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People v. Jones

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Oct 12, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 4th 220750 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

Opinion

4-22-0750

10-12-2023

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD L. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.


This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 09CF4005 Honorable Randy Wilt, Judge Presiding.

CAVANAGH JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

CAVANAGH JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable assistance.

¶ 2 Defendant, Ronald L. Jones, was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8) (West 2008)) and aggravated unlawful restraint (id. § 103.1). In February 2018, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. In March 2021, postconviction counsel filed an amended postconviction petition, which the trial court dismissed. On appeal, defendant argues his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to adequately present defendant's contentions in the amended petition in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In January 2010, the State charged defendant by indictment with (1) aggravated criminal sexual assault when by force he knowingly committed an act of digital sexual penetration on J.L. and caused bodily harm to her when he struck her in the head with a firearm (id. § 12-14(a)(2)) (count I); (2) aggravated criminal sexual assault when by force he knowingly committed an act of digital sexual penetration on J.L. while armed with a firearm (id. § 12-13(a)(1)) (count II); and (3) aggravated unlawful restraint when he knowingly bound J.L. with duct tape while armed with a firearm (id. § 10-3.1) (count III).

¶ 5 A. Jury Trial

¶ 6 At trial, J.L. testified on December 19, 2009, she went to her mother's home in Beloit, Wisconsin, where she spoke with defendant, who was waiting there for her. Defendant drove J.L. to her apartment in South Beloit, Illinois. While at J.L.'s apartment, defendant pointed a gun at her. Defendant then struck J.L. in the head with the gun multiple times. Defendant then digitally penetrated J.L. Defendant duct taped J.L.'s hands and feet together and placed duct tape over her mouth. Defendant apologized to J.L. and attempted to clean the blood from J.L.'s face and the carpet. Defendant removed the duct tape and drove J.L. back to Beloit. While driving back to Beloit, defendant stopped at a park to dispose of the gun and bloody rags, but the lake was frozen. Defendant dropped J.L. off in Beloit somewhere between where her boyfriend and mother lived. Defendant told her if she told anybody what had happened, he would kill her and whomever she told.

¶ 7 Detective James Gallagher interviewed defendant. According to Gallagher, defendant initially said J.L. could "fill out a form and put down what happened, that [defendant] would sign it, that [defendant] wanted the death penalty." Defendant then told Gallagher he met J.L. at her mother's home and took her to her apartment. Defendant and J.L. got into an argument, and he "lost it" and punched her in the face twice. Defendant denied having a weapon and denied sexually assaulting J.L., stating he could not because he was unable to get an erection. Initially, defendant denied using duct tape on J.L., but then he admitted he did because he wanted to kill himself. Gallagher prepared a handwritten statement for defendant that defendant edited and signed. The statement indicated defendant gave J.L. a ride to the apartment. Defendant stated he punched J.L. after she had hit him. Defendant also admitted duct-taping J.L.'s hands and feet. Defendant asked Gallagher if he could write a letter to J.L. Gallagher gave defendant a piece of paper. The letter stated defendant "can't take back the hurt [he] caused," and he wished "[J.L.] would have let [defendant] have the time to do what [he] needed to do." He also wrote that what happened was not J.L.'s fault.

¶ 8 Deputy Tim Speer testified he recovered wadded up duct tape in the garbage can at J.L.'s apartment. While Speer was swabbing defendant's fingers, defendant stated, "That's probably her blood on my thumb." In defendant's car, Speer located blood on the door handle and passenger seat belt. Laurie Lee of the Illinois State Police forensic science laboratory testified the blood on the passenger seat belt of defendant's car matched the DNA profile of J.L. Speer also discovered several handwritten letters from defendant to J.L., including a sexually explicit letter addressed to J.L. In some letters, defendant stated he loved and cared for J.L. and her daughter. Speer did not recover a gun, bloody rags, or duct tape when searching defendant's home or vehicle.

¶ 9 Officer David Lee testified on behalf of the defense. When Lee initially spoke with J.L., he asked J.L. if any sexual contact occurred between defendant and her. J.L. stated nothing sexual had taken place.

¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts.

¶ 11 B. Posttrial Proceedings

¶ 12 Posttrial, defendant attempted to proceed pro se, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court appointed conflict counsel to represent defendant on his motion for a new trial. Posttrial counsel filed an amended motion for a new trial alleging, inter alia, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach J.L. with a prior conviction.

¶ 13 At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, defendant testified he had only met with his trial counsel, Wendell Coates, on one occasion at the jail. Defendant stated he never reviewed any discovery materials with Coates. Defendant stated he was aware J.L. had previous convictions, but Coates told him he had looked into it and found nothing.

¶ 14 Coates testified he had 25 years' experience at the Winnebago County Public Defender's Office and significant jury trial experience. Coates stated he met with defendant multiple times both at the county jail and in a holding cell at the courthouse prior to court appearances. Coates said he had reviewed the discovery with defendant but nothing indicated J.L. had a prior conviction for any offense. Coates testified he had searched Winnebago County, Illinois, records but found only traffic violations and found nothing in a search of the adjacent Rock County, Wisconsin, court's website. On cross-examination, Coates was shown a printout from a statewide website for the Wisconsin court system indicating J.L. had been previously convicted of misdemeanor theft in 2005.

¶ 15 The trial court did not find Coates was ineffective. Regarding J.L.'s prior conviction, the court stated that "the bare fact of a felony conviction" was not admissible under Illinois law for purposes of impeachment. Defendant was sentenced to 35 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on count II and another 8 years, to be served consecutively, on count III. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the court denied.

¶ 16 On direct appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred when it gave him an extended-term sentence on count III of eight years' imprisonment. The State confessed error and the appellate court entered an order reducing defendant's sentence on count III to five years. People v. Jones, No. 2-15-1016 (Aug. 29, 2017) (unpublished order).

¶ 17 C. Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 18 In February 2018, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). The trial court found defendant had raised the gist of a constitutional issue and appointed postconviction counsel to represent defendant. In March 2021, counsel filed an amended postconviction petition but failed to file a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 651(c). The amended petition contained 11 claims, none of which alleged ineffective assistance based on appellate or trial counsels' failure to impeach J.L. with a prior theft conviction. In August 2021, new postconviction counsel was assigned to appear on defendant's behalf. The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, which, relevant to this appeal, argued defendant had forfeited various issues within the amended petition by failing to raise them on direct appeal. Postconviction counsel filed a reply arguing any forfeiture should be excused based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court dismissed the amended petition.

¶ 19 This appeal followed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 On appeal, defendant argues his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to include his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to allege trial counsel was ineffective when counsel did not impeach J.L.'s credibility with a prior theft conviction.

¶ 22 "The [Act] provides a procedural mechanism through which criminal defendants can assert that their federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in their original trials or sentencing hearings." People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12. A postconviction petition must clearly set forth the ways in which a defendant claims his constitutional rights were violated. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020). "The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached." Id.

¶ 23 "The Act provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions." Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 45. Once a postconviction petition moves from the first to the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel to represent the defendant and the State may file responsive pleadings. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17. During the second stage, the court determines "whether the postconviction petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation." Id. If a defendant fails to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, his postconviction claims are subject to dismissal. Id. The court's dismissal of a defendant's claims at the second stage of proceedings is subject to de novo review. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 14.

¶ 24 A. Rule 651(c) Compliance

¶ 25 Defendant argues postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to adequately present defendant's impeachment claim in compliance with Rule 651(c). Defendant requests the trial court be reversed and the matter remanded for further second-stage proceedings in compliance with Rule 651(c). We disagree.

¶ 26 In postconviction proceedings, there is no constitutional right to counsel; rather, the right is supplied by statute. People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19. A defendant is entitled to a "reasonable level of assistance," which is less than what is afforded by the federal and state constitutions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The distinction comes from the fact that postconviction counsel is appointed to shape a defendant's complaints into proper legal form and present them, not protect a defendant "from the prosecutorial forces of the State." Id.

