Summary
holding that it is only where the same criminal conduct is proscribed in both statutes that the equal protection principle arises
Summary of this case from People v. TorresOpinion
No. 26981
Decided December 27, 1976.
Defendant was charged in a two-count information with vehicular homicide, a felony, and criminally negligent homicide, a misdemeanor. The district court dismissed felony count of vehicular homicide and district attorney appealed.
Reversed
1. STATUTES — Different Punishments — Same Criminal Conduct — Equal Protection — Violation. Whenever two or more statutes provide different punishments for exactly the same criminal conduct, equal protection is violated.
2. HOMICIDE — Vehicular — Proof — Death — Criminally Negligent — Element — Not Required — Equal Protection. In order to convict under the vehicular homicide statute, the prosecution is required to prove the element of death caused through the use of a motor vehicle, while conviction under the criminally negligent homicide statute does not require proof of such element, hence, since the statutes do not provide different punishments for exactly the same criminal conduct, the vehicular homicide statute is not unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.
3. STATES — Legislature — Power — Create and Define Crime — Constitution. The legislature has power to create and define crime, subject only to the limitations of the constitution, including requirements that enactment not be arbitrary or unreasonable in its classification and that there be a reasonable relationship to the public purpose to be achieved.
4. HOMICIDE — Vehicular — More Severe Penalty — Criminally Negligent — Equal Protection — State — Legitimate Interest. Decision of legislature to provide a more severe penalty for a vehicular homicide than for criminally negligent homicide was not arbitrary and unreasonable and did not constitute a denial of equal protection, as the state has a legitimate interest in discouraging a specific evil which it believes to be of greater societal consequence.
5. PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS — Discretion — Vehicular Homicide — Criminally Negligent Homicide — Equal Protection. Mere fact that district attorney could exercise prosecutorial discretion as to whether he wished to prosecute under vehicular homicide statute or criminally negligent homicide statute did not violate tenets of equal protection.
Appeal from the District Court of Larimer County, Honorable Dale E. Shannon, Judge.
Stuart A. VanMeveren, District Attorney, Donald E. Johnson, Jr., Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.
Keller Dunievitz, Alex Stephen Keller, for defendant-appellee.
This is an appeal by the district attorney from a decision of the Larimer County District Court granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendant was charged in a two-count information with vehicular homicide, a felony, and criminally negligent homicide, a misdemeanor. The district court dismissed the felony count, basing its ruling on our decision in People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). We find Calvaresi not applicable and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court.
The trial court grounded its ruling on a finding that the statute defining the crime of vehicular homicide was indistinguishable from the statute defining criminally negligent homicide.
The statute dealing with vehicular homicide provided that one commits that crime when he:
"Operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner . . . and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another. . . ." 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-106
Now section 18-3-106, C.R.S. 1973.
The criminal negligent homicide statute provides that:
"A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another person:
(a) By conduct amounting to criminal negligence." 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-105
Now section 18-3-105, C.R.S. 1973.
[1] As the trial court pointed out, we held in Calvaresi, supra, that the standard of care described in the manslaughter statute defining a felony and the criminal negligence statute here involved was not sufficiently apparent to be intelligently and uniformly applied. We there held that the manslaughter statute which defined a felony was unconstitutional on the fundamental principle that wherever two or more statutes provide different punishments for exactly the same criminal conduct, equal protection is violated. People v. McKenzie, 169 Colo. 521, 458 P.2d 232 (1969); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961).
1971 Perm. Supp. C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-104.
[2] However, it is only where the same criminal conduct is proscribed in both statutes that the equal protection principle arises. In the statutes we compare today, there is a crucial difference in that the vehicular homicide statute requires for conviction that the prosecution prove the additional element of a death caused through the use of a motor vehicle. Calvaresi, therefore, clearly is not controlling. There, we held that the statutory language defining the crime was indistinguishable in the two statutes. Here, the distinction is that unless death is the result of the use of a motor vehicle, there can be no prosecution for vehicular homicide.
The defendant contends that even if the element of a motor vehicle distinguishes vehicular homicide from criminally negligent homicide, the distinction is insignificant. Not so.
[3] The legislature certainly has the power to create and define crime, subject only to the limitations of the constitution. People ex rel Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967). Among those constitutional limitations are the requirements that the enactment not be arbitrary or unreasonable in its classification and that there be a reasonable relationship to the public purpose to be achieved. People v. Calvaresi, supra.
[4] We cannot say that the legislature's decision to provide a more severe penalty for vehicular homicide than for criminal negligent homicide is arbitrary or unreasonable. The state has a legitimate interest in discouraging a specific evil which it believes to be of greater societal consequence. This choice does not offend equal protection.
[5] Nor does the fact that the district attorney, under this statutory scheme, may exercise prosecutorial discretion as to the statute under which he wishes to prosecute, violate the tenets of equal protection. People v. Fowler, 183 Colo. 300, 516 P.2d 428 (1973); People v. James, 178 Colo. 401, 497 P.2d 1256 (1972).
The order of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the charge of vehicular homicide.