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People v. Jurcoane

Court of Appeals of the California, Second Appellate District, Division One.
Nov 3, 2003
No. B162541 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003)

Opinion

B162541.

11-3-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSIF JURCOANE, Defendant and Appellant.

Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Marc E. Turchin and William T. Harter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following his jury conviction of two counts of the second degree murders of Lloyd W. ("Bill") Bryden, his former employer, and Alice McCannel, Brydens girlfriend, and findings that defendant used a shotgun and inflicted great bodily injury on a person 60 years of age or older (Bryden). (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022.5, 1203.09.)

Defendant was charged in a two-count information with two murder counts. A multiple murder special circumstance allegation under Penal Code section 190, subdivision (a)(3) was included, found true by the jury, and found not applicable by the court because defendant was convicted of second, not first, degree murders.

Additional statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

Defendant says the trial court (I) prejudicially erred in discharging juror No. 4, (II) erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, and (III) abused its discretion by denying defendant a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. We reject defendants first two claims. We find merit in his claim that he was wrongly denied a Marsden hearing and therefore vacate the judgment and remand the matter so the trial court may conduct a hearing pursuant to Marsden.

BACKGROUND

On July 4, 1984, defendant shot and killed Bryden and McCannel on Brydens ranch in Valyermo, where defendant had worked until approximately three weeks earlier. Sheriffs deputies arriving at the scene recovered from near the bodies three spent shotshell casings later determined to be identical and to have been fired from an unregistered 12-gauge semiautomatic shotgun found on the seat of a blue pickup truck parked near the trailer in which defendant, his wife and three children lived on a ranch two minutes drive from the crime scene. A cocktail glass lay adjacent to Brydens body. No firearm or anything else that could be used as a weapon was found at the scene. A shotgun and rifle were found in the main ranch house. Bryden died from one shotgun wound to his chest; McCannel died from two shotgun wounds.

Defendant fled to Mexico, where he lived illegally for the next 17 years under an assumed name. Most of that time he lived with a woman named Alicia Bedoy Alvarado, to whom he confessed having killed a man. Alvarado, who had family in Los Angeles, traveled back and forth from Tijuana on holidays or in family emergencies. Defendant never accompanied her.

In April 2001, defendant was arrested in Mexico and taken before a Mexican Department of Immigration hearing officer. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Sergeant Alfredo Castro and an official from the Mexican attorney generals office also were present. At the expulsion hearing, defendant said he arrived in Mexico from California on July 5, 1984. He volunteered that he had been working on a ranch for a man named "Bill Bryant," was living with his wife and three children, and owned a 12-gauge shotgun, a .30-06 rifle and a .22 rifle. (Two such rifles had been removed by a Sheriffs deputy from defendants familys trailer).

Defendant also told the hearing officer that around 6:00 p.m. on July 4, 1984, he heard a woman screaming and approached the location. He saw a person called "El Loco" and saw "his boss" falling to the ground. He saw "Alicia," who was screaming. El Loco shot her, too. Defendant took the weapon from El Loco and pushed him away. Defendant realized the shotgun El Loco had used belonged to him. He carried it in his pickup that he usually drove for work at the ranch. He kept the shotgun and hurried to his trailer to tell his wife what had happened. He took his things and fled to Tijuana because he feared he was going to be charged with homicide. He arrived in Tijuana the next day, started working at a market, and obtained a license and other documents such as a federal voting card.

Defendants daughter, Josephine, one week shy of her fourth birthday on the day of the shooting, visited defendant several times after he was returned to California and then decided to talk to the police. She told police she recalled Bryden and his girlfriend as neighbors. Her family was living on property adjacent to Brydens. The day before or on the day of the shootings, she and defendant were driving onto Brydens property. She remembered only that Bryden said, "`Either you come down here or Ill come up here — `or Ill come down — `up there." On July 4, she was sitting on a picnic table outside her familys trailer, eating fruit salad while her mother prepared dinner. She saw defendant enter and drive his truck toward Brydens property. She remembered the dirt being thrown up by the trucks tires. She recalled the truck was blue. She heard gunshots. Defendant came back in his truck and went into their trailer. "It was a commotion." He came back out with clothes piled in his hands. He climbed into the truck as he and her mother argued. He left. Her mother returned to the trailer and made a phone call. Police cars came, and Sandy, a friend of her mothers, came and picked up Josephine.

