Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VA096959, Thomas McKnew, Jr., Judge.
Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
After suffering eight prior convictions of violent or serious felonies, defendant and appellant Christopher Hines (defendant) was convicted of robbery and burglary. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the maximum sentence in alleged retaliation for defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike his prior felony convictions.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We hold that the record does not support defendant’s claim that he was sentenced in retaliation for exercising his right to a jury trial and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion to strike his prior felony convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2006, Alfred Clark was working at his Access Cellular store in Bellflower. His store was a non-profit business that conducted after-school programs that employed youth and taught them the business. Anthony Limones, 17 years old, was working with Clark that day. At about 3:00 p.m., Clark observed defendant enter the store. Clark, who had never seen defendant before, approached him as he would any other customer and asked how he could help him. Defendant stated that he was new to the area and “just looking around.” Clark explained the various items the store sold in addition to cell phones, including jewelry and jeans. Clark told defendant that if he needed help with anything “just to let [Clark] know.” Clark then sat back down at a table by the computer.
Prior to defendant entering the store, Clark had been counting money. When defendant entered, Clark “kind of balled [the money] up [in his hand].”
About two to three minutes after defendant entered Clark’s store, a second man entered. Clark recognized him as someone who grew up “two doors down from [Clark’s house].” Clark asked the man how the man’s mother was and how the man was doing. The man replied that his father had helped him get a job, and he was happy. The man was approximately 20 to 21 years old.
Clark, who was behind a counter when the second man entered the store, stood to greet the man. Clark was showing the second man shoes, when defendant approached the counter and stood next to the man. When Clark asked if the two men knew each other, defendant said, “Oh no. . . . I don’t know him.”
Clark turned his back on the men to return one of the shoes he had taken out, and, when he turned back towards the men, he saw that defendant had moved through a space between the two display cases and was behind the counter where Clark was. Clark told defendant that he must remain on the other side of the counter, and defendant returned to the other side of the counter. Clark looked at the other man, noticed he was not interested in the other shoe Clark had showed him, and turned to put that shoe back on the display. When Clark turned around, defendant, who had again moved between the display cases to the other side of the counter, put a knife to Clark’s neck and told Clark that if he did anything he would be stabbed. The other man, defendant’s accomplice, claimed to have a gun. Clark was concerned about Limones who had been in the back of the store, but had come to the door between the front and back rooms.
Clark was told to get to his knees, but did not comply immediately and instead tried to talk with the two men. Defendant “poke[d] [Clark] in [his] back twice with the knife,” causing cuts. Because Clark knew the accomplice, he was concerned for his own safety. He did not know how the men were “going to get away with it” or what they were “going to do with [him].”
The accomplice began to remove items from a bag he brought with him, including a long plastic bag and blue and yellow computer cords. As Clark was going to his knees, the accomplice began trying to tie Clark up. The accomplice then told defendant “to go get the other guy in the back.” Defendant pointed the knife at Limones who was standing at the door to the back room of the store. Defendant told Limones to sit down or he would be stabbed. Defendant “disappeared” behind a wall where a chair was located. He then returned to the front of the store and assisted his accomplice in trying to tie up Clark. Clark was on the ground and the two men were attempting to tie his hand behind his back. When the cords they brought with them did not work, the men tried to tie Clark’s hands with the cord attached to a store fan, but that did not work either. The men then tried unsuccessfully to tie Clark’s hands with a hanger.
While the men were trying to tie Clark, he spoke to the accomplice, asking him what he was doing and whether he realized that Clark had two daughters and knew the man’s brother and sister. The accomplice told Clark to be quiet, “[t]his is gangster stuff . . . . [B]e quiet before I pop you.” Clark complied because he did not know whether the accomplice had a gun.
The accomplice told defendant to bring Limones from the back and tie him up. But when defendant went to the back of the store, he discovered that Limones was gone. Defendant panicked and wanted to leave the store immediately, but the accomplice told him to be calm. The accomplice acted “like he was a pro, and took his time.”
