Opinion
2019-1017 S CR
09-09-2021
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daulat R. Gurtata, Appellant.
Scott Lockwood, for appellant. Suffolk County District Attorney (Alfred J. Croce of counsel), for respondent
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DECISION
Scott Lockwood, for appellant.
Suffolk County District Attorney (Alfred J. Croce of counsel), for respondent
PRESENT:: ELIZABETH H. EMERSON, J.P., JERRY GARGUILO, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (James W. Malone, J.), rendered May 1, 2019. The judgment, upon a jury verdict, convicted defendant of assault in the third degree, and imposed sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a new trial.
Defendant was charged in a misdemeanor information with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]). During jury selection, the court denied defense counsel's Batson challenge (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 [1986]) to the People's exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective jurors who were, like defendant, "people of color." Following the trial, defendant was convicted as charged.
In conducting an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [2]; People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348 [2007]), we accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, and observe their demeanor (see People v Lane, 7 N.Y.3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 409 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987]). We find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
"[T]he case of Batson v Kentucky (476 U.S. 79 [1986]) directs a three-step analysis for determining whether peremptory challenges have been used to exclude potential jurors for impermissibly discriminatory reasons" (People v Taylor, 185 A.D.3d 724, 725-726 [2020]). "At step one, 'the moving party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in the [opponent's] exercise of peremptory challenges'" (People v Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 634 [2010], quoting People v Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 420 [2003]; see People v Bridgeforth, 28 N.Y.3d 567, 572-575 [2016]). The second step shifts the burden to the nonmoving party to provide race-neutral reasons for peremptorily challenging each of the contested jurors (see People v Payne, 88 N.Y.2d 172, 181 [1996]). "If the nonmoving party fails to meet that burden, the Batson challenge is established" (People v Taylor, 185 A.D.3d at 726). If, however, the nonmoving party provides facially permissible, nondiscriminatory reasons for the exercise of the contested peremptory challenges, the third step of the Batson challenge is then reached (see People v Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418; People v Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101 [1995]). "At the third step, the burden shifts back to the moving party to prove purposeful discrimination and the trial court must determine whether the proffered reasons are pretextual" (People v Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d at 634-635 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d at 422; People v Allen, 86 N.Y.2d at 104). As the Court of Appeals has cautioned, "meaningful inquiry into the question of discrimination" requires an adherence to this "crucial process" (People v Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d at 423).
Here, after the defense made a prima facie showing of discrimination in the prosecutor's peremptory challenges to excuse the two prospective jurors who were, like defendant, "people of color" (see People v Bridgeforth, 28 N.Y.3d 567), the prosecutor provided nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenges (see People v Dunham, 172 A.D.3d 524 [2019]; People v Schumaker, 136 A.D.3d 1369 [2016]; People v Johnson, 73 A.D.3d 578 [2010]; People v Hall, 53 A.D.3d 552 [2008]). In response, defense counsel established that the reasons offered by the People, although facially neutral, were pretextual and not the genuine reasons for the challenges (see People v Fabregas, 130 A.D.3d 939 [2015]). Consequently, defendant is entitled to a new trial (see People v McIndoe, 277 A.D.2d 252 [2000]).
In view of the foregoing, we do not reach defendant's remaining contentions.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a new trial.
EMERSON, J.P., GARGUILO and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.