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People v. Jones

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Apr 2, 2009
No. F055043 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF119145A, Sidney P. Chapin, Judge.

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Jamie A. Scheidegger, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

THE COURT

Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Wiseman, J. and Hill, J.

Defendant Stanley James Jones was convicted of stalking (Pen. Code § 646.9, subd. (b) ; count 1), making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 2), and violating a court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 3). In addition, defendant was found to have served a prior prison term and to have suffered a prior serious conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. He appeals, claiming the trial court should have stayed the sentence for the criminal threat pursuant to section 654 and the trial court erred when it did not strike his prior serious felony conviction for sentencing purposes.

All future code references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

FACTS

Defendant and Teresa Vasquez began dating in February 2006. They dated for approximately four months. Vasquez was the apartment manager for the apartment complex where she lived. Defendant would get annoyed when she worked too much and he was jealous. In May 2006, Vasquez shook the hand of a male tenant at a barbeque. Defendant became angry and he and Vasquez fought. Vasquez decided to break off her relationship with defendant because of his anger and jealousy issues.

Although Vasquez broke off their dating relationship, she continued to maintain a friendship with defendant and wanted to help him. Defendant continually told Vasquez he loved her and that he would change. Vasquez believed him, but defendant did not change.

Defendant was incarcerated in the summer of 2006. Vasquez wrote him letters, visited him in jail, put money in his account, and talked to him on the telephone. Defendant wrote multiple letters to Vasquez.

In July 2006, Vasquez obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant, but continued to write, talk on the telephone, and visit him while he was incarcerated. Later in the summer, she went to see him one last time to tell him she could not see him anymore. Following this, the more Vasquez withdrew from the defendant the more aggressively he pursued her. He continued to write to her. While some of the letters expressed his love, over time they became threatening and angry.

After defendant was released from his incarceration, he would call Vasquez and walk up and down the street where she lived. He left her multiple messages on her answering machine threatening to come over to her home, telling her he would go to prison for what he was going to do to her, telling her he hated her, and making other assorted threats.

Vasquez was afraid. In March of 2007, defendant called and told her to get ready because he was coming over. He threatened to kill her. He came over and Vasquez's friend, Mary Robbins, told him to go away. A similar incident occurred in May 2007 when defendant called and threatened to come over. He showed up at her apartment in less than five minutes, called her names, and said he was going to kill her. Vasquez was very frightened.

DISCUSSION

I. Concurrent Sentences for Stalking and Criminal Threat Convictions

Defendant was convicted in count 1 of stalking in violation of section 646.9. The crime of stalking is described in subdivision (a): "Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family is guilty of the crime of stalking." (Emphasis added.) Defendant was convicted under section 646.9, subdivision (b) because he committed the crime of stalking while a restraining order was in effect.

Defendant was convicted in count 2 of making a criminal threat in violation of section 422. Section 422 defines a criminal threat as follows: "Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety."

A unanimity instruction was given limited to count 2 (criminal threat) only. The jury was instructed that the People presented evidence of more than one act to prove defendant committed the offense and that it may not find him guilty unless all jurors agree that he committed at least one of these acts and all agree on which act he committed for that count.

The prosecutor argued the March 2007 and May 2007 incidents as part of the evidence demonstrating that defendant made a credible threat, a required element to prove stalking in count 1. The prosecutor also told the jury to keep in mind the threats made in the stalking charge because there is an overlap between the stalking charge and the criminal threats charge. When discussing the criminal threat charge during argument to the jury, the prosecutor relied on evidence from both incidents.

Defendant filed a motion arguing that his sentences in count 1 (stalking) and count 2 (criminal threat) should not run consecutively. As part of this motion he claimed that the record does not demonstrate that the "credible threat" the jury found in order to convict defendant in count 1 was different from the "threat" that formed the basis for count 2. At sentencing defendant asked that count 2 be stayed based on this same argument.

The court commented that it was "troubled by the inability to distinguish those acts" and found that imposing a concurrent sentence for count 2 was appropriate and ran count 2 concurrent to the sentence in count 1. The court did not stay the sentence in count 2.