Josephine next saw defendant in April or May 2001 after he was returned from Mexico. She had read several local newspaper articles about this matter before she talked to the police and visited defendant twice after talking with the police. The articles did not help her clarify what had happened. They discussed only the accusations.

Richard Hylton, an equine veterinarian who had treated Brydens horses, knew defendant from Hyltons trips to the ranch. In late March 1984, Hylton had arrived and was still in his vehicle when defendant came up to him and said, "`Im going to kill that son of a b____." Defendant was "very angry" about something having to do with an animal. Hylton spoke calming words. When they finished discussing the reason for Hyltons visit, defendant, "definitely very mad," reiterated how angry he was and Hylton again tried to calm him. Hylton did not mention the conversation to anyone. Bryden was not there that day.

The Defense. Defendants son, David, testified he first became aware of the murders in 1989 or 1990, when he was seven or eight years old. The incident was sometimes discussed by the family when they wondered where defendant was and why everyone else had a father and he and his sisters did not. Josephine never mentioned to him having gone with defendant to Brydens and the occurrence of an argument that day. Nor did she mention defendants leaving the day of the murders, hearing shots, and defendants return. She did not mention she had seen defendant "grab clothing and leave." He accompanied Josephine on her second or third visit with defendant after his arrest. She mentioned nothing about defendant having an argument with Bryden, then returning, leaving and returning to the familys trailer. Josephine had been upset at defendants absence "pretty much our whole lives."

Defendant testified he had worked for Bryden for over six years before he quit about a month before "the accident." On the afternoon of the murders, he left his ranch, went to "a Mexican bar" in Palmdale and began drinking. About an hour later, a friend named Mario told him something had happened to his boss. Mario said he thought Bryden was dead and that the deputies were looking for defendant. When defendant arrived at Brydens ranch he saw the sheriffs crime scene lights and realized deputies were there. He went home. No police were there. He took an old passport and a bunch of clothes and left. He was afraid because about three weeks earlier defendant "had some problems" with Bryden when Bryden wanted him to do some work defendant did not want to do. When defendant refused, Bryden said he was going to be fired. Defendant quit. He fled because he feared Bryden would accuse him of something. He denied telling Hylton he was going to kill Bryden.

On cross-examination, defendant said Mario told him Bryden had been shot.

Defendant testified he left the trailer and returned to the bar in Palmdale, staying there until it closed. He slept in his truck. He returned to Brydens ranch and saw helicopters and law enforcement officers. He went to Palmdale with an acquaintance, whose name he did not know, who advised him to go to Tijuana and drove him in the other mans car to the border on the afternoon of July 5.

Defendant told the Mexican hearing officer he could not return to California because he had been charged with killing Bryden. He did not tell her he had killed a man. When detained by Mexican officials he was shown papers stating two people had died and defendant was being sought. The papers stated where he had been born in Romania, where he had attended school, and where he worked after finishing school. The documents contained his photograph, fingerprints and stated the two victims had been killed with a shotgun. He never owned a shotgun. He owned two rifles. He made up the story he told the immigration official because the official told him she was only going to make a record for her office and because "two rifles and a shotgun" had been mentioned in the documents shown him by the Mexican authorities. He was not at the ranch when the shootings occurred.

Defendant never saw McCannel doing the ranchs books and accounting. He did not remember her ever talking to him about problems with the books, any money missing, or any phone bills. Defendants truck was brown. The blue truck belonged to someone who worked on another ranch and sometimes left his truck near defendants familys trailer. Defendant was in that truck many times. When he returned home after seeing law enforcement personnel at Brydens ranch, defendant was at the trailer only a couple of minutes. He paid no attention to whether the blue truck was there. He did not return to the trailer after waking on July 5 because he saw deputies and helicopters there.

