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People v. Humason

Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, El Dorado.
Nov 25, 2003
No. C043251 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)

Opinion

C043251.

11-25-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHADWICK LEE HUMASON, Defendant and Appellant.


The 19-year-old defendant Chadwick Lee Humason was charged with second degree robbery in connection with the theft of a keg of beer from the back of a truck. (Pen. Code, § 211; further section references are to the Penal Code.) The owner of the truck was injured slightly when he tried to stop defendant and a codefendant from driving away with the keg. Defendant pled no contest to felony grand theft (§ 487, subd. (c)) on the condition that he would be granted probation.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in denying defendants subsequent motion to withdraw the plea. Finding no error, we affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant executed a change of plea form on June 13, 2002, the date set for his preliminary hearing. Among other things, defendant reviewed and initialed statements confirming that he had discussed the charge, facts, and possible defenses with his attorney, Amy Tobin, and that he was entering his no contest plea "freely and voluntarily." Defendant acknowledged he understood that he was pleading no contest to felony grand theft. The form did not mention reducing the felony to a misdemeanor at a future date.

At a hearing the same day, the court advised defendant of his constitutional rights, questioned him about the circumstances surrounding execution of the change of plea form, and accepted defendants waivers and no contest plea as freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Defendant acknowledged he had received no promises "other than the fact that the DA [was] amending the charge from a robbery to a grand theft person, and other than the fact that the DA would not be asking for state prison initially." He said he understood that he could be sentenced to state prison if he violated probation. Once again, there was no mention of reducing the felony to a misdemeanor in the future.

After the court confirmed that defendant had discussed the change of plea form with Attorney Tobin, the following exchange took place:

"THE COURT: And in your case, let me ask one other question. Ms. Tobin, initially when we talked about the case, you wanted to put it over so you could confer with your father, and understandably so. My understanding is you have done that.

"MS. TOBIN: No, he has not.

"DEFENDANT HUMASON: No. I was unable to.

"THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that if you enter the plea today, lets assume your dad tells you, `Hey, you jerk. You shouldnt have done it. Youre a fool. Quite candidly, based on the facts Ive heard in the case, its a good offer they made to you. Its a heck of a good offer, quite candidly, because if you fell on a robbery you could go to prison. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Do you understand you wont be able to come back here later on and say, `You know, my dad really thinks thats stupid of me, and Im going to withdraw my plea. Youre over 18. You have to make decisions. Unfortunately you made the wrong one in this case. [¶] But do you understand that?

"DEFENDANT HUMASON: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: And youre willing to go forward and accept the plea with that?"

"DEFENDANT HUMASON: Yes, Your Honor."

Attorney Richard Specchio substituted in as defense counsel before the sentencing hearing on October 17, 2002. The court indicated it was inclined to place defendant on probation with local time. Specchio responded that he understood from Attorney Tobin that "the matter [would] be reduced to a misdemeanor at . . . the conclusion of 18 months." The court replied there was nothing on the record to show that was part of the agreement. The court continued the sentencing hearing to allow Specchio to confer with defendant.

Thereafter, defendant moved to withdraw the no contest plea on two grounds. First, defendant asserted he pled no contest because he, his father, and Attorney Tobin believed the felony "would automatically be reduced to a misdemeanor after twelve (12) to eighteen (18) months." Second, defendant said he was factually innocent of taking the keg of beer from the victims person. He argued "his [no contest] plea was unfairly induced and therefore involuntarily entered, which constitute[d] a showing of manifest injustice."

The motion papers refer to defendant entering a "guilty" plea. But the record shows it was a plea of "no contest."

Both defendant and his father testified at the hearing on the motion. Defendant explained that he wanted his father present before he entered the plea because defendant was "easily confused." He stated he had learning disabilities, took Ritalin when he was younger, but was not taking any medication at the time he entered his no contest plea. Defendant said his thinking was less confused now that he was taking Ritalin and Depakote. He testified that after he spoke with Attorney Tobin, his understanding of the consequences of the plea was that "[he] would serve no more than 30 days, . . . that . . . the charge would not be bumped up to the GBI, and that it would be an automatic misdemeanor after 12 to 18 months." According to defendant, when he and his father met with Tobin after the hearing, Tobin repeated the felony would be reduced to a misdemeanor. Defendant claimed he would not have entered the plea if he had understood the charge was not going to be reduced to a misdemeanor automatically. When the court asked if the absence of medication prevented defendant from understanding his constitutional rights, defendant clarified that he did not understand the issue about the misdemeanor. On further questioning by the court, defendant said he "figured that [he] would have to still comply with [his] probation, pay [his] fines and restitution" in order to have the felony "automatically" reduced.

Defendants father testified that his son was diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder when he was in kindergarten. The father wanted to be present with defendant in court because defendant was off his medication at the time. After meeting with Attorney Tobin after the change of plea hearing, the father "was under the clear impression" the felony would be a misdemeanor under the plea agreement. On questioning by the court, he acknowledged, "[i]t possibly could not be" if defendant failed to comply with the conditions of probation. He said Tobin explained the matter "in a roundabout way" and focused more on whether defendant paid his restitution and completed his community service.

