whether "the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he [or she] had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (Ibid.)
We review a trial court's discretionary sentencing choices, including its refusal to strike a prior strike conviction, for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.) "In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ' "[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review." ' [Citations.] Second, a ' "decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 'An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.' " ' [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Id. at pp. 376-377.)
"[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not 'aware of its discretion' to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation]." (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) An abuse of discretion also occurs where the trial court "strikes a sentencing allegation[ ] solely 'to accommodate judicial convenience or because of court congestion,' " or "simply because a defendant pleads guilty." (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
On the other hand, "[w]here the record is silent [citation], or '[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance' [citation]. Because the circumstances must be 'extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he [or she] squarely falls once he [or she] commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack' [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary. Of course, in such an extraordinary case—where the relevant factors . . . manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ—the failure to strike would constitute an abuse of discretion." (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
In his Romero motion, Lee provided information about his background, including the fact that he experienced a very difficult childhood. He was raised by a single mother who was addicted to drugs and left Lee to fend for himself from a very young age. Lee often had to beg strangers for money to buy food. When he was eight years old, Lee was declared a dependent of the juvenile court because his mother could not properly care for him. Lee started using alcohol and marijuana at the age of 10. When Lee was a freshman in high school, he began selling crack cocaine to make money for food and ended up in juvenile hall. On June 18, 1990, when Lee was 17, he participated in a gang rape with two other boys, during which he raped the teenage victim two times. Lee was charged in a juvenile wardship petition with two counts of rape, and as a result of the allegations being found true, he spent five years at the California Youth Authority (CYA). While there, Lee earned his GED and high school diploma.
Following his release from the CYA, Lee worked and remained crime-free for two years. However, he eventually became addicted to methamphetamine and was arrested for carrying a loaded firearm. Lee was sentenced to state prison for eight years, four months. While in prison, Lee was diagnosed with Axis I Schizoaffective Disorder, Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, and Axis II Borderline Traits. After his diagnosis, Lee began taking psychiatric medications.
By the time Lee was released from prison, he had stopped taking his medications. He obtained employment while on parole, but resumed using methamphetamine. Lee violated parole by absconding and being under the influence of a controlled substance, and was returned to prison to finish his term.
After his release from prison a second time, Lee again resumed his methamphetamine use. He failed to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290, and was arrested while in possession of methamphetamine. As a result, Lee was sentenced to five years, four months in state prison.
Lee was released from prison in 2012, and again resumed using methamphetamine. He was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance in July 2012, and was ordered to serve 100 days in the county jail. In January 2014, Lee was arrested for possession of methamphetamine, and was sentenced to credit for time served.
Lee argued in his Romero motion that the court should strike one of his juvenile rape adjudications because he had a very difficult childhood fraught with neglect and drug abuse. Lee also pointed to the fact that the injuries from the present crimes were de minimis. Finally, Lee argued that the prior adjudications are very remote, having occurred more than 24 years prior to the motion.
We find nothing in the record to suggest that the court's decision to deny Lee's Romero motion in this case was "so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) Nor do we find that that this case presents extraordinary circumstances such that Lee falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. In denying Lee's motion, the trial court considered the fact that Lee had suffered from a long-term drug and alcohol abuse problem, and had experienced a difficult childhood. The court also noted that Lee was "offered an opportunity for the best possible treatment" and provided options to participate in drug treatment and rehabilitative programs yet he did not avail himself of them. He "repeatedly violated parole." Based on Lee's history, the court did not believe that Lee would comply with any court order, nor would he "follow any rule," or "any order of authority."
The court also considered the fact that Lee had a long criminal history. Lee's prior adjudication on two counts of rape, crimes he committed when he was a juvenile, were extremely serious, involving "the violent forcible rape of a vulnerable girl who was out-numbered by defendant and his co-participants." He subsequently engaged in criminal conduct without interruption. When considering whether the prior rape offenses priors, the court stated: "[T]here is nothing about the prior felonies that is di minimus [sic] in nature . . . . I consider whether or not the person is the same person now as he was back then. Because people can engage in conduct, youthful conduct where there is an error in judgment, immaturity, something like that and it really doesn't reflect who the person is today. And I thought long and hard in . . . Lee's case, whether or not the prior convictions really reflect who he is today and I find that they do. I don't have any reason to think that . . . Lee is not still a violent person. No reason to think that at all."
