From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

In re J.T.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT
Jan 18, 2012
B228499 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012)

Opinion

B228499

01-18-2012

In re J.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.T., Defendant and Appellant.

Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. MJ 19400)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robin R. Kesler, Referee, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Minor J.T., age 17, appeals from the juvenile court's order declaring him a ward of the court and placing him under the supervision of the probation department, which in turn was ordered to find a suitable placement for him. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2010, appellant admitted two counts of misdemeanor battery against his mother arising from two separate petitions. Concurrently, appellant was the subject of a pending dependency petition. At the July 28 hearing, the court indicated that its tentative ruling was to accept the admissions and give appellant probation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, but he could not be returned to his mother's home and would have to be placed in foster care by Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Appellant's dependency counsel was present and indicated that she agreed with the tentative and would "in fact go upstairs [to the dependency court] and indicate that the court will be releasing him to DCFS." The juvenile court accepted appellant's admissions and, without adjudging him a ward of the court, placed him on probation for six months. (§ 725, subd. (a).) The court stated, however, that "if they [the dependency court] d[o] not detain him from mom I will take him back. It's not an option at this time."

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

The next day, July 29, 2010, the parties appeared in the juvenile court again. DCFS was there to report on the situation in the dependency court. It reported that the current dependency court order was for placement in mother's home. DCFS explained that it was never its position to place appellant in a foster home because there was no place it could safely place appellant, given his behavior, even if it had a basis for removing him from his mother. The Assistant Regional Administrator and supervising social worker with DCFS further explained its position as follows. Appellant had threatened his social worker. DCFS had "provided as many services for [appellant] as the Department is able to," and it felt that appellant was a threat and should not be housed with other DCFS minors. Appellant did not recognize any authority figures and had "blatantly disregarded" attempts to assist reunification with his mother. He refused to attend school. At a team decisionmaking meeting in June 2010, appellant threatened to hurt his social worker, and he had made threats in the past. The prior year, he threatened to bomb the DCFS office. Appellant had admitted to drug use and to drinking "whatever is available at the time." His mother had alternated between saying she could take care of him, and then saying that she could not take care of him. DCFS had placed him in a "special foster care" called Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) with specially trained individuals, where he was the only minor placed in the home. This was in July 2009. The MTFC was described as the "most intense [type] of foster care" available, "almost the equivalent of Level 12-13 group homes." The caretakers were "very well-versed in how to deal with difficult children," and the foster mother was very experienced with delinquency issues. Appellant was in that home for only three weeks because his foster parents and the facilitator asked that he be removed. Appellant was being aggressive toward the foster parents and the supervisor of the program, and he was refusing services.

In the past, when appellant was potentially going to be detained from his mother, he refused to go to any foster homes that were not in the Palmdale area. There were no group homes in the Palmdale area. He had been placed in the one group home in the Antelope Valley before, and that group home had refused to take him back. A higher level group home was only possible outside the Antelope Valley area, and appellant had refused to go outside the area. DCFS argued that it had been "looking all over for places for" appellant, and that had not worked out. It felt the dependency court did not have the ability to meet his needs, and it did not have the ability to protect other children in placement from him.

The court noted that its order on July 28 was conditional on DCFS's being able to place appellant. As DCFS was "unwilling to take him," appellant could either pursue a writ based on DCFS's inability to place him, withdraw his admission and the court would set the case for trial, or the court could vacate its order of release to DCFS and either "suitably place him or put him in camp." Appellant did not want to pursue those alternatives and requested that the court order DCFS to find a foster placement. The court vacated the order releasing appellant to DCFS and continued the matter to August 26, 2010, for a progress hearing under section 725, subdivision (a).

On August 26, 2010, appellant again requested that the court order DCFS to place appellant and refused to withdraw his admission. The court noted as follows: "Court was under the belief that the dependency court or [DCFS] had the ability to place him; so we ordered our 725 before that occurred up there, in which we then learned that they do not have the ability to place him, and they actually had to terminate the case. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If he wants to withdraw his plea, he could do so." Because appellant refused to withdraw his admission, the court was going to move forward with disposition based on the admission. The court declared appellant a ward of the court pursuant to section 602 and found that his parents were incapable of providing and had failed to provide for the proper maintenance, education, and training of appellant. It placed him in the care, custody, and control of the probation department, and it ordered probation to find suitable placement for him in a program -- specifically, in an open facility with a drug treatment program.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion and denied him due process when it vacated its order of section 725 probation and instead ordered appellant to be suitably placed by the probation department. Appellant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to commit him to the custody of the probation department without first attempting less restrictive alternatives. We disagree.

