Opinion
4-20-0045 4-20-0107
12-13-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALPHA O. JALLOW, Defendant-Appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALPHA O. JALLOW, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Champaign County Nos. 19CM652, 19CM893 Honorable Brett N. Olmstead, Judge Presiding. Honorable John R. Kennedy, Judge Presiding.
HOLDER, WHITE JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOLDER, WHITE JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893 and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing defendant to 24 months' probation in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652.
¶ 2 In July 2019, the State charged defendant, Alpha O. Jallow, with one count of criminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2018)) in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652. In August 2019, defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to criminal trespass and received a sentence of three months' conditional discharge. In October 2019, the trial court granted the State's petition to revoke defendant's conditional discharge sentence. In November 2019, the court resentenced defendant to 24 months' probation. In September 2019, the State charged defendant with (1) aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(c)(1) (West 2018)) (count I), (2) aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a) (West 2018)) (count II), (3) unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a) (2) (West 2018)) (count III), (4) battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (a)(2) (West 2018)) (count IV), and (5) criminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2018)) (count V) in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893. In December 2019, a jury found defendant guilty of criminal trespass to real property, battery, and aggravated assault (public place) and found defendant not guilty of unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault (deadly weapon). In January 2020, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months' probation.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) his conviction for aggravated assault in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893 should be reversed because no rational trier of fact could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing defendant to 24 months' probation in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 A. Champaign County Case No. 19-CM-893
¶ 6 In September 2019, the State charged defendant with (1) aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(c)(1) (West 2018)) (count I), (2) aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a) (West 2018)) (count II), (3) unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a) (2) (West 2018)) (count III), (4) battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (a)(2) (West 2018)) (count IV), and (5) criminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2018)) (count V) in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893.
¶ 7 1. Jury Trial
¶ 8 In December 2019, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Below, we summarize the evidence presented to the jury.
¶ 9 a. Lenish Kumar Patel
¶ 10 Lenish Kumar Patel testified his parents owned University Food & Liquor located at 211 West University Avenue in Champaign, Illinois, where he served as manager. According to Lenish, University Food & Liquor included a convenience store and a parking lot at the same location. Lenish testified he knew defendant, who for "maybe a couple years used to come and buy liquor, beer and other stuff." According to Lenish, defendant was not allowed on store property pursuant to a February 1, 2019, police issued trespass notice. Lenish testified defendant was still banned from the store on September 8, 2019. University Food & Liquor had a surveillance system in place on September 8, 2019.
¶ 11 According to Lenish, police asked him to review the store surveillance footage from September 8, 2019. Lenish reviewed the video and provided a copy to police. When the State played the surveillance footage during trial, Lenish identified the University Food & Liquor parking lot, defendant, and Jigar Patel, a store employee, on the video.
¶ 12 The video showed defendant shifting between the grass and the sidewalk next to the store's parking lot. Jigar exited the store carrying cleaning supplies when he saw defendant walk toward him. Jigar took the cleaning supplies inside, then returned outside and approached defendant. Jigar then retrieved the cleaning supplies, came back outside, and defendant approached him. After Jigar spoke with defendant, he went inside the store, and defendant returned to the sidewalk. Approximately two minutes later, Jigar again exited the store and began to clean the door when defendant again approached. The two had a brief interaction, Jigar went back into the store, and defendant again returned to the sidewalk. Jigar came back outside and continued to clean the door, and defendant again approached. Jigar turned around and defendant raised his arm. Jigar put his hand on defendant's arm and went back inside the store.
¶ 13 b. Jigar Patel
¶ 14 Jigar testified with the assistance of a translator that, on September 8, 2019, he was working at University Food & Liquor at approximately 4:12 p.m. According to Jigar, he was cleaning the glass on the store's main door when he saw defendant approaching. Jigar testified defendant approached, pushed Jigar, and pulled out a knife. Jigar described the knife as small and black and stated he saw the blade. Jigar testified he was "really scared" and ran into the store. The State replayed a portion of previously shown surveillance video. Jigar identified the University Food & Liquor parking lot and himself. Jigar also identified the moment defendant showed him the knife.