¶ 27 At a minimum, Rule 651(c) requires postconviction counsel to (1) consult with defendant to ascertain his contentions, (2) examine the record of the trial proceedings, and (3) make "any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant's] contentions." Ill. S.Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 28 Rule 651(c) ensures defendants receive reasonable assistance from postconviction counsel. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 20. Compliance with Rule 651(c) is mandatory. Id. ¶ 21. Postconviction counsel creates a rebuttal presumption of reasonable assistance when filing a Rule 651(c) certificate. Id. A defendant can show failure to comply with Rule 651(c) by demonstrating postconviction counsel did not make all the necessary amendments to the pro se petition. Id.

¶ 29 In this matter, because no Rule 651(c) certificate was filed by postconviction counsel, no rebuttable presumption exists for defendant to overcome. Therefore, we must review the record to determine whether postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c). The record shows postconviction counsel consulted with defendant to ascertain his contentions and examined the record of the trial proceedings. In October and November 2020, postconviction counsel appeared on defendant's behalf and relayed to the trial court that he had sent multiple drafts of the amended postconviction petition to defendant for review. In January 2021, defendant approved the amended petition by notarized signature and an accompanying affidavit sent to postconviction counsel for filing. The amended petition that defendant approved did not contain a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to allege his trial counsel was ineffective by not impeaching J.L. with a prior theft conviction. The record shows postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c).

¶ 30 B. Addison

¶ 31 Defendant also argues postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by making defendant's pro se postconviction petition worse by amending it. Defendant contends postconviction counsel's failure to include defendant's impeachment claim has caused the issue to be forfeited. In support of his position, defendant cites Addison.

¶ 32 In Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 23, the defendant filed a pro se petition raising 15 issues, 14 of which claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Postconviction counsel pursued five of the issues raised by the defendant but did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel regarding any of the five issues. Id. ¶ 24. Because all of the issues raised by postconviction counsel could have been raised on direct appeal, the court concluded "we are faced with the unusual situation in which postconviction counsel, in one significant sense, made the pro se petition worse by amending it." Id. The State moved to dismiss the amended petition on the grounds the issues had been forfeited because they could have been raised on direct appeal and the defendant-in his amended petition-had not challenged appellate counsel's decision not to raise the issues. Id. ¶ 25. Postconviction counsel did not amend the petition in light of the State's arguments, nor did counsel rebut the State's assertion counsel failed to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. The Addison court found postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance when counsel identified arguable issues but failed to "make the necessary amendments to put the claims in their proper form." Id. The necessary amendments included alleging appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise the issues postconviction counsel had identified. Id. The court noted, "[Postconviction counsel] eliminated the necessary allegations that defendant had included in the pro se petition." (Emphasis in original.) Id.

¶ 33 We find the instant matter distinguishable from Addison. First, postconviction counsel for defendant argued on all the issues raised regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel that appellate counsel was also ineffective for failing to raise those issues on direct appeal. The State argued in its motion to dismiss the amended petition that defendant had forfeited various issues in the amended petition because they were not raised on direct appeal. Postconviction counsel specifically rebutted those arguments by stating any forfeiture should be excused based upon ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

¶ 34 Additionally, while defendant's pro se petition contains approximately 66 claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the petition does not itself clearly make an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim regarding the impeachment of J.L.'s credibility with a prior theft conviction. It is only in defendant's attached affidavit that he recounts trial counsel's failure to discover and impeach J.L.'s credibility with a prior theft conviction. As we noted earlier, postconviction counsel provided multiple drafts of the amended petition to defendant for his approval. Defendant approved the amended petition. Here, unlike Addison, postconviction counsel made the necessary amendments to avoid forfeiture of the issues that defendant himself approved of.

