Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUKCRCR05- 68753-2.
Reardon, Acting P.J.
Defendant Willard Michael House appeals from a judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to three years in state prison. In revoking his probation, the trial court determined that defendant had violated numerous conditions of his probation, including that he obey all laws, abstain from consuming alcohol, enroll in a domestic violence program, and pay various fines and fees. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the finding that he had violated his probation by appearing at his domestic violence program while intoxicated and by failing to attend further meetings at the program was based on inadmissible hearsay; and (2) the finding that he failed to pay fines and fees was not supported by evidence that he had the ability to comply with the monetary conditions of his probation. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2004, defendant pled no contest to one misdemeanor count of battery (Pen. Code, § 242), and was placed on 36 months’ probation. In December 2005, defendant pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) At the sentencing hearing in February 2006, the trial court suspended execution of a three-year prison sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to various conditions, including that he obey all laws. The court also revoked defendant’s prior misdemeanor probation and sentenced him to 30 days in jail.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In March 2006, the People alleged that defendant violated his probation by committing spousal battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and by violating a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). Following a contested hearing, the trial court determined defendant had so violated his probation; the court revoked and reinstated defendant’s probation, with the condition he serve 45 days in jail with credit for 42 days served.
In June 2006, defendant admitted to making criminal threats (§ 422) and falsely imprisoning his cohabitant (§ 236). In July 2006, the court ordered a diagnostic study of defendant pursuant to section 1203.03. Upon resumption of the proceedings, the court revoked probation, suspended execution of the three-year sentence, and reinstated probation with the condition that he serve additional jail time that was satisfied by time served.
Following a contested hearing on March 28, 2007, defendant was found in violation of 12 terms of his probation. At the hearing, Ukiah Police Officer Vince Morse testified that on March 10, 2007, he found defendant in a local bar. Defendant was “passed out” at a table in the back of the bar with a full glass of an alcoholic beverage next to him. Defendant was slouched over with his head on the table and eyes shut. Officer Morse recognized defendant from previous contacts; he repeatedly called defendant by name and finally had to shake him to rouse him from his slumber. Upon waking up, defendant was disoriented and had slurred speech. Officer Morse could smell an alcoholic odor emitting from defendant’s body. Defendant admitted he had been drinking. He was unsteady and could barely stand up. A breath test revealed that defendant’s blood-alcohol level was .137 percent. Following a search incident to arrest, defendant was found to be in possession of a pipe and a small amount of marijuana.
Probation Officer Rebecca Dunsing testified that she reviewed defendant’s file upon learning of his arrest and determined that he had not completed his required anger management program. A representative of the anger management program told Dunsing that when defendant attended his first meeting on March 13, 2007, he was so intoxicated that he had to be told to leave; defendant did not attend any further meetings.
Dunsing further testified that she reviewed defendant’s probation file for information regarding his payment history. Defendant had not made any payment toward the monetary conditions of his probation.
The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had violated his probation by failing to obey all laws (term 4), consuming alcohol (term 9), possessing marijuana (term 10), failing to cooperate in counseling (term 15), and failing to enroll in a 52-week domestic violence program (term 47). Additionally, the court determined that defendant had failed to make restitution (terms 30 & 31), and failed to pay various fines and fees (terms 39, 41, 44, 48 & 49).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had “reached its limit” about what could be done for defendant, noting that there had been numerous violations. The court revoked probation and imposed the previously suspended three-year prison term.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the judgment should be reversed because the trial court violated his constitutional rights by revoking his probation based on the inadmissible hearsay evidence presented by Dunsing and by finding that he failed to pay the fine and fees without determining that he had the ability to comply with the monetary conditions of his probation. Defendant, however, did not object on these grounds below. Even overlooking this forfeiture, defendant’s claim of reversible error fails on the merits.
Probation may be revoked “if there are reasons for the court to believe from the probation report that defendant has violated any of the terms or conditions of probation.” (People v. Taylor (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 393, 395, italics added; see § 1203.2, subd. (a).) However, “[b]efore a defendant’s probation may be revoked, a preponderance of the evidence must support a probation violation.” (People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1197; see also People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447.) Furthermore, “evidence which is insufficient or inadmissible to prove guilt at trial nevertheless may be considered in determining whether probation should be revoked.” (In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 58.) Trial courts have “very broad discretion in determining whether a probationer has violated probation,” and “ ‘only in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443; see also People v. Michael W. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1119 [“revocation of probation decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard”].)
There was no abuse of discretion here. The evidence amply supports the trial court’s determination that defendant violated his probation. Officer Morse saw defendant drunk in a bar. Moreover, defendant admitted that he had been drinking, which was admissible as a party admission. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Additionally, a search incident to defendant’s arrest revealed that he was in possession of a pipe and a small amount of marijuana. The trial court could reasonably conclude this evidence showed by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated his probation by failing to abstain from consuming alcohol and by going to an establishment where alcohol was the primary item for sale (term 9), by possessing marijuana (term 10), and by failing to obey all laws (term 4).
Considering the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude there was more than sufficient evidence to support the finding that defendant had violated at least three conditions of his probation. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it revoked defendant’s probation. As an order revoking probation may properly be based on a single ground (see People v. Taylor, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at p. 395; see also § 1203.2, subd. (a)), we need not address whether the additional grounds for revocation were established by inadmissible hearsay evidence (terms 15 & 47) or whether the trial court failed to consider defendant’s ability to comply with the monetary conditions of his probation (terms 30, 31, 39, 41, 44, 48 & 49). However, even if we were to address these claims, on this record we would find any error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.