Opinion
4-24-0398 4-24-0399 4-24-0400
06-11-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE TERRELL HOWARD, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County Nos. 24CF561, 24CF563, 24DV30 Honorable Scott Paccagnini, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
VANCIL, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred in granting the State's petition to deny defendant pretrial release where the court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).
¶ 2 On a Saturday in March 2024, defendant, Terrance Terrell Howard, was charged with two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. He was arrested on those charges and other previously filed charges, and he appeared before the trial court in Winnebago County that same day. Pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), the State petitioned the court to deny defendant pretrial release. The court, on its own motion, continued the hearing to the following Monday. At that hearing, defense counsel argued that over 48 hours had passed since defendant's first appearance, so he should be released. The court disagreed and denied defendant pretrial release. Defendant appealed.
¶ 3 We agree with defendant that the trial court failed to comply with the Code. We vacate the order denying pretrial release and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In January 2024, the State charged defendant with two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2022)). Later, the State further charged defendant with aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)), possession of a firearm without a firearm owner's identification card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2022)), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2) (West 2022)). Finally, on Saturday, March 2, 2024, the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(2)(D)). Defendant was arrested that day.
¶ 6 Also on Saturday, March 2, the State petitioned to deny defendant pretrial release. Defense counsel would later say the State filed its petition at approximately 1:40 p.m., although the record does not otherwise specify the time of filing. Defendant appeared before the trial court, and although the court's docket states this first appearance was scheduled for March 2 at 1 p.m., the record does not confirm what time the court appearance began. The court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the State's petition to deny pretrial release. Neither party had requested the continuance. The court's docket indicates that the hearing on the State's petition was scheduled for March 4 at 1:30 p.m.
¶ 7 The trial court conducted a hearing on the State's petition on Monday, March 4, 2024. Defense counsel observed that the hearing started "a little before 4:00." He argued that the Code requires hearings on pretrial release to be held within 48 hours of the defendant's first appearance. Defense counsel claimed that because the State filed its petition to deny release around 1:40 p.m. on Saturday, the hearing was untimely, so defendant should be released. The State argued that the Code's 48-hour deadline does not include Saturdays and Sundays, so the hearing was timely. The State also insisted that it had not asked for a continuance, it was prepared on Saturday, and the court continued the matter on its own motion
¶ 8 The trial court agreed with the State. It cited the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/1 et seq. (West 2022)), which tolls statutory deadlines in certain circumstances. Defense counsel objected that the Statute on Statutes only tolls weekends if the deadline "falls upon those days," but here, the 48-hour deadline fell on a Monday. The court overruled the defense's objection.
¶ 9 The trial court heard the State and defense counsel's arguments over whether defendant qualified for pretrial detention. It concluded that the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed a qualifying offense, that he posed a real and present threat to the community, and that no condition or conditions would ensure the safety of the alleged victim and the community, so it granted the State's petition to deny defendant pretrial release.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that section 110-6.1 of the Code required the trial court to conduct a pretrial release hearing within 48 hours of his first appearance, but the court failed to do so. Defendant contends that the court did not comply with the Code's procedural requirement, so his detention is unlawful. He asks us to reverse the trial court's detention order and remand for further proceedings to determine the least restrictive conditions for his release.
¶ 13 Defendant's argument focuses on the text of section 110-6.1 of the Code. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. "Our primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intent." Id. "The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Evans v. Cook County State's Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 27. "It is an elementary principle of statutory interpretation that no statute should be construed in a manner which will lead to consequences which are absurd, inconvenient, or unjust." People v. Partee, 125 Ill.2d 24, 30-31 (1988).
¶ 14 Section 110-6.1(c)(2) of the Code states that when the State petitions the trial court to deny a defendant pretrial release,
"the court shall immediately hold a hearing on the petition unless a continuance is requested. If a continuance is requested and granted, the hearing shall be held within 48 hours of the defendant's first appearance if the defendant is charged with first degree murder or a Class X, Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 felony, and within 24 hours if the defendant is charged with a Class 4 or misdemeanor offense. The Court may deny or grant the request for continuance. If the court decides to grant the continuance, the Court retains the discretion to detain or release the defendant in the time between the filing of the petition and the hearing." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022).
This section is clear and unambiguous. People v. McCarthy-Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, ¶ 11. It requires the trial court to hold a hearing on the State's petition "immediately" if no continuance is requested, or, if a continuance is requested, "within 48 hours of the defendant's first appearance" when the defendant is charged with a Class X, Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 felony. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022).
¶ 15 Here, defendant's charges included the following: aggravated battery, a Class X felony; aggravated discharge of a firearm, a Class 1 felony; possession of a firearm without a firearm owner's identification card, a Class 3 felony; two counts of domestic battery, a misdemeanor; and three counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, a Class 4 felony. Based on the Class X, Class 1, and Class 3 felonies, the text of Section 110-6.1 required the trial court to hold a hearing on the State's petition to deny release either "immediately," if no continuance was requested, or, if a continuance was requested, "within 48 hours of the defendant's first appearance." Id.
¶ 16 Defendant's first appearance occurred on Saturday, March 2, and the hearing on the State's petition to deny pretrial release occurred on Monday, March 4, but we note that the record does not clearly indicate the exact time of each court appearance. The trial court's docket entries show that the first appearance was scheduled for 1 p.m. on Saturday, March 2, and the pretrial release hearing was scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on March 4. At the hearing on the State's petition, defense counsel represented that the State had filed its petition to deny pretrial release at 1:40 p.m. on Saturday and the hearing was occurring "a little before 4:00" on the following Monday. Neither the State nor the court denied that 48 hours had passed since defendant's first appearance. Now, on appeal, the State still does not deny that the hearing on its petition occurred more than 48 hours after the first appearance. We will accept this framing, although the record itself is indeterminate.
