Opinion
SC 167140 (8) (9) COA 371064
06-05-2024
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMIAH AUGUST JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Sanilac CC: 23-008505-FC
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
ORDER
On order of the Court, the motions for immediate consideration and for stay of trial court proceedings are GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals, which shall be treated as an application for leave to appeal the June 5, 2024 order of the Court of Appeals, remains pending.
Viviano, J. (dissenting).
On the eve of trial, this Court has stayed the proceedings in the trial court without any justification or explanation for doing so. Unlike a stay of a trial court order pending appeal, for which our court rules do not provide a standard, see, e.g., O'Halloran v Secretary of State, 510 Mich. 970, 985-986 (2022) (Viviano, J., dissenting) (advocating for adoption of a standard for stays of trial court orders pending appeal), our court rules do address the situation in this case. MCR 6.126 states:
Where the court makes a decision on the admissibility of evidence and the prosecutor or the defendant files an interlocutory application for leave to appeal seeking to reverse that decision, the court shall stay proceedings pending resolution of the application in the Court of Appeals, unless the court makes findings that the evidence is clearly cumulative or that an appeal is frivolous because legal precedent is clearly against the party's position. [Emphasis added.]
The trial court in this case denied defendant's motion for a stay pending appeal, determining the appeal to be frivolous under MCR 6.126. Defendant appears to acknowledge that legal precedent is clearly against his position. He does not argue that the trial court improperly applied People v Spaulding, 332 Mich.App. 638 (2020), or People v Muniz, 343 Mich.App. 437 (2022), to deny his request for a Daubert hearing. Rather, he argues that this Court "should reexamine the root of that Court of Appeals caselaw," our decision in People v Peterson, 450 Mich. 349 (1995). Notably, MCR 6.126 does not contain an exception for a good-faith argument to reverse existing caselaw similar to that found in MRPC 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. A lawyer may offer a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."). Because defendant has not shown-or even attempted to argue-that the trial court erred in denying the stay under MCR 6.126, a stay is unwarranted. For these reasons, I dissent.
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Zahra, J., joins the statement of Viviano, J.