Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. TA088469 Gary E. Daigh, Judge.
Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Augustine Imperial.
Lynda A. Romero, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Luis Espinosa.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TURNER, P. J.
Defendants, Luis Espinoza and Augustine Imperial, appeal from their first degree murder convictions. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and the trial court’s finding that Mr. Espinoza was previously convicted of a serious felony. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12.) Both Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Imperial argue there was insufficient evidence to support their first degree murder convictions and there was instructional error. We affirm the judgments.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909.) On January 1, 2007, Yesenia Mundo lived at 807 West 91st Street with her husband, Jorge Roque, and their dog. The dog was confined to a pen in the yard. A homeless man, Vladmir Garcia, who was known to Ms. Mundo as “Cubano” lived in his car near their home. Ms. Mundo often gave Mr. Garcia money for cleaning her yard. Ms. Mundo also gave Mr. Garcia food on a daily basis and allowed him to use an extension cord from her home to watch television inside his car. Mr. Garcia’s leg had been amputated. Although Mr. Garcia had a prosthetic leg, Ms. Mundo had not seen it for a few weeks prior to January 1, 2007. Neither Mr. Roque nor Ms. Mundo knew Mr. Espinoza. However, Ms. Mundo and Mr. Roque had known Mr. Imperial for five or six years. Mr. Imperial regularly had conversations with Mr. Garcia. Augustine Torres lived at 810 West 91st Street. Mr. Torres knew Mr. Garcia. Ms. Mundo saw Mr. Imperial come to Mr. Torres’s home on several occasions. Mr. Torres and his wife, Diana, lived in the home with their children. Mr. Garcia often cleaned the Torres’s yard. The Torres’s gave Mr. Garcia food and money.
At approximately 6 p.m. on New Year’s Day, 2007, Ms. Mundo heard a loud argument between Mr. Garcia, his wife and children, and their cousin, identified only as “Alma.” The argument lasted approximately 30 minutes. Mr. Roque went outside to intervene. Thereafter, the argument ceased. Mr. Roque was sitting in front of his house at 12 or 12:30 a.m. Mr. Roque saw Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Imperial approaching. Mr. Espinoza wore a gray plaid shirt. Mr. Roque warned the men that his dog was loose and might bite them. Mr. Imperial grabbed the dog by the collar. Mr. Imperial said the dog was his friend and would not do anything to him. Mr. Imperial handed the dog to Mr. Roque. Mr. Imperial introduced Mr. Espinoza to Mr. Roque. At some point, there was a discussion between Mr. Roque and defendants regarding Mr. Garcia’s whereabouts. During the direct examination of Mr. Roque, the following occurred: “Q. Did you ever let Mr. Imperial and Mr. Espinoza know that [Mr. Garcia] was in his lot - - or in his car?” [¶] . . . A. Yes.” Mr. Roque described what Mr. Imperial then said as follows: “If I heard a noise, not to get scared, something like that. . . . that sort of thing. If I were to hear something, not to be frightened.” Thereafter, Mr. Roque saw Mr. Imperial walk to the Torres’s residence.
Later, while in a back bedroom, Mr. Roque heard a brief, friendly conversation between Mr. Imperial and Mr. Garcia. Mr. Roque returned to the living room to watch television. Mr. Roque’s dog began barking. Mr. Roque looked out his kitchen window. Mr. Roque saw Mr. Imperial walking toward the alleyway where Mr. Garcia’s car was parked. Mr. Roque’s sensor lights illuminated as Mr. Imperial passed by. Ms. Mundo was awakened by Mr. Garcia’s screaming: “‘Jorge, help me. Jorge, help me. It’s Augustine and his friend.’” Ms. Mundo went to the kitchen window, where she saw two men on either side of Mr. Garcia. The men were jabbing at Mr. Garcia’s body. Ms. Mundo yelled out: “‘Leave him alone. What are you doing?’” Ms. Mundo told Mr. Roque that “they” were hitting Mr. Garcia. The two men, who were thin, turned and stared at Ms. Mundo, but she could not see their faces. One of the men was wearing black. The other individual wore a white and black flannel jacket. Ms. Mundo saw a third person across the street at Mr. Torres’s house. That man wore a baseball hat and dark clothing.
