Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. FMB700496, William Jefferson Powell IV, Judge.
Michael A. Ramos, District Attorney, and Grover D. Merritt, Lead Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
Gaut, J.
The People appeal from the superior court’s denial of a motion to reinstate a criminal complaint, dismissed at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, following an order granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The People argue that the magistrate erroneously determined that the defendant was detained when the sheriff’s deputy, investigating recent burglaries in the area, pulled in behind defendant’s parked car, shone his spotlight into her vehicle, requested her identification, and asked her what she was doing in that area, and then ran a records or warrant check. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At 1:15 a.m. on November 2, 2007, a sheriff’s deputy was proactively patrolling an area of Yucca Valley where a rash of thefts and burglaries of businesses had taken place. While heading westbound, the deputy observed a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction toward him. The vehicle, driven by defendant, pulled over onto the dirt shoulder of the road, parked near some dumpsters outside a trailer park, and turned off the vehicle’s lights. The vehicle was not speeding or driving in an evasive manner. Neither defendant nor her car was linked to any of the recent crimes. However, his suspicion was aroused because defendant turned off her car lights when she parked. The deputy decided to contact defendant to see if she was involved in the burglaries.
The deputy turned his vehicle so that he pulled in behind defendant’s vehicle, and illuminated her vehicle with his spotlight. The deputy then approached defendant on the driver’s side of the vehicle, mentioned there had been thefts in the area, and asked her what her business was. The deputy was in full uniform and was visibly armed. Defendant informed him she had some trash from the trailer of a woman for whom she acted as caregiver and that she was there to dump the trash in the dumpster. There were cardboard boxes in the car.
The deputy then asked her name, and requested identification. Upon receiving the identification, the deputy ran the information through radio dispatch and learned that defendant was on parole. The deputy then conducted a parole search. In defendant’s wallet, among identification and other items, the deputy found two baggies containing methamphetamine.
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) It was further alleged she had previously served a prison term for a prior felony conviction. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant made a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), at the preliminary hearing, which was granted. After granting the motion, the magistrate found there was insufficient evidence to hold defendant to answer on the drug charge, so the case was dismissed.
On April 15, 2008, the People made a motion to reinstate the complaint in the superior court. (Pen. Code, § 871.5.) On May 1, 2008, the motion was denied. The People appeal.
DISCUSSION
The People argue the trial court erred in denying the motion to reinstate the complaint. Specifically, the People assert (1) the lower court used the wrong standard to review the magistrate’s action, and (2) the magistrate erred in concluding that the contact between the deputy and the defendant constituted a detention, for which there was no justification. We disagree.
1. We Directly Review the Magistrate’s Ruling, Disregarding the Superior Court’s Ruling, So We Must Affirm Unless the Dismissal of the Complaint Was Erroneous as a Matter of Law.
The People argue that the trial court improperly used an “abuse of discretion” standard to review the magistrate’s ruling on the motion to suppress evidence and in denying the motion reinstate the complaint. As we will explain, because we do not review the superior court’s ruling except to determine if the dismissal was erroneous as a matter of law, the standard of review applied by the superior court is irrelevant.
Penal Code section 871.5 authorizes a prosecutor to make a motion in the superior court to compel the magistrate to reinstate a complaint when an action has been dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage. The purpose of the statute was to decrease the number of refilings of felony complaints when the dismissal by a magistrate was based upon a legal rather than a factual ruling. (People v. Superior Court (Feinstein) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 331.)
The statute gives the superior court authority to review the magistrate’s dismissal of a felony complaint following the granting of a motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing. (People v. Salzman (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 676, 679, 683.) The motion is not intended to serve as a relitigation of the suppression motion, but simply to serve as a means to have the trial court determine the legal propriety of the magistrate’s dismissal of the complaint. (People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 233.)
On an appeal from an order denying reinstatement, we disregard the superior court’s ruling and directly examine the magistrate’s ruling to determine if the dismissal of the complaint was erroneous as a matter of law. (People v. Love (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 276, 282.) To the extent the magistrate’s ruling rests upon factual findings, we must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the magistrate’s ruling and cannot substitute our judgment on the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. (People v. Massey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 204, 210.) We then, as did the superior court, measure the facts found by the magistrate against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (People v. Salzman, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 684.)
Because we disregard the superior court’s ruling, it is irrelevant whether the superior court mistakenly applied an “abuse of discretion” standard in denying the motion.
We now turn to the magistrate’s ruling on the legal question presented at the preliminary hearing regarding the suppression motion.
2. The Magistrate Properly Determined that the Contact Between the Deputy and the Defendant Constituted a Detention.
The People argue on appeal that the initial contact was a consensual encounter, not a detention. The People challenge the correctness of the magistrate’s finding that a reasonable person, under the circumstances present here, would not feel free to leave. Whether a seizure occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341.) We review the trial court’s factual findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard, accepting factual inferences in favor of the trial court’s ruling, and we independently decide the ultimate constitutional question. (Id. at p. 342.)
In the trial court, the People took contradictory positions. In its points and authorities in opposition to the suppression motion filed prior to the preliminary hearing, the People argued that while the act of the deputy approaching the defendant “does not by its nature fall outside the range of consensual contact,” the deputy’s “candid statement of his intent to stop defendant’s vehicle had it left the scene makes clear that Det. [sic] Porter believed a sufficient basis to exist for a detention,” which “could have led to a reasonable perception that she was not free to terminate or avoid the encounter.” However, after testimony had been adduced at the hearing, and in arguing the legality of the contact, the prosecutor stated he was not conceding there was a detention.