Defendant learned a $10,000 reward had been offered for information about him approximately two months after he arrived in Tijuana. Defendant ran into a man who had bought fruit from Bryden. The man mentioned only the reward. He did not say anyone had been killed that night in Valyermo.

On redirect examination, defendant said the fruit buyer told him not only about the reward but that Bryden had died.

Nancy Kaser-Boyd, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified as an expert on childhood memory. She had not treated Josephine. She acknowledged that children are likely to remember things that are important in their world and are likely to give fairly specific information about that kind of thing. She testified memories fade and that subsequently acquired information can distort memory. She acknowledged it would be fair to say that as memory decays, ones memory is more like flashes of things that happened rather than specific and detailed. Traumatic childhood events can be entirely forgotten because they are traumatic, but sometimes they are remembered as flashbacks through much of ones life. Generally, she approaches the person for an interview, not the reverse. The more times a child discusses an incident, the more questionable the childs credibility. This was the first time she had testified in criminal court on childhood memory. Her other testimony on that topic had been in dependency court where she interviewed children.

DISCUSSION

I

We reject defendants claim that the trial court prejudicially erred when it discharged Juror No. 4, violating section 1089 and his constitutional right to trial under the due process clause and the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

On Thursday, August, 8, 2002, at 3:15 p.m., the jury retired to deliberate. They adjourned at 4:00 p.m. The jury again began deliberating at 9:00 a.m the next day. The court stated it had just been informed that Juror No. 3 had said he had to leave for vacation by noon that day (Friday) and that Juror No. 4s "last day is today." The court announced defense counsel had waived his appearance "for the substitution of an alternate juror into the deliberating . . . jurors."

At 11:49 a.m., the court called in the jury. No. 3 confirmed a vacation beginning at noon. No. 3 could return Monday morning, but had an hours appointment at 1:00 p.m. No. 4 confirmed a vacation consisting of the weekend and Monday. No. 4, who could return on Tuesday, had not earlier told the court of vacation plans.

The court explained that when a juror substitution occurs, deliberations must begin anew. The court presented the alternatives. It could discharge No. 3 and substitute in an alternate or it could excuse the entire jury at noon and resume deliberations on Tuesday morning with the same jury. The court could discharge both jurors.

The court asked the jury to retire, discuss the foregoing choices and let the court know if the jury had a preference. The jury returned, and the foreman said the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The court excused No. 3 and discharged No. 4. An alternate was sworn in to take No. 4s place, and the jury was excused until Monday morning. No. 3 was to return on Monday morning and at 2:30 p.m. Monday.

On Monday morning, both counsel were present. The court explained what had transpired on Friday. The court stated both counsel had waived appearances "for the court to substitute out jurors who had vacation time, and the defendant waived his appearance." The court stated it would not have declared a mistrial so early in deliberations even though the foreman said that further reading of instructions or testimony would not assist the jury in reaching a verdict. The court said it understood defense counsels concern that No. 4 might have been a holdout and that discharging him might have eliminated the deadlock.

Defense counsel confirmed the courts understanding of the defense position. "We dont know which way that juror was voting. We dont know what the vote was." Counsel contended that once the court asked if there was anything it could do to help and the foreman said "I dont think so," the court should [have] declare[d] a mistrial. The court disagreed, saying the jury had deliberated only three hours at that point and that "there was a weekend in between . . . to let them kind of step away." Counsel said he was requesting a mistrial to protect the record.

Court and counsel discussed what should occur. After a discussion off the record, the court announced they would "wait and see." The reconstituted jury was deliberating at the time. The jury then indicated it had a questions and wanted a reading. The jury deliberated for the rest of the day, excluding the lunch break, No. 3s appointment and regular breaks.

