Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR237343
Margulies, J.
Following denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his motel room during two searches, he entered a plea of no contest to nine counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). He also admitted an allegation that he served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of six years in state prison. In this appeal defendant renews his challenge to two warrantless searches of his motel room. We conclude that the searches were lawful despite the lack of a warrant, and affirm the judgment.
I. Statement of Facts and Procedural Background
In light of defendant’s plea and the search and seizure issue presented in this appeal our recitation of facts will focus exclusively on the search of defendant’s motel room, and will be taken from the hearing on the motion to suppress on March 6, 2007.
About 7:30 a.m. on August 14, 2006, Timothy Robinson, manager of the Motel 6 on Holiday Lane in Fairfield, received information from one of his clerks that a safe had been found “in front of room 141.” Robinson proceeded to room 141, where he observed a safe “laying on its side” just outside the door. The door to the room was open “about a foot wide.” Without looking into the room, Robinson immediately returned to his office and called the police to report “there was a safe in front of room 141.”
Officer Darryl Webb of the Fairfield Police Department was dispatched to the Motel 6 about 7:30 a.m. Robinson advised the officer “[t]here was a safe outside of room 141 and that the door was open.” When Officer Webb approached room 141 he noticed that the room door was slightly open. A safe was just outside and to the left of the door. As Officer Webb moved closer to the room he observed that the door to the safe “was off.” The officer instructed Robinson to “go back into the office,” while he waited for a “cover unit to arrive.”
Officer Webb approached the door, knocked and announced, “[W]e’re the Fairfield Police Department.” He received no response. The officer was not aware of any report of a burglary or a “room invasion,” but was concerned that someone inside the room may be hurt or injured. He decided to swing the door open with his foot to look inside as “more of a welfare check at that point.” He noticed that the covers of the bed were pulled down and the bathroom light was on, but he did not see any clothing, luggage, or toiletries in the room. “There was nobody in the room.” Officer Webb “gave another announcement” before he entered the room with Officer Garcia to conduct “a sweep” while Sergeant Buntin waited outside. Officer Webb also testified that he was not looking for evidence, and had no information that the safe was specifically connected to room 141.
As Officer Webb was walking back out of the room he learned from Sergeant Buntin that a burglary had occurred “just up the street” at a nearby business complex at 1300 Oliver Road. Sergeant Buntin and Officer Garcia waited at the motel room while Officer Webb drove to Oliver Road to determine “if this safe was related to that burglary.” At the Oliver Road location, Officer Webb learned from another officer that the safe at Motel 6 “could possibly be related” to the burglary under investigation.
Officer Webb then returned to the Motel 6 and waited for two victims of the burglary at Oliver Road to arrive. While he waited, he still did not search the room for evidence. When the burglary victims appeared they “[p]ositively identified” the safe outside room 141 as one taken in the burglary at 1300 Oliver Road. Officer Webb then asked “what other items might have been taken,” and the officers searched the motel room. Inside the motel room the officers found CD’s that belonged to the burglary victims stacked inside a desk drawer, and a “Dell CD computer piece of plastic,” along with a cigarette and a fast food restaurant cup.
The trial court found that the initial search or sweep of the motel room conducted in the officer’s “care-taking capacity” was reasonable and justified without a warrant. As for the second search, the court determined that the motel room “had been abandoned,” so defendant did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the room.
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that both searches of the motel room were unlawfully conducted without the authority of a warrant. He claims that the first search was not justified by any exigent circumstances or the “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement. He also complains that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the motel room had been abandoned before the second search was conducted.
“In ruling upon a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences.” (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761.) “ ‘In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.’ ” (People v. Gemmill (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958, 963.)
A. The First Search of the Motel Room
We proceed from the established premise that in the context of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law the search of a motel room, even one rented for a single night, is treated as any other private residence. (U.S. v. McClenton (3d Cir. 1995) 53 F.3d 584, 587–588; People v. Villalobos (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310, 318.) “ ‘ “[P]rivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.” ’ [Citation.] Hence, ‘[i]t is a “ ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gemmill, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 964; see also Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 587.)
“Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403.) “The presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to a warrantless entry into the home ‘can be overcome by a showing of one of the few “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement [citation], such as “ ‘hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, . . . or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling’ ” [citation]. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that entry into a home based on exigent circumstances requires probable cause to believe that the entry is justified by one of these factors such as the imminent destruction of evidence or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape.’ ” (People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 817–818, italics omitted.)
Another “ ‘exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. “ ‘The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Absolute proof of an imminent emergency is not required: A warrantless entry will be justified if there is probable cause to believe there is a risk of danger to persons inside the dwelling.” (People v. Seminoff (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 518, 528.) “ ‘There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers.’ ” (People v. Ormonde (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282, 292.)