¶ 15 Jigar testified his uncle translated for him when he spoke to police on September 8, 2019. Jigar stated, "I told my uncle that [defendant] tried to stab me and my uncle told the police officer that." Jigar and defense counsel had the following exchange:
"Q. And previously, you had testified that you did not tell an officer in response to the question of, 'He didn't come at you with it, he just had it in his hand,' you stated your response was not that, 'He just showed it,' correct?
A. Yes, I said that he tried to stab me.
Q. Okay. So to be clear, you did not say, 'He just showed it'?
A. I was really, really scared and flustered at that point. I was sweating profusely, so when the officer asked me about it, I'm not sure whether I said he showed me the knife or whether I said that he tried to stab me."
Defense counsel confronted Jigar with a recording from the police officer's body camera. The footage showed Jigar telling police that defendant just showed him the knife. On redirect examination, Jigar testified, "All I told the officer was that knife showed. My English is not that good, so my uncle did the rest of the talking."
¶ 16 c. Kelly Walton
¶ 17 Kelly Walton, a Champaign police officer, responded to a trespassing call at University Food & Liquor on September 8, 2019. When Officer Walton arrived, she saw defendant walking across the street toward the store. After Officer Walton detained defendant, a search of defendant's person revealed two knives in his right pants pocket.
¶ 18 d. Defendant
¶ 19 Defendant testified that, on September 8, 2019, at approximately 4 p.m., he went to University Food & Liquor intending to purchase a beer. As defendant approached the store, he made contact with an employee who told defendant he was not allowed in the store. Defendant testified, "I went back on the sidewalk to wait for somebody to go in there for me, if I see an, an acquaintance." No one came along, so defendant approached the store again and the employee again told him he had to leave. Defendant returned to the sidewalk.
¶ 20 Defendant approached the store a third time. Defendant testified, "As soon as he saw me, he turn his back, he saw me, he walked towards me, trying get me out of the parking lot. Then, when he approached me, it was so close I have to do like this to stop him." Defendant admitted he had knives in his pocket but denied using the knives or saying anything about the knives. When asked if he removed his hands from his pockets, defendant responded, "When I push him, I remove my hand from my pocket. Because he was coming close to me, I do like this. That's a defensive pose." Defendant thought Jigar told the police defendant had a knife because Jigar saw officers take a knife from defendant when they searched him in the parking lot.
¶ 21 2. Verdict and Sentence
¶ 22 The jury found defendant guilty of criminal trespass to real property, battery, and aggravated assault (public place) and found defendant not guilty of unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault (deadly weapon). In January 2020, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial and sentenced defendant to 24 months' probation. The court also denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence.
¶ 23 B. Champaign County Case No. 19-CM-652
¶ 24 In July 2019, the State charged defendant with one count of criminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2018)) in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652. In August 2019, pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal trespass. The State dismissed two pending misdemeanor cases, and defendant was placed on three months' conditional discharge. The State provided the following factual basis for the negotiated plea:
"If this case were to proceed to trial the State's evidence would show that on July 25th of this year the Defendant having previously been banned from 211 West University and served with a trespass notice from that premises came into the property,
entered the store and began yelling at customers. The Defendant admitted to going into the store and told responding officers that he could go there when it was open because it's a public place."
Defendant's conditional discharge order required defendant to abstain from any contact with University Food & Liquor.
¶ 25 In September 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant's conditional discharge, alleging defendant committed criminal trespass to property and violated the no contact provision in his conditional discharge order. In October 2019, the trial court granted the State's petition to revoke defendant's conditional discharge.
¶ 26 In November 2019, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. The State asked the court to take judicial notice of defendant's conviction for aggravated assault committed on February 15, 2019, in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-173. Defendant was charged with committing aggravated assault when he "used a deadly weapon in that he knowingly swung a screwdriver towards the face of [the complainant], thereby placing [the complainant] in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery."
¶ 27 Jigar Patel, testifying with the assistance of a translator, stated he recognized defendant who, three or four times, had been to the store where Jigar worked. The first time Jigar encountered defendant was at night when defendant came into the store and took beer. Jigar asked defendant for money, and defendant "threw money in the parking lot." On September 8, 2019, Jigar was cleaning the store's door when defendant approached him three times. Jigar testified, "When he came into the store the third time, he was very angry and he pushed me and then he tried to knife me." When defendant took the knife out, Jigar was "really scared" so he went back into the store.