Clark again spoke to the men telling them they should leave because the police were coming and “to take what [they were] going to take and go.” The accomplice took the big plastic bag to the display case and began pulling all the jewelry off the shelves. He then went to the back of the store and put shoe boxes into the bag. Defendant approached Clark and took the cash that Clark still had “balled” up in his hand. The men also took costume jewelry Clark was wearing and his wallet. Clark feared for his life.
The men left through the back of the store, but defendant soon returned to wipe up dark liquid he had spilled from a bottle he had with him. When defendant left a second time, Clark, who had only pretended to be tied, stood up, went to the back of the store, and retrieved a telephone. As Clark returned to the front door of his store, he dialed 911. The front door of the store opens to Flower Street where Clark observed a “U-Haul” truck pulling out of the driveway of the store on to Flower Street. Clark saw a driver in the truck, but it was not either defendant or his accomplice. As the truck made a right turn on to Flower, Clark turned and saw “a line of police cars.” Clark pointed to the truck and the police acknowledged him, and began to follow the truck.
Clark ran to his car and began to follow the police, assuming he would be required to identify the two men when they were apprehended. But when Clark heard gunshots, he returned to his store.
Detective Philip Guzman testified that Deputy Joyce shot at defendant’s accomplice.
In about five minutes, deputy sheriffs arrived at Clark’s store, told him they had apprehended some suspects, and explained that they wanted Clark to identify them. Clark and Limones rode with deputies in different patrol cars to a location where the truck had been pulled over, but Clark could not identify the driver. They then brought Clark to a park where he identified defendant.
Clark recognized and identified for deputies the property taken from his store that was strewn around the back of the truck. Later that night, deputies returned Clark’s cash, wallet, cell phone, and some of the jewelry he had been wearing.
In August 2006, Anthony Limones was employed at Clark’s Access Cellular store in Bellflower. On August 23, 2006, Limones was working at his desk in the back room of the store. He heard a crashing sound, went to the door that leads to the front of the store, and saw Clark with two men around him. One man was beside Clark and the other was on top of him. They were trying to tie Clark up with “cable wire.” One of the men was holding a knife.
Limones could not identify defendant in court as one of the two men he saw in the store that day.
The man with the knife saw Limones standing in the doorway, walked up to Limones, and told him to go into the backroom and not move. Limones sat down when ordered to do so and was scared. The man with the knife pulled Limones’s shirt over his head so Limones could not see. Limones heard the man leave the back room.
Limones pulled his shirt down and exited through the rear exit of the store. He saw a “U-Haul” truck in the driveway to the store and ran to an apartment complex near the store, where he called the police. Limones heard the police arrive and he later was driven to a location in a patrol car where he identified the man with the knife who pulled his shirt over his head.
Deputy Jorge Marchena testified that he drove Limones to a “field showup” the day of the robbery where Limones identified defendant as one of the men who committed the robbery.
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Deputy Ted Gomez was assigned to the Lakewood Sheriff’s station on August 23, 2006. At approximately 3:00 p.m. that day, Deputy Gomez received a radio transmission directing him to respond to a robbery at a location on Flower Street in the City of Bellflower. He responded to the location and observed another deputy speaking to someone. The other deputy relayed to Deputy Gomez information about a suspect vehicle used in the robbery, describing it as a “U-Haul” truck. The deputy pointed in a westbound direction and Gomez observed a U-Haul truck directly in front of his patrol vehicle.
Deputy Gomez communicated with other assisting deputies regarding a tactical approach. For safety reasons, he determined to stop the vehicle after it passed a school. There were other patrol units following the U-Haul truck down Flower Street, but Deputy Gomez and his two partners were in the lead.