A “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement has also been delineated in recognition of the functions regularly exercised by local police officers that are disassociated from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of criminal laws. (See Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441; United States v. Kimhong Thi Le (8th Cir. 2007) 474 F.3d 511, 514; United States v. Coccia (1st Cir. 2006) 446 F.3d 233, 237–238; People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 837, fn. 4; People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, 473 (Ray); People v. Morton (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046–1049.) “The community caretaking exception recognizes that the police perform a multitude of community functions apart from investigating crime. In performing this community caretaking role, police are ‘expected to aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect public safety.’ [Citation.].” (United States v. Coccia, at pp. 237–238.) “Under this exception, ‘circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry’ to preserve life or protect property. [Citation.]” (People v. Morton, at p. 1046, quoting Ray, at p. 473.)
The community caretaking exception was articulated by a plurality of the California Supreme Court in Ray, where officers were dispatched to a residence following a neighbor’s report that the door has been open all day and the inside was “a shambles.” (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th 464, 468.) The officers found the front door standing open about two feet; the front room appeared to have been ransacked. (Ibid.) No response was received to the officers’ repeated knocking and loud announcement of their presence. The officers believed that “a burglary or similar situation” had been encountered, and expressed concern for the welfare of people and property inside. (Ibid.) They entered the defendant’s residence briefly, touched nothing, and opened no doors or containers. They found no one inside the residence, although they observed a large amount of drugs and money “in plain view” before they left the premises to call a supervisor. (Id. at pp. 468–469.) There was no indication that the officers had ever been to the location, knew who lived in the residence, or suspected any criminal activity had occurred there.
Although Ray is a plurality opinion, we are nevertheless bound by it. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1298; People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1628.)
Their observations formed the basis for a warrant subsequently obtained.
In Ray, the court agreed with the defendant that “the People did not meet their burden of establishing circumstances warranting the officers’ actions under the emergency aid component of community caretaking,” but added: “This determination does not end our inquiry, however. Under the community caretaking exception, circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry, including the protection of property, as ‘where the police reasonably believe that the premises have recently been or are being burglarized.’ [Citation.] ‘Although the case law attaches slightly greater weight to the protection of persons from harm than to the protection of property from theft, many of the cases involving possible burglaries or breakings and enterings stress the dual community caretaking purpose of protecting both. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Of necessity, officers may enter premises to resolve the situation and take further action if they discover a burglary has occurred or their assistance is otherwise required. [Citations.]” (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 472–473.) The court drew a definitive distinction between the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and the community caretaking doctrine: in the case of exigent circumstances, officers must have probable cause to enter premises to search for evidence or pursue criminal suspects; conversely, the community caretaking exception may only be invoked when officers are not acting to solve a crime. “ ‘[T]he defining characteristic of community caretaking functions is that they are totally unrelated to the criminal investigation duties of the police.’ [Citations.] Upon entering a dwelling, officers view the occupant as a potential victim, not as a potential suspect.” (Id. at p. 471.) The plurality described the applicable standard “under the community caretaking exception [as] one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?” (Id. at pp. 476–477.) The court found “that the officers acted reasonably to protect the safety and security of persons and property when they briefly entered defendant’s residence without a warrant and then observed contraband in plain view.” (Id. at p. 468.)
As in Ray, we conclude that the evidence presented in the case before us brings the intrusion within the community caretaking exception. Of paramount significance to us is Officer Webb’s testimony that he was not investigating criminal activity, nor did he have any reason to do so. (Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 447.) Nothing in the record contradicts the officer’s stated motivation for the search: to check on the welfare of any occupants of the room, rather than to arrest a suspect or seize evidence. The officer had not yet obtained information that a burglary occurred. After he was dispatched to the Motel 6 in response to the report of a safe in front of room 141, he observed the safe just outside the door. He also noticed the door to the motel room was ajar, and the door to the safe had been removed. When Officer Webb received no response to his knock and announcement, “[W]e’re the Fairfield Police Department,” he observed through the open door that the bathroom light in the room had been left on. He was concerned that someone inside the room may be hurt or injured. We are persuaded that Officer Webb’s decision to further open the door, then conduct a sweep of the room as a “welfare check,” was a permissible exercise of his caretaking function.
We also conclude that the officer acted reasonably to protect the safety and security of persons and property when he briefly entered defendant’s motel room without out a warrant. (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 468.) Based on his observations, Officer Webb was justified in surmising that an occupant of the room may have been the victim of a recent crime and was unable to respond. (United States v. Quezada (8th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 1005, 1008.) In contrast to the unparticularized and unsupported suspicion or hunch of marijuana cultivation on the defendant’s property—and the associated possible recent “ ‘rip off’ ” of the marijuana crop—that precipitated the unlawful entry in People v. Morton, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048–1049, Officer Webb had reasonable grounds based on his observations to believe that an immediate need for assistance existed to protect the welfare or property of someone in the motel room. (See United States v. Quiroga (9th Cir. 2005) 160 Fed.Appx. 625, 628; United States v. Nord (8th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1288, 1289; United States v. Bradley (9th Cir. 2003) 321 F.3d 1212, 1215; United States v. Rohrig (6th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3d 1506, 1523–1525.)