Ms. Mundo came out of her bedroom screaming to her husband. Mr. Roque heard Mr. Garcia calling out, asking for help. Mr. Garcia was calling out for Mr. Roque. Mr. Roque came out of his house. Mr. Roque then found Mr. Garcia on the ground. Mr. Roque spoke to Mr. Garcia. Mr. Roque described their conversation, “He told me that he had gotten beaten up and I asked him who, and he said, ‘Augustine and his friend.’” Ms. Mundo came out into the alley, where she waited until the police arrived. Ms. Mundo asked Mr. Garcia who had beaten him. Mr. Garcia said “‘It’s Augustine and his friend.’” The man in the alley walked away before the police arrived. Ms. Mundo first told the detectives that she believed the third person in the alley had been “Augustine Torres” because of the hat he wore and the fact that he often was outside drinking at 2 or 3 a.m. However, in retrospect, Ms. Mundo realized that the individual was much thinner than Mr. Torres, who, as noted, lived in the neighborhood. Ms. Mundo then believed the person standing by the alley could have been Mr. Imperial. Ms. Mundo later selected Mr. Imperial’s photograph from a photographic lineup shown to her by police. Ms. Mundo indicated that the person in the alley was Mr. Imperial, based upon the baseball hat. Ms. Mundo wrote on the photographic lineup, “‘I saw him besides the alley the same time [Mr. Garcia] was getting stabbing.’”
Mr. Garcia died as a result of blood loss related to multiple stab wounds. An autopsy revealed that Mr. Garcia suffered 10 stab wounds to his neck, chest, back, arm, legs, and abdomen. A blood sample revealed that Mr. Garcia had both cocaine and a cocaine metabolite in his system at the time of his death.
Los Angeles Police Detectives Christopher Barling and John Skaggs arrived at the scene of the stabbing in the early morning hours on January 2, 2007. There was a full moon that night. Mr. Garcia had already been removed from the scene. A latent print specialist was called to the scene to attempt to recover prints. The blood found at the scene was pooled rather than spattered. Detective Barling spoke with Mr. Roque and Ms. Mundo at their home. Detective Barling looked through the window of the house and was able to see the area where the blood was located. The distance from the window to where Mr. Garcia’s car was parked was approximately 20 feet. Detective Barling also spoke with members of the Torres family. The Torres residence was approximately 42 to 45 feet away from the window. As a result of his discussion with the Torres family, Detective Barling became aware of a van that a suspect might be driving. Mr. Torres gave Detective Barling the license number of the van.
The red van registered to Mr. Torres was located at approximately 4:30 p.m on January 2, 2007. The van described by Mr. Torres was parked on 108th Street near Broadway, which is approximately two to three miles from where the stabbing occurred. The police then began to watch the van. Mr. Imperial entered the passenger side door of the van briefly and then got out. Mr. Espinoza stood nearby. The two men then walked toward Broadway, where they were stopped by police. Detectives Barling and Skaggs separated Mr. Imperial and Mr. Espinoza and handcuffed each of them. Referring to Mr. Imperial, Mr. Espinoza spontaneously stated: “‘I don’t know him. He was just getting me a lighter.’” Initially, Mr. Imperial gave a false name of Antonio Medina. Later, Detective Barling called Mr. Imperial by the name Augustine. Only then did Mr. Imperial give his correct name. Mr. Espinoza looked as though he had recently shaved off his moustache because the skin was lighter between his upper lip and the remainder of his face. Photographs of Mr. Espinoza taken over previous years depicted him with a bushy moustache. A search of the red van revealed a small steak knife. The knife was later ruled out as being involved in the murder. A search of a shed in which Mr. Espinoza had been living revealed no weapons. However, a plaid patterned jacket similar to that described by witnesses as what one of the suspects was wearing was found in a shed. A knife sheath was found at the Torres home. However, a knife was never located.
Mr. Imperial and Mr. Espinoza were interviewed individually. Each interview was videotaped. The trial was conducted before two juries. Mr. Imperial’s interview was redacted before it was shown to the jurors trying Mr. Espinoza. During the interview, Mr. Imperial was rubbing his arms and rocking back and forth while breathing heavily. Mr. Imperial repeatedly said he felt sick. Mr. Imperial admitted knowing Mr. Garcia. Mr. Imperial could not remember if he had been to the area where the stabbing occurred. Mr. Imperial admitted getting the red van from Mr. Torres. Mr. Imperial denied having used “crack” cocaine on the day of his arrest. However, Mr. Imperial thought he might have had “one or two” beers. Later, Mr. Imperial admitted being in the alley when Mr. Garcia was stabbed. Mr. Imperial admitted “smoking” dope with Mr. Garcia the previous night. Mr. Imperial denied stabbing Mr. Garcia. Mr. Imperial said Mr. Garcia started screaming. While screaming, Mr. Garcia was also calling out Mr. Imperial’s name. Mr. Garcia tried to grab Mr. Imperial. Mr. Imperial ran away. Mr. Imperial told the detectives “somebody” stabbed Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Espinoza was subsequently interviewed at approximately 11:25 p.m. The recording was played for the jurors in his case only and a redacted transcript was provided for their use. During that interview, Mr. Espinoza denied having gone to Mr. Garcia’s car on 91st Street with Mr. Imperial the previous evening. Mr. Espinoza admitted smoking cocaine just before he was arrested.
