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People v. Johnson

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Three.
Nov 3, 2003
No. G030637 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003)

Opinion

G030637.

11-3-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARQUIS JUAN JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Paul R. Ward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil P. Gonzalez and Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Marquis Juan Johnson appeals from the judgment sending him to prison for 16 years, 4 months, following a jurys conviction of him and two codefendants, Duvall Tyree Hartley and Ronnie Lamont Matthews,[] for robbery and false imprisonment after having a prior serious felony conviction. He contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient for any charge, the instructions were inadequate to insure the jury find proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was denied due process of law by the prosecutions invocation of an uncharged conspiracy to establish culpability. He requests we take judicial notice of all transcripts and briefings filed in the appeal of his codefendant, Duvall Tyree Hartley. We grant the motion to the extent of taking judicial notice of our unpublished opinion and the parties briefs in the related appeal of People v. Hartley, supra, G030436. We affirm the judgment.

We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion for the charges against Hartley—who had no prior felony record—in which he received a prison sentence of 15 years in June 2003. (People v. Hartley (June 30, 2003, G30436) [nonpub. opn.].) Matthews has not filed a notice of appeal.

FACTS

Early one morning, two African-American men approached a Westminster motel with the intention of robbing the manager. When Gerald Getz, a 73-year-old guest, said hello to the two men, they mistook him for the manager. The men waited for Getz to return to the walkway by the lobby from his car, and then put a gun to his head, ordering him to unlock the managers office.

Getz pleaded that he was not the manager, but the men were convinced otherwise. They proceeded to search Getz, taking his wallet, keys, and medicine. While the men were attempting to unlock the managers office with Getzs rental car keys, a second person approached and was ordered to the ground. Next, Scott Spoerlein and his pregnant wife approached and were instructed, at gunpoint, to get to the ground. At trial, they identified Matthews as the unarmed robber but failed to identify the second robber, although Spoerlein previously reported that Hartley and Matthews appeared to be the two robbers he had seen. In contrast, Getz identified Matthews as the armed robber, and tentatively identified Johnson as the unarmed one.[]

Hartley and Johnson were charged with personally using a gun in the robbery but the allegation against Johnson was dismissed before the defense case. Matthews, on the other hand, was charged with being vicariously armed during the robbery, and the jury found all charged allegations to be true.

Meanwhile, the hotel manager was watching the situation unfold through the peephole in his door. At the same time, his wife was on the phone notifying the police. Sirens could be heard almost immediately, and the two men soon fled towards the back alley. As the officers approached the rear alley—anticipating the robbers to use that route—they saw a red Honda, driven by Matthews, accelerating away from the motel. Matthews appeared to be the sole occupant of the car.

A short time later, police were notified that a red Honda had been abandoned and a neighboring citizen saw two men climbing a nearby fence, going in the direction of Beach Boulevard. Hiding behind a set of trashcans nearby, they located Matthews. In his pocket was Hartleys set of car keys to the red Honda, and in the Hondas trunk the police found Getzs wallet and medication pouch. On the cars floorboard, the officers could see two ski caps and an envelope with Hartleys return address in Long Beach. In the glove box was a framed photograph of Hartley and his girlfriend, Sicola Cofield. In the spare tire niche, a 9-millimeter, semi-automatic gun was found, fully loaded.

At Beach and Bolsa Boulevards, Hartley boarded a bus. Fellow passengers noticed that he was sweating profusely and acting erratic, swearing repeatedly and cracking his knuckles nervously. He got off the bus at the first stop, saying he had to make a phone call, yet he failed to stop at the first available public phone. Eventually, he called Cofield, the registered owner of the red Honda. Hearing that Hartley was in an "emergency" situation, she agreed to come pick him up. When she arrived at the beach per Hartleys instructions, she found him in the company of Johnson.

Johnson was later arrested as a coconspirator in the crime. Not only was he in the company of Hartley not far from the abandoned red Honda, but his fingerprints were found on that cars exterior passenger window while Hartleys fingerprints were found on the exterior of the drivers window frame.

Cofield testified that she gave Hartley her car to use the night before. After receiving Hartleys phone call that morning, she took her sisters car and drove from Long Beach to the area of Beach Boulevard and Pacific Coast Highway to get Hartley. Hartley, however, got into her car but rode with her for only a short distance, changing his mind and deciding to ride with his friend, Robert Diaz, who had arrived at about the same time as Cofield. Johnson chose to ride with Diaz from the start. After driving back to Long Beach, Cofield returned to the apartment she sometimes shared with Hartley and noticed that Johnsons car was parked there. She knew Johnson and Hartley were long-term friends.

Johnson told an investigator that he knew neither Matthews nor Hartley, and, oddly enough, failed to identify his own photograph along with those of the other two men. The prosecution alleged that Johnson had been sitting in the red Honda while the crime was being committed and had fled with the two men. All three men were found guilty as charged.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of Evidence

Johnson contends the evidence is insufficient to connect him with the robbery because all the victims testified to seeing only two perpetrators. Thus, any contrary conclusion must be premised on mere speculation. (See generally, People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 [inference cannot be drawn from speculation as to the probabilities of an event].)

On review of a conviction for the sufficiency of evidence, we must "`review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment" (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848), resolving all conflicts in favor of the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in its support. (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 373.) With this standard in mind, the evidence is sufficient to support Johnsons conviction as an aider and abettor of the actual robbers. The corroborating evidence was: (1) Johnsons fingerprint was on the passenger window while Hartleys print was found on the drivers door; (2) Johnson was in Hartleys company soon after the two fled together from the abandoned getaway car; and (3) Johnsons car was parked at Hartleys apartment in Long Beach while the two of them were together. Contrary to Johnsons argument, there was evidence of three perpetrators: Although only Matthews was seen fleeing the scene in the car, he was not one of the two men seen climbing the fence near the abandoned getaway car. Matthews was found under some bushes behind some trashcans whereas the two men climbed the fence, going together in the direction of Beach Boulevard.

