Opinion
104790
06-18-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gregory LEE, Appellant.
Salvatore C. Adamo, Albany, for appellant, and appellant pro se. D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Carly Wolfrom of counsel), for respondent.
Salvatore C. Adamo, Albany, for appellant, and appellant pro se.
D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Carly Wolfrom of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., GARRY, ROSE and DEVINE, JJ.
Opinion GARRY, J.Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams, J.), rendered December 14, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts).
In April 2011, defendant was arrested for possessing and selling heroin and cocaine in the Town of Saugerties, Ulster County. He was indicted on three counts each of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of two counts of each offense and sentenced as a second felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 18 years, followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
Initially, we reject defendant's claim that he was denied a fair trial by County Court's refusal to recuse itself. Where, as here, there are no grounds for legal disqualification (see Judiciary Law § 14 ), a trial judge's decision as to whether recusal is necessary will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion (see People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 521 N.Y.S.2d 663, 516 N.E.2d 200 [1987] ; People v. Lerario, 43 A.D.3d 492, 492–493, 840 N.Y.S.2d 471 [2007] ; People v. Wallis, 24 A.D.3d 1029, 1031, 806 N.Y.S.2d 760 [2005], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 854, 816 N.Y.S.2d 760, 849 N.E.2d 983 [2006] ). Defendant based his motion for recusal on the fact that the County Judge who presided over his trial had been the District Attorney in 2005, when defendant was prosecuted by his office on a similar drug-related charge. Defendant has acknowledged that the trial was handled by assistant district attorneys and that, to his knowledge, the Judge did not participate. Nevertheless, defendant asserted that the Judge must have been aware of the 2005 prosecution and, as a result, acquired prejudicial information. In denying the motion, the Judge stated unequivocally that he had no memory of the prior prosecution, no knowledge or information about defendant other than the evidence in the current prosecution, and no reservations as to whether he could be fair and impartial. Nothing in our review of the record controverts these statements or suggests any bias or prejudice. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion (see People v. Curkendall, 12 A.D.3d 710, 714, 783 N.Y.S.2d 707 [2004], lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 743, 790 N.Y.S.2d 655, 824 N.E.2d 56 [2004] ; People v. West, 254 A.D.2d 315, 315, 680 N.Y.S.2d 99 [1998] ; People v. Rosato, 193 A.D.2d 1052, 1053, 599 N.Y.S.2d 195 [1993], lv. denied 84 N.Y.2d 910, 621 N.Y.S.2d 527, 645 N.E.2d 1227 [1994] ; People v. Jones, 143 A.D.2d 465, 466–467, 532 N.Y.S.2d 586 [1988] ).
Defendant next claims that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The People sought to prove that defendant sold narcotics to a confidential informant (hereinafter CI) and an undercover officer in two controlled buys in March 2011. The CI testified that she agreed to participate in the controlled buys in exchange for favorable treatment of her alleged involvement in unrelated drug transactions. On both occasions, she telephoned defendant and arranged to meet him at a motel to purchase drugs. Before each transaction, she was searched, provided with a body wire and given prerecorded currency. She and an undercover officer then met defendant in the motel parking lot, where he accepted the buy money and, in exchange, provided them with heroin in the first transaction and with heroin and crack cocaine in the second transaction. Members of a law enforcement drug task force observed both controlled buys from a nearby van and made audio and video recordings of the transactions as they occurred. The undercover officer then retained possession of the drugs, which were subsequently tested and identified as heroin and cocaine. At trial, the CI and the undercover officer identified defendant as the person who participated in both transactions, officers who observed the transactions testified as to what they had seen and heard, and the audio and video recordings were played for the jury.