Attorney Tobin testified for the prosecution that she read the change of plea form to defendant paragraph by paragraph in order to make sure he understood it. She explained that defendant was looking at a possible robbery conviction and straight felony if he did not accept the plea. In response to questions by the prosecution and the court about references to the misdemeanor, Tobin stated: "I dont specifically recall exactly what I told him, but Im — but I would have told him that if — that he would have been placed on probation for a period of 3 years, and that after a period of 12 months to 18 months — I probably would have said 18 months, but if Mr. Humason said I said 12, I may have said that. That if he completed all his terms and conditions of probation and he was successful and he didnt get into . . . any more trouble, then in all likelihood, the charge would be reduced to a misdemeanor." Tobin testified she never would have said defendant would receive an automatic misdemeanor unless it was part of the plea agreement. She did not recall defendant being confused about the change of plea form.

The court continued the hearing for argument and decision. Attorney Specchio argued that the court should grant defendants motion because of his learning disabilities, lack of medication, and absence of his father at the change of plea hearing.

The court denied the motion to withdraw the no contest plea, finding it was made knowingly and intelligently. Specifically, the court found that defendant "was properly advised of each and every one of his constitutional rights. He was further advised of each of the consequences to him. [¶] . . . [¶] It appears as if there was some discussion mainly between him and his attorney about the possibility of this being a misdemeanor, and theres no question that it can be pursuant to the type of charge he pled to. If he pled to the original charge, the robbery, that stays a felony forever. [¶] But after hearing all the testimony and all that, the Court does not find that the plea should be withdrawn. . . ." The court acknowledged defendant wanted to talk to his father, but noted "hes also over 18." The court felt "that in a sense what we kind of have here is buyers remorse."

The court continued sentencing to permit defendant to seek appellate review. Thereafter, the court issued a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

Section 1018 provides that a defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea or no contest plea may do so before judgment on a showing of good cause. "While the section is to be liberally construed and a plea of guilty may be withdrawn for mistake, ignorance, or inadvertence or any other factor overreaching defendants free and clear judgment, the facts of such grounds must be established by clear and convincing evidence." (People v. Urfer (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 887, 892; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) "A decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea `"rests in the sound discretion of the trial court" and is final unless the defendant can show a clear abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] Moreover, a reviewing court must adopt the trial courts factual findings if substantial evidence supports them. [Citation.]" (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)

Section 1018 states in part: "On application of the defendant at any time before judgment . . . , the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." The legal effect of a no contest plea to a felony is the same as that of a guilty plea for all purposes. (§ 1016.)

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw the plea "despite clear and convincing evidence that [he] was operating under a mistaken belief that his conviction would automatically become a misdemeanor and that [his] mental state was adversely affected by a lack of medication." He claims the evidence shows that "the lack of his medications made him easily confused and impaired his ability to understand the terms and consequences of his guilty plea."

We reject the contentions because there is nothing in the record to show that defendant was confused or otherwise adversely affected by his learning disabilities at the time he filled out the change of plea form and entered his no contest plea in open court.

We begin by reviewing the record of the change of plea hearing in June 2002. As we explained, the court questioned defendant at length before finding that he changed his plea and waived his rights freely and voluntarily. The reporters transcript fails to show defendant was confused at any time during the hearing. The court specifically explored defendants expressed wish to speak with his father before entering the plea. Indeed, the court mentioned Attorney Tobins initial request to continue the matter so defendant could confer with his father. However, defendant stated without hesitation that he was willing to go forward and accept the plea in spite of the fact he was unable to contact his father.

Defendant filed a sentencing report in preparation for the sentencing originally scheduled for October 17, 2002, which demonstrated defendant was functioning well without medication during the period after the offense and change of plea. The report represented that defendant had attended junior college during the summer of 2002 and made excellent grades. At the time the report was filed in October 2002, defendant was working at his fathers McDonalds restaurant, attending college full time, and volunteering in various community service agencies. Attached to the sentencing report was a statement from Michael Sullivan, M.D., defendants neurologist, stating that defendant did not restart his medications until mid-September 2002. Dr. Sullivan said defendant "ha[d] not been on . . . medication for quite some time." He reported that defendant was "calm and not hyperactive" during an examination on September 12, 2002. However, defendant reported mood swings and complained he was easily irritated. Sullivan restarted defendant on Depakote "for stabilization of his moods."

Attorney Tobins testimony at the hearing on November 21, 2002, regarding defendants motion to withdraw the no contest plea also supports the courts findings. Recounting her discussions with defendant about the change of plea, she could not recall defendant being confused about the form.

Because the record amply supports the trial courts finding that defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendants motion to withdraw his plea is affirmed.

We concur: NICHOLSON, J., ROBIE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Humason

Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, El Dorado.
Nov 25, 2003
No. C043251 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Humason

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHADWICK LEE HUMASON, Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, El Dorado.

Date published: Nov 25, 2003

Citations

No. C043251 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)