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People v. Jenkins

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 30, 2009
2d Crim. B211520 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo, Super. Ct. No. F420519, Michael L. Duffy, Judge

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


COFFEE, J.

Keith Jenkins appeals an order determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO), and recommitting him to the Department of Mental Health for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the recommitment order. We affirm.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1990, appellant was sentenced to state prison for 16 years for robbery. (§ 211.) In 2003, he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§ 4501) and sentenced to an additional four-year consecutive state prison term. In June 2007, before appellant's release on parole, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) determined that he met the MDO criteria and required treatment as a condition of his parole. On July 31, 2007, BPH retained appellant on parole and reaffirmed treatment as a condition of his parole. On July 23, 2008, BPH again determined that appellant met the MDO criteria and could not be kept in remission without treatment. Appellant petitioned the trial court for a review of the BPH's decision pursuant to section 2966.

Joshua Deane, M.D., a psychiatrist at Atascadero State hospital (ASH), evaluated appellant and concluded that he met the MDO criteria at the time of the July 23, 2008 BPH hearing. He had a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Appellant began experiencing auditory hallucinations as a young child. He also had been committed to Patton State Hospital in 1985 and to Metropolitan State Hospital in 1987.

Deane treated appellant at ASH, until December 2007, when Deane left appellant's unit; appellant was then doing well. However, Deane did not see appellant for several months following December 2007.

Deane described appellant as a "volatile and vulnerable patient" who decompensated severely in May 2008. In 2008, appellant's symptoms included paranoia, mood instability, extremely aggressive behavior, poor impulse control, impaired judgment, day and night agitation, shadow boxing, and severe sleep disturbance. Appellant nearly became involved in a fight with a fellow patient on "more than one occasion." He also had difficulty following staff directions, and required restraint or seclusion for at least four consecutive days in 2008. Deane described appellant's extreme irritability and volatility by giving examples. Appellant "pound[ed] on the windows of the nursing home." He also "immediately threw a temper tantrum" when the "medication room staff was late."

Deane acknowledged appellant's participation in several treatment programs, including a Department of Mental Health Forensic Conditional Release Program (CONREP) MDO group. Although appellant did not complete the recommended substance abuse or recovery group program, he completed three months of NA meetings, three months of AA, and, possibly, the MDO CONREP group and the problem solving group programs.

In addition, Deane testified as follows regarding a change in appellant's medication that might have contributed partly to his decompensation: "In fact, he ha[d] a severe decompensation in... May. There are, I forget, either four or five days... he had to be using restraint or in-room seclusion. Of course, probably [his] decompensation [was] coming [on for] probably months [and]... he basically began to experience... pressured speech and [became] extremely... agitated.... So he ha[d], basically, manic episodes while he was on the medication. [¶] Now, some medication adjustment was made around that time and that might [have] partially at least contribute[d] to his decompensation."

During cross-examination, Deane responded to the following questions regarding the medication change:

"Q. Dr. Deane, you indicated about the time he was decompensating in May, there was some changes going on with his medication?

"A. Yes. And I think prior to that there was a reduction of his medication by one of our contract doctor[s].

"Q. Is it your opinion that that contributed to his decompensation?

"A. I would say at least partially contributed to his decompensation. Incidentally, he was my patient, he was doing very well, but I left the unit in December 2007.

"Q. And the intervention of another clinician?

"A. Correct.

"Q. Caused that fall apart when it changed his meds?

"A. I would say at least partially, because I am reminded of [the] fact that he was on medication in... July 2002, when he [committed] the offense by inmate, he was on medication. Eventually [it was necessary] to make [a] medication adjustment. Overall, I think suffice [it] to say he is a volatile and vulnerable patient.

"Q. Up until that time he had been doing well?

"A. He was doing very well. If he continued that way, most certainly will recommend him to be decertified to release to the community."

After Deane testified further about appellant's decompensation, counsel asked, "[Y]ou indicated earlier that had that not occurred, had he kept going on the path he was going on, you would have recommended his release; is that correct?" Deane responded, "That's correct."

The court denied the petition. It made the following statements in ruling: "I do find beyond a reasonable doubt that he meets the criteria. So I'm denying the petition. [¶] And I'm sorry to have to make that finding because it's unfortunate that – not really being your client's fault that there was this relapse, but there was a relapse. And as Dr. Deane's opinion that he's not in remission or wasn't in remission at the time of the Board of Prison Terms hearing. So as I said, I'm sorry, but because it isn't your client's fault, they think he needs a bit more time.... Mr. Jenkins,... [y]ou're doing well. If you continue doing well, hopefully there won't be the need for another trial and certify that you're in remission and should be released, or at the very least be released to CONREP. Again, sorry, but I feel compelled to make this ruling."

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support the recommitment order. More specifically, he argues that because improper treatment caused his relapse, there is not sufficient evidence to support the recommitment order. We disagree.

Recommitment of an MDO for treatment is required if the defendant meets three criteria: (1) he continues to have a severe mental disorder; (2) his mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; and (3) he continues to present a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (§ 2972, subd. (e).)

In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to ascertain if there is any reasonable, credible evidence to support the challenged finding. (People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398; People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.) We may not predetermine the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the judgment. The testimony of a qualified expert can be sufficient evidence in itself to support the trial court's findings. (See, e.g., People v. Valdez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1017; People v. Douglas (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1691, 1695.)

Appellant bases his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on his claim that the "court expressly found that [his] lack of remission was caused by the improper reduction of his medication." The court did not make such a finding. It expressed its regret in having to deny the petition because it was "not really... [appellant's] fault that there was this relapse, but there was a relapse." It did not address the cause of the relapse. Appellant seems to premise his claim on Deane's statements regarding the possibility that the medication change might have contributed partly to appellant's decompensation in May 2008.

However, Deane also testified, "probably [appellant's] decompensation [was] coming [on for] probably months [and]... he basically began to experience... pressured speech and [became] extremely... agitated.... So he has, basically, manic episodes while he was on the medication." Apparently Deane concluded that appellant's relapse may have been developing for months. He also stressed that appellant was a "volatile and vulnerable patient." Deane further noted that in 2002, while on medication, appellant "was... convicted of assaults by [an] inmate." Appellant's condition improved between May 2008 and late July 2008.

In arguing that respondent failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not in remission, appellant relies upon inapposite cases, including People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184. Noble reversed a commitment order where "the jury received contradictory instructions allocating first to the People and then to defendant the burden to prove the only contested issue at trial: whether, as a result of medication, defendant is in remission and is not dangerous." (Noble, at p. 190.) Noble thus concerned an obvious error. In contrast, appellant asks us to infer that the court misunderstood its authority under the MDO because it felt compelled to deny the petition and it made an ambiguous statement of regret about his relapse. The applicable standard of review prevents our drawing that inference. (See People v. Beeson, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398; People v. Clark, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.) "[A] court's oral comments... may never be used to impeach the order or judgment on appeal." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268.) Nor do we accept respondent's suggestion that we find that appellant was not in remission as a result of his failure to voluntarily follow his treatment plan. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that appellant met the MDO criteria.

The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.

We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.


Summaries of

People v. Jenkins

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 30, 2009
2d Crim. B211520 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Jenkins

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KEITH JENKINS, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Apr 30, 2009

Citations

2d Crim. B211520 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009)