Defendant relied upon an agency defense at trial. Although conceding that he participated in both exchanges, he claimed that he merely acted as an agent for the true seller, did not intend to sell the drugs or profit from the transactions, and provided the drugs as a favor to the CI, who had told him that she and her companion—the undercover officer—were suffering from withdrawal symptoms. This testimony presented factual questions and credibility assessments for the jury, which had the opportunity to hear defendant's testimony and observe his demeanor (see People v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 74–75, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200 [1978], cert. denied 439 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 330, 58 L.Ed.2d 331 [1978] ; People v. Mitchell, 112 A.D.3d 1071, 1071–1072, 977 N.Y.S.2d 136 [2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1140, 983 N.Y.S.2d 498, 6 N.E.3d 617 [2014] ). It was likewise the jury's province to resolve inconsistencies and conflicts that defendant now contends rendered the trial testimony unworthy of belief, all of which were thoroughly explored on cross-examination. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find a “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury” (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ; see People v. Guthrie, 57 A.D.3d 1168, 1170, 869 N.Y.S.2d 292 [2008], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 816, 881 N.Y.S.2d 24, 908 N.E.2d 932 [2009] ). Further, viewing the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility assessments, we find that the People met their burden to disprove the agency defense and that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see People v. Robinson, 123 A.D.3d 1224, 1226–1227, 999 N.Y.S.2d 555 [2014], lvs. denied 25 N.Y.3d 992, 993, 10 N.Y.S.3d 535, 536, 32 N.E.3d 972, 973 [2015] ; People v. Mitchell, 112 A.D.3d at 1073, 977 N.Y.S.2d 136 ; People v. Johnson, 91 A.D.3d 1115, 1116–1117, 939 N.Y.S.2d 575 [2012], lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 959, 944 N.Y.S.2d 487, 967 N.E.2d 712 [2012] ).
County Court did not err in its Molineux, Ventimiglia or Sandoval rulings. During a joint pretrial hearing, the court denied the People's request to introduce evidence of certain prior convictions and bad acts, specifically including two 2005 convictions for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and certain alleged prior drug sales to the CI. The court found that the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value, but warned that this ruling could change if defendant opened the door during trial. Thereafter, defendant asserted his agency defense during his opening statement, and the People renewed their prior application. The court found that defendant had opened the door, conducted an additional Ventimiglia/Molineux hearing, and concluded that the evidence was relevant to rebut defendant's agency defense and demonstrate his intent to sell narcotics, and that its probative value outweighed its potential for prejudice. We find no error. It is well established that a defendant opens the door to Molineux evidence by asserting an agency defense (see People v. Mitchell, 112 A.D.3d at 1073, 977 N.Y.S.2d 136 ; People v. Nealon, 36 A.D.3d 1076, 1078, 827 N.Y.S.2d 359 [2007], lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 988, 838 N.Y.S.2d 492, 869 N.E.2d 668 [2007] ; People v. Ortiz, 259 A.D.2d 979, 980, 688 N.Y.S.2d 358 [1999], lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 1024, 697 N.Y.S.2d 583, 719 N.E.2d 944 [1999] ), and any potential prejudice was mitigated by the court's timely and proper limiting instructions (see People v. Small, 12 N.Y.3d 732, 733, 876 N.Y.S.2d 675, 904 N.E.2d 811 [2009] ).
As for County Court's Sandoval rulings, the People sought before the trial to impeach defendant with evidence of his numerous prior convictions and bad acts in the event that he elected to testify. Upon such an application, a trial court, in its discretion, “may exclude the evidence entirely; limit the prosecution's inquiry to the mere fact that there has been a prior conviction; it may limit inquiry to the existence and nature of the prior conviction; or it may permit examination into the facts and circumstances underlying the prior conviction” (People v. Smith, 18 N.Y.3d 588, 593, 942 N.Y.S.2d 5, 965 N.E.2d 232 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). During the joint hearing, the court carefully considered each of defendant's prior convictions and ruled on the extent to which the People could question him, precluding all inquiry into some of the convictions and limiting the People's inquiry into the nature and underlying circumstances of almost all of the others. When defendant testified at trial, the People questioned him in accord with these directions, and defendant offered no objections. Considering the numerous restrictions imposed as a result of the court's careful analysis, we find no abuse of discretion (see People v. Nichol, 121 A.D.3d 1174, 1175–1176, 994 N.Y.S.2d 691 [2014] ).
