Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ct. No. INF056124 David B. Downing, Judge.
Mark S. Devore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Oetting, Felicity Senoski, and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, J.
Defendant and appellant Thomas Mack Lane was charged with receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), count 1) and committing a theft-related offense with a prior theft-related conviction (§ 666, count 2). He moved to suppress the prosecution’s evidence against him, contending that it was the product of an unlawful detention. (§ 1538.5.) Defendant’s motion to suppress was heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied. Subsequently, defendant filed a renewed motion to suppress. The trial court denied that motion as well. A jury trial commenced, but the court declared a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Defendant later pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and the court dismissed count 1 and granted probation for a period of three years.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in denying his renewed motion to suppress evidence since the police were not justified in detaining him; in the alternative, he argues the detention was unlawfully prolonged. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following statement of facts is derived from the original hearing on the motion to suppress: On the afternoon of October 24, 2006, defendant knocked on the front door of Mario Bustios’s residence. Bustios had met defendant about one year prior. Bustios answered the door and told defendant he was sick and did not want company. Bustios slammed the door in defendant’s face. Defendant then hit the door so hard that it shook the sliding glass door. Bustios called 911 because defendant had banged on his door and almost broke the sliding glass door. He did not tell the police that he believed defendant had committed any crime. He just wanted defendant to “go away.” Bustios provided a description of defendant. He described defendant as a White male, who was bald, wearing cut-off shorts, and “probably walking up the street.”
For the renewed suppression motion, the court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and heard argument from counsel. The parties did not present any new testimony.
Officer Marc Melanson was dispatched to the area where the call originated. The information provided to him was that there was some type of disturbance involving a man pounding on someone’s door, the details of which were unknown. The description of the suspect given was that he was a bald, White male wearing a black jacket, no shirt, tan shorts, and his name was “Tommy.” When Officer Melanson arrived in the area, he received updated information that the suspect was going northbound on Sunrise Way. Officer Melanson was driving northbound on Sunrise Way when he observed defendant, who fit the description. Officer Melanson drove past defendant, made a U-turn, and then stopped his marked patrol car in front of the path where defendant was walking. The officer approached defendant, asked him his name, and asked if he was just involved in a dispute with Bustios. Defendant said that he had been to Bustios’s house and that they had had some kind of disagreement. Officer Melanson observed defendant’s shaved head and tattoos, and believed that he resembled a “skinhead” or member of the Aryan Brotherhood. Officer Melanson saw the word “white” on defendant’s tattoos and asked him about the word “power.” Defendant said he had that word covered up. (Melanson could not recall if the word was removed or covered by clothing.) Based on Officer Melanson’s experience and training, he knew that skinheads sometimes carried weapons or firearms. Thus, he conducted a patdown search for weapons, for officer safety reasons. Officer Melanson felt a heavy object in defendant’s jacket pocket, and defendant told him it was a camera. Officer Melanson felt the object and confirmed defendant’s statement. Finding no weapons, he concluded the patdown search. Officer Melanson instructed defendant to sit on the grass and then asked defendant for his consent to search a bag he was carrying and his person. Defendant told him to “go ahead.” As he was in the process of the search, Officer Melanson was advised by dispatch that defendant was on probation for a fraud conviction. Officer Melanson continued the search and found some pieces of jewelry, watch parts, and other similar things, in defendant’s bag. In defendant’s pocket, he found the camera, credit cards belonging to another person, a watch, and a pair of men’s socks. The name on the credit card was “Micah Lipman.” In addition, Officer Melanson found pieces of paper in defendant’s pocket with the same name on them, as well as a birth date and address for a house on Calle Bravo. The socks were significant because, in Officer Melanson’s experience, he knew that socks were used as gloves during burglaries, to prevent leaving fingerprints. Officer Melanson also noticed that defendant was wearing a watch that was several sizes too big for his wrist. Officer Melanson arrested defendant based on his suspicion that defendant possessed stolen credit cards and other suspicious items.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Suppression Motion
Defendant argues that his detention was unlawful because Officer Melanson lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in criminal activity. He further contends that, even if the initial detention was lawful, it was unlawfully prolonged when the officer conducted the patdown search for weapons. Defendant concludes that all evidence found as a result of the detention should have been suppressed. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
B. The Detention Was Reasonable
“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained maybe involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.)
Officer Melanson responded to a 911 call regarding some type of disturbance involving a man pounding on someone’s door. The description of the suspect which Officer Melanson received was that the suspect was a bald, White male wearing a black jacket, no shirt, tan shorts, his name was “Tommy,” and he was going northbound on Sunrise Way. Officer Melanson drove northbound on Sunrise Way and saw defendant, who fit the description. Thus, defendant was located in the same vicinity where the disturbance occurred, right after the disturbance occurred, and Officer Melanson believed defendant matched the description of the suspect. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer Melanson had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and investigate whether he may have been involved in criminal activity. (See People v. Snyder (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 389, 391-392 [an officer was justified in detaining the defendant when investigating a report that a panhandler at a drugstore had been creating a disturbance, and the defendant was standing in front of the store and matched the description of the suspect].)
C. The Detention Was Not Unduly Prolonged
Defendant next argues that even if the initial contact was lawful, the detention was unlawfully prolonged when Officer Melanson conducted a patdown search of defendant for weapons. Defendant concludes that his “subsequent consent to search his person and bag were fruits of the unlawfully prolonged detention.” We find that Officer Melanson had a reasonable belief that defendant was potentially armed. Furthermore, defendant’s consent to search eviscerated any possible taint.
1. Officer Melanson Had a Reasonable Belief that Defendant Was Armed and Dangerous
“An officer, in the course of the criminal investigation, may pat down the suspect’s outer clothing where the officer has reason to believe the suspect may be armed and dangerous. [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 135-136.) “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27.) “[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” (Ibid.)
Officer Melanson was justified in conducting a limited patdown for weapons. First, defendant confirmed with Melanson that he had been to Bustios’s house and that they had had a disagreement. Thus, Officer Melanson had reason to believe defendant had created some type of disturbance, as reported in the 911 call. Second, Officer Melanson observed defendant’s shaved head and tattoos and believed that he resembled a “skinhead” or member of the Aryan Brotherhood. The officer saw the word “white” on defendant’s tattoos. Based on Officer Melanson’s experience and training, he knew that skinheads sometimes carried weapons or firearms. So, he conducted a patdown search for weapons for officer safety.
Defendant argues “there is no evidence in the record that members of white supremacist organizations are known to carry weapons while walking down the streetin [sic] the middle of a Palm Springs afternoon.” We would be hard pressed to find any evidence which was that specific. However, we note that Officer Melanson was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts in light of his experience. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.) The evidence showed that he did just that.
2. Defendant Consented to the Search of His Person and Bag
Ultimately, defendant’s attempt to suppress the items found on his person and in his bag fails. The detention and patdown search for weapons were both lawful. Since defendant cannot establish that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights, there is no reason to suppress the evidence. (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1299.) Moreover, the evidence defendant is seeking to suppress was obtained from the search of his person and bag, and he voluntarily consented to those searches. Defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of his consent, but rather appears to argue that his consent was ineffective because it was tainted by the unlawfully prolonged detention. As discussed ante, the detention was not unlawfully prolonged. Defendant’s consent was valid.
II. Defendant Cannot Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Defendant argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. Since we conclude that the court properly denied the suppression motion, there is no reason to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P.J., MILLER, J.