¶ 28 Before asking the parties for sentencing recommendations, the trial court noted defendant was in custody on Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893. The court observed defendant lacked impulse control and stated as follows:
"In other words, I've never seen something like the evidence in this case where there is an order that [defendant] not step onto certain property, and there is a video that shows *** exactly what the limit of his impulse control is. The limit of his impulse control is as long as there's not a human being associated with that store, whose face turns in his general direction, he can abide by the order and stay there literally one step off the property and just stare at it, and the camera captures this where he's just standing there for extended periods of time, staring at the store. As soon as somebody comes out, Mr. Jigar, and looks or points his face in [defendant] 's general direction, [defendant] can no longer control his impulses and immediately starts walking toward Mr. Jigar, even though he knows that's prohibited by law."
The court again noted defendant was in custody on another charge and, even if he were released on bond in that case, the maximum sentence the court could impose would keep defendant in custody for approximately one month. The court queried, "What does it take to deter [defendant], to give him the ability to master his impulses so that when somebody comes out of that store and casts their face in his general direction, he can resist the impulse to walk toward the store, because he can't be in the store?"
¶ 29 The State recommended a term of 18 months' probation. The State argued probation would give defendant "an opportunity to meet with somebody that encourages him to maintain sobriety, that can encourage him to engage in resources that may be available, [and] that can remind him of the consequences of further violations ***." Defense counsel recommended the court sentence defendant to time served.
¶ 30 The trial court stated it considered the presentence report, the evidence presented, recommendations from counsel, defendant's statement in allocution, the case it took judicial notice of, the nature and circumstances of the offense, defendant's character, and all statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court considered defendant's history of criminality in aggravation and found a nonstatutory aggravating factor to be defendant's "complete and total misunderstanding as to his rights with respect to University Food & Liquor." The court explained the owner of the store had the right to ban defendant from their private property.
¶ 31 In trying to fashion an appropriate sentence, the court stated:
" [The State] is correct that if something is to be done to rehabilitate [defendant] and put him in a position where he's not going to commit future offenses, and just frankly negatively affect in a very serious way downtown Champaign, and specifically University Food & Liquor, where [Jigar] deserves to be able to go to work and not worry about people pulling a knife on him in the store [and] not worry about someone who has been repeatedly told he can't be on the property, repeatedly walking onto the property ***. That is something that can't happen. That's something that the law is
meant to prevent. That's something that I have a responsibility in my sentence to take effective action to try and prevent ***."
The court resentenced defendant to 24 months' probation. Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence and argued the sentence of probation failed to consider defendant's homelessness and attendant difficulty in complying with probation requirements. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider the sentence.
¶ 32 This appeal followed. We docketed Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652 as case No. 4-20-0045 and Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893 as case No. 4-20-0107. We have consolidated the cases for review.
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 34 On appeal, defendant argues (1) his conviction for aggravated assault in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-893 should be reversed because no rational trier of fact could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing defendant to 24 months' probation in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652.
¶ 35 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 36 Defendant argues no rational trier of fact could have found that defendant showed Jigar a knife, placing Jigar in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. Specifically, defendant argues Jigar's testimony was inconsistent with his statement to officers after the incident, his testimony was uncorroborated, and the case amounted to a credibility contest between Jigar and defendant.
¶ 37 When determining whether sufficient evidence supported a conviction, "our function is not to retry the defendant." People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242, 860 N.E.2d 178, 217 (2006). Instead, we must determine" 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We allow all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill.2d 1, 8, 944 N.E.2d 319, 323 (2011). It is the province of the finder of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the finding is entitled to great weight. People v. Smith, 185 Ill.2d 532, 542, 708 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1999). We reverse only where the evidence is so unsatisfactory, unreasonable, or improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004).
¶ 38 Due process "protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged." People v. Young, 128 Ill.2d 1, 48, 538 N.E.2d 461, 472 (1989). "A person commits an assault when, without lawful authority, he or she knowingly engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery." 720 ILCS 5/12-1 (West 2018). "A person commits aggravated assault when he or she commits an assault against an individual who is on or about a public way, public property, a public place of accommodation or amusement, or a sports venue, or in a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship." 720 ILCS 5/12-2(a) (West 2018).