Defendant claims the trial court erred in not staying the sentence in count 2 pursuant to section 654. He argues that he cannot properly be punished for stalking and the criminal threat because during the course of conduct that resulted in the stalking he committed the criminal threat. In addition, he argues he had a single objective in committing both crimes.

Section 654 provides that "[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." Although section 654 "'literally applies only where such punishment arises out of multiple statutory violations produced by the "same act or omission,"' we have extended its protection 'to cases in which there are several offenses committed during "a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time."'" (People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.) Section 654 is intended to ensure that a defendant is punished commensurate with his culpability. However, "[i]t is defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible." (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) If the defendant "harbored 'multiple criminal objectives,' which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, 'even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.'" (Ibid.)

Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the jury necessarily used defendant's conduct in March 2007 and/or May 2007 to support the stalking conviction. The stalking offense was based on defendant's incessant communications to Vasquez by letter, by telephone, and in person over a period of months. The question of whether a defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives is generally a question of fact for the trial court. (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) A finding that the crimes were divisible is inherent in the judgment if there is no express finding on the issue in the record, and this inherent finding must be upheld if supported by the evidence. (People v. Nelson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 634, 638.) Thus, defendant's argument fails.

Even if we were to assume that the event in March 2007 or the event in May 2007 was used by the jury to support the stalking conviction, it would not require staying his sentence for making a criminal threat on those occasions under section 654. "[T]he trial court may impose punishment for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.] The principal inquiry in each case is whether the defendant's criminal intent and objective were single or multiple. Each case must be determined on its own facts." (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1134.)

The evidence supports the conclusion that defendant acted with separate intents. While the overarching goal of the terrorist threats and stalking was intimidation of Vasquez, each crime had its own more immediate and separate objective, which permitted the imposition of separate sentences. The fact that both crimes involved mental intimidation does not render them indistinguishable. The stalking offense was based on months of letters, telephone calls, and walking past Vasquez's apartment. Defendant's objective was to intimidate Vasquez into resuming their relationship. After it became clear to defendant that Vasquez wanted nothing to do with him, he showed up at her apartment twice and threatened her life.

The trial court did not violate the prohibition of section 654 in imposing concurrent sentences.

II. Court's Refusal to Strike a Prior Conviction at Sentencing

Defendant filed a motion requesting the trial court to strike the prior serious felony conviction allegation under the Three Strikes law. He alleged several factors he claimed would support such an action by the trial court. First, he asserted that the nature of the current offense was a tragic love story. He supported this assertion with two letters from jurors expressing their belief that although defendant was guilty, his actions were based on love. Next, he argued that his prior burglary conviction that resulted in the strike finding was not a particularly serious offense because he and another person merely went into a trailer and stole property valued at $40 and that offense occurred 20 years earlier. Finally, defendant claimed his background, character and prospects demonstrate he is outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, noting that he has an alcohol problem, but is capable of hard work and is employable.

The court refused to strike the prior serious felony conviction, finding that defendant was not outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law and commenting in particular on defendant's prior criminal history. The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years for his count 1 stalking conviction and doubled that term based on his strike. The court also imposed a one-year consecutive term for the prior prison term enhancement, for a total sentence of nine years in count 1.

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to strike the prior serious felony conviction strike. Defendant repeats the arguments he made in his motion in the trial court in asserting his claim on appeal.

"[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law ... 'in furtherance of justice' pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)

Defendant's prior criminal history began when he was only 13 years old and continued until his current convictions now at the age of 45. As pointed out by the prosecutor and as reflected in the probation officer's report, defendant has over 25 prior convictions, some of them for the same type of behavior that occurred here; he has violated probation and parole on numerous occasions; and there are few window periods in this over 30-year span when defendant was not on probation, on parole, or incarcerated.

We need not discuss all of the factors presented by defendant in support of his argument because, given defendant's age and his extensive criminal history, defendant is clearly the type of recidivist who falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes scheme. (People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750.) The trial court did not err when it refused to strike defendant's prior serious felony conviction.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Jones

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Apr 2, 2009
No. F055043 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Jones

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STANLEY JAMES JONES, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Apr 2, 2009

Citations

No. F055043 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009)