¶ 17 The trial court relied on the Statute on Statutes, which provides as follows:
"The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or Sunday or is a holiday as defined or fixed in any statute now or hereafter in force in this State, and then it shall also be excluded. If the day succeeding such Saturday, Sunday or holiday is also a holiday or a Saturday or Sunday then such succeeding day shall also be excluded." 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2022).
The court found that this provision excludes Saturdays and Sundays from the 48-hour period in section 110-6.1 of the Code, so the hearing in this case on Monday, March 4, was timely.
¶ 18 The trial court misinterpreted the Statute on Statutes. Because we reject this reading of the Statute, we need not decide whether it applies to the Code's 48-hour deadline. See McCarthy-Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, ¶ 13 (finding "no authority that disposes of the question whether the method for calculating deadlines set forth in the Statute on Statutes should apply" to section 110-6.1 of the Code). Assuming arguendo that the Statute on Statutes applies here, it still does not exclude all Saturdays and Sundays anytime a statute designates a time limit. Instead, the Statute on Statutes tolls the last day of a deadline if "the last day is Saturday or Sunday or is a holiday as defined or fixed" by statute. 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2022). Here, if the 48-hour period began with defendant's first appearance on Saturday, sometime around 1 p.m. or 1:40 p.m., then it ended at the same time on Monday. That Monday was not a "Saturday or Sunday" or a "holiday as defined or fixed in any statute," so the Statute on Statutes does not exclude that Monday from the calculation. Id. The Code required the court to conduct a hearing on the State's petition by around 1:40 p.m. on Monday, but the hearing did not begin until nearly 4 p.m. on Monday. The hearing was late, so the court failed to comply with the Code's procedural requirements.
¶ 19 Instead of relying on the Statute on Statutes, the State asks us to be flexible in our application of the Code and to "defer to the trial court's findings." Defendant's first appearance occurred on a Saturday. The State and defense counsel were both ready to proceed with the hearing immediately after the State filed its petition, and the trial court continued the matter on its own motion. Trial courts have busy dockets and cannot always conduct hearings at precisely the specified time. If the hearing on pretrial release here was untimely, it was at most a few hours late. The State asks that we not impose a "draconian interpretation" on section 110-6.1(c)(2) of the Code.
¶ 20 We recognize that the Code's short deadline creates practical difficulties for trial courts and attorneys, but those difficulties do not alter the clear and unambiguous language of section 110-6.1. We cannot "defer" to the trial court on matters of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. Our interpretation also does not lead to any "absurd" result. Partee, 125 Ill.2d at 30-31. Here the trial court conducted the first appearance on Saturday, March 2. When the trial court already operates on a Saturday and both parties are prepared to proceed on the petition for pretrial release, any practical difficulties with scheduling appear to be less burdensome.
¶ 21 Having concluded that the hearing on the State's petition to deny pretrial release did not comply with the Code's procedural requirements, our next step is to determine the proper remedy. Defendant asks us to reverse the trial court's order and remand with instructions that it determine the least restrictive conditions for his release. That is, defendant asks us to effectively prohibit the trial court from continuing his detention.
¶ 22 We granted this relief in McCarthy-Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, ¶ 18. There, the State had petitioned to deny a defendant pretrial release on December 24 but moved to continue the hearing on the petition. The trial court granted the continuance and held the hearing on December 27. We found that the hearing took place after the Code's 48-hour deadline, which expired on December 26. Just as in this case, we found that the final day of the 48-hour period did not fall on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, so the Statute on Statutes, even if it applied in section 110-6.1 cases, did not change the result. Id. ¶ 13.
¶ 23 We then considered possible remedies. We reasoned that simply ordering the trial court to conduct a new detention hearing would provide no relief, because the new hearing would still be untimely. Id. ¶ 14. Instead, we compared the case to People v. Gil, 2019 IL App (1st) 192419, in which a trial court had denied a defendant bail under the previous bail system even though the State had not petitioned to deny bail. The appellate court found that this was an error, and it determined that the proper remedy was to reverse the order denying the defendant bail and to remand "for the purpose of setting the amount of bail and other conditions of his release." Id. ¶ 2.
¶ 24 The McCarthy-Nelson court applied the same reasoning and held, on remand, the trial court lacked the authority to detain the defendant. We explained:
"[I]f we were to allow the State to again petition the court to deny defendant pretrial release on remand, it would have little incentive to comply with the timing requirements of the statute in other cases. There would be no consequence for its failure to comply with the unambiguous language of the statute, and thus would render nugatory the statute's timing requirement." McCarthy-Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, ¶ 18.
¶ 25 Here, unlike in McCarthy-Nelson, the State did not ask for the continuance that resulted in the untimely hearing. The trial court continued the hearing on its own motion, even though both parties were prepared for the hearing at defendant's first appearance. This is notably different from McCarthy-Nelson, where we imposed serious consequences on the State's noncompliance with the explicit goal of incentivizing the State to adhere to the procedural requirements of section 110-6.1.
¶ 26 However, the State has proposed no other remedies for the Code violation. As we observed in McCarthy-Nelson, simply remanding for a new hearing on pretrial release would not provide any remedy because the new hearing would still be untimely. Id. ¶ 14. If we must choose between effectively granting no remedy and remanding with instructions that the trial court release defendant and set conditions for his release, we choose the latter, primarily to incentivize the trial court to comply with the Code's deadline. Id. ¶ 18 (granting this remedy "for the State's and trial court's failure to ensure the detention hearing was conducted in compliance with the timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c)(2)" (emphasis added)).
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand with directions that the court promptly set the case for a hearing to determine the least restrictive conditions of defendant's pretrial release.
¶ 29 Reversed and remanded with directions.