A detention is a seizure of the person, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904-905].) To determine whether a person has been detained, we ask whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have thought he or she was free to leave. (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 168 L.Ed.2d 132].) Not all personal intercourse between an officer and a citizen involves a “seizure” of the person. (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437, 434 [111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389].) A seizure occurs only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains a person’s freedom of movement through means intentionally applied, as opposed to a restraint through an unknowing act. (Brendlin v. California, supra, at p. 2405.)
In arguing that the magistrate erred in finding that a seizure occurred, the People assert that (a) no seizure occurred merely because the deputy approached the vehicle, (b) no seizure occurred merely because the deputy approached the vehicle and questioned the defendant, and (c) the deputy’s use of a spotlight did not convert a consensual encounter into a detention. While any single factor might be insufficient to support the trial court’s determination, it is the totality of the circumstances that we must review. (Florida v. Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 437, 439.) We must assess the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) The test for the existence of a show of authority is an objective one. (Ibid.)
It is true that law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment in approaching an individual on the street or in another public place and asking if he or she is willing to identify himself or herself. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497 [103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229].) It is also true that, by itself, the shining of a spotlight into a defendant’s vehicle will not constitute a detention. (People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496.) While it is also true that an officer’s “uncommunicated state of mind” and the individual citizen’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure has occurred (People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254), an officer’s knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned, such that a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 345, citing Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [128 L.Ed.2d 293, 114 S.Ct. 1526].)
In People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, the reviewing court focused on the officer’s use of a spotlight in determining whether the defendant would have felt free to leave as one of the key circumstances showing a detention occurred. The appellate court reviewed cases involving the use of a spotlight. It observed that while certain cases have not found the use of a spotlight alone to constitute a detention, they do indicate its use should be considered in determining whether there was a show of authority sufficient to establish that a detention occurred. (Id. at p. 1111.)
The court in People v. Garry concluded the deputy’s actions, taken as a whole, would be very intimidating to any reasonable person. (People v. Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.) Those actions included approaching the defendant immediately after bathing the defendant in light, armed and in uniform, walking directly to defendant and questioning him about his legal status. (Id. at pp. 1111-1112.) The deputy in Garry also questioned defendant about his probation and parole status, disregarding the defendant’s indication he was merely standing outside his home. (Id. at p. 1112.) The reviewing court observed, “No matter how politely Crutcher may have stated his probation/parole question, any reasonable person who found himself in defendant’s circumstances, suddenly illuminated by a police spotlight with a uniformed, armed officer rushing directly at him asking about his legal status, would believe themselves to be ‘under compulsion of a direct command by the officer.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
The People rely heavily on the holding of People v. Perez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d, at page 1496, interpreting it to mean that use of the spotlight did not convert the encounter into a detention. However, the Perez court recognized that use of high beams and spotlights “might cause a reasonable person to feel himself the object of official scrutiny.” (Ibid.) The case does not hold that, as a matter of law, the use of spotlights can never constitute a detention.
The present case is distinguishable from Perez because that case did not involve facts like those presented here. The totality of circumstances present here included the following factors: The deputy determined that the defendant acted suspiciously by stopping her vehicle in front of a dumpster and turning off her headlights; the deputy had to make a U-turn in order to drive up behind her because they were traveling in opposite directions; he shone a spotlight into her vehicle to illuminate the interior and occupants of the vehicle; he immediately approached the driver, armed and in uniform; he informed her of the thefts in the area and asked her what she was doing there; after learning she was parked near the dumpster to dump trash, he requested her identification; he ran the defendant’s identification through dispatch. If she had attempted to drive away, the deputy would have stopped her.
While the deputy in the present case did not “rush” at the defendant as was the case in People v. Garry, he did contact defendant immediately after spotlighting the interior of the vehicle, and the rest of the circumstances are, as the magistrate determined, markedly similar to the circumstances of the Garry case. These circumstances support the magistrate’s conclusion that the deputy initiated a show of authority to which a reasonable person would feel compelled to submit and to which the defendant actually did submit. (People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371.) The deputy’s stated reasons for the contact (to inquire if she was involved in the burglaries), the questions of defendant about her business in the area, accompanied by information about recent thefts, show this was an investigative stop and not a consensual encounter; the officer did not simply approach an individual on the street and ask a few questions. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)
A person sitting in a car whose interior has been spotlighted, who is immediately approached by an armed and uniformed officer, would not feel free to leave or to refuse to answer. By law, a driver is required to produce a driver’s license when requested, so defendant could not refuse to do so when asked by the deputy. (Veh. Code, § 12951, subd. (b).) While requesting identification, by itself, may not give rise to a detention, it is another factor that must be weighed in the totality of the circumstances.
Contrast the present situation with that found in People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, where the officers contacted defendant sitting on a bench in a park and requested identification, which led to discovery of an outstanding warrant. A pedestrian may be permitted to leave without a driver’s license or identification.
The record does not reveal whether the deputy took defendant’s driver’s license when he ran the records check, but it is common practice. If he did so, defendant was not free to leave because departure without her license would violate the statutory requirement that a driver have his or her license in his or her possession at all times while driving on a highway. (Veh. Code, § 12951, subd. (a).)
The People’s argument assumes that the magistrate found a detention had occurred solely because of the use of the spotlight. While the magistrate did place weight on that factor, it is not the only factor in the record before us for our independent review, and the totality of the factors support the magistrate’s conclusion. Therefore, even if we disagreed with the magistrate about the weight to be attributed to the use of the spotlight to illuminate the interior of defendant’s vehicle, when that fact is considered in combination with the other factors present, the magistrate’s conclusion that the defendant was detained is justified.
The People do not contend that the deputy had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, prior to determining that she was on parole. Instead, the People rely on the defendant’s parole status to justify the search. Absent any lawful justification for the detention, we cannot say that the dismissal of the complaint was erroneous, as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKinster, Acting P. J., King, J.