As the patrol units were following the truck, it pulled over in front of a school. Deputy Gomez stopped behind the truck, and he and his partners took positions with their guns drawn, about 20 feet behind the truck. Deputy Gomez observed that the sliding cargo door to the truck was open three to five inches at the bottom and he was able to see two pairs of feet moving. Then the cargo door began moving up. As the door rolled up, Deputy Gomez observed two males standing in the cargo area, one of whom was defendant. As defendant and his accomplice jumped out of the truck, the deputies ordered them to drop to the ground and show their hands. Neither defendant nor his accomplice complied. Instead, they ran westbound, away from the deputies’ position.
Deputy Gomez maintained his position because there was still a driver inside the truck and there were other deputies positioned at the end of the street—the direction in which defendant was running. Deputy Gomez and other deputies approached the driver of the truck, instructed him to show his hands, and ordered him to open the door slowly. The driver complied and was immediately taken into custody. About the time the driver was arrested, Deputy Gomez heard a shot, possibly coming from the school. Thereafter, Deputy Gomez searched the van and found a duffle bag containing jewelry, cell phone cases, a hammer, a knife, and a skull cap. The bag was recovered from the cargo area of the truck along with a large trash bag. He also found watches in the cargo area outside the duffle bag.
On August 23, 2006, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Norman Weisenstein was assigned to the Lakewood station working patrol duty. Around 3:00 p.m., he responded to a robbery reported at a location on Flower Street in Bellflower. As he pulled up to the location, he exited his patrol vehicle and approached on foot. He noticed a “U-Haul” truck in the driveway of the location making a right turn on to Flower Street and proceeding west. He immediately notified other responding units and returned to his patrol car. He followed the truck along with other patrol units.
When the truck pulled over, Deputy Weisenstein ran up to the lead patrol unit and took up a position with the other deputies. He noticed the truck shaking from side to side and a set of fingers at the base of the cargo door. The door was opened by the two individuals inside, one of whom was defendant. One of the deputies at the scene ordered the two men to exit the truck and they complied. Another deputy ordered the men to lie down on the ground. At that point, defendant and his accomplice ran west on Flower. Deputy Weisenstein ran back to his patrol unit and pursued the men westbound on Flower. Initially, the two men ran in the same direction, but then defendant went northbound over a fence into a school, while the accomplice turned right onto Virginia Avenue.
As defendant ran across the school yard, Deputy Weisenstein continued driving in an attempt to cut him off. He made a right on to Virginia Street and observed defendant standing on top of a cargo container trying to get down on the other side of the fence. As Deputy Weisenstein turned right onto Laurel, he made eye contact with defendant who ran back into the school. The deputy then drove to the entrance of the school and entered the school grounds on foot. He was accompanied by two other deputies.
Upon entering the school grounds, Deputy Weisenstein saw defendant backing away from the deputies toward a fence. The deputies ordered defendant to lie down on the ground and defendant complied. Defendant was taken into custody and searched. The deputies recovered approximately $500 in cash and some jewelry from defendant.
Jeremiah Chavers is defendant’s nephew. He knew Clark as a friend of his aunt, Deana Hines. The first time Chavers met Clark was in the phone store on either Downey or Flower Street. He was standing five feet from defendant and Clark when he heard them make a bet on the 2006 Super Bowl. Chavers did not know the exact amount of the bet, but he “knew it was pretty big . . . .”
Clark testified that he did not know defendant before he entered Clark’s store that day and had never made a Super Bowl bet with defendant. Clark also testified that he did not know anyone named Jeremiah Chavers.