In addition to his past criminal conduct, the court considered the current offense, and the fact that the injuries Lee inflicted were not serious even though Lee assaulted the victims with a knife. However, the court noted that the absence of serious injuries was merely the fortuitous result of the fact that the victims were stabbed in areas of the body that were not particularly vulnerable, i.e., Robles's buttocks and the back of Beloney's knee. The court considered the fact that when Lee swung the knife at Beloney while Beloney was in bed, and stabbed Robles in the buttocks while Robles was passed out on the couch, he demonstrated that he was not exercising restraint or attempting to prevent more serious injuries. The court stated: "And it's as I indicated, there is nothing about the nature and circumstances of the present felony that indicates that . . . Lee is not exactly who the Legislature is talking about when the Legislature has indicated that this falls within the spirit of Three Strikes law."
We conclude that the trial court weighed the appropriate factors, and properly exercised its discretion in denying Lee's motion. The fact that Lee disagrees with the court's decision, and argues that his motion should have been granted does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. " '[W]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, [the court] shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if [the court] might have ruled differently in the first instance.' " (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Lee's claim of abuse of discretion is without merit.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Lee argues that his 50 year-to-life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions because it is grossly disproportionate to his current offenses, which did not result in serious injuries, and his prior strikes are juvenile offenses that occurred over 25 years ago.
"Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. Punishment is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. [Citation.]" (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fns. omitted (Mantanez); see also Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20, 23 (Ewing).)
"The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment encompassed in the Eighth Amendment contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences.' [Citations.]" (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 20, citing Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996-997.) " 'The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.' [Citation.]" (Ewing, at p. 23.)
California's Constitution sets a similar standard. "[I]n California a punishment may violate article I, section 6, of the Constitution if, although not cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted.) "The main technique of analysis under California law is to consider the nature both of the offense and of the offender. [Citation.] The nature of the offense is viewed both in the abstract and in the totality of circumstances surrounding its actual commission; the nature of the offender focuses on the particular person before the court, the inquiry being whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability, as shown by such factors as age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind. [Citations.]" (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).)
The United States Supreme Court considered whether punishment imposed under California's Three Strikes law was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment in Ewing, wherein the defendant was convicted of grand theft of three golf clubs worth $399 each and was sentenced to 25 years to life. (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 20, 28.) The defendant had a nine-year criminal history that spanned from 1984 to 1993 that included misdemeanor and felony convictions for petty theft, auto theft, battery, burglary, robbery, possession of drugs, trespass, and unlawful possession of a firearm. (Id. at pp. 18-19.) The Supreme Court found that the sentence of 25 years to life was constitutional, noting that in enacting the Three Strikes law, the California Legislature "made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice." (Id. at p. 25.) The Ewing court further stated: "In imposing a three strikes sentence, the State's interest is not merely punishing the offense of conviction, or the 'triggering' offense: '[I]t is in addition the interest . . . in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.' " (Id. at p. 29.) The court found that "Ewing's sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record," and that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at pp. 29-30, fns. omitted.)
Whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law. (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1474.) We therefore apply the de novo standard of review when determining whether Lee's 50 years to life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. (Ibid.)
Considering both "the nature both of the offense and [] the offender" in this case, we find that Lee's sentence is not cruel and unusual. (Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 494.) While the offenses in the present case did not in fact result in significant injuries, they were committed in a manner that could have resulted in lethal results. Lee entered a home at night and attacked and stabbed two people, stole property and hit his former girlfriend. The injuries were minimal because of the defensive actions of the victims: Beloney was able to fight Lee off and sustained a stab to the back of his knee, and Robles was stabbed in the buttocks. There is no evidence that Lee exercised restraint, or used the knife strategically. Lee and his victims were simply fortunate the injuries were relatively minor.
As an offender, Lee has a substantial and long criminal history, which began when he was a juvenile in 1990, and continued until 2015, when he was arrested in the present case. While his prior rape strike offenses were committed more than 25 years ago, Lee has continued to commit crimes throughout the years leading up to the current crimes. Given Lee's age of 42, the 50 year-to-life sentence will likely result in his imprisonment for the rest of his life. However, "the combined effect of [defendant's] age and the length of the sentence are of no consequence" in determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate. (People v. Szadziewicz (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 823, 845, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166.) Moreover, the fact that a sentence may in effect be life without the possibility of parole does not make the sentence unconstitutional. (See, e.g., People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 573 [210 years to life].)
Lee's 50 year-to-life sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Based on the seriousness of the present offense, Lee's criminal history, and the strikes in this case, the sentence is not "so disproportionate . . . that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. [Citation.]" (Mantanez, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 358, fns. omitted.)
C. Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes
Lee argues that the trial court erred in using his prior juvenile adjudications as strikes, because it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
Lee's arguments are based on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, in which the United States Supreme Court stated that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at p. 490.) Lee argues that because his prior juvenile adjudications were not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, they may not be used to enhance his sentence.
Lee's claim is meritless under People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007 (Nguyen), wherein the California Supreme Court held that prior juvenile adjudications may be used to enhance a sentence under the Three Strikes law. The court concluded that a defendant has "the right to a jury trial in the current criminal proceeding with respect to any sentencing fact that may increase the maximum punishment for the underlying conviction." (Id. at p. 1012.)
