Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TA092554, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Nathan Lamar appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to one count of selling cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a).
On August 29, 2007 Lamar was arrested after a hand-to-hand sale of rock cocaine to an undercover police officer. Lamar was charged by amended information with one count of selling cocaine base. The information further alleged Lamar had suffered four prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served five separate prison terms for felonies within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Lamar was originally represented by appointed counsel, but he asserted his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562]. The trial court granted his request. Lamar filed motions to set aside the information (Pen. Code, § 995) and “to dismiss the charge” on due process grounds; the trial court heard and denied the motions on December 5, 2007. The same day Lamar entered a negotiated plea of no contest to selling cocaine base and admitted two of the prior prison term enhancement allegations. The remaining enhancement allegations were to be dismissed, and Lamar sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of six years.
The record of the plea hearing establishes Lamar was advised of and waived his constitutional rights and was advised of, and acknowledged he understood, the consequences of his plea. Specifically, Lamar stated he understood he was to receive a state prison sentence of six years as a result of his plea. Both the court and the prosecutor made clear to Lamar the plea agreement was structured to meet his demand to be eligible for 50 percent conduct credits by ensuring the prior conviction he admitted was not a strike allegation. (See Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (c)(5).) Lamar stated he understood the consequences of his plea and believed it was in his best interests to accept the plea agreement. He stipulated to a factual basis based on the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court found the plea was freely and voluntarily entered and there was a factual basis for the plea.
In accordance with the plea agreement, Lamar was sentenced to an aggregated state prison term of six years, consisting of the middle term of four years for selling cocaine base, plus one year for each of two prior prison term enhancements (case No. TA085009 -- possession of a controlled substance; case No. CR40974 -- second degree burglary). The court ordered Lamar to pay a $20 security fee and a $200 restitution fine. A parole revocation fine was imposed and suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45. The remaining prior conviction enhancements were dismissed. Lamar was awarded 147 days of presentence credit (99 actual days and 48 days of conduct credit).
The trial court originally awarded Lamar 146 days of presentence credit, consisting of 98 actual days and 48 days of conduct credit. In April 2008 Lamar filed an ex parte motion to correct the number of actual days of credit to 99, giving him a total of 147 days of presentence credit. The trial court granted Lamar’s request, as reflected in its nunc pro tunc order dated April 29, 2008.
Lamar filed a timely notice of appeal, but failed to request a certificate of probable cause. We appointed counsel to represent Lamar on appeal. On March 21, 2008 we granted Lamar’s application to construe his notice of appeal as raising noncertificate issues only. Our order expressly precluded Lamar from raising issues relating to the validity of his sentence because the terms of the plea agreement included the term of imprisonment actually imposed. (See People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 769-771; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79.)
After examination of the record counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On June 3, 2008 we advised Lamar he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. We have received no response to date.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied Lamar’s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ZELON, J., JACKSON, J.