The next time Chavers saw Clark he was in front of Chavers’s house. Chavers approached Clark, asked him “what was going on” and told Clark that “they” were under arrest for robbery. Clark was “antsy” and denied that a robbery took place. But Clark did not stay to have a conversation with Chavers; he just drove off.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County District Attorney in an amended information charged defendant in count 1 with second degree robbery in violation of section 211, a felony; in count 2 with attempted second degree robbery in violation of sections 664 and 211, a felony; and in count 3 with second degree commercial burglary in violation of section 459, a felony. As to counts 1 and 2, the District Attorney alleged that defendant personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The District Attorney further alleged that defendant had suffered eight prior convictions of violent or serious felonies within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The District Attorney also alleged that defendant had suffered three prior convictions of serious felonies with in the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). And, the District Attorney alleged that defendant had suffered three prior convictions for which he served prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
As discussed below, prior to trial, the trial court recommended a disposition of the case that defendant rejected and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury acquitted defendant on count 2, attempted robbery, but convicted him on count 1, robbery, and count 3, burglary. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant used a knife in the commission of count 1. Defendant admitted the eight prior felony convictions.
Prior to sentencing, the trial court heard and denied defendant’s motion under section 1385 to strike his prior convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count 1, plus three additional consecutive five-year sentences under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and an additional one-year consecutive sentence for the use of the knife allegation, for an aggregate sentence of 41 years to life. The trial court stayed the sentence on count 3.
DISCUSSION
A. Retaliatory Sentencing
Defendant contends that the trial court imposed a maximum sentence in retaliation for defendant’s refusal to accept the offered plea bargain prior to trial. According to defendant, the trial court improperly penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial.
1. Background
Prior to trial, the trial court had a chambers conference with counsel during which the court discussed its recommended disposition of the case. According to the trial court, it would recommend treating the case as a two strike case “which would require the court striking strikes.” Under that recommended disposition, the trial court would “use Count I, a 211, high term, one-third of the two remaining counts . . . [and] give five years which [the court was] required to do pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) plus [an] additional one year which would run consecutive, not concurrent, nor would it be stayed.”
Thereafter, the trial court had the following exchange with defense counsel: “[Court]: What is your disposition, [counsel], regarding the court’s offer? [¶] [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I have spoken to [defendant], talked about my evaluation of the case, and pros and cons, but however he --. [¶] [Court]: Adamant about proceeding? [¶] [Defense Counsel]: Yes. He feels --. [¶] [Court]: I’m delighted. So let’s proceed and have the jury in. When you’re old and gray, sir, you’re going to regret this decision, more likely than not. I’m not sure. It’s up to the jury.”
The next day, prior to the voir dire of the prospective jurors, the trial court advised defense counsel as follows: “[Court]: By the way, any offer by the court yesterday—I hope its understood—is off the table. Totally off the table. I will not revisit it. So we don’t have to delay for that.”
After the jury was selected and sworn, defense counsel and the trial court had another exchange concerning the trial court’s recommended disposition. “[Defense Counsel]: Oh, Your Honor, you know, may we put on the record that I did honor my client’s request to talk to the court once again about a settlement. [¶] [Court]: The offer the court made yesterday. I did make—she did approach me. She did, in a very moving and direct way and did indicate what the defendant now wished to do—he wished to accept the offer made by the court yesterday. [¶] As I indicated this morning and communicated yesterday, that was yesterday’s offer. Once we start proceeding, the policy of this court—that means this judge—is to then proceed. I mean what I say when I say it. I don’t back pedal, I don’t change my mind. Once I have said what I had to say, you were offered an excellent, excellent—under the circumstances—opportunity, and unfortunately you chose not to accept it, and you had to make that decision yesterday, sir. We’ve gone too far now. We are going to proceed.”