On Tuesday, at 11:42 a.m., the jury announced it had a verdict. When it returned to the courtroom, the court asked the foreman whether, about an hour earlier, the jury had told the bailiff it was deadlocked. The foreman confirmed the statement. The foreman then handed the verdicts to the bailiff. The clerk announced the verdicts. After a request from the court that each juror carefully consider his or her answer, the clerk polled the jury. Each juror confirmed his guilty verdicts. The court excused all jurors except the foreman.

The following occurred in chambers: "The Court: All right. . . . Both counsel are present. We have Juror No. 6, . . . who was the foreperson. [¶] [No. 6] . . . I have a question for you, and let me try to explain what it relates to. [¶] As you know, the first day that you were deliberating, Friday morning — actually, you had, I think, deliberated a little bit on Thursday and then Friday morning, I had sent the jury back for you to powwow as to what days you wanted to come back to assist the court in retaining as many jurors as possible.

"Then at a quarter to 12:00 I brought the jury out and on behalf of the jury you dropped the bombshell to me that you felt that the jury was deadlocked.

"Juror No. 6: Yes.

"The Court: The attorneys were not present and the defendant was not present per their agreement. [¶] At that time I made a tactical decision, without much thought, just what to do to keep as many jurors as possible. [¶] So I excused Juror No. 4 and replaced him with Alternate No. 1.

"Juror No. 6: Correct.

"The Court: And my delicate question to you is, was Juror No. 4 the single hold-out on the case?

"Juror No. 6: Oh no.

"The Court: Was he a hold-out at all?

"Juror No. 6: Oh no.

"The Court: All right. I think thats answered the question.

"Juror No. 6: Okay.

"The Court: So is it correct that when he was excused, it had no effect on the dynamics that had been going on?

"Juror No. 6: That is correct.

"The Court: All right. Thats it.

"Juror No. 6: Thank you.

"The Court: Thank you very much. . . ."

Section 1089 protects those aspects of the jury trial required by the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (People v. Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722, 729.) Section 1089 provides: "If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefore, the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate . . . ."

The decision whether to excuse a juror is subject to the trial courts discretion. However, the jurors inability to perform must "`appear in the record as a demonstrable reality." (People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 448.)

Defendant says there was no good cause or any demonstrable reality justifying the discharge of No. 4. He says the record does not reflect that No. 4 was unwilling or unable to continue deliberations and did not ask to be discharged. Defendant claims that because the court was prepared to accommodate No. 3s need for an early Friday recess and an hours appointment on Monday, it could have similarly accommodated No. 4. Defendant also claims that No. 4s discharge on the heels of the foremans declaration of a deadlock was "particularly egregious" and because defense counsel waived his presence only for the substitution of No. 3 due to vacation, the court had no authority to do anything other than replace No. 3 without counsels consent. Defendant states that discharging No. 4 after the declared deadlock while simultaneously accommodating No. 3 made No. 4 look "unacceptable" in the courts eyes.

In defense counsels presence, after No. 4s discharge, the court stated both counsel had waived appearance for the court to "substitute out jurors who had vacation time[.]" When the court questioned the foreman concerning No. 4, it again referred to counsels waiver of appearance ("The attorneys were not present and the defendant was not present per their agreement"). Counsel did not dispute either statement. Nor was defendants mistrial motion based on the ground that No. 4 was discharged instead of No. 3. Juror No. 4s discharge was not raised in defendants motion for new trial. As respondent posits, defense counsels conduct in this regard suggests he concluded he had no objection to the discharge of any juror with vacation plans. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise. We find defendant has waived the issue.

Preferably, the trial court should have placed the waiver on the record at the time it occurred.

Defendant also faults the court for its comments in excusing the jury for the weekend. When the foreman, instead of giving the court the jurys preference as to scheduling and juror discharge, announced a deadlock, the court responded. "All right. This is what Im going to do. Im going to excuse Juror Number Three for your vacation. All right. You are excused until Monday morning at 9:00 a.m.

