Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 5-080486-4
McGuiness, P.J.
Michael Ray Jiles (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence and appellant entered a no contest plea. Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not file such a brief. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
An information was filed on April 29, 2008, charging appellant with possession of cocaine base for sale (Health and Saf. Code, § 11351.5, count one), possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a), count two), possession of cocaine salt (§ 11350, subd. (a), count three), and possession of marijuana (§ 11357, subd. (b), count four). The information alleged enhancements for a prior sales-related drug conviction (§ 11370.2) and five prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5), and also alleged that appellant had a prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667 subd. (b)) and was ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4); § 11370, subds. (1), (c)(1)(2)).
All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise stated.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on May 8, 2008. On May 14, 2008, he filed a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the arresting officer “had no justification” for the traffic stop. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Norris of the Concord Police Department testified that he was driving on duty at about 11:47 p.m. on December 5, 2007, when he observed a silver Chrysler car approaching him from the opposite direction. When the Chrysler passed by and was about 20 feet away from him, Norris looked in his rearview mirror and noticed the Chrysler’s “left taillight seemed to have a crack or hole in it, allowing white light to shine to the rear.” Norris stopped the Chrysler because the cracked taillight constituted a violation of the Vehicle Code. Norris testified the Chrysler was otherwise in “very nice condition” and “very well kept,” with a “very nice paint job” and “custom rims.”
As Norris approached the driver’s side window, he saw that the “taillight seemed to have a quarter inch to half an inch hole with, if I remember right, three cracks radiating out from it.” Appellant was in the driver’s seat. Norris informed appellant that he had stopped him because of his taillight, and obtained appellant’s driver’s license. When a radio dispatcher informed Norris that appellant was on parole, Norris conducted a parole search of appellant and his car. The search revealed a “large roll of bills” and a “wad of small white rocks that were each individually wrapped in plastic and . . . contained in another plastic bag.” The Chrysler was impounded after appellant was arrested.
Norris testified at the preliminary hearing that the plastic bag contained about 20 rocks and that he also found on appellant’s person what he believed to be marijuana, powder cocaine and methamphetamine. He further testified that a criminalist examined the items and determined they were rock cocaine, cocaine salt, methamphetamine and marijuana.
John Edward Taylor, who performed in-home care for appellant’s mother, testified that appellant asked him to take photographs of the Chrysler’s rear taillight. When Taylor took the photographs on or about December 6 or 7, 2008, he saw there was no damage to the car. Taylor did not turn on the taillights to test them because he did not see any damage and believed “the picture would tell the story.” The photographs taken by Taylor were admitted into evidence.
Daphne Taylor Jiles (Jiles), appellant’s wife, testified that on the night of appellant’s arrest, appellant called to tell her he had been pulled over because of a taillight and that his Chrysler had been impounded. Jiles and appellant’s cousin went to the impound lot the following morning to retrieve the Chrysler. The tow yard provided an impound slip that did not indicate the Chrysler was damaged. Jiles took photographs of the Chrysler’s right and left taillights that morning. She testified that when she saw the Chrysler before appellant’s arrest, she did not notice any damage to the rear of the car.
On rebuttal, Norris testified he could not see any holes or cracks in the photographs provided by the defense. He noted that in one picture, there “seems to be a small white object on the rear, the center taillight, but I can’t tell if that’s a hole or just simply a distortion of the photograph itself.” He testified that there were several things depicted in the photographs that he did not recall seeing on the night of appellant’s arrest, including horizontal bars, a chrome trim, and some damage to the right rear bumper. He also believed the color of the Chrysler appeared lighter in the photographs than he remembered it being on the night of the arrest.
During closing argument, appellant conceded that a broken taillight would have provided sufficient justification for the stop, and therefore argued that “the only issue here is whether or not the taillight was broken in violation of [the] Vehicle Code . . . .” The trial court focused on the issue presented and ruled against appellant, stating: “Notwithstanding the fact that there is a conflict in the evidence that creates at least some doubt with respect to what happened here, I am crediting Officer Norris’s testimony. I believe that he saw what he saw and as honestly and forthrightly as he could indicated what he saw the evening that he stopped this car. [¶] And while there is some evidence that suggests that he is wrong, that evidence hasn’t gotten me to the point where I’m convinced that the pictures that are described here—I don’t give much credit to the tow form, because I just don’t think the tow form helps us very much to decide what the condition of the car was when the car was in the impound lot. [¶] There is some doubt with respect to the pictures . . . [and] they do not, I think, get me to the point where I believe I should discredit Officer Norris’s testimony.” The trial court denied the motion.
On June 12, 2008, appellant pled no contest to all counts in exchange for an agreed upon term of three years in state prison. The prior convictions were stricken as part of the negotiated plea. The court imposed the agreed upon state prison term with 285 days of credit. Appellant timely appealed from the denial of his motion to suppress.
Discussion
We have reviewed the entire record and conclude there are no arguable issues that warrant further briefing. Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1), provides in part: “A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on . . . the following grounds: [¶] (A) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.” “The clear implication of the subsection is that the evidence need not be suppressed, if the seizure was reasonable. To state the implication positively: a warrantless seizure of evidence may be valid if reasonable cause for the seizure exists.” (People v. Curley (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 732, 746.)
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. [Citation.]” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922; see also People v. Ingram (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750.)
Here, the trial court properly denied the motion on the ground the traffic stop was reasonable. As noted, Norris testified that he conducted a traffic stop based on his belief that the Chrysler’s taillight was broken. Although the photographs taken by Taylor and Jiles suggested that Norris was wrong, i.e., the taillight was not broken, the trial court could reasonably find that Norris’s testimony regarding his observations was credible, and that his belief was sincere. Questions of credibility are for the trial court and are entitled to great weight. (See People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 248.) On appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (See People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) Because the traffic stop was legal, the subsequent parole search that revealed the drugs and “large roll of bills” was also legal. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 668 [a parolee is subject to search or seizure at any time, without a search warrant and without cause].)
Appellant has not sought to withdraw his no contest plea, and in any event, there is no clear and convincing evidence of good cause to allow appellant to do so. Appellant was adequately represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings and appeared at every hearing. There was a factual basis for the no contest plea. There was no sentencing error. There are no issues that require further briefing.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Siggins, J., Jenkins, J.