Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. VCR182015
Reardon, Acting P.J.
Appellant Floyd Shunday Hall was convicted of carjacking by a jury and sentenced to 23 years in state prison. Appellant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in finding that his out-of-state prior conviction met the statutory requirements for a strike or prior serious felony enhancement under California law. We reversed in part and affirmed in part, ordering the trial court to strike both the prior out-of-state strike and serious prior felony conviction enhancement, and to issue an amended abstract of judgment. (People v. Hall (Mar. 28, 2008, A115416 [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, appellant requested that the trial court reconsider a grant of probation on the theory that the newly stricken out-of-state prior conviction was the only reason probation had been previously denied. Citing lack of jurisdiction to modify the disposition of the Court of Appeal, the trial court denied the request. From this denial, appellant now appeals, contending that the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction to grant probation. We affirm.
I. FACTS
In May 2006, a second amended information alleged that appellant committed felony carjacking on December 30, 2005. (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a).) The information also alleged that appellant’s prior Texas robbery conviction constituted a robbery in California, and could therefore support a prior serious felony enhancement and a strike. (§§ 667, subds. (a)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
A jury found appellant guilty of felony carjacking. The trial court concluded that the Texas conviction constituted a prior serious felony conviction and a strike under California law. (See § 667, subd. (a).) It sentenced appellant to a total term of 23 years in prison—the upper term of nine years for carjacking, doubled for an additional nine years based on the strike, and a five-year consecutive term for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. (§§ 215, subd. (a), 667, subds. (a)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).)
Appellant appealed, challenging the determination that his prior robbery conviction in Texas satisfied the statutory requirements for robbery in California. In reversing in part and affirming in part, this court struck the strike and serious felony enhancement and directed the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment. (People v. Hall, supra, A115416.) After the trial court amended the abstract, appellant asked the court to reconsider whether to grant probation. The trial court declined and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the trial court in fact had jurisdiction to grant probation. We disagree.
The filing of a proper notice of appeal lodges jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until the appeal is determined and the remittitur issues. (People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1472; see People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094.) Upon issuance of the remittitur, the trial court is reinvested with jurisdiction of a cause. (People v. Dick (1870) 39 Cal. 102, 104.) Section 1265, subdivision (a) provides for this exact procedure, stating in relevant part: “After the certificate of the judgment has been remitted to the court below, the appellate court has no further jurisdiction of the appeal or of the proceedings thereon, and all orders necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be made by the court to which the certificate is remitted....”
The trial court, however, enjoys only such jurisdiction “as is defined by the terms of the remittitur.” (Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655; see People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 228 (Lewis).) The reviewing court’s order, as stated in the remittitur, is “ ‘ “decisive of the character of the judgment to which the appellant is entitled.” ’ [Citation.] On remand, the lower court may act only within [the remittitur’s] express jurisdictional limits.” (Lewis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 228.) In the instant case, we reversed in part and remanded with directions. On remand, the court below had the limited authority to follow the directions precisely, and make only those orders that were necessary to carry the judgment into effect. The trial court did just that by ordering that the strike and serious felony enhancement be stricken. No further action was necessary; and, no further action was within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Appellant cites People v. Hall (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 144 (Hall) in support of the assertion that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider the request for probation. In that case, the reviewing court concluded that the trial court had the authority to grant probation after the execution of the sentence had already begun. However, Hall is inapposite. First, the question in Hall was whether probation may be granted after the execution of the sentence had begun. (Id. at p. 147.) The court never considered the question presented in the instant case of whether the trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider a grant of probation after the Court of Appeal has remanded the case with specific instructions to modify the abstract of judgment, but has otherwise affirmed the judgment.
Second, and more importantly, Hall is procedurally distinct. In Hall, the appellant made several motions, including one to set aside the judgment, and the trial court issued several orders, including granting bail, before the remittitur was issued. In distinguishing Hall, the court in People v. Rittger (1961) 55 Cal.2d 849, 853 emphasized that “during all of the period within which the above related events were occurring the defendant in the [Hall] case either had some jurisdictionally cognizable proceeding pending in the trial court or the statutory time for instituting such proceeding had not expired.” Here, there was no proceeding pending in the trial at the time of the appeal. Thus, the trial court retained no jurisdiction beyond that provided by the specific terms of the remittitur.
Appellant also argues that this court’s judgment did not contain instructions to amend in a specific manner and that the trial court was directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment “pursuant [to]” or “in a manner consistent with” this court’s decision on appeal. We agree that a general specification does not call for the entry of a particular order, but leaves the trial court free to dispose of the matter on the merits as its discretion dictates. (See Eldridge v. Burns (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 907, 917-918; cf. People v. Sheldon (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1136, 1142.) However, this rule does not apply here. This court’s disposition was far from a generalized order granting the trial court discretion to dispose of the matter as it saw fit. Nor was the disposition ambiguous. Rather, it clearly and specifically directed the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment by striking the strike and prior serious felony conviction enhancement. In these circumstances, the trial court was bound to carry out the specific instructions. (Lewis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 228.)
Finally, even if this court erred in failing to instruct the lower court to reconsider the request for probation in light of the striking of the Texas prior, the trial court was still powerless to entertain, much less grant, such a request. This court’s judgment, whether erroneous or not, became final and again, the lower court could not exceed our specific directions. (Lewis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 228.) Appellant could have, but failed to object to the remand order in a petition for a rehearing, electing instead to appeal the trial court’s judgment. (See People v. Sheldon, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1142.) This tactical decision proved procedurally dispositive.
See section 1203, subdivision (b)(1) (stating that “[i]f a person is convicted of a felony and is eligible for probation..., the court shall immediately refer the matter to a probation officer to investigate and report to the court”).
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the request for probation. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.