"Im going to have the jurors continue deliberating. And Juror Number Three, you are excused to leave. Well, all of the jurors are excused to leave now, but dont go yet.

"Then I think having the weekend for you to think about this case more, you shouldnt think about it while youre away because youre not supposed to do that, but just to let things settle a little bit, sometimes that helps a juror when they kind of step away from it and come back.

"And then Juror Number Four, who has the vacation, were going to substitute you out now at this time."

Defendant says the court thus "gave the jury the unmistakable message that any holdout position was unreasonable and the case warranted only desultory deliberation" and constituted "impermissible coercion of a verdict."

The short answer is that the jury did not so interpret the courts words. On its return the jury asked for extensive reading and announced another deadlock. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 467.)

II

Defendants claim that he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction lacks merit.

A defendant is entitled to voluntary manslaughter instruction where a sudden quarrel or heat of passion is the sort which would be aroused in an "ordinarily reasonable person." (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 326-327, disapproved on another point in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.) "In a murder case . . . heat of passion . . . as [a] form[] of voluntary manslaughter," must be given where it has "substantial evidentiary support." (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 160.)

The day of, or the day before, the shootings, Josephine overheard what appears to have been a contentious exchange between Bryden and defendant. Defendant combines that with Hyltons testimony of the confrontation more than three months before the shooting to create "an emotional peak" in defendant "immediately before the shooting." On the contrary, the record contains no evidence of provocation by Bryden sufficient to lead a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant acted under a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Defendant testified he did not shoot the victims. (People v. Sinclair (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1015-1022.) The court correctly rejected defendants request.

III

Defendants claim that the trial court should have conducted a Marsden hearing has merit.

At the beginning of the September 20, 2002, sentencing hearing, defense counsel told the court defendant had a letter he wanted the court to read. The court asked defense counsel to first read the letter. Counsel did so and told the court he believed the court should read the letter. The court read the letter, which contained 10 points in 10 sentences. It opened with the statement that defendant was giving reasons for his need to fire appointed trial counsel. The court read the letter and found that nothing in it justified legal cause why sentencing should not proceed.

When the court asked defendant if he wished to speak on the issue of sentencing, defendant spoke of "papers they send from here to Mexico, . . . the reason Mexico send me back." He complained that defense counsel never obtained those papers. The court tried to redirect defendants focus to the subject of sentencing, but defendant said he did not understand what "issue of sentencing" meant and "just wanted to know [the] truth." At one point, defendant said, concerning counsel, "He didnt help me for year and a half. Hes not going to help me now." Having repeatedly cut off defendants attempts to speak, shortly thereafter, the court moved to sentencing issues.

The record reflects that, at defense counsels request, the court twice asked Sheriffs Sergeant Paul Mondry to try to track down these papers. Mondry told the court he had contacted Sergeant Castro, who had been present at the deportation hearing, and that Castro said he had "`no idea what they showed [defendant]."

Because a defendant is entitled to competent representation at all times, the trial judge should appoint substitute counsel for a criminal defendant when a proper showing has been made by the defendant at any stage of the proceedings. (See People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 694.) "[S]ubstitute counsel should be appointed when, and only when, necessary under the Marsden standard, that is whenever, in the exercise of its discretion, the court finds that the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would substantially impair the right to assistance of counsel [citation], or, stated slightly differently, if the record shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation or that the defendant and the attorney have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citation]." (People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.)

When such a request is made, "[t]he court must allow the defendant to express any specific complaints about the attorney and the attorney to respond accordingly." (People v. Smith , supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 694; People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 125, 126 [when defendant requests change of counsel, court must allow defendant an opportunity to explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel. Defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events concerning counsels diligence and competence not apparent to the trial judge.)

"Thereafter, substitution is a matter of judicial discretion. Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would `substantially impair the defendants right to assistance of counsel. [Citations.]" (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 435.)

