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People v. Jones

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Mar 26, 2008
No. B200351 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LONGENO JONES, Defendant and Appellant. B200351 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Sixth Division March 26, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Superior Court County of Los Angeles James R. Brandlin, Judge Super. Ct. No. BA308139

Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

COFFEE, J.

Longeno Jones appeals from the judgment following his jury trial and conviction of burglary and attempted burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 664.) Appellant admitted that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served six prison terms for prior felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to 41 years to life in state prison, including 25 years to life for burglary; ten years for the two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)); and six one-year prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions; contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss his prior strike convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero); and argues that his sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2006, Vernon Henry lived in room 21 of the Pine Tree Motel near 38th and Western Avenue in Los Angeles. On August 23, in the evening, he left his room for approximately 10 or 15 minutes.

Sean Johnson worked as a private patrol officer for a security company. On August 23, 2006, at approximately 10:30 p.m., he responded to a call from the Pine Tree Motel. On arriving there, Johnson saw appellant on his knees, throwing his shoulders into the door of room 16, upstairs, as if he were trying to force it open. Johnson asked appellant what he was doing. Appellant's mouth was foaming, his eyes were glazed, and his lips were white. He hid his hands and said that he had lost his keys. Johnson asked for identification. Appellant said that he was not going back to jail and that he had not done anything wrong. Johnson detained and handcuffed him before taking him downstairs and placing him in the back seat of his patrol car. Johnson then retrieved two black bags that had been in appellant's vicinity and put them on the patrol car's trunk.

Meanwhile, Henry had returned to room 21, where he found that some of his belongings had been "rearrange[d]." Johnson went to room 21 to speak with Henry, and brought him downstairs. Johnson called the Los Angeles Police Department. Its officers arrived within minutes. They searched the bags on the patrol car's trunk and located some shoes, as well as Henry's blue jeans, CD's and DVD's.

The police officers placed appellant in their custody and a screwdriver fell from his hand as they searched him. Officer Cesar Orozco located fresh pry marks on the entry doors of rooms 21 and 16. Appellant gave Orozco false information when he asked for his name. He initially declined to provide his fingerprints to the police.

DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

Appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict him of attempted burglary and burglary. We disagree. "[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) "Reversal . . . is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction] .'" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) "[A]ll conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the judgment and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in its favor." (People v. Kelso (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 538, 542.)

The elements of attempted burglary are a direct but ineffectual act to enter a building with the specific intent to commit larceny or another felony. (§§ 664, 459, 21a.) Here, substantial evidence supports the existence of each of these elements. There is abundant credible evidence that appellant attempted to burglarize room 16, where Johnson found appellant throwing his shoulder against its entry door; that door had fresh pry marks; a screwdriver fell from appellant's hands during a contemporaneous search; and bags recovered from appellant's vicinity contained property removed on the same evening from room 21 of the same motel.

Substantial evidence also supports the burglary conviction. The elements of burglary are the entry into a building with the specific intent to commit larceny or another felony. (§ 459.) Henry observed that his belongings had been rearranged upon returning to room 21 after a brief absence. Some of his belongings were retrieved from appellant's vicinity. Room 21's entry door bore fresh pry marks. Appellant carried a flat-headed screwdriver shortly after property was removed from room 21. He exhibited a consciousness of guilt by hiding his hands when Johnson questioned him and by giving the police false information.

Romero Motion

The trial court sentenced appellant to serve 41 years to life in state prison after denying his motion to strike his two prior qualifying strike convictions pursuant to section 1385 and Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, 530. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike his two prior strike convictions. We disagree.

A trial court has limited discretion under section 1385 to strike prior convictions in Three Strikes cases. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, 530.) In determining whether to exercise that discretion, the court must consider "whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) We review the denial of a section 1385 motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373-374.)

The probation report indicated that appellant's criminal history began when he was a juvenile and included an arrest for possession of a controlled substance in 1979. His adult record included prior convictions for attempted grand theft in 2001; domestic battery in 1999; assault with a firearm in 1994; robbery in 1990; grand theft property in 1987; and burglary in 1981. He violated parole three times and was on parole when he committed the current offense. The probation report recommended state prison and listed four circumstances in aggravation and no circumstances in mitigation.

During sentencing, the trial court indicated that it had read and considered the report of the psychologist who evaluated appellant, the written Romero motion, and the probation report. Appellant's counsel indicated that appellant suffered from mental illness, and stressed that appellant was under the influence of drugs at the time of the current offenses. He argued that even if the court dismissed appellant's prior strike convictions, it could impose a lengthy sentence that would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the Three Strikes law, given [appellant's] background and the actual nature of the crime[s]."

The trial court recognized its "discretion under Romero and under . . . section 1385" to dismiss prior strike convictions. It also acknowledged that appellant had "some mental health issues," and that, "at the time of the offense, [he] may have consumed alcohol, or . . . controlled substances." The court observed that appellant recognized the criminal nature of his conduct while committing the current crimes, and that he took steps to try to conceal his lengthy criminal history from the police (e.g., by giving them a false name, initially refusing to be fingerprinted, etc.). The court concluded that appellant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law and denied appellant's Romero motion. The court's sentencing decision was not irrational or arbitrary. Appellant has committed several violent offenses. As is evident from the record, the court reviewed appellant's criminal history, his background, his character, and prospects. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Romero motion.

Cruel and Unusual Sentence

Appellant additionally contends that his sentence of 41 years to life is cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.) We reject the argument because appellant is not merely being punished for the current offense, but also for his recidivism. (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 366; People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1432.)

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution "prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime." (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 271.) But the "gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case." (Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 [two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for two petty thefts not grossly disproportionate].) Under the California Constitution, punishment is disproportionate if it "shocks the conscience" considering the offender's history and the seriousness of his offenses. (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.)

We cannot say that the sentence is constitutionally disproportionate given appellant's recidivism, his propensity for violence, his failed attempts at parole and probation, and the seriousness of the present offense. Appellant has served six prior prison terms and committed the current offenses while on parole.

When faced with recidivist defendants such as appellant, "California appellate courts have consistently found the Three Strikes law is not cruel and unusual punishment." (People v. Mantanez, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 359; see also Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 [rejecting similar claims of cruel and unusual punishment; 25 years to life for theft of golf clubs].) Appellant's sentence conforms to sentences for repeat offenders under the Three Strikes law and is proportionate to sentences for repeat offenders in other states. (See e.g., People v. Romero, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1433 [25 years to life for theft of magazine]; People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1416-1417 [61 years to life not cruel or unusual punishment for recidivist burglar], overruled on another point in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 560, fn. 8; People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1338 [25 years to life for grand theft]; People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509-1516 [25 years to life for possession of methamphetamine]; People v. Goodwin (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th. 1084, 1093-1094 [25 years to life for commercial burglary and petty theft with a prior].)

Even if we assumed that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains a proportionality guarantee outside the context of capital punishment, this is not one of those exceedingly rare cases in which the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. (Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. 11, 21; Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 994-995.) Nor is the punishment so severe that it shocks the conscience or offends fundamental notions of human dignity. (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.)

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: YEGAN, Acting P.J. PERREN, J.


Summaries of

People v. Jones

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Mar 26, 2008
No. B200351 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Jones

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LONGENO JONES, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Mar 26, 2008

Citations

No. B200351 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008)