¶ 39 Defendant argues no rational trier of fact could have found that defendant showed Jigar a knife where Jigar testified at trial that defendant tried to stab him with a knife and defense counsel impeached him with his statement to the police officer that defendant "just showed" him the knife. Defendant argues Jigar's inconsistent statements compromised his credibility, his testimony was not corroborated, and defendant's testimony contradicted Jigar's account. The State argues the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 40 Here, Jigar testified that, on September 8, 2019, he was working at University Food & Liquor at approximately 4:12 p.m. According to Jigar, he was cleaning the glass on the store's main door when he saw defendant approaching. Jigar testified defendant approached, pushed Jigar, and pulled out a knife. Jigar described the knife as small and black and stated he saw the blade. Jigar testified he was "really scared" and ran into the store. The State replayed a portion of the same surveillance video. Jigar identified the University Food & Liquor parking lot and himself. Jigar also identified the moment defendant showed him the knife.
¶ 41 This testimony alone is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Meyers, 2018 IL App (1st) 140891, ¶ 26, 126 N.E.3d 11 ("The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even though it is contradicted by the defendant."). Although Jigar's statement to police officers that defendant "just showed" the knife to him was inconsistent with his testimony that defendant made a stabbing motion, the inconsistency was explained by Jigar's emotional state at the time of the statement and by the language difficulties involved because Jigar gave his statement to the police with his uncle acting as an interpreter. Moreover, credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder, and they are entitled to great weight. Smith, 185 Ill.2d at 542.
¶ 42 Jigar's testimony was corroborated by the surveillance video, which showed defendant approach Jigar three times and raise his hand during the third interaction. Notably, it is difficult to see what if anything defendant has in his right hand when he raises it. However, Jigar's testimony was also corroborated by the fact that defendant had two knives in his possession when he was arrested. Although defendant denied Jigar's version of events, the jury could have reasonably accepted Jigar's testimony where the inconsistencies were minor and explained by Jigar's emotional state and the language barrier. Moreover, the jury could have found defendant's claim that Jigar saw police recover knives from defendant and falsely claimed defendant used them incredible. And, as the State points out, Jigar was consistent in his statements that defendant confronted him with a knife. If the jury determined defendant merely showed Jigar the knife or made a stabbing motion, the jury could have reasonably found defendant guilty of aggravated assault.
¶ 43 Where the jury was presented with conflicting accounts regarding whether defendant confronted Jigar with a knife outside the store, they resolved the conflict by accepting Jigar's version of events. The evidence was not so unsatisfactory, unreasonable, or improbable that it raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Evans, 209 Ill.2d at 209.
¶ 44 B. Resentencing
¶ 45 Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing defendant to 24 months' probation in Champaign County case No. 19-CM-652. Specifically, defendant asserts the court punished defendant for conduct he allegedly committed while on conditional discharge instead of sentencing defendant for the conduct for which he was convicted. Defendant concedes this claim has been forfeited but asks this court to review the claim under the plain-error doctrine. The State asserts the record demonstrates the trial court appropriately considered defendant's conduct while on conditional discharge and, forfeiture aside, no error occurred.
¶ 46 "[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2007). The first step in plain-error analysis is to determine whether error occurred. Id.
¶ 47 After conditional discharge is revoked, a defendant can be resentenced to any sentence which would have been appropriate for the underlying offense. People v. Turner, 233 Ill.App.3d 449, 456, 599 N.E.2d 104, 110 (1992); see People v. Janovic, 365 Ill.App.3d 547, 551, 850 N.E.2d 238, 242 (2006) ("[C]ase law regarding the revocation of probation applies equally to issues involving the revocation of conditional discharge."). "Although the sentence imposed after revocation of probation may not constitute punishment for conduct which was the basis of revocation, the defendant's conduct on probation is to be considered by the trial court in assessing the defendant's potential for rehabilitation ***." Turner, 233 Ill.App.3d at 456. "[I]t is appropriate for a defendant who conducts himself poorly while on probation to receive a more severe sentence than he originally received." People v. Palmer, 352 Ill.App.3d 891, 895, 817 N.E.2d 137, 141 (2004)." [A] sentence within the statutory range for the original offense will not be set aside on review unless the reviewing court is strongly persuaded that the sentence imposed after revocation of probation was in fact imposed as a penalty for the conduct which was the basis of revocation, and not for the original offense." (Emphases in original.) People v. Young, 138 Ill.App.3d 130, 142, 485 N.E.2d 443, 450 (1985).