Respondent cites People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 481, for the proposition that when a defendant submits his complaints in writing there is no need for a full-blown hearing. Freeman is factually distinguishable. The Freeman defendant filed pro se a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the case was assigned to a judge for trial. The petition contained substantive content complaints about his lawyer — that he did not trust his lawyer, a conflict of interest existed, and the attorney wanted him to plead guilty. A week later, the trial court denied the petition, stating the defendant alleged no grounds on which relief could be granted. On appeal, the defendant contended the document was essentially a Marsden motion and the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing.

The defendant had used a standard printed habeas petition form which allowed him to state all reasons for the relief requested. He left blank the space designated for a statement of facts supporting his allegations. The Supreme Court interpreted that act to mean he was relying on grounds already stated and there was no reason for the trial court to suppose the defendant withheld his reasons or supporting facts or wanted to state further examples of counsels inadequacy. "He certainly did not `offer to relate specific instances of misconduct. [Citation.]" (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 481.)

The Freeman court, in turn, quoted People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 580. "`When the basis of a defendants dissatisfaction with counsel is set forth in a letter of sufficient detail . . . a full-blown hearing is not required." (Ibid.)

The trial court found counsel had done an outstanding job representing defendant. However, defendants letter to the court suggests relevant events may have occurred off the record. Certainly there are items in defendants letter that require explanation by defendant because the letter lacks detail. The trial court prevented defendants oral attempts to address his claim of right to substitute counsel. The court did not hear his claims.

Describing them as "reasons why I need to fire my State Appointed Attorney . . . , defendant wrote: "First he never gave me my court transcripts. [¶] Second he continues to change the story. [¶] Third he never called the officer that transported me from Mexico to [the] United States, to testify about [m]y documents that were sent from [the] United States to Mexico. [¶] Fourth my Attorney said he had tapes in court but he never played them. [¶] Fifth he tried making me look guilty by reading a letter that was sent from [the] [i]mmigration office of Mexico. [¶] Sixth [t]he Judge in [L]ancaster allowed me to talk to my daughter, but [m]y Attorney does not help me lift the block on the phone. My daughter is named Josephine Jurcoane. [¶] Seventh he twice went on vacation during my case wa[i]ving time. I did not agree. [¶] Showed my Attorney a newspaper article, showing a reward of $10,000 . . . for[] anyone who comes forward with information on my case. The next day police officers searched me and took the newspaper article away without my permission. [¶] Ninth [w]hy they tried stopping the press from being in court for my case. [¶] Tenth I dont believe there was any excuse to send my case from Lancaster to San Fernando."

Defendant does not argue that his failure to be heard amounted to prejudicial error and acknowledges, as an alternative, the disposition we choose. "When, as here, a request for new counsel comes after trial, and the court fails to conduct a proper Marsden hearing, `[t]he appropriate course of action is to remand to the trial court to allow it to fully inquire into appellants allegations concerning counsels performance." (People v. Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1667.) Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for a hearing at which defendant shall be afforded an opportunity to explain and elaborate on the assertions outlined in his letter to the court filed September 20, 2002. ". . . [T]he trial court shall have discretion to consider [defendant]s complaint in light of the manner in which his counsel actually performed at trial." (People v. Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1401.)

DISPOSITION

We reject defendants claims that the trial court erred in discharging juror No. 4 and in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter.

The judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded for the limited purpose of holding a hearing on defendants Marsden motion as outlined in part III of this opinion.

If the court finds that defendant has not shown good cause for appointment of new counsel, it shall reinstate the judgment. If the court finds defendant has shown good cause for appointment of new counsel, it shall appoint new counsel and entertain any motions brought by counsel (including any renewal of the new trial motion previously denied), and shall resentence defendant if necessary.

VOGEL (Miriam A.), J., MALLANO, J. we concur.


Summaries of

People v. Jurcoane

Court of Appeals of the California, Second Appellate District, Division One.
Nov 3, 2003
No. B162541 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Jurcoane

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSIF JURCOANE, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeals of the California, Second Appellate District, Division One.

Date published: Nov 3, 2003

Citations

No. B162541 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003)