Following the jury verdict, the trial court sentenced defendant to 41 years to life in prison on Count 1. In doing, so the trial court made the following observations: “[Court]: This is one of those cases where the court struggles. My first week as a bench officer—it was the first week, it may have been the second week—before Romero came down, I struck a strike in the interests of justice. On reflection I thought it was the right thing then and all these years later I think it was the right thing to have done when I look back on it. [¶] This case, however, I do not find even if I look at the date of the prior convictions and the youth of the defendant at the time he was convicted, these were five—five counts of which he was found guilty, and they are very serious charges. I realize that he does not take responsibility for having committed those crimes, but he was in fact convicted. [¶] Also, notwithstanding that, he sustained serious felony convictions for 211s in two separate cases. In 1991 he sustained an armed robbery conviction, and in 1997 again two counts of robbery, convicted. He has sustained, even if I should strike—which I am not inclined to do—the 1979 convictions, he still has two priors, and he is now faced with his third prior. [¶] The court feels that it is obligated to apply the law evenhandedly and to comply with the intent of the Three Strikes Law. I’m more than willing in the appropriate case—in the appropriate case—to strike a strike. [¶] This case doesn’t warrant that, and having said that, having—it’s interesting enough that I had worked out myself what the sentencing should have been some time ago, and the sentencing memorandum of the People happens to correspond with the one that I had worked out, but I only worked it out with the intent to hear whatever evidence there is in mitigation that the court could consider, and I have considered this. It weighs heavy on me, and I have to impose the sentence as I do in this case. [¶] He’s been found guilty of Count I, which, after a jury trial, he was charged with a very serious crime, and it was again a 211. He has had a repeated history of . . . committing robberies.”
2. Forfeiture
Defendant did not object to his sentence on the grounds of retaliation or vindictiveness. “Ordinarily, an appellate court will not consider a claim of error if an objection could have been, but was not, made in the lower court. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093] (Saunders).) The reason for this rule is that ‘[i]t is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.’ (People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279] (Vera); see Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 590.) ‘[T]he forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error.’ (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472].)” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46,)
There is nothing in the record to suggest that, once the trial court pronounced sentence, defendant was prevented from objecting to the sentence on the grounds of retaliation or vindictiveness. Because an objection could have been made, but was not, the trial court was unable to address it and avoid any claimed error. The failure to raise the objection to the sentence on the grounds now advanced on appeal forfeited the retaliatory sentencing claim on appeal.
3. No Retaliation
Even if defendant had preserved his retaliation claim on appeal, the record does not support it. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the legitimate interest that a state has in encouraging guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargains. (Corbitt v. New Jersey (1978) 439 U.S. 212, 222.) That court has also recognized that plea bargains can have “a discouraging effect” on a defendant’s decision to exercise his or her right to a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 220-221.) Nevertheless, the court has acknowledged that the discouraging effect of a plea bargain on a defendant’s exercise of his or her right to a jury trial is “‘an inevitable’—and permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.’” (Ibid.)
As a result, that a trial court imposes a harsher sentence after jury trial than would have been imposed if the defendant had accepted a plea bargain is insufficient to show retaliation. (People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35 [“The mere fact . . . that following trial defendant received a more severe sentence than he was offered during plea negotiations does not in itself support the inference that he was penalized for exercising his constitutional rights”].) Instead, the trial court, in pronouncing sentence, must say something that supports a reasonable inference that the court was penalizing the defendant for exercising his or her right to a jury trial. (Ibid.) Here, the trial court did not say anything at the time of sentencing that would support a reasonable inference of retaliation. To the contrary, from the trial court’s comments at sentencing, it is evident that the court weighed the appropriate factors and gave the sentencing issue substantial and thoughtful consideration.
As for the trial court’s comments at the time it made its pretrial sentencing recommendation, we do not construe them as evidence of a retaliatory or vindictive state of mind. At that stage of the proceedings, it was incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that defendant understood the potential consequences of not accepting the recommended sentence. And, because it was a three strikes case, it was reasonable and appropriate for the trial court to impress upon defendant the substantial risk he would run by proceeding to trial.
Similarly, the trial court’s refusal to reconsider a plea bargain once defendant had rejected the court’s original recommendation does not raise a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive. Even assuming defendant’s trial counsel communicated her client’s change in position to the trial court before the jury was empanelled, that change occurred after the trial court revoked its sentencing offer. The trial court had discretion to refuse to reconsider the issue after it withdrew its offer.