Here, we are bound by the California Supreme Court authority in Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1007, the trial court did not err in using Lee's prior juvenile adjudications as strikes to enhance his sentence. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
D. Defense Counsel's Stipulation to Prior Bad Acts
1. Background
Before trial, the prosecution made a motion requesting that the court admit Lee's prior bad acts to impeach his testimony. Defense counsel objected to admission of the evidence. The trial court ruled that if Lee testified and denied the conduct, the prosecution could question him and bring in witnesses to prove he had committed the acts.
Subsequently, Lee testified at trial, and denied that he committed the charged crimes. Lee also denied that he committed the prior bad acts when questioned by the prosecutor. These acts were the following crimes from 1998: first degree burglary while armed with a firearm, witness intimidation with personal use of a firearm, and willful discharge of a firearm in a negligent manner which could result in death or great bodily injury. Lee also denied that he committed the prior crime of vehicle theft in 2013.
After Lee testified, he became disruptive and the judge ordered him removed from the courtroom. The trial proceedings were broadcast over the intercom in the holding area where Lee was detained. During that time, defense counsel entered into a stipulation with the prosecution that Lee had committed the prior crimes that he had denied during his testimony. The prosecution read the following stipulation into evidence regarding the prior crimes: "The parties stipulate that in 1998 the defendant committed the crimes of witness intimidation with the personal use of a firearm, negligent discharge of firearm with the likelihood of causing death or great bodily injury with personal use of firearm and first degree burglary with personal use of firearm." The court then informed the jury that the stipulations could only be used to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
When Lee returned to the courtroom for the trial after the stipulation had been read to the jury, he told the bailiff that he wanted to make a Marsden motion to remove his appointed counsel. At the Marsden hearing, Lee stated that he did not authorize his attorney to stipulate that he committed crimes, and that his attorney did not speak for him. Lee maintained that he did not commit the crimes to which his attorney stipulated, and that he wanted the prosecution to bring in witnesses to prove the crimes because the crimes never occurred. The trial court explained to Lee that the rules of evidence do not require a witness be convicted of the conduct in order for an act of moral turpitude to be admissible under certain circumstances to impeach the credibility of a witness.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. --------
The court explained defense counsel's strategy and why he wanted to prevent the prosecution from introducing inflammatory evidence of the prior crimes at trial. Lee continued to state that he did not approve of his counsel's decision to stipulate. The trial court denied the Marsden motion.
2. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Lee asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his counsel stipulated that he committed the crimes that he had previously denied in his testimony. Lee relies on McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) ___ U.S. ___ (McCoy), arguing that his attorney's stipulation to impeachment evidence over his objection violated his right to choose the objective of his defense.
In McCoy, the defendant in a death penalty trial explicitly and repeatedly told counsel not to concede his guilt on murder charges, maintaining he was innocent. (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1506.) There was no question counsel knew of defendant's " 'complet[e] oppos[ition] to [counsel's] telling the jury that [defendant] was guilty of killing' " three people. (Ibid.) Even so, during his opening statement and closing argument, in order to maintain credibility with the jury for the penalty phase, counsel told the jury that defendant was undoubtedly guilty and that he had taken "[the] burden off of [the prosecutor]." (Id. at p. 1507.) The United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant "vociferously insist[s] that he did not engage in the charged acts and adamantly object[s] to any admission of guilt," defense counsel is prohibited from admitting defendant's guilt during the guilt phase of trial. (Id. at p. 1505.) "When a client expressly asserts that the objective of 'his defence' is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt." (Id. at p. 1509; U.S. Const. 6th Amend.)
The present case is distinguishable from McCoy. Here, unlike McCoy, defense counsel did not concede that Lee was guilty of the crimes charged against him. Rather, defense counsel made a tactical decision to stipulate to impeachment evidence that would have been highly inflammatory if the prosecution called witnesses to prove Lee's prior crimes. Defense counsel's objective was to maintain Lee's innocence, and to earn an acquittal after trial. Lee maintained his innocence to the charges throughout the trial, and had the same objective of acquittal. Defense counsel's decision to stipulate to impeachment evidence was within counsel's role of determining the defense strategy. "Trial management is the lawyer's province: Counsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as 'what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.' " (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1508, citing Gonzalez v. United States (2008) 553 U.S. 242, 248.)
Here, unlike McCoy where counsel admitted that his client had committed the charged offenses, defense counsel's stipulation to impeachment evidence was not an admission of Lee's guilt to the crimes for which he was on trial. As a result, Lee was not denied his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Greenwood, P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Premo, J. /s/_________
Elia, J.