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People v. Hill

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Mar 5, 2008
No. C054728 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WAYNE EUGENE HILL, Defendant and Appellant. C054728 California Court of Appeal, Third District, Sacramento March 5, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super. Ct. No. 05F11111

SCOTLAND, P.J.

Defendant Wayne Eugene Hill made two payments to a car dealer with checks written on the account of Rachel and Francisco P. The signatures were forged, and another forged check from the account was found in defendant’s possession.

A jury convicted defendant of two counts of second degree commercial burglary, two counts of forgery by possession of a check with intent to defraud, and two counts of identity theft. Finding that defendant had been convicted of a prior serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law and had served four prior prison terms, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate, unstayed term of nine years and four months.

On appeal, defendant contends that the prior conviction finding was based on improperly admitted hearsay evidence, and that the trial court erred in refusing to admit medical records to show the prior conviction was not a serious felony. We shall affirm the judgment.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant’s prior conviction was for assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.) In order for the crime to have been a serious felony (strike) within the meaning of the three strikes law, defendant must have personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim or used a deadly weapon. (§ 1192.7, subds. (c)(8), (c)(23); People v. Banuelos (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 601, 605.)

To prove the strike allegation, the People introduced the transcript of defendant’s plea of guilty to violating section 245, subdivision (a)(1) in 1988. The transcript shows that as the factual basis for the plea, the prosecutor stated, and defense counsel in the 1988 proceeding agreed: “[O]n the date specified in the Information in the County of Sacramento, the defendant had an altercation with the victim in this case, one Cynthia D[.] During that altercation, Mr. Hill flipped the victim over his back causing her to break her leg.” Defendant made no objection to this factual basis before pleading guilty to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury.

The transcript of defendant’s plea in 1988 was allowed into evidence over the objection of his defense counsel in this case, which occurred in 2006. According to defense counsel, the factual basis stated for the plea in 1988 was inadmissible hearsay and its introduction violated defendant’s right to confront evidence against him. Overruling the objection, the trial court found that defendant’s plea of guilty after recitation of the factual basis for the plea constituted an adoptive admission of that factual basis.

As he did in the trial court, defendant argues the factual basis stated for his plea in 1988 should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

Evidence Code section 1221 provides that “[e]vidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.”

Thus, in People v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 911 (hereafter Sohal), this court held that when a defendant enters a plea of guilty following a recitation of “the factual basis for the plea as stated by the prosecutor with which defense counsel agree[s],” the defendant makes “an adoptive admission of the truth of the facts underlying the plea . . . .” (Id. at p. 916.)

Defendant seeks to distinguish Sohal because in that case the appellant entered a plea of guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Sohal, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 916), whereas defendant pled guilty to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. In his view, the holding of Sohal is inapplicable because he admitted only that he flipped the victim over his back under circumstances that were likely to cause great bodily injury, not that he actually caused her to suffer great bodily injury. Not so.

The factual basis for his guilty plea to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury was that defendant “flipped the victim over his back causing her to break her leg.” (Italics added.) Defense counsel agreed that this was an accurate factual statement, and defendant heard the statement and entered his guilty plea without objecting to the factual basis stated for the plea. Therefore, as the trial court in this case properly found, defendant’s plea of guilty was an adoptive admission that he not only assaulted the victim by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim by breaking her leg.

Accordingly, admissible evidence supports the finding that defendant’s prior felony conviction constituted a serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law.

II

In the trial court, defendant moved to dismiss the strike allegation, asserting that medical records from 1988 showed the victim’s leg had been broken just before the assault which led to defendant’s prior conviction. He argued that the records would prove the prior assault did not involve serious bodily injury and, thus, it was not a serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law.

Because those medical records were not part of the record of defendant’s conviction in 1988, the trial court ruled that it was precluded from reviewing the records and, thus, sustained the People’s objection to their introduction into evidence.

Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to due process of law by refusing to admit medical records which, he claims, would show that the victim’s leg was broken before defendant’s assault, thus proving he did not personally inflict great bodily injury in his prior conviction. He is mistaken.

In determining whether a prior conviction is a serious felony for purposes of the three strikes law, “the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction” but “no further.” (People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355, orig. italics (hereafter Guerrero).) Accordingly, the trial court is bound by the record of the conviction and “may not relitigate the circumstances of the prior crime.” (People v. Williams (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 911, 915.) This rule “bars the prosecution from relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby threatening the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial.” (Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355.)

Defendant invites us to limit this rule only to the efforts of a prosecutor to prove the nature of a prior conviction as a serious felony. It should not, defendant argues, be applied to his effort to defend against the allegation that his prior felony conviction constituted a strike. We decline the invitation.

An argument akin to defendant’s was rejected by the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, in People v. Bartow (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1573, at pages 1579, 1581-1582, which noted: “By emphasizing that the trial court could go ‘no further’ than the record [of conviction], Guerrero forecloses the calling of live witnesses--by either prosecution or defense. [Guerrero] did not limit this condition to the prosecution, although it did justify the reasonableness of the rule by stressing its consequent protections for the defendant. We see no rational basis for adopting a different rule for the defendant, especially where to do so here would actually result in less protection for the accused.” (Barstow, supra, at p. 1581, orig. italics.) The same can be said for documentary evidence that is not included in the record of conviction. The doctrine of finality of judgments precludes such collateral attacks on the nature of a prior conviction.

The passage in People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217 at page 228, fn. 6, quoted by appellant does not compel a different rule. Indeed, in People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, which was decided after People v. Reed, supra, the California Supreme Court reiterated that in deciding whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike, the trier of fact may look to the entire record of conviction, but no further. (People v. Kelii, supra, at p. 456.) “Thus, no witnesses testify about the facts of the prior crimes. The trier of fact considers only court documents.” (Id. at pp. 456-457.)

The passage he quotes from People v. Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 228, fn. 6, states: “The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘under recidivist statutes where an habitual criminal issue is “a distinct issue” [citation] . . . [d]ue process . . . requires [the defendant] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own.’ (Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, 610 [18 L.Ed.2d 326, 330, 87 S.Ct. 1209] . . . .)” However, Specht v. Patterson, supra, involved a “new finding of fact” that “was not an ingredient of the offense charged.” (Specht v. Patterson, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 608 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 329].) Such is not the situation here.

Under the compulsion of Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355 and People v. Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457, the trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered evidence of medical records of the victim of his felony in 1988.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: BLEASE , J., HULL , J.


Summaries of

People v. Hill

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Mar 5, 2008
No. C054728 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Hill

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WAYNE EUGENE HILL, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento

Date published: Mar 5, 2008

Citations

No. C054728 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008)