Defendant next contends that County Court erred by granting the jury's request to allow the second seated juror to take over the duties of the jury foreperson. However, defendant was present and raised no objection when his counsel affirmatively consented to the substitution, and his counsel did not object when the decision was communicated to the jury. Even if the substitution was in some manner erroneous, it did not constitute a mode of proceedings error and, contrary to defendant's contention, preservation was required (see People v. Alexander, 104 A.D.3d 1221, 1221, 960 N.Y.S.2d 581 [2013], lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 941, 968 N.Y.S.2d 3, 990 N.E.2d 137 [2013] ; see generally People v. Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 769–770, 642 N.Y.S.2d 594, 665 N.E.2d 164 [1996] ). We decline to take corrective action in the interest of justice.
Defendant was not denied a fair trial by County Court's refusal to instruct the jury as to an intoxication defense. Such a charge is warranted when “there is sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to the element of intent on that basis ... [or when] the record contains evidence of the recent use of intoxicants of such nature or quantity to support the inference that their ingestion was sufficient to affect [the] defendant's ability to form the necessary criminal intent” (People v. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918, 920, 563 N.Y.S.2d 48, 564 N.E.2d 658 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). Here, there was no evidence that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the drug transactions except for his own self-serving testimony, and such “bare assertions,” standing alone, do not warrant an intoxication charge (People v. Sirico, 17 N.Y.3d 744, 745, 929 N.Y.S.2d 14, 952 N.E.2d 1006 [2011] ; accord People v. Duffy, 119 A.D.3d 1231, 1234, 990 N.Y.S.2d 346 [2014], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1043, 998 N.Y.S.2d 313, 23 N.E.3d 156 [2014] ). Likewise, the court properly rejected defendant's request for an instruction on the definition of a mandated reporter pursuant to Social Services Law § 413. Defendant's claim that the police had improperly failed to report the CI to a child protective agency had no bearing on his guilt, and the requested charge would only have served to confuse the jurors.
Although defendant now contends that County Court responded improperly to a jury note, his counsel agreed to the court's proposed response in defendant's presence and did not object when the response was communicated to the jury. Our review of the record reveals that the court complied with its “core responsibilit[ies]” to give counsel notice of the specific contents of the note and an opportunity to participate in framing appropriate responses, and to provide the jury with a meaningful response (People v. Kisoon, 8 N.Y.3d 129, 134, 831 N.Y.S.2d 738, 863 N.E.2d 990 [2007] ; see CPL 310.30 ; People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 276, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189 [1991] ). Accordingly, preservation was required, and we decline to take corrective action in the interest of justice (see People v. Woodrow, 89 A.D.3d 1158, 1160, 932 N.Y.S.2d 236 [2011], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 978, 950 N.Y.S.2d 361, 973 N.E.2d 771 [2012] ; People v. Rivera, 83 A.D.3d 1370, 1370–1371, 919 N.Y.S.2d 691 [2011], lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 904, 933 N.Y.S.2d 659, 957 N.E.2d 1163 [2011] ).
Finally, we reject defendant's contention that his sentence was harsh and excessive. He was not sentenced to the maximum permissible term (see Penal Law § 70.70[3][b][i] ), and the record provides no support for his claim that he was punished for exercising his right to trial (see People v. Nichol, 121 A.D.3d at 1178, 994 N.Y.S.2d 691 ; People v. Massey, 45 A.D.3d 1044, 1048, 845 N.Y.S.2d 197 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 1036, 852 N.Y.S.2d 21, 881 N.E.2d 1208 [2008] ). In view of defendant's lack of remorse and his extensive criminal history—which dates back to 1984 and includes convictions for robbery, kidnapping and assault, as well as drug-related offenses—we perceive no abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction in the interest of justice (see People v. McDonald, 43 A.D.3d 1207, 1207, 842 N.Y.S.2d 100 [2007], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 867, 860 N.Y.S.2d 493, 890 N.E.2d 256 [2008] ; People v. Davis, 4 A.D.3d 567, 568, 770 N.Y.S.2d 914 [2004], lv. denied 2 N.Y.3d 798, 781 N.Y.S.2d 297, 814 N.E.2d 469 [2004] ).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
PETERS, P.J., ROSE and DEVINE, JJ., concur.