We review a juvenile court's dispositional order for abuse of discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330; In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1207.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the court "'exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.'" (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432.) Further, we indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the court and will not disturb its factual findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. (In re Robert H., supra, at p. 1330.)

When a court declares a minor to be a ward of the court, the court may "order the care, custody, and control of the minor to be under the supervision of the probation officer who may place the minor in any of the following: [¶] (1) The approved home of a relative, or the approved home of a nonrelative, extended family member . . . . [¶] (2) A suitable licensed community care facility. [¶] (3) With a foster family agency to be placed in a suitable licensed foster family home or certified family home . . . ." (§ 727, subd. (a).)

Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in placing appellant under the probation department's supervision and ordering probation to place him in an open-facility drug treatment program. Section 727 expressly permits probation to place minors in any of three placements, including a "suitable licensed community care facility." (§ 727, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, the fact that the court vacated its first order of probation under section 725 was not an abuse of discretion. Any order made by the court in juvenile delinquency proceedings "may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge deems meet and proper." (§ 775.) The court expressed at the July 28 hearing that its order was conditioned on what occurred in the dependency proceedings -- namely, that the dependency court would detain appellant from his mother and DCFS would place him in a foster home. When that did not occur, it was entirely proper for the court to change its order. The court then gave appellant the option of withdrawing his admission and proceeding to contested adjudication of the petition. The court also informed him that if he did not withdraw it, the admission would remain on the record, and the court would proceed to order him suitably placed. We perceive no abuse of discretion or violation of constitutional rights here. Appellant seems to suggest that the court should have forced DCFS and/or the dependency court to find a foster placement. But DCFS is not a party to delinquency proceedings as it is in dependency proceedings, and the court therefore did not have the authority to make orders of DCFS. Likewise, it had no authority to tell the dependency court how to run its proceedings.

Appellant's argument that the court had to attempt less restrictive alternatives is unpersuasive. He relies on In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557 (Aline D.) and In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571 (Teofilio A.), both of which are inapposite. Both cases dealt with minors whom the courts committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA), "an institution primarily designed for the incarceration and discipline of serious offenders," and the most restrictive placement available. (Aline D., at p. 567; see also Teofilio A., at p. 573.) In this context, the Aline D. court noted that the statutory scheme contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders in juvenile delinquency cases -- "'namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement.'" (Aline D., at p. 564.) Aline D.'s commitment to CYA had to be supported by a determination of probable benefit to her, based upon substantial evidence in the record. (Id. at p. 567.) The unavailability of suitable alternatives, standing alone, did not justify commitment to CYA. (Ibid.) Similarly, the court in Teofilio A. held that, before a court may commit a minor to CYA, the evidence must demonstrate a probable benefit to the minor and support a determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. (Teofilio A., at p. 576.) The requirement that the evidence show less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate applies to CYA commitments because they are the "last resort." The requirement does not apply here, when the court has not committed appellant to CYA. Indeed, here the court chose one of the less restrictive alternatives -- placement in a treatment facility.

We note that, even if the court's order were subject to the same standard as CYA commitment, the evidence showed that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. Home placement with appellant's mother was inappropriate, given that he was under the court's wardship for two counts of battery against her. Also, his mother had been going back and forth between wanting him to live with her and not wanting him to live with her, and appellant was refusing to attend school. As to foster home placement, DCFS attested to the problems they had placing appellant in the past because of his problematic behavior. He had threatened to hurt his social worker and threatened to bomb DCFS. In a specialized foster placement with individuals trained to deal with delinquency issues, the caretakers had not been willing to have him for more than a few weeks because of his aggressive behavior. He had also refused services. These circumstances would have supported a finding that the less restrictive alternatives were inappropriate.

In sum, the court's dispositional order was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FLIER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.


Summaries of

In re J.T.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT
Jan 18, 2012
B228499 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012)
Case details for

In re J.T.

Case Details

Full title:In re J.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT

Date published: Jan 18, 2012

Citations

B228499 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012)