¶ 48 Defendant asserts the trial court's "extended focus" on the September 8, 2019, incident shows it in fact sentenced defendant for the conduct giving rise to the conditional discharge violation as opposed to the conduct for which he was convicted. We disagree.
¶ 49 Here, prior to asking for the parties' sentencing recommendations, the trial court discussed defendant's lack of impulse control and referenced a video of the September 8, 2019, incident. However, the court went on to ask, "What does it take to deter [defendant], to give him the ability to master his impulses so that when somebody comes out of that store and casts their face in his general direction, he can resist the impulse to walk toward the store, because he can't be in the store?" In making its sentencing determination, the court also referenced the September 8, 2019, incident when it commented that Jigar deserved to go to work without fearing someone would pull a knife on him. However, that comment was made in the broader context of the court considering what sentence would serve to rehabilitate defendant. The court properly considered defendant's conduct while he was on conditional discharge as evidence of his rehabilitative potential. Palmer, 352 Ill.App.3d at 895.
¶ 50 Additionally, the totality of the record clarifies that the trial court did not impose sentence to punish defendant for his actions while on conditional discharge. The court specifically stated it considered the presentence report, the evidence presented, recommendations from counsel, defendant's statement in allocution, the case it took judicial notice of, the nature and circumstances of the offense, defendant's character, and all statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court considered defendant's history of criminality in aggravation and found a nonstatutory aggravating factor to be defendant's "complete and total misunderstanding as to his rights with respect to University Food & Liquor."
¶ 51 Here, defendant's argument ignores the fact that the underlying offense was for the same conduct that led to the revocation of his conditional discharge-specifically, trespassing at University Food & Liquor. Defendant argues the trial court's "passing reference" to the underlying offense by mention of the presentence report-which described the underlying offense-shows the court improperly sentenced him for conduct committed while on conditional discharge instead of for the underlying offense.
¶ 52 In this instance, we find People v. Miller, 2021 IL App (2d) 190093, persuasive. In Miller, the defendant was convicted of violating an order of protection that precluded contact with the victim, K.N. Id. ¶ 3. The defendant was sentenced to probation, and the terms of defendant's probation required he have no contact with K.N. Id. The defendant's probation was revoked because of his continued contact with K.N. Id. ¶ 5. The trial court imposed the maximum prison sentence. Id. ¶ 26. In so doing, the court specifically stated it considered the presentence report, the defendant's criminal history, the defendant's letter in allocution, the exhibits, the defendant's noncompliance with other terms of probation, and the factors in aggravation and mitigation. Id. The court found the defendant's noncompliance with probation aggravating and discussed the criminal offenses against K.N. that led to the revocation of the defendant's probation. Id.
¶ 53 The appellate court upheld the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence in the face of the defendant's claim he was being punished for his conduct while on probation rather than the underlying offense. Id. ¶ 27. The defendant argued the trial court did not specifically mention the original offense but discussed the conduct that led to the revocation of his probation. Id. The appellate court rejected this argument and found the totality of the record showed the trial court considered the original offense. Id. Additionally, the appellate court stated, "As occurred here when the court emphasized [the] defendant's unceasing history of wrongful contact with K.N., a court can consider an original offense by implication." Id. The appellate court also noted that the criminal conduct the trial court considered would not have occurred if the defendant had complied with his original sentence's no-contact condition. Id. ¶ 28. "While on probation, [the] defendant's criminal conduct (1) spoke directly to his rehabilitative potential, and (2) was inextricably linked to his violation of probation conditions." Id.
¶ 54 As in Miller, defendant's violation of his conditional discharge spoke directly to his rehabilitative potential where it involved the same conduct as the underlying offense. Had defendant complied with the terms of his conditional discharge, none of the conduct considered by the trial court would have occurred.
¶ 55 Because we conclude the trial court did not impose the sentence of 24 months' probation as punishment for defendant's conduct while on conditional discharge instead of the underlying offense, we find no clear or obvious error occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 58 Affirmed.