The search was also properly limited in scope. During the initial sweep of the room the officer did not discover any evidence that connected defendant to the burglary, or any crime, again in distinction to People v. Morton, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048–1049. (See United States v. Bradley, supra, 321 F.3d at p. 1215.) He observed only that the room did not have any occupant, clothing, luggage, or toiletries in it. As we read the record, the officer then immediately left the room without undertaking an additional, more intrusive search for evidence. The search was carefully circumscribed to meet the exigency which justified its initiation: to dispel or confirm the presence of anyone in the room. (See People v. Gemmill, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 971; People v. Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1503.) We conclude that the initial sweep search of the motel room was lawful under the community caretaking doctrine to determine whether there was anyone in the room in need of assistance. (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 478.)
B. The Second Search of the Motel Room
The second search of the motel room upon Officer Webb’s return following the report of the burglary was not pursuant to his community caretaking function or any other exigent circumstance. It was an investigatory search for evidence without a warrant. The Attorney General seeks to justify the second search by claiming that the motel room was abandoned. Defendant asserts that the “trial court’s finding that a reasonable officer could have believed the room was abandoned is not supported by substantial evidence.” The focus of our inquiry is upon whether defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room.
“An illegal search or seizure violates the federal constitutional rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place or the seized thing. [Citations.] The legitimate expectation must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge. [Citation.] Defendant bears the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy. [Citation.] Among the factors to be considered are ‘ “ ‘whether the defendant has a [property or] possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 507; see also People v. Shepherd (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825, 828.)
“Property that is abandoned is no longer subject to Fourth Amendment protection because one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in property that has been abandoned.” (People v. Pereira (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112.) “ ‘Abandonment here [i.e., for Fourth Amendment purposes] is not meant in the strict property-right sense, but rests instead on whether the person so relinquished his interest in the property that he no longer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it at the time of the search. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘ “In essence, what is abandoned is not necessarily the defendant’s property, but his reasonable expectation of privacy therein.” ’ [Citation.] If the defendant has so treated the object as to relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy, it does not matter whether formal property rights have also been relinquished.” (In re Baraka H. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048.) “[T]he intent to abandon is determined by objective factors, not the defendant’s subjective intent. ‘ “Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words, acts, and other objective facts.” ’ ” (People v. Daggs (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361, 365–366, italics omitted.) “The question whether property is abandoned is an issue of fact, and the court’s finding must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 365.)
After Officer Webb returned to the motel room and learned that the safe was in fact taken during the burglary at 1300 Oliver Road, he entered the room again to search for evidence. By then, he was aware of additional facts: the safe stolen during the burglary had been left just outside the motel room with its door removed; the door to the motel room had been left open; during the previous entry, no one responded to his knock and identification, and no one was present in the room; the bathroom light had been left on, but no clothing, luggage, or toiletries remained in the room; after the first search, no one appeared to claim the room.
Defendant relies on several factors to argue against a finding of abandonment. First, defendant directs our attention to the time of the search, 7:30 a.m., hours “prior to checkout” time, to suggest that he left the room temporarily but intended to return. While the first entry was made at 7:30 a.m., the second search occurred appreciably later, after Officer Webb went to the scene of the burglary, spoke to an officer there, returned to the motel, and waited for the burglary victim to arrive and identify the safe. In any event, the fact that the search occurred before defendant was forced to leave the room does not militate against a finding of abandonment. Guests need not wait to leave motel rooms until checkout, and may be particularly inclined to depart earlier if they have committed a burglary nearby. Defendant also notes that he had not “returned the keys” to the room, and neither the motel manager nor any other employees disclosed to the officers that the room had been abandoned. Again, guests may and regularly do check out without advising motel management, and typically leave motel keys in the room when they do. Further, a key left on the motel room desk was depicted in a photograph of the room admitted in evidence—although it was not identified as the room key, and the officer did not testify that he saw it. In addition, defendant maintains that the officers would not have “positioned themselves inside and outside the room,” or waited for Officer Webb’s return from the burglary scene, if they believed the motel room had been abandoned. The officers’ subjective intent is of no consequence in our review of defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy; intent to abandon is found on the basis of objective measurement of the defendant’s conduct. (People v. Daggs, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 365–366; People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1316.) Further, the commendable restraint exercised by the officers to wait until probable cause for the search was verified does not disprove defendant’s abandonment of the room. And finally, the fact that no one appeared to claim the room during the delay between the first and second searches reinforces the belief that the room had been abandoned.
Precisely how much later we do not know.
We thus discount the key as persuasive evidence of abandonment.
Upon review of the entirety of the evidence we find that when the second search was conducted defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room. The officers knew that a safe taken during a recent, nearby burglary had been left immediately outside the room with its the door removed. The door to the motel room was also left open. Thus, defendant neither excluded anyone from the room nor took measures to maintain his privacy in the room or its contents. The room was also left unoccupied, without luggage or clothing inside. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the occupant of the motel room committed the burglary on Oliver Road, brought the safe to the motel room to open it, then left as soon as the contents of the safe had been successfully retrieved. We conclude that the finding of abandonment of the motel room, and with it defendant’s relinquishment of any reasonable expectation of privacy in the room, is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279.) The second warrantless search of the motel room was therefore also lawful.
III. Disposition
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Swager, J.