Thereafter, Mr. Imperial was again interviewed. Mr. Imperial admitted accompanying Mr. Espinoza on a visit to Mr. Garcia’s car late at night for about 15 minutes. They smoked crack cocaine with Mr. Garcia. The tape was played for the jury trying Mr. Imperial. Mr. Imperial sat in the driver’s seat. Mr. Garcia was in the passenger seat and Mr. Espinoza was in the rear seat. The three men shared a “dime” of cocaine, which Mr. Imperial had purchased at 93rd Street and Vermont Avenue. Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Garcia began fighting. Mr. Garcia yelled, “‘Augustin, Augustin.’” Mr. Imperial ran away. Mr. Espinoza killed Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Imperial and Mr. Espinoza were later placed in a room together. Their conversation was also recorded on videotape. The tape was played for Mr. Espinoza’s jury only. Mr. Espinoza admitted being at the murder scene along with Mr. Imperial and another individual. Mr. Espinoza said that Mr. Garcia was arguing with the third individual. Mr. Imperial did not appear intoxicated or under the influence of drugs either when Detective Barling arrested him at 6 p.m. or later while in the holding cell on January 2, 2007. Mr. Imperial did not exhibit any physical signs of being cold, achy, or sick until his interview began at 9:55 p.m.
Both defendants testified. Defendants admitted that they had been smoking cocaine with Mr. Garcia on January 2, 2007. However, their testimony differed regarding the events that led to Mr. Garcia’s death. Both defendants admitted that they got together on the day following Mr. Garcia’s death.
First, defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence to support their premeditated murder convictions. Both defendants argue that there was no evidence of a preconceived plan to kill Mr. Garcia. Mr. Espinoza further argues, “[T]here was insufficient evidence to support a theory that [he] aided and abetted a deliberate and premeditated murder.” Mr. Imperial joins that argument and adds that Ms. Mundo testified “that she saw [him] standing across the street in an alley near the Torres’ residence” at the time of the stabbing.
In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: “[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. omitted; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303; Taylor v. Stainer, supra, 31 F.3d at pp. 908-909.) The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) The California Supreme Court has held, “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
In People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080, the California Supreme Court held: “A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. (§ 189 [‘willful, deliberate and premeditated killing’ as first degree murder].) ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance. [Citations.] ‘The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly. . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26, our Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence available to sustain a finding of premeditated murder; namely, planning, motive, and intent. The Supreme Court later clarified, “The Anderson analysis was intended only as a framework to aid in appellate review, it did not propose to define the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658; People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 768; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 32.) In People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 577, our Supreme Court reiterated: “[W]e continue to apply the principle that ‘[t]he process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 370-371.) In People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741-742, our Supreme Court held: “‘[I]f the jury found defendant’s use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance.’ [Citation.] . . .[M]otive is generally not an element of a crime in the first instance, including the crimes of murder and attempted murder. One may kill with or without a motive and still be found to have acted with express malice.” (Ibid., quoting People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162, original italics.) As the Perez court emphasized, on review the appellate court should focus on the evidence presented and all logical inferences drawn therefrom. (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1124, 1125.)
In this case, there was substantial circumstantial evidence to support the first degree murder verdicts. Defendants acknowledged being at the scene of the stabbing when questioned by police and at trial. Mr. Roque spoke with both defendants at 12 or 12:30 a.m. On the evening of the killing, Mr. Roque knew Mr. Imperial. Mr. Imperial introduced Mr. Roque to Mr. Espinoza. Mr. Imperial spoke with Mr. Roque. Mr. Roque was told he should not be “scared” if he later heard a noise. Mr. Roque heard Mr. Imperial talking with Mr. Garcia shortly thereafter. Later, Ms. Mundo heard Mr. Garcia screaming: “‘Jorge, help me. Jorge, help me. It’s Augustine and his friend.’” Ms. Mundo went to the kitchen window, where she saw two men on either side of Mr. Garcia. The men were jabbing at Mr. Garcia’s body. Ms. Mundo yelled out: “‘Leave him alone. What are you doing?’” Mr. Garcia was repeatedly stabbed on both sides of his body by the two assailants. The nature of the multiple wounds demonstrated the assailants acted deliberately. By their own admissions at trial, defendants fled the scene of the stabbing. When interviewed following their arrests, defendants repeatedly lied to the detectives about their whereabouts the previous night as well as their familiarity with Mr. Garcia. The juries could reasonably find that defendants acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation when they stabbed Mr. Garcia and caused his death. (See People v. San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 658 [deliberate, premeditated decision to kill present where defendant saw the victim’s reflection in the mirror, turned around, and committed the stabbing]; People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 767.)