Johnson contends that logically the prosecution cannot have it "both ways:" They cannot convict Hartley and Matthews as being the two robbers—and argue the evidence supports those convictions, as did the Attorney General in requesting us to affirm Hartleys conviction—but also argue Johnson was one of the two robbers, based on Getzs tentative identification of him. Johnson notes that the prosecutor at trial argued Johnson must have been waiting in the car while Hartley and Matthews committed the robbery. If so, he contends, the evidence is insufficient to connect him with aiding and abetting the two robbers.[]

However, the prosecution at trial did not limit itself to this theory: It also argued that Hartley may have been the aider and abettor and Johnson was the one with Matthews doing the robbery.

Accomplice liability may be based on a defendants "presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense" such as flight—indicating a consciousness of guilt—if such circumstances reflect the requisite mental state. (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095.) The requisite mental state for such liability is that the person, "with [] knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, [and with] the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the commission of the offense," then engages in some act that aids, promotes, or encourages commission of the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.)

Obviously, the jury concluded that Johnson must have been present in the red Honda while Hartley and Matthews were committing the robbery, because it concluded Hartley personally used a firearm in the offense and Matthews was vicariously armed. The sole reason for Johnson to remain in the car in the back alley would be to provide a quick getaway in the event of that need. Although Johnson was not the driver of the car as it fled the scene, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Johnson waited in the backseat of the little Honda, thereby permitting his compatriots to quickly take the front seats for a quick getaway. Moreover, his knowledge of their criminal purpose was also shown by the fact he concealed himself as the car sped away. Had he not known of their criminal intention in going to the motel, he would not have had any reason to try to conceal himself during their escape. Moreover, when the robbers ran back to the getaway car, one of them was clearly armed with a gun and carrying Getzs items. Nonetheless, Johnson remained with the two, fleeing in the car with them. Fleeing from the scene with a robber who is armed with a weapon and the stolen item is sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting the robbery. (See e.g., People v. Dominguez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1352; see Pen. Code, § 1127c.)

Thus, Johnsons conduct during and after the commission of the robbery was sufficient to support the conviction. Finally, his denial of knowing Hartley when they had been friends for years and his refusal to recognize even his own photograph were strong indications of his consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Amador (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 788, 791 ["where a material fact is established by evidence and it is shown that a defendants testimony [or pretrial statement to the police] as to that fact was willfully untrue, this circumstance not only furnishes a ground for disbelieving other testimony of this defendant . . . but also tends to show consciousness of guilt or liability on his part and has probative force in connection with other evidence on the issue of such guilt or liability. Such false testimony is in the nature of an admission from which with other evidence guilt or liability may be inferred."]; see CALJIC No. 2.03.)

Conspiracy Instructions

Although no conspiracy was charged, the trial court informed the jury of the definition of an uncharged conspiracy (CALJIC No. 6.10.5) and that proof of an express agreement is unnecessary (CALJIC No. 6.12). Johnson now contends CALJIC No. 6.12 permits the jury to possibly find a conspiracy existed without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement was reached between conspirators or that an overt act occurred in furtherance of it. But CALJIC No. 6.12 does not mention anything about the standard of proof; it only discusses methods of proof: "The formation and existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all circumstances tending to show the common intent and may be proved in the same way as any other fact may be proved, either by direct testimony of the fact or by circumstantial evidence, or by both direct and circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary to show a meeting of the alleged conspirators or the making of an express or formal agreement." Moreover, this instruction has been repeatedly upheld as a correct statement of law. (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 789-790; People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 396, 403-404.)

Similarly, the definition of an uncharged conspiracy as found in CALJIC No. 6.10.5 has likewise been upheld. (See People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 190; see also People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at 789-790.) Finally, the jury was clearly instructed that it had to find each fact to support the elements of any crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.90, 2.91.)

Lastly, Johnson attacks the adequacy of the standard instruction of reasonable doubt found in CALJIC No. 2.90 and as referenced in CALJIC No. 2.01. CALJIC No. 2.90 is well established as an adequate and correct statement of law. (See People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1366, fn. 1.) CALJIC No. 2.01 is also a well-established instruction, which has withstood various complaints. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1084-1085.) Finally, his request that the reasonable doubt instruction be injected into various other instructions is rejected as unnecessary and cumbersome. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 342; see also People v. Welborn (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 668, 676-677.)

Uncharged Conspiracy Argument

Johnson argues the trial court denied him due process and rendered his counsels assistance ineffective by permitting the prosecution to argue a legal theory not previously discussed: An uncharged conspiracy. As it was uncharged, he was unable to anticipate it and thus, defend against it. Such arguments have been rejected in the past (see e.g., People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 788; People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 1048-1050) and are rejected here.[]

We decline to engage in the squabbling whether Johnson was "on notice" of the potential conspiracy "charge." The pretrial motion to sever involved language alerting all parties to the potential theory of the conspiracy, but we need not resolve a dispute that is nonessential to the holding in this case.

The judgment sending Johnson to prison for 16 years, 4 months, is affirmed.

WE CONCUR OLEARY, J. and ARONSON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Johnson

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Three.
Nov 3, 2003
No. G030637 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Johnson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARQUIS JUAN JOHNSON, Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Three.

Date published: Nov 3, 2003

Citations

No. G030637 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003)