¶ 35 C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claim

¶ 36 Furthermore, defendant has not shown prejudice from his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

¶ 37 Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are governed by the two-pronged test from Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Johnson, 206 Ill.2d 348, 378 (2002). In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, a defendant must show it is arguable (1) his appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability, but for appellate counsel's errors, the appeal would have been successful. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 17 (2009). Appellate counsel's decision regarding which issues to pursue is generally entitled to substantial deference. People v. Johnson, 205 Ill.2d 381, 406 (2002). Appellate counsel is not required to" 'brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit.'" Johnson, 206 Ill.2d at 378 (quoting People v. Easley, 192 Ill.2d 307, 329 (2000)). Where the underlying issue is nonmeritorious, a defendant suffers no prejudice; therefore, the reviewing court is required to examine the merits of the claims not raised by appellate counsel. People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 362 (2000).

¶ 38 The merits of the claim not raised by appellate counsel concern whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach J.L. with a prior conviction and are analyzed under the same standard set forth above from Strickland. People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill.2d 490, 497 (2010) (stating the "Strickland standard applies equally" to ineffective assistance claims of both trial and appellate counsel).

¶ 39 "The impeachment of witnesses is generally considered a matter of trial strategy, immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58. The exception to this general rule occurs when trial counsel "fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "[T]he complete failure to impeach the sole eyewitness when significant impeachment is available is not trial strategy and, thus, may support an ineffective assistance claim." (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 40 The record shows trial counsel failed to discover J.L. had a prior theft conviction, thereby failing to seek its admission to impeach J.L.'s credibility. But this failure by trial counsel did not amount to a complete failure by counsel to impeach J.L. In fact, the record shows trial counsel attempted to impeach J.L. through both cross-examination and a defense witness. Counsel called Lee as a defense witness to show J.L. told Lee no sexual contact occurred and similarly tried to elicit the same from J.L. on cross-examination. Based on the record, we cannot find trial counsel completely failed to impeach J.L.

¶ 41 Even if we were to assume, for argument's sake, trial counsel's failure to discover and impeach J.L. with a prior theft conviction amounted to deficient performance, defendant would still be required to show he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. "The failure to satisfy either the deficiency prong or the prejudice prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. ¶ 57.

¶ 42 Defendant's contention hinges partly on the trial court admitting J.L.'s prior theft conviction pursuant to People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 (1971). During defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court specifically addressed J.L.'s prior conviction, noting its mere existence was not enough under Montgomery. See People v. Brown, 2013 IL App (3d) 110669, ¶ 50 (stating the trial court "is presumed to have understood the law and properly applied it"). The court's statement implies J.L.'s prior conviction would not have been admissible, but the court did not explicitly make a finding on this issue.

¶ 43 The standard set forth in Strickland requires a defendant to "affirmatively prove" prejudice resulted from trial counsel's error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. "It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id." 'Satisfying the prejudice prong necessitates a showing of actual prejudice, not simply speculation that [the] defendant may have been prejudiced.'" People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 55 (quoting People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 81). Defendant's contention would leave us to speculate whether the trial court would admit J.L.'s prior theft conviction- despite contrary evidence-and whether it would have affected J.L.'s credibility with the jury.

¶ 44 As we have already found, trial counsel did seek to impeach J.L.'s credibility with the jury through cross-examination and the testimony of Lee. J.L.'s credibility notwithstanding, impeachment evidence would also have to overcome defendant's admissions to striking and duct-taping J.L., along with the other inculpatory evidence. We decline to engage in such speculation. Therefore, we find defendant has failed to show prejudice regarding his trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Because we find defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, we cannot find appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue on direct appeal. Simms, 192 Ill.2d at 362; People v. Randall, 2021 IL App (1st) 191194, ¶ 66 ("If the underlying claim would not have succeeded on direct appeal, then there is no arguable legal basis for defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). It follows that postconviction counsel could not have provided unreasonable assistance for failing to amend defendant's postconviction petition with a meritless claim.

¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 47 Affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Jones

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Oct 12, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 4th 220750 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)
Case details for

People v. Jones

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD L…

Court:Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District

Date published: Oct 12, 2023

Citations

2023 Ill. App. 4th 220750 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)