Second, defendants argue their trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed with CALCRIM No. 625 on voluntary intoxication. Mr. Espinoza argues that instruction would have assisted the jurors in determining whether defendant premeditated or harbored express malice. Mr. Imperial joins that argument.
CALCRIM No. 625 provides: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill, or the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation. [¶] A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect. [¶] You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.”
Our standard of review in determining whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel was specified by the Supreme Court as follows: ‘“In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must first show counsel’s performance was deficient because the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) Second, he must show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack thereof. Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721.)’ (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215.) [¶] . . . ‘ . . . “In order to prevail on [an ineffective assistance of counsel] claim on direct appeal, the record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission.” (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 349.)’ (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 215.)” (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403.) Our Supreme Court has also held: “Moreover, ‘[i]f the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206, quoting People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569.)
The California Supreme Court has held: “‘We have repeatedly stressed “that ‘[if] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.”’ (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.) ‘Because claims of ineffective assistance are often more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding, the rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal [citations] would not bar an ineffective assistance claim on habeas corpus.’ (Id. at pp. 266-267.)” (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 726; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 459.) On the record before us, there is no indication that counsel did not exercise a reasonable tactical choice in determining an intoxication instruction was not supported by the evidence. In terms of intoxication, the California Supreme Court has held: “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication ‘only when there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant’s “actual formation of specific intent.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715, quoting People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677; see also People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1119.) In this case, there was very little evidence that either defendant was voluntarily intoxicated at the time Mr. Garcia was killed. Both defendants gave self-serving statements to police and testimony at trial that they had been smoking cocaine base. However, neither indicated that he was so intoxicated that he did not know what occurred. Rather, each defendant acknowledged that they were present at the scene of the murder. During his initial police interview, Mr. Imperial denied having used “crack” cocaine on the day of his arrest. However, Mr. Imperial thought he might have had “one or two” beers. Later, Mr. Imperial admitted that he was in the alley when Mr. Garcia was stabbed. Mr. Imperial said he had been “smoking dope” with Mr. Garcia the previous night. Mr. Imperial claimed to have shared a “dime” of cocaine with Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Garcia. During his interview with the police, Mr. Espinoza admitted smoking cocaine just before he was arrested the day after the incident. At trial, Mr. Imperial testified that he had purchased cocaine base prior to going to see Mr. Garcia. Mr. Imperial admitted smoking cocaine with Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Garcia. This was before Mr. Imperial sent Mr. Garcia to purchase more. Mr. Imperial stated that an unknown Black man came to demand money from Mr. Garcia. An argument about money and drugs ensued. Thereafter, Mr. Imperial left the scene because he sensed that a fight would occur. From the alley, Mr. Imperial saw Mr. Espinoza and the Black man punching Mr. Garcia. This hardly constituted substantial evidence of intoxication to a degree where either defendant could not premeditate or act maliciously.
Similarly, Mr. Espinoza’s testimony failed to constitute substantial evidence either defendant was so intoxicated to the degree they were incapable of premeditating or acting maliciously when they violently and repeatedly stabbed Mr. Garcia. According to Mr. Espinoza, defendants drank a six-pack of Bud Light beer beginning at 5 p.m.. They also smoked some cocaine base. Later, defendants went to see Mr. Garcia. Mr. Garcia went to buy cocaine for the three of them to smoke. The $10 “rock” was cut in three pieces. That amount was sufficient for “three hits.” The three men took turns smoking from a cocaine pipe. Thereafter, Mr. Espinoza saw another individual arrive. Mr. Espinoza left the scene. As he walked away, he heard Mr. Garcia yell, “Augustine, Augustine.”
Defendants spoke with investigators, understood their questions, and gave intelligible responses with thorough descriptions of what occurred. Although both defendants denied their own culpability, each eventually admitted he was present at the scene. Neither defendant indicated that he was so intoxicated that he could not form any requisite mental state. Moreover, each defendant denied that they committed the murder. Given defendants’ comments after their arrests and their testimony at trial, there has been an insufficient showing that: intoxication was a potentially meritorious defense; defense counsel did not make a rationally based decision to forego voluntary intoxication instructions; or that there was the requisite prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 985-988; People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1122.)
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., MOSK, J.