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Morales (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 537 is misplaced. In that case, the trial court made several comments at the time of sentencing that suggested it was imposing consecutive sentences on the defendant because the defendant, who had no bona fide defense, insisted on a jury trial, thereby inconveniencing the trial court. (Id. at p. 542.) Among other things, the trial court stated that it wanted the defendant to return to San Quentin and inform his fellow inmates that, if they were to bring “this kind of defense” to the trial court, they would receive consecutive sentences as well. (Ibid.) The trial court in Morales summarized its position as follows: “If there is honest doubt, or even the possibility of honest doubt that a defendant can be convicted, certainly, a defendant should have the right to raise the point, but when he doesn’t have any basis of offering a defense, then I think he should suffer some additional sanction and I am inclined to agree that perhaps these knife possession cases should be treated a little more severely than they have been. The practice has been to give a concurrent sentence, I know, I have done it myself, but I think this is a proper case for a consecutive sentence and that is what he is going to get. Tell the people back at San Quentin why he got it, too.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Unlike the trial court in People v. Morales, supra, 252 Cal.App.4th 537, the trial court here made no comments at the time of sentencing that would suggest that the sentence was being imposed to punish defendant for bringing a meritless case to trial. To the contrary, the trial court’s comments at sentencing suggest that it was attempting to follow the applicable sentencing laws under the facts and circumstances presented by this case.
People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero motion seeking to strike all but one of his prior convictions. According to defendant, several of his convictions were based on conduct that occurred in 1979 when he was 16, and the two other convictions for robbery were based on conduct in 1991 and 1997, respectively.
The trial court has limited discretion under section 1385 to strike prior convictions of serious or violent felonies. “‘. . . A court’s discretion to strike [or vacate] prior felony conviction allegations [or findings] in furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must proceed in strict compliance with [Penal Code] section 1385(a), and is subject to review for abuse. . . . [¶] ‘“The trial court’s power to dismiss an action under [Penal Code section 1385(a)], while broad, is by no means absolute. Rather, it is limited by the amorphous concept which requires that the dismissal be “in furtherance of justice.”’”’” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158-159.) “[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. If it is striking or vacating an allegation or finding, it must set forth its reasons in an order entered on the minutes, and if it is reviewing the striking or vacating of such allegation or finding, it must pass on the reasons so set forth.” (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
Here, the nature and circumstances of the present felonies militated against striking the prior convictions. Defendant and his accomplice invaded Clark’s store well prepared to commit the robberies. At knife point, defendant threatened both Clark and Limones with serious bodily injury and attempted to tie them up. Defendant wounded Clark twice with the knife, and then he and his accomplice fled the scene and attempted to evade police, with defendant running through a school during school hours. There was a suggestion that the accomplice had a gun during the robbery, and the accomplice was apparently involved in a shooting with the deputies—even if by a deputy—before he was arrested. Defendant’s conduct was serious and violent and justified the denial of his Romero motion.
The nature and circumstances of the prior felonies were also not favorable to a finding that defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. As the trial court noted, the 1979 convictions, although remote in time to the present offenses, were nevertheless very serious crimes, including forcible oral copulation, forcible sodomy, and robbery. And the 1991 and 1997 convictions were for robbery, the same crime as the present offense. Defendant admitted eight prior felony convictions that were found to be strikes. Viewing defendant’s record as a whole, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that defendant had a long and “repeated history” of committing robberies.
Defendant’s background, character, and prospects also supported the trial court’s conclusion that he did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. From the time he was an adolescent, defendant was either in prison or on parole. Moreover, when he was on parole, he did not perform well. For example, prior to the current offense, defendant was released from prison in January 2006, only to violate the terms of his parole in February 2006 and return to prison for six months. He was released from prison on August 17, 2006, and committed the offenses in this case just six days later, on August 23, 2006. That conduct was consistent with defendant’s prior history and supports the trial court’s finding that he was not outside the spirit of the Three Strike Law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.